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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment.

Harry W Jones↗

NASA NTRS2023

Oregon Coast Range Ecological Conservation: Mapping Recent Logging Within Drinking Watersheds of Oregon’s Coastal Range to Support Future Resource Management Policies

Logging operations are widespread across the Oregon Coast Range and conventional logging practices pose a risk of contamination to surface water quality. The NASA DEVELOP Oregon Coast Ecological Conservation team partnered with nonprofit Oregon Wild to quantify the extent of clearcutting and commercial thinning in 80 Coast Range drinking watersheds between 2000 and 2022. This project used all available Landsat data from 1997 through June 2023 in Google Earth Engine. Sensors used include Landsat 5 Thematic Mapper, Landsat 7 Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus, Landsat 8 Operational Land Imager, and Landsat 9 Operational Land Imager-2. The Continuous Change Detection and Classification (CCDC) algorithm was used with Landsat observations to identify clearcutting patches. Percent change in summer median Landsat Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) images were used to identify areas of forest disturbance including commercial thinning. The team concluded that logging, including both clearcutting and commercial thinning, impacted 31% of forested area in drinking watersheds and the intensity of logging remained consistent from year to year. Clearcutting occurred primarily on private land while commercial thinning occurred primarily on state and federal lands. This study showed that CCDC effectively identifies clearcutting, and percent change in NDVI successfully identifies disturbances including commercial thinning. Key constraints included the lack of field validation data and the inability to attribute disturbances to logging with certainty. Ultimately, this study identified the drinking watersheds and communities most likely to be impacted by logging activity. These results can inform legislation aimed at balancing the commercial and environmental benefits of forestlands.

Logging↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A New Vision and A More Rational Process Will Advance Space Life Support Through Better Projects

Many space life support assumptions are obviously mistaken but they are generally accepted because they mutually support each other and because they advance a mistaken futuristic vision of closed human ecosystems in space. Many projects have been mistakenly selected to increase life support system closure or reduce launch mass in order to implement this impractical vision. Project members rarely challenge their project’s assumptions and guiding vision. Systems engineering including cost, reliability, risk, and system trade-offs has been very strongly discouraged to prevent rational criticism of these dubious assumptions, the projects, and the ecosystem vision. A more realistic vision can define better near term life support goals and future aspirations that will improve mission support and increase public interest. Given more realistic goals, it will be possible to develop effective technical alternatives, use open rational project selection methods, conduct professional project management, and make swifter progress in the inevitable human advance into space. The current unworkable human space settlement scenario involves moon visits and permanent bases, zero gravity trips to Mars, Mars visits and bases, all leading to extensive human settlements on the moon and Mars. This is unrealistic because the moon and Mars have less than Earth normal gravity and high radiation that can seriously damage human health. A better alternative would use rotating space colonies that produce Earth gravity and are radiation shielded. The attractive fantasy of reproducing terrestrial ecology in space should be replaced by the idea of building a closed system based on advancing technology such as artificial photosynthesis. Past mistaken projects include growing plants for food to replicate terrestrial food sources, recovering small amounts of water from difficult to process waste to achieve high system closure, and using newly designed, lighter, but unreliable hardware to reduce launch mass. The political process supporting the false assumptions, projects, and vision has deliberately prevented the usual systems engineering and cost-benefit analysis. We are going to do much better.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRS1990

Software technology insertion: A study of success factors

Managing software development in large organizations has become increasingly difficult due to increasing technical complexity, stricter government standards, a shortage of experienced software engineers, competitive pressure for improved productivity and quality, the need to co-develop hardware and software together, and the rapid changes in both hardware and software technology. The 'software factory' approach to software development minimizes risks while maximizing productivity and quality through standardization, automation, and training. However, in practice, this approach is relatively inflexible when adopting new software technologies. The methods that a large multi-project software engineering organization can use to increase the likelihood of successful software technology insertion (STI), especially in a standardized engineering environment, are described.

Lydon, Tom↗

NASA NTRS2011

Risk Acceptance Personality Paradigm: How We View What We Don't Know We Don't Know

The purpose of integrated hazard analyses, probabilistic risk assessments, failure modes and effects analyses, fault trees and many other similar tools is to give managers of a program some idea of the risks associated with their program. All risk tools establish a set of undesired events and then try to evaluate the risk to the program by assessing the severity of the undesired event and the likelihood of that event occurring. Some tools provide qualitative results, some provide quantitative results and some do both. However, in the end the program manager and his/her team must decide which risks are acceptable and which are not. Even with a wide array of analysis tools available, risk acceptance is often a controversial and difficult decision making process. And yet, today's space exploration programs are moving toward more risk based design approaches. Thus, risk identification and good risk assessment is becoming even more vital to the engineering development process. This paper explores how known and unknown information influences risk-based decisions by looking at how the various parts of our personalities are affected by what they know and what they don't know. This paper then offers some criteria for consideration when making risk-based decisions.

