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23 records · Page 2

TEX-Chlorine Assemblies: Highly Enriched Uranium Plates with Sodium Chloride Absorbers Using Polyethylene Moderator and Polyethylene Reflector

This evaluation documents highly enriched uranium (HEU) experimental critical configurations with polyethylene moderators and sodium chloride absorbers conducted as part of the United States Nuclear Criticality Safety Program’s Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) program. HEU-MET-MIXED-021 provides the benchmark evaluation of five TEX experiments designed to establish baseline configurations with HEU Jemima plates moderated by high density polyethylene (HDPE). The TEX-HEU experiments were designed to cover five different fission energy regimes by varying the thickness of the interstitial HDPE moderator, with varying fractions of thermal, intermediate, and fast fissions, and to be easily modified to accommodate test materials of interest. HEU-MET-INTER-013 documents the first TEX-HEU variation, incorporating hafnium in seven different experimental configurations. This evaluation covers an additional variant that incorporates absorber plates of compacted high-purity sodium chloride salt. These experiments were motivated by a criticality safety need for validation data for uranium purification by means of electrorefining with chloride salts, especially thermal and intermediate energy configurations resulting from moderator upset conditions, and their design was optimized by matching sensitivity profiles from application cases. All three experimental configurations are judged to be acceptable as benchmark cases. The main parameter varied between the configurations is the thickness of the polyethylene moderators and the sodium chloride absorbers between the HEU plates. Varying the thickness of the polyethylene tunes the neutron energy spectrum between majority thermal (Case 1 and 2) and intermediate (Case 3). The fission fractions, presented in Table 1, are determined calculationally. Case 3 is cross listed as HEU-MET-INTER-014.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Nuclear Data Sensitivity/Uncertainty Studies of Tantalum-Reflected Systems

Tantalum (Ta) is a refractory metal with high melting point and high corrosion resistance. This makes it useful as a mold material for plutonium casting operations. Unfortunately, there are few criticality benchmarks with high nuclear data sensitivities. Given that, it is desirable to design new experiments to provide additional validation data for nuclear criticality safety, which is the objective of the Thales project. Multiple application models were used to represent process conditions (either normal conditions or credible upset conditions) both at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Savannah River Site (SRS). A total of 40 application models were obtained. Given this, it was useful to down-select the number of needed application models. This work documents the down-selection based on several nuclear data sensitivity/uncertainty metrics. In addition to showing the result of the specific down-selection used for the Thales project, this work discusses potential ways to represent a large number of application models with a smaller number of proposed experiment designs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Process Intensification for Recovery of Uranium from Spent Fuel Using DEHiBA

Two approaches are being pursued to intensify the DEHiBA process for recovery of U from used nuclear fuel. For the traditional solvent extraction approach in which the fuel is first dissolved in hot nitric acid, the DEHiBA concentration was adjusted to 1.5 M. This allows for increased loading in the organic phase, but the organic phase U concentration should remain below 100 g/L to avoid unfavorable physicochemical properties that would upset the hydrodynamics in contacting equipment such as centrifugal contactors. Direct extraction of U into the 1.5 M DHEiBA solvent is another intriguing approach to intensifying the process. In this case, the hot nitric acid dissolution step is avoided, a potential significant simplification of the process. Strategies for routing Tc, Np, and Pu to the HLW stream will likely need to be developed to avoid contamination of the U product with these undesirable species.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Control Selection for the Neutralization Tank in the Aqueous Recovery System at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

The Aqueous Recovery System (ARS) at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) recovers and purifies plutonium (Pu) using aqueous chemistry techniques. The neutralization tanks in the ARS collect waste streams with various impurities and greatly reduced concentrations of Pu than are produced during aqueous processing. Criticality safety is primarily achieved in the ARS by using geometrically favorable process vessels. However, due to the geometry of neutralization tanks, each tank is administratively limited to no more than 450 g Pu, thus representing the transition from geometry to mass control. To ensure that this mass limit is not exceeded, an administrative control requires taking two samples of any solution to be sent to a neutralization tank. Normal operations are expected to result in less than 50 g Pu in a neutralization tank filled to its capacity of 250 L. Process upsets may cause an inadvertent transfer of up to 1000 g Pu to a neutralization tank, producing a system that is potentially not subcritical for all possible configurations of the tank. To ensure that a neutralization tank remains safety subcritical, passive engineered controls (e.g. changing tank geometry or adding fixed poisons), active engineered controls (e.g. interlocks), and administrative controls (e.g. soluble poisons and valve isolation) were considered and their viability evaluated. Ultimately, the team chose an administrative, dual-valve isolation strategy. This paper will thoroughly discuss the various control strategy options and why many of the options were not feasible for maintaining criticality safety.

Dressman, Phillip M. [Savannah River Nuclear Solut↗

Control Selection for the Neutralization Tank in the Aqueous Recovery System at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

The Aqueous Recovery System (ARS) at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) recovers and purifies plutonium (Pu) using aqueous chemistry techniques. The neutralization tanks in the ARS collect the waste streams, containing various impurities and greatly reduced concentrations of Pu, that are produced during aqueous processing. Criticality safety is primarily achieved in the ARS by using geometrically favorable process vessels. However, due to the geometry of neutralization tanks, each tank is administratively limited to no more than 450 g Pu, thus representing the transition from geometry to mass control. To ensure that this mass limit is not exceeded, an administrative control requires taking two samples of any solution to be sent to a neutralization tank. Normal operations are expected to result in less than 50 g Pu in a neutralization tank filled to its capacity of 250 L. Process upsets may cause an inadvertent transfer of up to 1000 g Pu to a neutralization tank, producing a system that is potentially not subcritical for all possible configurations of the tank. To ensure that a neutralization tank remains safety subcritical, passive engineered controls (e.g.changing tank geometry or adding fixed poisons), active engineered controls (e.g. interlocks), and administrative controls (e.g. soluble poisons and valve isolation) were considered and their viability evaluated. Ultimately, the team chose an administrative, dual-valve isolation strategy. This paper will thoroughly discuss the various control strategy options and why many of the options were not feasible for maintaining criticality safety.

Dressman, Phillip M. [Savannah River Nuclear Solut↗