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Y-12 National Security Complex's Sustainable Recovery and Transformation - 12420

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds were used at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) to remove legacy materials from large contaminated excess facilities in order to prepare the facilities for demolition, demolish five excess buildings, and clean up sources of environmental contamination. The legacy materials and buildings presented many challenges and the potential hazards included depleted uranium and other radiological contaminants, lead, polychlorinated biphenyls, Freon, mold, mildew, asbestos, beryllium and mercury. Y-12 project teams have integrated sustainable waste management practices into each of the seven ARRA projects. The ARRA clean up efforts have resulted in the reduction of potential environmental, health, and safety risks posed by the excess facilities and sources of environmental contamination. Y-12's ARRA project teams focused on completing the activities in a sustainable, timely and safe manner. The site utilized a systematic material disposition evaluation process to ensure that materials were not automatically dis-positioned as waste. ARRA projects have recycled or reused over 1.3 million pounds of materials while preventing over 3 million vehicle miles traveled for waste disposal. Y-12 ARRA projects have worked over 2 million safe work hours without a lost time injury. The site has already begun to beneficially reuse land cleared by ARRA project activities to support sustainable transformation efforts. The Y-12 ARRA project activities have demonstrated that large complex projects can be completed sustainably and safely while maintaining an aggressive schedule. Through careful planning and execution, ARRA projects at the site have sustainably reduced the potential environmental, health, and safety risks posed to site employees and the community by the excess facilities and sources of environmental contamination. Y-12's systematic material disposition process ensured that materials were not automatically assumed to be wastes and facilitated the evaluation of all unneeded materials for reuse or recycling. The site's pervasive pollution prevention culture is reflected in the recycling or reuse of over 1.3 million pounds of materials by the ARRA project teams. While the disposal of a large volume of ARRA wastes could not be avoided, the projects were able to reduce the local and national impacts of waste transportation and disposal through careful planning and efficient execution. The site has conserved natural resources through the preservation and beneficial reuse of materials and land cleared by ARRA activities. Y-12 has taken steps to preserve its history as the site undergoes a sustainable and safe transformation for the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

U.S, Department of Energy's Bioenergy Research Centers An Overview of the Science

Alternative fuels from renewable cellulosic biomass--plant stalks, trunks, stems, and leaves--are expected to significantly reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil while enhancing national energy security and decreasing the environmental impacts of energy use. Ethanol and other advanced biofuels from cellulosic biomass are renewable alternatives that could increase domestic production of transportation fuels, revitalize rural economies, and reduce carbon dioxide and pollutant emissions. According to U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, 'Developing the next generation of biofuels is key to our effort to end our dependence on foreign oil and address the climate crisis while creating millions of new jobs that can't be outsourced'. In the United States, the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 is an important driver for the sustainable development of renewable biofuels. As part of EISA, the Renewable Fuel Standard mandates that 36 billion gallons of biofuels are to be produced annually by 2022, of which 16 billion gallons are expected to come from cellulosic feedstocks. Although cellulosic ethanol production has been demonstrated on a pilot level, developing a cost-effective, commercial-scale cellulosic biofuel industry will require transformational science to significantly streamline current production processes. Woodchips, grasses, cornstalks, and other cellulosic biomass are widely abundant but more difficult to break down into sugars than corn grain--the primary source of U.S. ethanol fuel production today. Biological research is key to accelerating the deconstruction of cellulosic biomass into sugars that can be converted to biofuels. The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science continues to play a major role in inspiring, supporting, and guiding the biotechnology revolution over the past 25 years. The DOE Genomic Science Program is advancing a new generation of research focused on achieving whole-systems understanding for biology. This program is bringing together scientists in diverse fields to understand the complex biology underlying solutions to DOE missions in energy production, environmental remediation, and climate change science. New interdisciplinary research communities are emerging, as are knowledgebases and scientific and computational resources critical to advancing large-scale, genome-based biology. To focus the most advanced biotechnology-based resources on the biological challenges of biofuel production, DOE established three Bioenergy Research Centers (BRCs) in September 2007. Each center is pursuing the basic research underlying a range of high-risk, high-return biological solutions for bioenergy applications. Advances resulting from the BRCs will provide the knowledge needed to develop new biobased products, methods, and tools that the emerging biofuel industry can use. The scientific rationale for these centers and for other fundamental genomic research critical to the biofuel industry was established at a DOE workshop involving members of the research community (see sidebar, Biofuel Research Plan, below). The DOE BRCs have developed automated, high-throughput analysis pipelines that will accelerate scientific discovery for biology-based biofuel research. The three centers, which were selected through a scientific peer-review process, are based in geographically diverse locations--the Southeast, the Midwest, and the West Coast--with partners across the nation. DOE's Oak Ridge National Laboratory leads the BioEnergy Science Center (BESC) in Tennessee; the University of Wisconsin-Madison leads the Great Lakes Bioenergy Research Center (GLBRC); and DOE's Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory leads the DOE Joint BioEnergy Institute (JBEI) in California. Each center represents a multidisciplinary partnership with expertise spanning the physical and biological sciences, including genomics, microbial and plant biology, analytical chemistry, computational biology and bioinformatics, and engineering. Institutional partners include DOE national laboratories, universities, private companies, and nonprofit organizations.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

