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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 361 records · Page 20
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Moore ME Feb 18 2019 aerosol class for Northern NM College [Slides)

This presentation was prepared for the request from Northern New Mexico College. "For your talk I’m thinking a bit more detail about the specific sampler you’re bringing, and the types in use at LANL, then setup and ops check, loading and removing a filter, cutting out the right size circle, reading the sample (we have a couple Eberline SAC-4s and Ludlum 2929s here), and radon/daughters corrections."

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

General Employee Radiological Refresher Training (Self-Study 47968)

This General Employee Radiological Training (GERT) course is designed to refresh knowledge of basic radiological principles and terms, the risks of exposure to ionizing radiation, LANL radiological hazards and postings, ALARA tools, emergency response responsibilities, and how to obtain personal radiological dose records.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

MCNP modelling of the Thermo SPA3 with Tungsten (Rees model) collimator

A Thermo Model SPA3 2”x2” NaI probe fitted with a Tungsten collimator has been modelled using MCNP6. The collimator was assumed to be machinable Tungsten which typically includes Ni and Fe. Various ratios of these additives are used in industry and for the purposes of these calculations the collimator was assumed to contain 7% Ni and 3% Fe with a density of 17.0 g/cm 3 . The dimensions of the collimator were based on measurements taken by Mike Fanning. The above detector model was used, in a manner similar to the approach described in LA-UR-19-32358, to calculate photopeak count rates per unit activity per unit area (i.e. cpm per pCi/cm 2 ) conversion factors for various contamination scenarios.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dose Calculations from Source Models and Gamma-Ray Spectra

Gamma-ray dose rates computed by two radiation source model-based methods and five measured spectrum-based methods are compared. With the exception of a Detective DX-100, which reported dose rates that are about 25% less than the mean, dose rates are generally within 10% of mean values. Methods for computation of dose rates employed by the Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS) are described and critically evaluated. Results are presented for a feasibility evaluation that seeks to use spectra recorded inside vehicles to estimate the minimum dose outside the vehicles.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Co-60 Sterilization of PPE

We are assessing the efficacy and integrity of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) after irradiating the PPE with gamma radiation over a three-week sprint (report should be available before April 17th)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fissionable Materials Handlers Operators-Initial Training

These courses were designed for all Initial Fissionable Material Handlers Operators and Supervisors whose job activities will require the performance of Fissile Material Operations located within the Plutonium Facility (PF-4). The course requirements are based on DOE order 426.2, Personnel Section, Qualification, and Training Requirements for Fissionable Material Handlers. These courses are required training for all initial Fissionable Material Handlers and is specific to TA-55 FMH Certification. It covers the core areas and topics in Criticality Safety, Material-at-Risk, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, Radiological Protection, TA-55 Material Handling and Movement.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Hanford Site Disposition Baseline for Composite Analysis

An updated version of the Hanford Site Disposition Baseline (HSDB) was prepared to document the evolution of conditions for 637 waste sites within Central Plateau of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford Site. The HSDB provides information that will be used to evaluate post-closure radiological dose in the updated composite analysis (CA).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Hotspot 2.07.1 doses (FGR-13) from releases of 1 g Pu-239 (SBK Calcs)

This calculation is to be used for accident analysis at B239, B331, B332, and B334. The objective of this analysis is to determine: The dose per gram of Pu-239 Solubility Class S (FGR-13) for various release heights, receptor heights and distances from 100 to 1000 meters. This calculation can be used to evaluate particulate plume dispersion releases for the co-located worker and public receptors.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

2018 Annual Site Environmental Report Summary

We are committed to act as stewards of our environment to achieve our mission in accordance with all applicable environmental requirements. We set continual improvement objectives and targets, measure and document our progress, and share our results with our workforce, sponsors, and public. We reduce our environmental risk through legacy cleanup, pollution prevention, and long-term sustainability programs.

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DOE OSTI2020

Radioactive Plume Avoidance and Aircraft Decontamination – Best Practices

Response to an incident involving the release of radioactive material will most likely involve aircraft for disaster relief and radiological monitoring. Aircraft flying into a radiologically contaminated area risk becoming contaminated, and in the worst cases having to be removed from service. Contamination is avoidable, and decontamination is possible, but both require planning and forethought.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Prototype for Unclassified Algorithm

Continuing previous efforts to investigate and develop the Unclassified Radioisotope Algorithm, the goal of the FY19-FY20 effort was to develop a prototype detector system which uses the algorithm to confirm warhead attributes related to the presence of either weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The final deliverable is a prototype attribute measurement system built with common, commercially available gamma radiation detector components, capable of confirming the presence of specific, complex radioactive sources of interest, without the collection and storage of gamma energy spectra. This is accomplished by processing each gamma pulse as it is received, applying weight values based on the energy and incrementing or decrementing scalar counters which can be compared with expected values to determine if the measured source is consistent with WGPu or HEU. This report documents the design of the prototype system as well as the development of the algorithm and performance testing results. While the previously conceptualized, simple algorithm resulted in a prohibitive amount of false positives, the goal for a simple attribute measurement system capable of verifying Ba-133 and Ra-226 (weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium surrogate testing sources) at over 95% accuracy with sub 5% false positive rate was demonstrated.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Site 300 B-851 Permit: Radiological Assumptions and Source Term - Air Dispersion Modeling for Radiological Dose Assessment

