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This was a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC as manager and operator of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Makel Engineering, Inc., ("MEI"), to develop powder bed printing approaches for fabrication of energetic material payloads and munitions.
This was a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC as manager and operator of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Sol Xorce LLC to develop LLNL’s Gyrosole™ solar thermal energy system. The original scope of the CRADA project was to develop LLNL’s Gyrosole™thermal-powered motor technology for solar thermal energy system use, and was originally entitled, "Development of Gyrosole™ Solar Thermal Technology for 20-60 kW Applications". The scope and title of the project were later modified under Amendment One to the CRADA. The technical objective of this CRADA project was to develop Gyrosole™ motor technology so that it is marketplace-ready, and to produce a motor prototype that: Produces 50kW power at >22% efficiency; Operates oil-free; Has sufficient reliability and lifetime to be suitable for both commercial and residential applications; Costs less than $100 per kW installed to produce at scale; and, Can be combined cost-effectively to produce 200kW. The motor prototype would be integrated into model systems that provide electricity generation in combination with air/water heating, heat-pump driven cooling, desiccant dehumidification, and light industrial heat supply.
This project was a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC as manager and operator of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Amgen, Inc. ("Amgen"), to develop a capability to computationally evaluate the importance and roles of different ion channels in atrial fibrillation. The first phase of this collaboration was to implement the atrial model, run prototype simulations, and analyze the results. Two No-Cost Time Extension (NCTE) requests were executed for this project. The first NCTE was executed on April 1, 2016, and extended the CRADA project for an additional two months to allow enough time to complete the tasks and deliverables, due to a delay in the start of the project. A second NCTE was executed on June 28, 2016, extending the project by three months, through November 3, 2016, to allow enough time to complete the final tasks and deliverables as well as negotiate a CRADA extension. The actual duration of this project was fourteen months. Amgen was unable to obtain budget approval to extend the CRADA past November 3, 2016. All of the deliverables for this CRADA project were successfully completed according to schedule.
To gain a better understanding of the complex transients in a utility grid with a large number of solar PV installations coupled by PWM inverters during the protection and restoration period of the power grid, in this project a kW-level experimental system with dominating inverter-based resources and a hardware-in-loop simulation system with transmission and distribution models, as well as several SEL protective relays have been built and used. The major research findings of the project are summarized below in two perspectives: Experimental research: A self-organized ultra-high frequency solitary waveform is discovered and demonstrated in the hardware experimental system. Despite the familiarities, such a solitary waveform is distinct from any harmonics, transient, or resonance waves in that, it is 1) non-dispersive over time and space, 2) not associated with any active source or the linear superposition of sources, 3) half-cycle asymmetric, 4) not responding to filters or change of system characteristic resonance frequency, 5) ubiquitous as it occurs simultaneously everywhere in the system from DC supply, power lines, and the utility grid, and 6) explosive through tripping the protection or damaging susceptible devices or circuits. Analytical study: The nature of such a new waveform and an analytical explanation of its formation are studied based on related physics and non-linear science principles, with the following highlights: 1) such a new waveform follows the solutions to the Non-linear Schrödinger equation, so the classic linear perturbation theory is unable to explain or predict such a unique waveform as confirmed with the research team of RTDS; 2) the critical condition of occurrence of such a waveform is derived, which indicates that the breakings of solitary wave is a system synchronous issue between the utility grid in the 60Hz phasor domain and duty-ratio modulation of DC sources in the inverter switching frequency domain; 3) such a waveform carries energy mass so it could be detrimental; 4) such a waveform is deceiving as it is not readily detectable in the energy propagation direction by the primary protection equipment, while it is detrimental in the perpendicular direction of energy propagation, i.e. voltage direction. Thus, it has more likely challenges to the second primary equipment and devices, particularly at the weakest link and point such as aging insulation and inappropriate setting of susceptible devices. Therefore, such a waveform can be easily ignored in the aftermath investigation. The intellectual merits: The experimental discovery reveals certain unfamiliar transient phenomena that could challenge the integration of large-scale grid-connected solar PV installation during the group ride-through period of solar PV installations, commissioning of large-solar farms, or dramatic change of solar radiation conditions. Particularly, the research findings suggest that the occurrence of the unfamiliar transient phenomena is uniquely associated with the inverter-based solar PV installation, which is less likely to happen for rotary energy systems. The physics and non-linear science-based research work laid down an analytical path to the challenging transient stability problems including those that have been observed currently and future calls. Both experimental and analytical research results explain the limitation of many current research effects including some DoE research undertakings as well as possible solutions. The broader impacts: The research outcome of the project advances the understanding of the possible transient problems for the integration of inverter-based solar PV installation. It also highlights the theoretical and technical barriers for applying the conventional theory and technology to design and implement countermeasures against their adverse impacts of the large-scale solar PV installation and operation on grid reliability and security. More broadly, the research outcomes have shed some light on the open, fundamental challenges in the integration of large-scale solar photovoltaic energy into current and next-generation power grids across the country, and worldwide. The advanced physics and non-linear science-based analysis open up a path to harmonization of the renewables for societal energy needs via building a resilient and sustainable electric power infrastructure.