INFORMATION: Management Alert on Environmental Management's Select Strategy for Disposition of Savannah River Site Depleted Uranium Oxides

The Administration and the Congress, through policy statements and passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), have signaled that they hope that proactive actions by agency Inspectors General will help ensure that Federal Recovery Act activities are transparent, effective and efficient. In that context, the purpose of this management alert is to share with you concerns that have been raised to the Office of Inspector General regarding the planned disposition of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) inventory of Depleted Uranium (DU) oxides. This inventory, generated as a by-product of the nuclear weapons production process and amounting to approximately 15,600 drums of DU oxides, has been stored at SRS for decades. A Department source we deem reliable and credible recently came to the Office of Inspector General expressing concern that imminent actions are planned that may not provide for the most cost effective disposition of these materials. During April 2009, the Department chose to use funds provided under the Recovery Act to accelerate final disposition of the SRS inventory of DU oxides. After coordination with State of Utah regulators, elected officials and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department initiated a campaign to ship the material to a facility operated by EnergySolutions in Clive, Utah. Although one shipment of a portion of the material has already been sent to the EnergySolutions facility, the majority of the product remains at SRS. As had been planned, both for the shipment already made and those planned in the near term, the EnergySolutions facility was to have been the final disposal location for the material. Recently, a member of Congress and various Utah State officials raised questions regarding the radioactive and other constituents present in the DU oxides to be disposed of at the Clive, Utah, facility. These concerns revolved around the characterization of the material and its acceptability under existing licensing criteria. As a consequence, the Governor of Utah met with Department officials to voice concerns regarding further shipments of the material and to seek return of the initial shipment of DU oxides to SRS. Utah's objections and the Department's agreement to accede to the State's demands effectively prohibit the transfer of the remaining material from South Carolina to Utah. In response, the Department evaluated its options and issued a draft decision paper on March 1, 2010, which outlined an alternative for temporary storage until the final disposition issue could be resolved. Under the terms of the proposed option, the remaining shipments from SRS are to be sent on an interim basis to a facility owned by Waste Control Specialists (WCS) in Andrews, Texas. Clearly, this choice carries with it a number of significant logistical burdens, including substantial additional costs for, among several items, repackaging at SRS, transportation to Texas, storage at the interim site, and, repackaging and transportation to the yet-to-be-determined final disposition point. The Department source expressed the concern that the proposal to store the material on an interim basis in Texas was inefficient and unnecessary, asserting: (1) that the materials could remain at SRS until a final disposition path is identified, and that this could be done safely, securely and cost effectively; and, (2) that the nature of the material was not subject to existing compliance agreements with the State of South Carolina, suggesting the viability of keeping the material in storage at SRS until a permanent disposal site is definitively established. We noted that, while the Department's decision paper referred to 'numerous project and programmatic factors that make it impractical to retain the remaining inventory at Savannah River,' it did not outline the specific issues involved nor did it provide any substantive economic or environmental analysis supporting the need for the planned interim storage action. The only apparent driver in this case was a Recovery Act-related goal established by the Department to accelerate the general disposition of the SRS material. We recognize that decisions such as the one proposed for the SRS inventory of DU oxides are often more complex and nuanced than might appear on the surface. Consideration of factors such as cost, state interest, posture of local regulators, etc., are important elements in this process. Although, we have not completed sufficient work to reach an independent judgment on the merits of this matter, we wanted to ensure that the Department was aware of the concerns that have been raised before imminent decisions and resource commitments were made regarding the path forward.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Energy Efficiency and Infrastructure Upgrades on Nuclear Clean-up Sites: The Hanford Experience - 18641