Massie, Michael J.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Application of Probabilistic Methods to Assess Risk Due to Resonance in the Design of J-2X Rocket Engine Turbine Blades

The LOX-Hydrogen J-2X Rocket Engine, which is proposed for use as an upper-stage engine for numerous earth-to-orbit and heavy lift launch vehicle architectures, is presently in the design phase and will move shortly to the initial development test phase. Analysis of the design has revealed numerous potential resonance issues with hardware in the turbomachinery turbine-side flow-path. The analysis of the fuel pump turbine blades requires particular care because resonant failure of the blades, which are rotating in excess of 30,000 revolutions/minutes (RPM), could be catastrophic for the engine and the entire launch vehicle. This paper describes a series of probabilistic analyses performed to assess the risk of failure of the turbine blades due to resonant vibration during past and present test series. Some significant results are that the probability of failure during a single complete engine hot-fire test is low (~1%) because of the small likelihood of resonance, but that the probability increases to around 30% for a more focused turbomachinery-only test because all speeds will be ramped through and there is a greater likelihood of dwelling at more speeds. These risk calculations have been invaluable for use by program management in deciding if risk-reduction methods such as dampers are necessary immediately or if the test can be performed before the risk-reduction hardware is ready.

Brown, Andrew M.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Fault Management Guiding Principles

Regardless of the mission type: deep space or low Earth orbit, robotic or human spaceflight, Fault Management (FM) is a critical aspect of NASA space missions. As the complexity of space missions grows, the complexity of supporting FM systems increase in turn. Data on recent NASA missions show that development of FM capabilities is a common driver for significant cost overruns late in the project development cycle. Efforts to understand the drivers behind these cost overruns, spearheaded by NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD), indicate that they are primarily caused by the growing complexity of FM systems and the lack of maturity of FM as an engineering discipline. NASA can and does develop FM systems that effectively protect mission functionality and assets. The cost growth results from a lack of FM planning and emphasis by project management, as well the maturity of FM as an engineering discipline, which lags behind the maturity of other engineering disciplines. As a step towards controlling the cost growth associated with FM development, SMD has commissioned a multi-institution team to develop a practitioner's handbook representing best practices for the end-to-end processes involved in engineering FM systems. While currently concentrating primarily on FM for science missions, the expectation is that this handbook will grow into a NASA-wide handbook, serving as a companion to the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook. This paper presents a snapshot of the principles that have been identified to guide FM development from cradle to grave. The principles range from considerations for integrating FM into the project and SE organizational structure, the relationship between FM designs and mission risk, and the use of the various tools of FM (e.g., redundancy) to meet the FM goal of protecting mission functionality and assets.

principles↗

NASA NTRS2020

EDL Simulation Results for the Mars 2020 Landing Site Safety Assessment

The Mars 2020 rover is NASA’s next flagship mission, set to explore Mars in search of scientific evidence of past microbial life. Importantly, the rover will also, for the first time, have the ability to collect and cache rock and soil samples for retrieval and return to laboratories here on Earth. A key step in the development of the Mars 2020 mission is the selection of a suitable landing site with the largest likelihood of meeting scientific goals. This decision is a complex and critical one that requires close interaction between the scientific and engineering communities. The chosen landing site must be both scientifically interesting — providing the project with the greatest possible chance of gathering credible and defendable scientific evidence — and also safe enough to attempt a landing in the first place. Thus, arguably one of the most important undertakings of the Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) team, is to effectively enumerate, quantify, and communicate the landing risks to all of the stakeholders. The culmination of this effort is the Landing Site Safety Assessment, which is a review commissioned by the project, presided over by the EDL Standing Review Board, and attended by management and science stakeholders, in which the EDL team communicates their assessment of the associated landing risks and the statistical probability of a successful landing at each of the final candidate landing sites. This paper summarizes the results of high-fidelity computer simulations of the Mars 2020 EDL sequence used in this assessment. From an EDL performance perspective, all four candidates offer similar level of robustness, which is in-family with Mars Science Laboratory (MSL). However, two new features of the Mars 2020 EDL sequence – range trigger and Terrain-Relative Navigation (TRN) – dramatically enhance the capability of the EDL system to safely land at landing sites with much more rugged terrain than ever before considered. This has allowed the landing site selection for Mars 2020 to proceed in a manner that has been unprecedentedly weighted more heavily toward scientific interest and less heavily on engineering constraints. With TRN, the overall probability of success is predicted to be approximately 99% for all of the candidates.