Leidos prepared this Preliminary Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) Sampling Plan for the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) Pantex Plant Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) Pantex, the operations and maintenance (O&M) contractor of Pantex Plant commissioned the Preliminary PFAS Sampling Plan to evaluate the potential risks at the facility and collect preliminary groundwater data at areas within the Plant with the highest potential for PFAS. This plan presents findings from research conducted to assess past and current use of materials containing PFAS and identify areas where these materials were potentially stored, handled, used, or released at Pantex Plant. Pantex Plant is located in Carson County in the Texas Panhandle (Figure 1-1).
The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) is a general-purpose critical assembly facility located within the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada National Security Site. The NCERC is operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory.
This document details the needs and requirements for a propulsion-assisted drop tower system (further referenced simply as Drop Tower) to perform hardware testing at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). LLNL is managed and operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) for the Department of Energy (DOE). LLNL requires a robust testing platform that will allow for the characterization of interactions between objects of interest. The initial siting of the equipment will be located in an existing test facility (B191). When another test facility becomes online, the objective will be to move the test capability to the new facility as a final location (B132N). The Drop Tower will be a cornerstone capability for testing and model validation for LLNL interested programs.
The U.S. nuclear sector encounters a difficulty in upholding essential safety standards while also securing economic viability for continued operation. Safety stands as a pivotal factor across all facets of operations within light-water reactor nuclear power plants. Achieving economic feasibility alongside safety can be facilitated through the utilization of a risk-informed framework, exemplified by the ongoing development within the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis Pathway under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy's LWRS Program. This initiative advocates for a diverse array of research and development endeavors aimed at optimizing both safety and economic efficacy within nuclear power plants, particularly pertinent as many plants contemplate second license renewals. The Risk-Informed Systems Analysis Pathway has two main goals: deploy methodologies and technologies that better represent safety margins and cost and safety factors and develop advanced applications that enable cost-effective plant operation. This report assesses the potential for resolving multi-cycle plant reload challenges through real-world scenarios utilizing the Plant ReLoad Optimization (PRLO) framework. This framework offers reactor core design developers analytic tools of reactor safety and fuel performance with the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance core design solutions. Multi-objective genetic algorithm alongside acceleration techniques is explored as an enabling technology for improving fuel efficiency while upholding safety thresholds. The demonstration of multi-cycle core design optimization is performed. This report investigates the practical application of the PRLO platform in addressing real-world core design challenges, supporting AI efforts, and contrasting outcomes with those derived from heuristic or conventional algorithms.
Deterministic transport simulations for national-security and energy applications often operate in high-dimensional phase-space, where accuracy and cost both become major challenges. A common numerical artifact in such problems is the “ray-effect,” which appears as unphysical streaks. Beyond misinterpretation, these artifacts can contaminate tightly coupled physics, such as fluid dynamics, radiation-hydrodynamics, and laser-plasma interactions, eroding the predictive capability of entire multiphysics workflows. Our objective was to make high-dimension studies practical on modern hardware while mitigating the ray-effect without relying on prohibitively expensive sampling approaches such as Monte Carlo methods. We developed the Generic Discretization Library (GenDiL), a Graphics Processing Unit (GPU)-first framework that uses high-order Discontinuous Galerkin (DG) methods and matrix-free algorithms to reduce memory usage and improve computational efficiency, critical for phase-space simulations. GenDiL supports phase-space adaptivity in both mesh size and polynomial order (hp-adaptivity) to place resolution only where it is needed. A central capability is Local Dimensional Refinement (LDR), which couples lower-dimension continuum models to higher-dimension kinetic models through stable and conservative interfaces, so that high-fidelity physics is applied only in regions where it is essential. Building on the GenDiL framework, we developed the General SN (GSN) family of algorithms as a true generalization of the polar SN approach (discrete ordinates, often denoted SN). Rather than tying discrete ordinates to a specific polar change of coordinates, GSN formulates transport on an arbitrary change of coordinates chosen to reduce ray-effect. We studied two complementary variants: an analytic variant, where the coordinate map is prescribed in advance by a closed-form function; and a data-driven variant, where a quantity of interest, such as the net flux, guides the coordinate system. GenDiL provides the library infrastructure for efficient GPU execution, but the GSN concept is algorithmic and independent of any one library. Across representative high-dimension tests, including non-symmetric solutions, both variants delivered strong ray-effect mitigation at practical cost, moving four- to six-dimensional analysis toward repeatable, routine studies.