The Hanford site, located in southeastern Washington, produced much of our nation's weapons-grade plutonium for the Defense nuclear weapons program. This production lasted the better part of four decades with production ending in 1987. Since 1987, the focus of the Hanford site has turned to clean-up activities. Mission Support Alliance (MSA) is the integrator of the multi-contractor effort to clean up the Hanford site. MSA collaborates with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and all Hanford site contractors in finding and implementing new, cost-saving, safe and practical solutions to cleanup challenges with a continual focus on innovative processes and technologies that reduce costs, energy use and bring safety improvements to the site. Support Services include environmental integration and land management; fleet and road maintenance; water/electric and utilities; cyber security and information management as well as the preservation of the site's cultural artifacts. This paper describes the process, challenges, and focus on infrastructure upgrade and energy efficiency projects in the context of a multi-contractor nuclear clean-up site. Project development and new technology deployment at Hanford has long been plagued with economic challenges. For example, despite extensive auditing, analysis, and project development, most of the energy-related projects on the Hanford site have gone unfunded due to the low cost of electricity, the relatively high cost of labor, and costs associated with detailed safety and cultural reviews. - The Hanford site is a direct-service customer of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and has a marginal electricity rate of $0.033/kWh. - Labor costs on the Hanford site track high because of the requirements associated with the safety and security necessary to operate a legacy nuclear weapons complex. - In partnership with three federally recognized and other affected Native American tribes (Yakama Nation, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Nez Perce Tribe, and Wanapum People), most activities on the Hanford site are afforded in-depth cultural reviews. To work within these constraints, the MSA Energy Management team has embarked on a three-pronged approach to energy project development: Program Visibility: The MSA Energy Management team has promoted both project opportunities and requirements across the Hanford site. This information comes in the form of site-wide newsletters, group meetings, e-mails, success stories, and recognition of staff. Single-point Analysis: To by-pass the inevitable duplications of effort, learning curve issues, and to improve project consistency/delivery, the MSA Energy Management team serves as the single resource to the site for energy project analysis. This resource includes initial assessment, engineering analysis, efficiency calculation and project recommendations. Contractor/utility Interface: In addition to the infrastructure under its own purview, MSA provides all support services for the contractor/utility interface. These activities include formulation and submission of incentive-based efficiency projects, project tracking, and incentive awards. All incentive awards are forwarded to the relevant contractor and then highlighted in the visibility campaign. Successful energy efficiency projects at Hanford have included high efficiency heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) systems, interior and exterior lighting/lighting control systems, pump and motor systems, and the right-sizing of transformers and area-wide electrical distribution systems. Prior to the initiation of this program and structure (roughly 3 years ago) the average annual energy efficiency incentive applied for and received was under $10,000, with an annual energy savings of approximately 36,000 kilowatt hours (kWh). In fiscal year 2017, the annual incentive received was over $419,000, with identified energy savings of over 1.3 million kWh. Details and case studies of the major project accomplishments are included. The success of this program can be traced to an understanding of the constraints, the development of a program to address these constraints, and good communication/coordination across DOE and the multiple contractors serving the Hanford site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Physical Security Model Development of an Electrochemical Facility.

