Structural safety during curved flight
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Rohrbach, Adolf↗
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Evolution of Space Shuttle Range Safety (RS) Ascent Flight Envelope Design
Ascent flight envelopes are trajectories that define the normal operating region of a space vehicle s position from liftoff until the end of powered flight. They fulfill part of the RS data requirements imposed by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) on space vehicles launching from the Eastern Range (ER) in Florida. The 45SW is chartered to protect the public by minimizing risks associated with the inherent hazards of launching a vehicle into space. NASA s Space Shuttle program has launched 130+ manned missions over a 30 year period from the ER. Ascent envelopes were delivered for each of those missions. The 45SW envelope requirements have remained largely unchanged during this time. However, the methodology and design processes used to generate the envelopes have evolved over the years to support mission changes, maintain high data quality, and reduce costs. The evolution of the Shuttle envelope design has yielded lessons learned that can be applied to future endevours. There have been numerous Shuttle ascent design enhancements over the years that have caused the envelope methodology to evolve. One of these Shuttle improvements was the introduction of onboard flight software changes implemented to improve launch probability. This change impacted the preflight nominal ascent trajectory, which is a key element in the RS envelope design. While the early Shuttle nominal trajectories were designed preflight using a representative monthly mean wind, the new software changes involved designing a nominal ascent trajectory on launch day using real-time winds. Because the actual nominal trajectory position was not known until launch day, the envelope analysis had to be customized to account for this nominal trajectory variation in addition to the other envelope components.
Brewer, Joan D.↗
Proposed Draft Ground Safety Requirements for Flight Metallic Pressure Vessels for Inclusion in AIAA S-080
No abstract available
Hamilton Joseph B.↗
Safety of rift vehicle launch and flight operations
Nuclear radiation safety of rift vehicle launch & flight operations
NUCLEAR RADIATION↗
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 23-02: Safety Considerations when Repurposing Commercially Available Flight Termination Systems from Uncrewed to Crewed Launch Vehicles
Both uncrewed and crewed launch vehicles (LV) require Flight Termination Systems (FTS) for Range Safety to protect the public and ground assets in the event of a LV failure. Flight crew safety in this context is an added consideration for human spaceflight. The FTS is an electroexplosive system that activates destruct charges to rupture propellant tanks and shutdown engines during flight termination. Commercially available FTS units have been developed for uncrewed applications and are now being repurposed to crewed applications. A consequence of using these systems is that they are designed for public and ground crew safety, though inadequate for flight crew safety. Missing are Human Space Flight (HSF) design controls for inadvertent activation during crewed ascent and protection for crew emergency abort.
Flight Termination Systems↗
Utilizing Code Generation from Models for Electric Aircraft Motor Controller Flight Software
The processes followed to develop and test safety-critical flight software significantly increase development effort and overhead in comparison to both non-safety-critical and non-flight software. Generating code from models can be used to reduce development effort; however, the processes for using code generation to develop flight software are relatively immature. This work presents an approach for developing safety-critical flight software utilizing code generation from models to reduce development time and effort. The presented use-case is of electric aircraft motor control software developed for NASA's X-57 Maxwell aircraft.
flight software↗
Spacecraft Fire Safety: A Human Space Flight Program Perspective
This paper presents viewgraphs on the International Space Station's fire safety program from a human space flight perspective. The topics include: 1) Typical Manned Spacecraft Materials; 2) Typical Flammable Hardware Protection; 3) Materials Flammability; 4) Fire Retardants; 5) Nonflammable Foam Cushion Material; 6) Electrical Wire and Cable; 7) Russian Solid-Fuel Oxygen Generator (SFOG); 8) GOX Ignition Mechanisms; 9) Fire Detection; and 10) Fire Suppression.
Pedley, Michael D.↗
NASA Engineering Safety Center NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group 2007 Proactive Task Status
In 2007, the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) chartered the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group to bring forth and address critical battery-related performance/manufacturing issues for NASA and the aerospace community. A suite of tasks identifying and addressing issues related to Ni-H2 and Li-ion battery chemistries was submitted and selected for implementation. The current NESC funded are: (1) Wet Life of Ni-H2 Batteries (2) Binding Procurement (3) NASA Lithium-Ion Battery Guidelines (3a) Li-Ion Performance Assessment (3b) Li-Ion Guidelines Document (3b-i) Assessment of Applicability of Pouch Cells for Aerospace Missions (3b-ii) High Voltage Risk Assessment (3b-iii) Safe Charge Rates for Li-Ion Cells (4) Availability of Source Material for Li-Ion Cells (5) NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop This presentation provides a brief overview of the tasks in the 2007 plan and serves as an introduction to more detailed discussions on each of the specific tasks.
Manzo, Michelle A.↗
Mission risk appraisal.
Mission risk appraisal technique for identification and quantification of high risk areas for unmanned interplanetary missions
MISSION PLANNING↗
B-52B-008/DTV (Drop Test Vehicle) configuration 1 (with and without fins) flight test results - captive flight and drop test missions
The B-52B-008 drop test consisted of one takeoff roll to 60 KCAS, two captive flights to accomplish limited safety of flight flutter and structural demonstration testing, and seven drop test flights. Of the seven drop test missions, one flight was aborted due to the failure of the hook mechanism to release the drop test vehicle (DTV); but the other six flights successfully dropped the DTV.
