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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Doppelpaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019

The DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the PEMEX cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The 2019 DoppelPaymer ransomware attack on PEMEX, Mexico’s nationalized petroleum corporation, highlights a unique threat that ransomware and cybercriminal extortion poses to Operational Technology (OT) environments in critical infrastructure. The incident began with an employee downloading commodity malware that allowed adversaries to gain initial access to PEMEX’s enterprise environment. After conducting privilege escalation, tool ingress, and data exfiltration, the adversaries deployed DoppelPaymer ransomware throughout the PEMEX enterprise environment, resulting in the company having to take dozens of systems offline for at least several days. Although PEMEX stated that their operations were not affected, the data exfiltrated from PEMEX was made available for download on DoppelPaymer’s leak site, as well as on other illicit criminal forums. This stolen data included not only company information, but also sensitive OT-specific configuration data. This incident showcases how cybercriminal exfiltration and posting of sensitive OT architecture documentation can pose security concerns for the targeted organization for years due to the long lifespan of OT assets and architectures. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 190 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the DoppelPaymer ransomware attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 163 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 34 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 60 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services 2020

The Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services (UHS) 2020 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the 2020 UHS cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. UHS manages over 400 hospitals and is one of the largest healthcare providers in the United States with 3.5 million patients each year. On 27 September 2020, UHS suffered a widespread ransomware attack that resulted in a denial of service to critical internet-dependent healthcare systems including workstations, phones, and data centers. Employees resorted to filing patient details with pen and paper, while other facilities had to redirect ambulances and urgent patients to other facilities for adequate care. Adversaries carried out the attack with Ryuk, a ransomware that encrypts data and generates a RyukReadMe.txt ransom note with the ransom fee to decrypt the data, varying from 15 Bitcoin (BTC) to 50 BTC, equivalent to roughly $\$$353,892 to $\$$964,617. UHS did not pay the ransom and was able to recover data through backups, but still reported an impact of $\$$67 million dollars in recovery costs. On 29 October, one month after the attack, UHS made an official statement that their systems had been restored and they were resuming normal operations. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 19 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fourteen of the identified techniques used during the UHS cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 106 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 82 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 30 days to two hours preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: JBS Foods Ransomware Attack 2021

The JBS Foods 2021 Ransomware Attack Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the JBS ransomware cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In late May 2021, one of the world’s largest meat producers, JBS Foods, announced they had fallen victim to a worldwide ransomware attack, later found to be REvil ransomware. In the United States alone, JBS Foods accounts for nearly 25% of beef and roughly 20% of pork production. Adversaries initially launched a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the company’s Information Technology (IT) networks in Australia, but the attack impacted operations in Brazil, Canada, and the United States, as well. The attack caused plant operations in all four countries to shut down for at least one day. All nine of the U.S. meatpacking plants temporarily shut down because of the attack. The adversaries initially demanded a $\$$22 million ransom for the company’s data, but later negotiated the ransom down to $\$$11 million even after JBS Foods restored most of their systems. JBS Foods eventually paid the $\$$11 Million for reassurance from the adversaries that none of their customers’ data would be compromised in the future. Despite its short duration, the attack still caused large stocks of meat to spoil. The incident also underscored how adversaries can simultaneously compromise and move laterally through global subsidiaries of an organization. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (in a sequence of 21 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 361 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Sixteen of the identified techniques used during the JBS Foods cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 308 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 163 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 75 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003

The SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about Davis-Besse’s 2003 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 25 January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts and crashed the internet in 10 to 15 minutes, making it one of the fastest spreading worms in history. SQL Slammer is a fileless, memory-resident worm that remotely exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability on local hosts to intensively scan and rapidly self-propagate across the internet. The worm infected approximately 300,000 unpatched hosts running Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server 2000 or Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 with SQL Server Resolution Service. The SQL Slammer worm indirectly infected FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant by first infecting a consultant’s company network server and then propagating through an external misconfigured connection into Davis-Besse’s site network. The infection caused major network congestion, slow performance, data overloads, and the inability of local hosts to communicate with each other, which eventually caused a loss of availability and a loss of view when the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) crashed. At the time of the infection, the plant was already offline, the digital monitoring systems had redundant analog backups, and the plant control and safety functions were not affected, so there were no concerns of a safety breach. However, this incident resulted in many lessons learned and spawned important discussions about cybersecurity’s role in nuclear safety and electric power reliability regulation, policy, and guidance. Researchers and analysts identified 10 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 640 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Eight of the identified techniques used during Davis-Besse cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 596 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 428 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 331 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Precursor Analysis Report: Blackmatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021

The BlackMatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the New Cooperative cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The BlackMatter ransomware was first identified in July 2021 and is reported to have infected more than 50 corporations around the world. , The Iowa-based grain cooperative, New Cooperative, was impacted by the BlackMatter ransomware on or before 18 September 2021. The adversary likely resided on New Cooperative’s networks for 15 days prior to encrypting its network and demanding New Cooperative pay $5.9 million in ransom by 25 September to unlock systems and prevent 1 terabyte (TB) of sensitive data from being publicly released. It is not clear if New Cooperative paid the ransom. The full impact of the ransomware attack is not known; however, according to New Cooperative’s general manager, the attack caused the company’s automated processes to revert back to processes used in the 1970s. , As of 6 October, only 50 percent of New Cooperative’s operations were utilizing automated processes. The company took eight weeks to rebuild the entire network and information technology (IT) systems from the ground up, which puts the date of fully recovery around 13 November. Researchers and analysts identified 20 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 404 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Seventeen of the identified techniques used during the New Cooperative cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 360 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 284 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 15 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022

The Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Industroyer2 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. An adversary attempted to cause a blackout in Ukraine in April 2022 by using the Industroyer2 malware against a regional Ukrainian energy provider. The adversary targeted eight high-voltage electrical substations and utilized the malware in tandem with disk wipers for Windows, Linux, and Solaris operating systems in an attempt to make response and recovery efforts more difficult. The adversary reused a piece of the original Industroyer malware designed to open circuit breakers and de-energize target substations. The adversary gained initial access to the victim’s enterprise network through unknown means in February 2022 and was able to perform reconnaissance, pivot to the operations network, and reside in the system for at least 51 days. This gave the adversary a detailed understanding of the environment and allowed them to customize the Industroyer2 malware to the victim’s operations network. However, defenders detected and stopped the attack before the adversary could achieve their intended impact. Had the Industroyer2 attack been successful, it could have caused a blackout for more than two million people during the early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 31 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 297 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-three of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer2 cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 224 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 122 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 51 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS2022

A Multi-sensor Evaluation of Precipitation Uncertainty for Landslide-triggering Storm Events

Extreme precipitation can have profound consequences for communities, resulting in natural hazards such as rainfall-triggered landslides that cause casualties and extensive property damage. A key challenge to understanding and predicting rainfall triggered landslides comes from observational uncertainties in the depth and intensity of precipitation preceding the event. Practitioners and researchers must select among a wide range of precipitation products, often with little guidance. Here we evaluate the degree of precipitation uncertainty across multiple precipitation products for a large set of landslide triggering storm events and investigate the impact of these uncertainties on predicted landslide probability using published intensity-duration thresholds. The average intensity, peak intensity, duration, and NOAA-Atlas return periods are compared ahead of reported landslides across the continental US and Canada. Precipitation data are taken from four products that cover disparate measurement methods: near real-time and post-processed satellite (IMERG), radar (MRMS), and gauge-based (NLDAS-2). Landslide-triggering precipitation was found to vary widely across precipitation products with the depth of individual storm events diverging by as much as 296mm with an average range of 51mm. Peak intensity measurements, which are typically influential in triggering landslides, were also highly variable with an average range of 7.8262745mm/hr and as much as 57mm/hr. The two products more reliant upon ground-based observations (MRMS and NLDAS-2) performed better at identifying landslides according to published intensity duration storm thresholds, but all products exhibited hit-ratios of greater than 0.56. A greater proportion of landslides were predicted when including only manually-verified landslide locations. We recommend practitioners consider low-latency products like MRMS for investigating landslides, given their near-real time data availability and good performance in detecting landslides. Practitioners would be well-served considering more than one product as a way to confirm intense storm signals and minimize the influence of noise and false alarms.

Precipitation inter-comparison↗
NASA NTRS2007

Method and apparatus for detecting and determining event characteristics with reduced data collection

A method and apparatus for detecting and determining event characteristics such as, for example, the material failure of a component, in a manner which significantly reduces the amount of data collected. A sensor array, including a plurality of individual sensor elements, is coupled to a programmable logic device (PLD) configured to operate in a passive state and an active state. A triggering event is established such that the PLD records information only upon detection of the occurrence of the triggering event which causes a change in state within one or more of the plurality of sensor elements. Upon the occurrence of the triggering event, the change in state of the one or more sensor elements causes the PLD to record in memory which sensor element detected the event and at what time the event was detected. The PLD may be coupled with a computer for subsequent downloading and analysis of the acquired data.