Nuclear facilities in the U.S. and around the world face increasing challenges in meeting evolving physical security requirements while keeping costs reasonable. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the approach of the past) can easily lead to cost overruns. Instead, security should be considered at the beginning of the design process in order to provide robust, yet efficient physical security designs. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how modeling and simulation can be used to optimize the design of physical protection systems. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D and Blender, were used to model up a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical security. One outsider theft scenario was examined with 4-8 adversaries to determine security metrics. This work fits into a larger Virtual Test Bed 2020 Milestone in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program through the Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the milestone is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the DOE complex provide the capabilities to demonstrate complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for nuclear facilities. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Nuclear Technology Research and Development Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Inclusion of Scatter in HADES: Final Report

Covert nuclear attack is one of the foremost threats facing the United States and is a primary focus of the War on Terror. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is chartered to develop, and improve domestic systems to detect and interdict smuggling for the illicit use of a nuclear explosive device, fissile material or radiologica1 material. The CAARS (Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System) program is a major part of the DHS effort to enhance US security by harnessing cutting-edge technologies to detect radiological and nuclear threats at points of entry to the United States. DNDO has selected vendors to develop complete radiographic systems. It is crucial that the initial design and testing concepts for the systems be validated and compared prior to the substantial efforts to build and deploy prototypes and subsequent large-scale production. An important aspect of these systems is the scatter which interferes with imaging. Monte Carlo codes, such as MCNP (X-5 Monte Carlo Team, 2005 Revision) allow scatter to be calculatied, but these calculations are very time consuming. It would be useful to have a fast scatter estimation algorithm in a fast ray tracing code. We have been extending the HADES ray-tracing radiographic simulation code to model vendor systems in a flexible and quick fashion and to use this tool to study a variety of questions involving system performance and the comparative value of surrogates. To enable this work, HADES has been linked to the BRL-CAD library (BRL-CAD Open Source Project, 2010), in order to enable the inclusion of complex CAD geometries in simulations, scanner geometries have been implemented in HADES, and the novel detector responses have been included in HADES. A major extension of HADES which has been required by this effort is the inclusion of scatter in these radiographic simulations. Ray tracing codes generally do not easily allow the inclusion of scatter, because these codes define a source and a grid of detector pixels and only compute the attenuation along rays between these points. Scatter is an extremely complex set of processes which can involve rays which change directions many times between the source and detector. Scatter from outside the field of view of the imaging system, as well as within the field of view, can have an important role in image formation. In this report, we will describe how we implemented a treatment of scatter in HADES. We begin with a discussion of how we define scatter in Section 2, followed by a description of how single Compton scatter is now included in HADES in Section 3. In Section 4 we report a set of verification tests against MCNP and tests of how the technique scales with image size, number of scatters allowed and number of processors used in the calculations. In Section 5, we describe how we plan to extend this approach to other forms of scatter and conclude in Section 6. It should be emphasized that the purpose of this report is to show that a form of scatter has been implemented in HADES and has been verified against MCNP. Validation, the process of comparing simulation and experiment, is a future task.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Integrating science for water security governance

Hydrological extremes are intensifying globally, increasing the complexity of decisions required to ensure water security. Advances in hydrological science, modeling, and data systems have expanded the technical frontier of water research, yet uptake of scientific insights in policy and management decisions remains limited. This persistent science–policy gap is not primarily a failure of knowledge generation or robustness, but an institutional challenge shaped by how scientific and governance systems are organized, coordinated, and connected to support the effective use of scientific knowledge. These challenges are particularly pronounced in multi-level and transboundary water governance, where decisions span jurisdictions and require coordination across institutional and political boundaries. We synthesize research at the science–policy interface and evidence from water security initiatives to show how institutional arrangements, scientific tool development, and research practices enable or constrain the sustained use of scientific knowledge in water-security governance processes. Building on these insights, we develop ‘shared decision infrastructure’ as a framing to describe how scientific knowledge is embedded within the institutional, relational, and procedural arrangements that connect science to decision-making processes over time. We translate this framing into a practical intervention roadmap centered on institutional design, tool translation, sustained co-production, and outcome-oriented evaluation to support the integration of science into ongoing governance processes. By positioning science as shared decision infrastructure, the roadmap clarifies how researchers can design scientific efforts that support more coordinated, accountable, and adaptive water security decisions amid deepening uncertainty.