David Way↗

NASA NTRS1991

Increasing productivity through Total Reuse Management (TRM)

Total Reuse Management (TRM) is a new concept currently being promoted by the NASA Langley Software Engineering and Ada Lab (SEAL). It uses concepts similar to those promoted in Total Quality Management (TQM). Both technical and management personnel are continually encouraged to think in terms of reuse. Reuse is not something that is aimed for after a product is completed, but rather it is built into the product from inception through development. Lowering software development costs, reducing risk, and increasing code reliability are the more prominent goals of TRM. Procedures and methods used to adopt and apply TRM are described. Reuse is frequently thought of as only being applicable to code. However, reuse can apply to all products and all phases of the software life cycle. These products include management and quality assurance plans, designs, and testing procedures. Specific examples of successfully reused products are given and future goals are discussed.

Schuler, M. P.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Space Shuttle Propulsion Safety Upgrades

This document is a viewgraph presentation which reviews the proposed upgrades to the Space Shuttle Propulsion system, to improve safety, and reduce significant hazards. The goals of the program are to reduce the risk of a catastrophe in ascent, to achieve significant reduction in orbital and entry systems, and to improve the crew cockpit situational awareness for managing the critical operational situations. The document reviews the upgrades to the propulsion system which are planned to improve the safety. These include modifications to the Advanced Thrust Vector Control, modifications to the Space Shuttle Main Engine Block III, improvement in the Advanced Health Management System, the use of Friction Stir welding on the external tank, which is expected to improve mechanical properties, and reduce defect rate, and the modification of the propellant grains geometry.

Humphries, William Randy, Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2011

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗

NASA NTRS1993

Intervention strategies for the management of human error

This report examines the management of human error in the cockpit. The principles probably apply as well to other applications in the aviation realm (e.g. air traffic control, dispatch, weather, etc.) as well as other high-risk systems outside of aviation (e.g. shipping, high-technology medical procedures, military operations, nuclear power production). Management of human error is distinguished from error prevention. It is a more encompassing term, which includes not only the prevention of error, but also a means of disallowing an error, once made, from adversely affecting system output. Such techniques include: traditional human factors engineering, improvement of feedback and feedforward of information from system to crew, 'error-evident' displays which make erroneous input more obvious to the crew, trapping of errors within a system, goal-sharing between humans and machines (also called 'intent-driven' systems), paperwork management, and behaviorally based approaches, including procedures, standardization, checklist design, training, cockpit resource management, etc. Fifteen guidelines for the design and implementation of intervention strategies are included.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS2005

NASA Heavy Lift Rotorcraft Systems Investigation

The NASA Heavy Lift Rotorcraft Systems Investigation examined in depth several rotorcraft configurations for large civil transport, designed to meet the technology goals of the NASA Vehicle Systems Program. The investigation identified the Large Civil Tiltrotor as the configuration with the best potential to meet the technology goals. The design presented was economically competitive, with the potential for substantial impact on the air transportation system. The keys to achieving a competitive aircraft were low drag airframe and low disk loading rotors; structural weight reduction, for both airframe and rotors; drive system weight reduction; improved engine efficiency; low maintenance design; and manufacturing cost comparable to fixed-wing aircraft. Risk reduction plans were developed to provide the strategic direction to support a heavy-lift rotorcraft development. The following high risk areas were identified for heavy lift rotorcraft: high torque, light weight drive system; high performance, structurally efficient rotor/wing system; low noise aircraft; and super-integrated vehicle management system.

Johnson, Wayne↗

NASA NTRS2006

Designs and Technology Requirements for Civil Heavy Lift Rotorcraft

Johnson, Wayne↗

NASA NTRS2011

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Zelkin, Natalie↗

DOE OSTI2024

Carbon Capture from ArcelorMittal Hot Briquetted Iron Plant Using Air Liquide Cryocap™ FG Technology – FEED Study