Totman, Peter D.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Markovian Statistical Data Analysis of Single-Event Upsets Triggered by High Intensity Neutrons

This paper analyzes data from a single-event upset experiment conducted at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Statistical tools, based on well-known x(sup 2) hypothesis testing theory, are used to determine if sequences of upsets can be modeled as a homogeneous Markov chain of a specific order. The experiment consisted of radiating a new experimental flight control computer (FCC) with a high intensity neutron beam while the FCC controlled a simulation of a Boeing 737. The analyzed data is a sequence of states that indicates when the FCC is under an upset condition.

Lakdawala, Anushka V.↗
NASA NTRS2022

Cascading Rupture of a Megathrust

Understanding variability in the size and location of large earthquakes along subduction margins is crucial for evaluating seismic and tsunami hazards. We present a coseismic slip model for the 2021 M8.2 Chignik earthquake and investigate the relationship of this earthquake to previous major events in the Alaska Peninsula region and to interseismic coupling. Stress changes from the 2020 M7.8 Simeonof event triggered the Chignik event, and together, the earthquakes partially filled an unruptured section along a 3000-km subduction margin that has experienced a series of ruptures along almost its entire length over the past century. Variations in coupling and structural characteristics may make the region more prone to nucleating M7 to M8 events rather than larger M > 8.5 earthquakes. Stress changes and rupture areas suggest that the two recent earthquakes may be part of an 80-year-long rupture cascade and may have advanced seismic hazard in the region.

Julie L. Elliott↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Identifying Common Use Cases across Extensible Traffic Management (xTM) for Interactions with Air Traffic Controllers

NASA’s Extensible Traffic Management (xTM) builds on the foundation and the architecture of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) concept and extends it broadly to other domains, such as Advanced / Urban Air Mobility (AAM/UAM) and Upper Class E Traffic Management (ETM). These xTM concepts assume the ability to fly in airspace that is authorized to operate solely under xTM services and mostly without any air traffic control (ATC) support. However, they also assume circumstances in which the xTM vehicles would need to operate in conventional ATC-managed airspace, both during nominal and off-nominal scenarios. Due to the vast differences in the xTM vehicle performances and missions, there is a concern that ATC may have difficulty in safely managing the xTM traffic and providing appropriate services to all vehicles, unless a consistent set of roles, procedures, and data exchange requirements are defined across the diverse set of xTM vehicle operations. In this paper, we describe a set of use cases that have been identified in UTM, AAM/UAM, and ETM operations that are related to ATC interactions, and we propose to categorize these use cases across xTM domains based on common trigger events. Organizing the use cases from the perspective of ATC roles per each trigger event is expected to provide the first step in discovering common procedures and data requirements across xTM domains that could help ease the controllers’ cognitive task load and allow them to manage these interactions more safely.

Extensible Traffic Management (xTM)↗
DOE OSTI2021

HP in Cybersecurity: CyOTE

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) Program, worked with energy sector asset owners and operators (AOOs), partners, and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop capabilities for AOOs to independently detect adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) within their operational technology (OT) environments. Unlike the approach taken with commercial security solutions, CyOTE seeks to tie anomalies in cyber operations to a cyber-attack. By stringing together multiple techniques in the OT environment, AOOs can identify attack campaigns with ever decreasing impacts. The CyOTE methodology applies fundamental concepts of perception and comprehension to a universe of knowns and unknowns increasingly disaggregated into observables, anomalies, and triggering events. MITRE’s ATT&CK® Framework for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is used as a common lexicon to identify a set of triggering events related to three Use Cases – Alarm Logs, Human-Machine Interface (HMI), and Remote Logins – which together account for 87 percent of the techniques commonly used by adversaries. The CyOTE methodology is also appropriate for OT-related anomalies perceived outside the three Use Cases, such as through the energy system itself.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity Enhancement for Multi-Infeed High-Voltage DC Systems