M whitney, Kristen [NASA Goddard Space Flight Cent↗

Modularization of Small Modular Reactor Facilities: Physical Protection Recommendations

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. In consideration of the economic viability of small modular reactor (SMR) facilities, many designers and utilities are considering a modular approach to the construction and operation of these facilities. This modular approach considers building and operating a first unit; once the first reactor is in operation, construction will begin on a second reactor. This process would allow the vendor or utility to ensure production of energy and financial income while the second reactor is under construction. This project evaluates the feasibility of modular construction in terms of physical protection and identifies several recommendations for vendors and utilities considering this approach. To conduct this evaluation, a hypothetical three-unit SMR facility was developed, a physical protection system (PPS) was considered for the design, and a hypothetical design basis threat (DBT) was used to evaluate this PPS. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined, with adversary team sizes ranging from 4-to-8 to determine security system effectiveness. The results of this work will influence PPS designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic SMRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex can impact the design and completion of security-by-design (SeBD) for SMRs considering modular construction. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Implementing and Evaluating Multithreaded Triad Census Algorithms on the Cray XMT

Commonly represented as directed graphs, social networks depict relationships and behaviors among social entities such as people, groups, and organizations. Social network analysis denotes a class of mathematical and statistical methods designed to study and measure social networks. Beyond sociolo-gy, social network analysis methods are being applied to other types of data in other domains such as bioinformatics, computer networks, national security, and economics. For particular problems, the size of a social network can grow to millions of nodes and tens of millions of edges or more. In such cases, researchers could benefit from the application of social network analysis algorithms on high-performance architectures and systems. The Cray XMT is a third generation multithreaded system based on the Cray XT-3/4 platform. Like most other multithreaded architectures, the Cray XMT is designed to tolerate memory access latencies by switching context between threads. The processors maintain multiple threads of execution and util-ize hardware-based context switching to overlap the memory latency incurred by any thread with the computations from other threads. Due to its memory latency tolerance, the Cray XMT has the poten-tial of significantly improving the execution speed of irregular data-intensive applications such as those found in social network analysis. In this paper, we describe our experiences in developing and optimizing three implementations of a social network analysis method known as triadic analysis to execute on the Cray XMT. The three im-plementations possess different execution complexities, qualities, and characteristics. We evaluate how the various attributes of the codes affect their performance on the Cray XMT. We also explore the effects of different compiler options and execution strategies on the different triadic analysis im-plementations and identify general XMT programming issues and lessons learned.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Radiation Effects in Next Generation Used Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Strategies

With the global community committed to significantly expanding nuclear energy capacity, the development of efficient used nuclear fuel (UNF) management strategies has become more critical than ever. These strategies are vital to fostering the widespread adoption of closed fuel cycles, which are essential for sustainable nuclear energy production and security. Achieving this ambitious goal necessitates a comprehensive understanding of radiation effects on next-generation technologies, as radiolysis can often limit the longevity and performance of these systems. This seminar will provide an overview of next-generation UNF reprocessing strategies, highlighting the latest advancements and innovative approaches in the field. Particular attention will be given to two key areas of recent research: 1. Radiation robustness and performance of advanced sulfur chloride-based chlorination technologies. We will explore the efficacy of sulfur chloride-based chlorination processes in the presence of surrogate cladding materials, specifically aluminum. These processes have shown promise in the dissolution, decontamination, and recovery of cladding materials for reuse. Detailed findings on how the composition and performance of these sulfur chloride solvents respond to radiation exposure will be discussed. 2. Impacts of metal ion complexation and direct dissolution conditions on monoamide-based reprocessing strategies. We will delve into the time-resolved and dose accumulation effects of irradiation on the direct dissolution of voloxidized uranium and rhenium using N,N-di-(2-ethylhexyl) butyramide (DEHBA) or N,N-di-(2-ethylhexyl)isobutyramide (DEHiBA) in pre-equilibrated n-dodecane solvent. The implications of these interactions on dissolution efficiency, radiolytic stability, and overall process performance will be examined. These studies aim to underscore the importance of understanding radiation effects in the development of next-generation UNF reprocessing technologies and the global transition towards more sustainable and efficient nuclear energy systems.