This is a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC as manager and operator of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (“LLNL”) and Guardian Glass, LLC ("Guardian Glass") to develop a fast-running emulator of the reactive Computational Fluid Dynamics (“CFD”) simulations needed to understand the complex reactions and flows in the glass melting, fining, and forming subprocesses. This CRADA project is sponsored under the High-Performance Computing for Manufacturing (“HPC4Mfg”) Program of the Department of Energy’s Advanced Manufacturing Office (“AMO”) within the Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (“EERE”) Office.
The Elastic Analysis Facility (EAF) hosted at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) is a platform being developed with the goal of providing a fast and efficient facility for physics analysis. As high-energy physics moves towards collecting larger datasets, such as those from the High-Luminosity LHC, the EAF strives to provide a powerful and adaptable framework for future colliders and multi-experiment institutions. Currently, the EAF supports several experiments including CMS, NOvA, and DUNE as well as serving accelerator physicists and beam line operations through integrated software and secure connections to Fermilab's computing resources. In addition, the EAF was designed with a user-friendly interface, intended to be more intuitive for emerging generations of physicists, that is still accessible for established styles of analysis. The EAF can also achieve better analysis efficiency due to the modernization of software and tools that can better utilize Fermilab's computing power. Furthermore, its design incorporates industry standards whenever possible, enhancing its sustainability and making it a possible template for other national or international laboratories and research facilities. Overall, the EAF is a forward-looking solution that will meet the evolving needs of particle physics, ensuring readiness for future colliders and multi-experiment research institutions.
Recent technological advancement has created a growing convergence of innovation. From machine learning to ubiquitous computing to wireless networks and automation, the world is seeing new technology increasingly capable of connecting with each other. Devices and systems use open communications networks to interact, process information, and react. This is called the Internet of Things (IoT) and is comprised of physical devices that exchange data over networks, creating revolutionary possibilities. The most common way most people interact with an IoT is through ‘smart home’ products like Amazon’s Alexa, which use microphones, speakers, and phones to control a variety of devices, from lights and thermostats, to cameras, to appliances and vacuum cleaners. But the open nature of IoT networks—necessary for their ability to communicate and operate—also introduces privacy and security concerns. At a personal level, this might mean a hack into a home to steal private information, but when applied in broader industries like healthcare, transportation, manufacturing, or the military, this vulnerability can have serious consequences. As IoT usage and interconnectivity increases, so too does the susceptibility to malicious actors. And the entire system is only as secure as its least secure member. This creates particular risk and vulnerability to radiological material industries, as a competent insider adversary could utilize the IoT to potentially steal or access classified or sensitive information about employees, sites, or systems; or simply sabotage security or maintenance from a more remote—and less secure—device. The IoT relies on a secure network across the entire system, especially in transport which may lack the security of more permanent locations; if one device fails, it can create a ripple effect and an insider threat may seek to exploit that connectivity. While IoT benefits drive increased innovation and usage, there are also vulnerabilities an insider threat could exploit; this risk of an IoT to radiological material must be addressed in any mitigation effort.
In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.