Composed of multiple two-terminal high-voltage DC (HVDC) transmission systems, a multi-infeed HVDC (MIDC) system exchanges massive power among multiple asynchronous AC systems. However, as an intrinsically cyber-physical system, an MIDC system could suffer from cyber-attacks, leading to massive power mismatches in multiple AC systems, and resulting in catastrophic consequences. Since the sequential responses of an MIDC system and interconnected AC systems are in different timescales, this paper first establishes a two-timescale model to evaluate the sequential impacts caused by cyber-attacks. Then, an event-triggered cyber-defense strategy is proposed to enhance the cybersecurity of an MIDC system by mitigating multiple non-simultaneous cyber-attacks. Whenever new cyber-attack events occur, the proposed cyber-defense strategy, which is mathematically modeled as a mixed-integer quadratic programming problem, is executed on-line and updated in an event-triggered manner. Here, simulation results on an MIDC system demonstrate that the low-cost and almost blind cyber-attacks can cause severe frequency deviations, and the proposed strategy can mitigate multi-cyber-attacks effectively.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS1998

Cosmic Ray Energy Determination by the Reduced-Opening Angle Method

The reduced opening angle technique offers a simple way with minimal model dependence to measure cosmic ray energies over a broad range with out any normalization uncertainties. The emulsion film and CR39 detectors proposed are well established techniques and should perform adequately. The analysis method depends on accurate automatic scanning of the CR39 plates. UAH have developed such a capability. With the proposed geometry energy measurements to approx. 5 TeV/a can be made. The expected iron event rate (E greater than or equal to 500 GeV/a) is 10/sq m day. The expected energy resolution, from accelerator calibrations at 200 GeV/a, is -50% to +80%. Since the absolute flux has some sensitivity to the assumed power law index it is essential that good energy resolution is obtained. The expected charge resolution is approx. 0.3 charge units for the CNO group falling to approx. 1 charge unit for the iron group. A suitable event trigger would be a measurable (greater than 2 micrometer) deflected heavy (Z greater than 2) fragment. One potential background is electromagnetic dissociation that predominantly couples to individual protons or alphas. Although the cross- sections can be appreciable such events will not pass the event trigger.

Gregory, John C.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Climatic Controls on Soil Carbon Accumulation and Loss in a Dryland Ecosystems

Arid and semiarid ecosystems drive year-to-year variability in the strength of the terrestrial carbon (C) sink, yet there is uncertainty about how soil C gains and losses contribute to this variation. For this work, to address this knowledge gap, we embedded C-depleted soil mesocosms, containing litter or biocrust C inputs, within an in situ dryland ecosystem warming experiment. Over the course of one year, changes in microbial biomass and total soil organic C pools were monitored alongside hourly measurements of soil CO 2 flux. We also developed a biogeochemical model to explore the mechanisms that gave rise to observed soil C dynamics. Field data and model simulations demonstrated that water exerted much stronger control on soil biogeochemistry than temperature, with precipitation events triggering large CO 2 pulses and transport of litter- and biocrust-derived C into the soil profile. We expected leaching of organic matter would result in steady accumulation of C within the mineral soil over time. Instead, the size of the total organic C pool fluctuated throughout the year, largely in response to microbial growth: increases in the size of microbial biomass were negatively correlated with the quantity of C residing in the top 2 cm, where most biogeochemical changes were observed. Our data and models suggest that microbial responses to precipitation events trigger rapid metabolism of dissolved organic C inputs, which strongly limit accumulation of autotroph-derived C belowground. Accordingly, changes in the magnitude and/or frequency of precipitation events in this dryland ecosystem could have profound impacts on the strength of the soil C sink.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Cost and Benefit of Enhancing Cybersecurity for Hybrid AC/DC Grids

As critical interfaces of AC grids and DC grids inside a hybrid AC/DC grid, the voltage-sourced-converter (VSC) has been demonstrated to be vulnerable to false data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks. As a result, the cyber-attack-induced AC grid frequency deviations and DC grid voltage deviations threaten the secure operation. Here, to enhance cybersecurity in a not only feasible but also cost-effective manner, this paper proposes a cost-benefit-based cyber-defense strategy for a hybrid AC/DC grid. First, this paper establishes a spatial-temporal dual cyber-attack evaluation model, in which the cyber-attack-induced frequency and voltage deviations are modelled in both a spatially and temporally dual manner. Then, the proposed cost-benefit-based cyber-defense strategy is modelled as a VSC commitment problem to achieve the trade-off between maximizing the cyber-defense benefits and minimizing the cyber-defense costs. The VSC commitment problem is then mathematically convexified into a mixed-integer second-order cone programming (MISOCP) problem, which could be efficiently solved in an event-triggered manner against unfolding cyber-attack events. Simulation results on a test hybrid AC/DC grid verified the feasibility and the cost-effectiveness of the proposed cyber-defense strategy.

cost-benefit analysis↗