38 - RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCL↗

Dragonstone Strategy – State of Cybersecurity in the Oil & Natural Gas Sector

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system touches every corner of the nation and increased communications & control capabilities have not only allowed for greater efficiency of system operation, but have also created a massive target for adversaries to launch cyber-attacks. Like any other heavy industrial process, the ONG system relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. The current state of cyber-preparedness across the ONG industry varies from organization to organization. Among the most common challenges that ONG companies face are remote locations, longlived field assets, and lacking capabilities to find and track malware on their systems. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. Various industry and government organizations are performing research and development activities to address some of these challenges, but in many cases industry stakeholders are not aware of solutions that already exist. It is clear that a need exists for a coherent, comprehensive, multi-layered strategy for assuring the security and resilience of the nation's pipeline infrastructure against cyber threats. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cyber-security within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cyber-security of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: The sheer number of differing regulatory bodies and trade groups offering both standards and best-practice recommendations for ONG cyber-security makes it difficult to create a comprehensive, directed, and coherent strategy that is applicable to all players within the ONG industry. The ONG industry is unaware of potentially useful technologies that have been developed for ensuring cyber-security of other infrastructure systems, such as the electric grid. Leveraging these technologies—and the science and engineering behind them—can provide some low-hanging fruit that can greatly improve cyber-security in the ONG industry without significant investments in terms of time and money. In the months following this report, LLNL will continue to perform outreach to key oil & gas industry stakeholders in a continual effort to identify the most pressing cyber-resilience issues in the industry. This outreach will be supplemented with LLNL’s threat intelligence capabilities to begin painting a clearer picture of the overall threat landscape faced by this sector. This assessment will be threat-informed and while the strategy itself will not be classified we will leverage intelligence analysis and adversary capabilities to identify gaps in current cybersecurity practices for oil & gas pipeline systems. Recommended efforts will be compiled into a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, in which LLNL will highlight priority activities to immediately improve the state of cyber-resilience in the industry.

02 PETROLEUM↗

SoK: A Framework for and Analysis of Software Bill of Materials Tools

Modern software development has gradually become more complex, leveraging available open-source software and third party components. This practice has raised questions about the provenance, licensing, versioning and compliance of reused code and its dependencies. Furthermore, it is par ticularly important to review such code fragments and third party components for known-vulnerabilities before they are included in a software product. A Software Bill of Materials (SBoM) is a mechanism to achieve such an analysis, provid ing transparency and visibility into a software product to both the software developer and its respective consumer. An SBoM lists information and details about all the elements constituting a piece of software and can, therefore, be used to evaluate associated security risk. While the concept of SBoMs is growing in popularity, it is still fairly new to many organizations, causing them to potentially struggle with pro ducing and processing SBoMs and limiting their widespread adoption. In this work, we delve into the area of SBoMs and present the state-of-the-art SBoM tools, creating a framework for analysis and categorizing them based on a diverse set of features and functionalities. We are the first to provide a detailed analysis of 83 open-source SBoM tools along with a perspective on how a potential SBoM user can select a tool based on their specific requirements. Our work aims to help promote understanding of this domain, thereby encouraging and furthering its overall adoption. We additionally seek to pave a path for future work in this area by providing recommendations to tool developers and users, researchers, and standardizing organizations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Sulfur Polymer Stabilization/Solidification Treatability Study of Mercury Contaminated Soil from the Y-12 Site