Quade, D. A.↗
Automated Testing Experience of the Linear Aerospike SR-71 Experiment (LASRE) Controller
System controllers must be fail-safe, low cost, flexible to software changes, able to output health and status words, and permit rapid retest qualification. The system controller designed and tested for the aerospike engine program was an attempt to meet these requirements. This paper describes (1) the aerospike controller design, (2) the automated simulation testing techniques, and (3) the real time monitoring data visualization structure. Controller cost was minimized by design of a single-string system that used an off-the-shelf 486 central processing unit (CPU). A linked-list architecture, with states (nodes) defined in a user-friendly state table, accomplished software changes to the controller. Proven to be fail-safe, this system reported the abort cause and automatically reverted to a safe condition for any first failure. A real time simulation and test system automated the software checkout and retest requirements. A program requirement to decode all abort causes in real time during all ground and flight tests assured the safety of flight decisions and the proper execution of mission rules. The design also included health and status words, and provided a real time analysis interpretation for all health and status data.
Larson, Richard R.↗
Applicability of Digital Flight to the Operations of Self-Piloted Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) hold great promise for a new era of specialized missions, including personal air transportation, cargo flight operations, aerial surveys, inspections, firefighting and more. The anticipated market growth is significant. To unlock its scalability and incumbent benefits requires a human to oversee multiple flights simultaneously, focusing on multi-vehicle mission management and relinquishing to autonomous systems their active role in controlling the aircrafts’ flight paths. Key to the realization of these scalability benefits is minimally-encumbered access to the National Airspace System (NAS), which poses some unique challenges for self-piloted UAS aircraft operations. These include the requirement for compatibility with existing airspace structures and operations including Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), neither of which were developed to accommodate the unique needs and capabilities of UAS. This paper explores the applicability of Digital Flight to the operations of self-piloted UAS. As proposed by NASA, Digital Flight is a flight operations capability, enabled by a set of cooperative procedures and digital technologies, in which flight operators ensure flight-path safety through automated separation and flight path management in lieu of visual procedures and Air Traffic Control separation services. Flights operating under potentially-forthcoming rules of Digital Flight employ advanced automation technologies, information sharing, connectivity to operational data, and cooperative behaviors through distributed decision-making to maintain safety and achieve mission objectives. Designed for integration with VFR and IFR operations in shared NAS airspace, potentially as a third set of flight rules, Digital Flight may provide the mechanism for UAS operators – and all aircraft operators – to scale and diversify their operations beyond what is achievable under current regulations.
DFR↗
Dynamic Structural Fault Detection and Identification
Aircraft structures are designed to guarantee safety of flight in some required operational envelope. When the aircraft becomes structurally impaired, safety of flight may not be guaranteed within that previously safe operational envelope. In this case the safe operational envelope must be redefined in-flight and a means to prevent excursion from this new envelope must be implemented. A specific structural failure mode that may result in a reduced safe operating envelope, the exceedance of which could lead to catastrophic structural failure of the aircraft, will be addressed. The goal of the DFEAP program is the detection of this failure mode coupled with flight controls adaptation to limit critical loads in the damaged aircraft structure. The DFEAP program is working with an F/A-18 aircraft model. The composite wing skins are bonded to metallic spars in the wing substructure. Over time, it is possible that this bonding can deteriorate due to fatigue. In this case, the ability of the wing spar to transfer loading between the wing skins is reduced. This failure mode can translate to a reduced allowable compressive strain on the wing skin and could lead to catastrophic wing buckling if load limiting of the wing structure is not applied. The DFEAP program will make use of a simplified wing strain model for the healthy aircraft. The outputs of this model will be compared in real-time to onboard strain measurements at several locations on the aircraft wing. A damage condition is declared at a given location when the strain measurements differ sufficiently from the strain model. Parameter identification of the damaged structure wing strain parameters will be employed to provide load limiting control adaptation for the aircraft. This paper will discuss the simplified strain models used in the implementation and their interaction with the strain sensor measurements. Also discussed will be the damage detection and identification schemes employed and the means by which the damaged aircraft parameters will be used to provide load limiting that keeps the aircraft within the safe operational envelope.
Smith, Timothy↗
Experimental study of the flight envelope and research of safety requirements for hang-gliders
The flight mechanic computations were computed, providing both the flight envelopes with all sorts of limits and a fairly precise idea of the influence of several parameters, such as pilot's weight, wing settings, aeroelasticity, etc... The particular problem of luffing dives was thoroughly analyzed, and two kinds of causes were exhibited in both the rules of luffing and aeroelastic effects. The general analysis of longitudinal stability showed a strong link with fabric tension, as expected through Nielsen's and Twaites' theory. Fabric tension strongly depending upon aeroelasticity, that parameter was found to be the most effective design one for positive stability. Lateral stability was found to be very similar in all gliders except perhaps the cylindro-conical. The loss of stability happens in roll at low angle of attack, whereas it happens in yaw at high angle. Turning performance was a bit suprising, with a common maximum value of approximately 55 deg of bank angle for a steady turn.
Laburthe, C.↗
A pilot rating scale for evaluating failure transients in electronic flight control systems
A pilot rating scale was developed to describe the effects of transients in helicopter flight-control systems on safety-of-flight and on pilot recovery action. The scale was applied to the evaluation of hardovers that could potentially occur in the digital flight-control system being designed for a variable-stability UH-60A research helicopter. Tests were conducted in a large moving-base simulator and in flight. The results of the investigation were combined with existing airworthiness criteria to determine quantitative reliability design goals for the control system.
Hindson, William S.↗
Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission
In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.
human spaceflight safety↗
Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission
In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.
human spaceflight safety↗