The following modeling assumptions and source term that is provided in the attachments to this document are meant to serve as a guide to the presentation delivered on April 23rd, 2020, to the San Joaquin Air District Permit Services slides. This analysis is in response to the District’s “Project Incompleteness Letter” (Facility Number: N-472 and Project Number: N-1173492) regarding the potential for depleted uranium (DU) to be resuspended from areas of contaminated soil at Site 300 as a result of high explosive (HE) experiments increased to a requested permitted maximum of 1,000 pound detonations with an annual HE throughput not to exceed 7,500 pounds per year. LLNL has taken every step in the radiological health risk concerns in the modeling assumptions and final source term to be at a level of maximum conservativeness. As an example, forty soil samples were taken in the B-851 area (LLNL-AR-738708 – 2018) and assayed for uranium-234, uranium-235, and uranium-238 concentrations. The maximum uranium soil concentrations were used in the assumptions (potential for resuspended dust occurring from detonation experiments) and not the use of median uranium soil concentrations – a more realistic outcome. Additionally, these uranium soil concentrations were considered to be at 100% uptake in the vegetation for prescribed burns; vegetation uptake factors were not used as that would lower the final source term. This level of conservativeness was maintained throughout the modeling assumptions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Worker Safety and Radionuclide Intakes [Slides]

Our team detects intakes of radionuclides using urine bioassay and confirms the people responsible for protecting workers from radiation are limiting or preventing intakes. Plutonium or americium enter the body by inhalation, or a wound and stays in the body for decades. Committed Effective Dose (CED(50)) is the total dose an intake will cause over 50 years after it happens. Radiation can’t escape the body, so we look in urine. There is almost never enough radiation to make an employee sick. It takes months and multiple samples to confirm. Most “elevated” samples turn out to be false alarms.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Otowi Well No. 4 Analytical Results

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) collected soil samples near Otowi Well No. 4 on behalf of Los Alamos County (LAC) to address health and safety concerns related to potential radioactive contamination in Los Alamos canyon. Oil had spilled from Otowi Well No. 4 and sampling was to determine if radiological contamination in the soils to be excavated in response to that spill presented a health or safety risk to LAC personnel who would be involved in the cleanup. Results of the sampling event are attached to this memo.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Overview of PFAS at LANL [Slides]

This presentation addresses these questions. What are the potential uses and sources of PFAS at LANL? What are the emerging issues? What are federal and state agencies doing regarding PFAS? Where are we monitoring PFAS at LANL? What are the preliminary findings of PFAS monitoring? What do the data suggest? Where do we go from here?

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Calculation for T Plant Estimated PTE with Receipt of K Basin Sludge and Filter Media

The purpose of this environmental calculation is to: (1) show compliance with the WAC 173-400-110, New Source Review (NSR) for Sources and Portable Sources requirements and (2) provide the methodology, assumptions and calculation used to estimate the potential to emit (PTE) and Total Effective Dose Equivalent to the Maximally Exposed Individual (TEDE to the MEI) radionuclide airborne emissions associated with the receipt of K Basin sludge and filter media for storage at T Plant.

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DOE OSTI2020

NESHAPs CY19 Report: Radionuclide Air Emission Report for 2019

Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC operates facilities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in which radionuclides are handled and stored. These facilities are subject to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) in Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 40, Part 61, Subpart H, which regulates radionuclide emissions to air from Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. Specifically, NESHAPs limits the emission of radionuclides to the ambient air to levels resulting in an annual effective dose equivalent of 10 mrem (100 μSv) to any member of the public. Using measured and calculated emissions, and building-specific and common parameters, LLNL personnel applied the EPA-approved computer code, CAP88-PC, Version 4.0.1.17, to calculate the dose to the maximally exposed individual member of the public for the Livermore Site and Site 300. In 2019, LLNL maintained its compliance with 40 CFR 61, Subpart H. All radioactive air emissions resulted in calculated doses far below the annual 10 mrem (100 μSv) sitewide standard. The annual doses to the site-wide maximally exposed individual member of the public at the Livermore Site and Site 300 from planned and unplanned operations in 2019 are: Livermore Site: 4.3 x 10⁻³ mrem (4.3 x 10⁻² μSv); Site 300: 9.5 x 10⁻⁸ mrem (9.5 x 10⁻⁷ μSv).

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