As a result of past operations, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Oak Ridge Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 Plant) has extensive mercury-contamination in building structures, soils, storm sewer sediments, and stream sediments, which are a source of pollution to the local ecosystem. Because of mercury’s toxicity and potential impacts on human health and the environment, DOE continues to investigate and implement projects to support the remediation of the Y-12 site. URS and #9122;CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) under its prime contract with DOE has cleanup responsibilities on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation and is investigating potential mercury-contaminated soil treatment technologies through an agreement with Babcock and Wilcox (B and W) Y-12, the Y-12 operating contractor to DOE. As part of its investigations, UCOR has subcontracted with Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) to conduct laboratory-scale studies evaluating the applicability of the Sulfur Polymer Stabilization/Solidification (SPSS) process using surrogate and actual mixed waste Y-12 soils containing mercury (Hg) at 135, 2,000, and 10,000 ppm. SPSS uses a thermoplastic sulfur binder to convert Hg to stable mercury sulfide (HgS) and solidifies the chemically stable product in a monolithic solid final waste form to reduce dispersion and permeability. Formulations containing 40 – 60 dry wt% Y-12 soil were fabricated and samples were prepared in triplicate for Environmental Protection Agency Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) testing by an independent laboratory. Those containing 50 and 60 wt% soil easily met the study criteria for maximum allowable Hg concentrations (47 and 1 ppb, respectively compared with the TCLP limit of 200 ppb Hg). The lowest waste loading of 40 wt% yielded TCLP Hg concentrations slightly higher (240 ppb) than the allowable limit. Since the Y-12 soil tended to form clumps, the improved leaching at higher waste loadings was probably due to reduction in particle size from friction of the soil mixing, which creates more surface area for chemical conversion. This was corroborated by the fact that the same waste loading pre-treated by ball milling to reduce particle size prior to SPSS processing yielded TCLP concentrations almost 30 times lower, and at 8.5 ppb Hg was well below EPA limits. Pre-treatment by ball milling also allowed a reduction in the time required for stabilization, thus potentially reducing total process times by 30%.Additional performance testing was conducted including measurement of compressive strength to confirm mechanical integrity and immersion testing to determine the potential impacts of storage or disposal under saturated conditions. For both surrogate and actual Y-12 treated soils, waste form compressive strengths ranged between 2,300 and 6,500 psi, indicating very strong mechanical integrity (a minimum of greater than 40 times greater than the NRC guidance for low-level radioactive waste). In general, compressive strength increases with waste loading as the soil acts as an aggregate in the sulfur concrete waste forms. No statistically significant loss in strength was recorded for the 30 and 40 wt% surrogate waste samples and only a minor reduction in strength was measured for the 43 wt% waste forms. The 30 wt% Y-12 soil did not show a significant loss in strength but the 50 wt% samples were severely degraded in immersion due to swelling of the clay soil. The impact on Hg leaching, if any, was not determined.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Storm Water Report for the Y-12 National Security Complex Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This is the seventh annual storm water report prepared in accordance with the modified National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit issued to the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) on April 1, 2014. This modified permit removed the authorization to augment flow in East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC) and thus removed the requirement to sample this effluent in conjunction with other major outfalls on EFPC. The general condition of the site continues to improve. The concentrations of Escherichia Coli (Es. coli) at the major outfalls and instream monitoring locations on EFPC are no longer elevated as they were in 2018. Follow-up samples indicated normal levels. Monitoring for this parameter will continue into 2020. The repair of Outfall 014 is nearing completion and will be sampled for storm water in 2020. This repair was expected to occur in 2019 but was delayed until 2020. There are several construction and demolition activities currently in progress at Y-12. These include the construction of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), the Mercury Treatment Facility (MTF) on EFPC and the impending demolition of the Biology Complex. These projects will present challenges for the protection of storm water. Oversight of these activities will be a priority in 2020. Y-12 will continue to implement appropriate Best Management Practices and reduce outside material storage areas where possible.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

U.S. Department of Energy's Bioenergy Research Centers An Overview of the Science

Alternative fuels from renewable cellulosic biomass - plant stalks, trunks, stems, and leaves - are expected to significantly reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil while enhancing national energy security and decreasing the environmental impacts of energy use. Ethanol and other advanced biofuels from cellulosic biomass are renewable alternatives that could increase domestic production of transportation fuels, revitalize rural economies, and reduce carbon dioxide and pollutant emissions. According to U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, 'Developing the next generation of biofuels is key to our effort to end our dependence on foreign oil and address the climate crisis while creating millions of new jobs that can't be outsourced.' Although cellulosic ethanol production has been demonstrated on a pilot level, developing a cost-effective, commercial-scale cellulosic biofuel industry will require transformational science to significantly streamline current production processes. Woodchips, grasses, cornstalks, and other cellulosic biomass are widely abundant but more difficult to break down into sugars than corn grain - the primary source of U.S. ethanol fuel production today. Biological research is key to accelerating the deconstruction of cellulosic biomass into sugars that can be converted to biofuels. The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science continues to play a major role in inspiring, supporting, and guiding the biotechnology revolution over the past 30 years. The DOE Genomic Science program is advancing a new generation of research focused on achieving whole-systems understanding of biology. This program is bringing together scientists in diverse fields to understand the complex biology underlying solutions to DOE missions in energy production, environmental remediation, and climate change science. For more information on the Genomic Science program, see p. 26. To focus the most advanced biotechnology-based resources on the biological challenges of biofuel production, DOE established three Bioenergy Research Centers (BRCs) in September 2007. Each center is pursuing the basic research underlying a range of high-risk, high-return biological solutions for bioenergy applications. Advances resulting from the BRCs are providing the knowledge needed to develop new biobased products, methods, and tools that the emerging biofuel industry can use (see sidebar, Bridging the Gap from Fundamental Biology to Industrial Innovation for Bioenergy, p. 6). The DOE BRCs have developed automated, high-throughput analysis pipelines that will accelerate scientific discovery for biology-based biofuel research. The three centers, which were selected through a scientific peer-review process, are based in geographically diverse locations - the Southeast, the Midwest, and the West Coast - with partners across the nation (see U.S. map, DOE Bioenergy Research Centers and Partners, on back cover). DOE's Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory leads the DOE Joint BioEnergy Institute (JBEI) in California; DOE's Oak Ridge National Laboratory leads the BioEnergy Science Center (BESC) in Tennessee; and the University of Wisconsin-Madison leads the Great Lakes Bioenergy Research Center (GLBRC). Each center represents a multidisciplinary partnership with expertise spanning the physical and biological sciences, including genomics, microbial and plant biology, analytical chemistry, computational biology and bioinformatics, and engineering. Institutional partners include DOE national laboratories, universities, private companies, and nonprofit organizations.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Bayesian batch optimization for molybdenum versus tungsten inertial confinement fusion double shell target design