The process of steel production is energy and carbon intensive with global average energy consumption of 5.5 MWh/tonne of steel and CO2 emission intensity of 1.83 tonne CO2/tonne of steel. The steel making process has inherent CO2 emissions from mineral conversion and is considered major contributors to the global carbon emissions. The steel industry is responsible for 8% of global carbon emissions. The main objective of this research project is to execute and complete a front-end engineering and design (FEED) study for a commercial-scale, carbon capture project that separates 95% of the total CO2 emissions at the ArcelorMittal’s Hot Briquetted Iron (HBI) plant in Portland, TX (Figure 1). The HBI is an ore-based metallic that is used as high-grade feedstock for high-quality steel via an Electric Arc Furnace (EAF) route. The HBI plant produces 2.0 million metric tonnes of high-quality HBI and emits approximately 1 million tonnes CO2/yr. The capture system is a Pressure Swing Adsorption (PSA) system assisted Cryocap™ FG technology (Figure 2). The captured CO2 will be pipeline grade and will be geologically stored in a facility within 10 miles of the CO2 source. The Host Site location in Corpus Christi, TX, is near hydrocarbon processing facilities and near Environmental Justice (EJ) and Qualified Opportunity Zone (QOZ) communities. Due to the location of the Host Site, the retrofit project offers the ability to demonstrate how a workforce focused on the fossil energy sector can be redirected to the clean- energy sector. The Air Liquide Cryocap™ capture technology is a proven technology and has been extensively examined for large industrial applications. It has been shown to be applicable to a variety of industrial applications including the steel industry. Cryocap™ FG (specific setup for Flue Gas application) consists of a Pressure Swing Adsorption (PSA) unit coupled with a Cryogenic System. The PSA pre-concentrates the CO2 from the flue gas, while the cryogenic unit enables the CO2 purity to be increased to the desired level. The scope of this study incorporates completing FEED study of the CO2 capture system which includes point-source CO2 capture and balance-of-plant; Business Case Analysis (BCA) outlining the current and projected volumes of the steel plant’s point sources of CO2 and the potential utilization of tax credits, including its projected revenue and duration; Life Cycle Analysis (LCA); Environmental Justice Analysis; Economic Revitalization and Job Creation Outcomes Analysis; and Workforce Readiness Plan. The plant design work was divided into two components: Inside Battery Limits (ISBL) and Outside Battery Limits (OSBL). The ISBL focuses on the capture system, while the OSBL focuses on the utility feeds and ducting from the plant to the capture system. Various design and engineering deliverables will be developed to define commodity quantities, equipment specifications, and labour effort required to execute the project. These FEED study deliverables will be prepared with the intent to develop an overall project capital cost estimate consistent with an AACE Class 3 estimate. The modular approach for the Cryocap™ FG that is being designed for this study integrates compression, PSA, and cryogenic “bricks” to achieve the desired CO2 capture rates. This carbon capture system integrates easily with the existing plant, thus reducing project costs and risks. It is also capable of managing impurities such as nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx), mercury, hydrocarbons, and particulate matter. The capture system has a smaller footprint than amine-based systems. The two-step process uses PSA to preconcentrate the CO2 in the feedstream and then uses the cryogenic portion to purify and compress the resulting high purity CO2 product. This combination of purification and compression (i.e., process intensification) significantly reduces the CAPEX associated with use of a separate compressor commonly utilized for amine solvent-based systems. Successful completion of the FEED study will provide DOE with a detailed understanding of the costs for scaling up this proven capture technology for commercial applications at industrial facilities.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2010

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Space Missions

Use of heritage and new technology is necessary/enabling to implementing small, low cost missions, yet overruns decrease the ability to sustain future mission flight rates The majority of the cost growth drivers seen in the D&NF study were embedded early during formulation phase and later realized during the development and I&T phases Cost drivers can be avoided or significantly decreased by project management and SE emphasis on early identification of risks and realistic analyses SE processes that emphasize an assessment of technology within the mission system to identify technical issues in the design or operational use of the technology. Realistic assessment of new and heritage spacecraft technology assumptions , identification of risks and mitigation strategies. Realistic estimates of effort required to inherit existing or qualify new technology, identification of risks to estimates and develop mitigation strategies. Allocation of project reserves for risk-based mitigation strategies of each individual area of heritage or new technology. Careful tailoring of inheritance processes to ensure due diligence.

Barley, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS1995

Earth Sciences Data and Information System (ESDIS) program planning and evaluation methodology development

An Earth Sciences Data and Information System (ESDIS) Project Management Plan (PMP) is prepared. An ESDIS Project Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) consistent with the developed PMP is also prepared. ESDIS and related EOS program requirements developments, management and analysis processes are evaluated. Opportunities to improve the effectiveness of these processes and program/project responsiveness to requirements are identified. Overall ESDIS cost estimation processes are evaluated, and recommendations to improve cost estimating and modeling techniques are developed. ESDIS schedules and scheduling tools are evaluated. Risk assessment, risk mitigation strategies and approaches, and use of risk information in management decision-making are addressed.

Dickinson, William B.↗