Access to reliable, clean energy sources is a major concern for national security. Much research is focused on the “grand challenge” of producing energy via controlled fusion reactions in a laboratory setting. For fusion experiments, specifically inertial confinement fusion (ICF), to produce sufficient energy, the fusion reactions in the ICF fuel need to become self-sustaining and burn deuterium-tritium (DT) fuel efficiently. The recent record-breaking NIF ignition shot was able to achieve this goal as well as produce more energy than used to drive the experiment. This achievement brings self-sustaining fusion-based power systems closer than ever before, capable of providing humans with access to secure, renewable energy. In order to further progress toward the actualization of such power systems, more ICF experiments need to be conducted at large laser facilities such as the United States's National Ignition Facility (NIF) or France's Laser Mega-Joule. The high cost per shot and limited number of shots that are possible per year make it prohibitive to perform large numbers of experiments. As such, experimental design relies heavily on complex predictive physics simulations for high-fidelity “preshot” analysis. These multidimensional, multi-physics, high-fidelity simulations have to account for a variety of input parameters as well as modeling the extreme conditions (pressures and densities) present at ignition. Such simulations (especially in 3D) can become computationally prohibitive to turn around for each ICF experiment. In this work, we explore using Bayesian optimization with Gaussian processes (GPs) to find optimal designs for ICF double shell targets, while keeping computational costs to manageable levels. These double shell targets have an inner shell that grades from beryllium on the outer surface to the higher Z material molybdenum, as opposed to the nominally used tungsten, on the inside in order to trade off between the high performance associated with high density inner shells and capsule stability. We describe our results for “capsule-only” xRAGE simulations to study the physics between different capsule designs, inner shell materials, and potential for future experiments.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater and Surface Water Sampling and Analysis Plan (CY 2021)

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2021 at the U.S. Department of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring is performed by the GWPP. Groundwater and surface water monitoring will be performed in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12. Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2021 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3. Sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4, and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information. The narrative sections of the report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding a data summary table presented in Section 4) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Groundwater Monitoring Schedules (when issued throughout CY 2021) will be inserted in Appendix C, and addenda to this plan (if issued) will be inserted in Appendix D. Laboratory requirements (bottle lists, holding times, etc.) are provided in Appendix E, and an approved Waste Management Plan is provided in Appendix F. Modifications to the CY 2021 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. Each modification to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as an addendum to this sampling and analysis plan.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an over-pack container, similar to the pipe component, called the criticality control over-pack, which will significantly enhance the efficiency of disposal. Hundreds of shipments of transuranic SNM, suitably packaged to meet WIPP waste acceptance criteria and with safeguards terminated have been successfully emplaced at WIPP (primarily from the Rocky Flats site clean-up) since WIPP opened. DOE expects that thousands more may eventually result from SNM consolidation efforts throughout the weapons complex. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