Sealed radioactive sources (SRS) are being used worldwide in the field of medicine, agriculture, industry and research. They can be found in mobile as well as stationary devices. SRS contains radioactive material that is (a) permanently sealed in a capsule or (b) closely bounded and in a solid form. The capsule or material of an SRS should be strong enough to maintain leak tightness under the conditions of use and purpose for which the source was designed, also in case of accidents. In this case only emitted radiation is utilized. Firstly, the hazard from external radiation has to be considered, but the possibility of contamination due to fracture of the capsule should not be disregarded. The radioactive sources are composed of the radiating isotope contained in the filling medium, the single or double isotope holder that partially or totally surrounds the filling medium, the outer cover that contains the parts mentioned above and the capsule closed airtightly by welding or using some other method. The capsule must be tested for leakage periodically. If the SRS is no longer needed (e.g. replaced by a different technique) or it becomes useless for the intended application (e.g. the activity becomes too weak, the equipment containing the source works poorly or becomes obsolete, the source is damaged or leaking) it is considered disused. Disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) are typically conditioned and disposed if a facility is available. If the disposal option is not available, conditioned DSRS should be stored under proper conditions. In some cases, the radionuclide(s) in DSRS can be recovered/recycled or the DSRS can be repurposed for other applications. Conditioning of DSRS ensures containment of the radioactive material, provides confinement for leaking sources, provides sufficient radiation shielding, reduces storage/disposal volume by allowing consolidation of multiple sources into a single storage/disposal container, facilitates transport operations and contributes to safety and security as well. Typically, conditioning technologies are deployed either as permanently installed stationary systems in centralized or mobile on-site waste processing facilities, or in a mobile configuration. Centralized stationary facilities provide a single processing location for multiple users that requires transport of the waste to the facility. On the other hand, mobile systems may be provided for the selection and application of the optimum technology for a specific waste stream (such as DSRS) by bringing the process to the point where the waste is generated. In addition, mobile systems could offer additional flexibility by sharing equipment among multiple waste generating sites for processing campaigns that vary in duration, from very short periods to several years. The term 'mobile processing system' refers to any radioactive waste processing system or component which is designed to be transportable and which is not considered permanently installed. Two mobile system for conditioning of disused sealed radioactive sources are developed in the Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia. Development of these mobile systems was supported by SRB9005 national project via Technical Cooperation of the IAEA. The first mobile system, built inside the 20 feet ISO container, will be used for conditioning of DSRS category 3 to 5. The second mobile system, built inside the 7 m long vehicle (Iveco Daily Van), will be used for dismantling of ionizing smoke detectors mostly with Am-241 sources. Designs of the mobile systems were defined in cooperation with two companies from Belgium (Belgoprocess and Leniko) and a Croatian company Ekoteh as well as with the support of the IAEA experts. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures for the mobile systems are developed. Based on safety assessment the acceptance criteria and operational limits and conditions are established. Operational procedures include: (a) equipment and material requirements, (b) assembling procedure of the mobile unit, (c) procedure for acceptance of devices for dismantling and conditioning, (d) dismantling procedure for devices to recover the DSRS, (e) characterization of DSRS, (f) encapsulation procedure of DSRS, (g) disassembling procedure of the mobile unit, and (h) keeping records, identification and traceability. In addition, radiation safety, health safety, security and emergency preparedness plans are prepared. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures could be updated with site specific requirements, DSRS inventory, and different needs for future customers. Developed mobile systems could be used in all situations when it is feasible to perform conditioning of DSRS on the spot in the county and worldwide. Development of these mobile units was just the first step to create the Reference Center for Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disused Radioactive Sources Conditioning for Small Facilities which can become a regional training center in the future, and/or as a tool for comprehensive national search and secure programmes. In the next phases development of e-learning platforms and blended learning packages as well as application for the IAEA Qualified Technical Centre (QTC) for the management of DSRS is foreseen. (authors)
Accelerators increasingly use artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) software and workflows for a variety of tasks, from optimization to fault detection and recovery. Efficient and sustainable application of these technologies necessitates specialized and facility-specific infrastructure commitments. Accelerator facilities also introduce unique radiation and security hazards, placing additional demands on operational infrastructure. These needs further escalate the prioritization of effective collaboration models and associated funding mechanisms and legal frameworks.
This paper provides an overview of the progress to date, and discussion of the path forward, related to designing, fabricating, and testing an integrated security and safety monitoring system (ISSMS) for railcars used to transport spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in the United States. The system will comply with the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) Order 460.2B “Departmental Materials Transportation Management” and the Association of American Railroads’ (AAR) standard S-2043 “Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High-level Radioactive Material” [1] developed specifically for railcars used to transport high-level radioactive material (HLRM). DOE is in the process of developing and testing an ISSMS that will satisfy both DOE requirements and AAR standards. DOE has already developed railcar designs for transportation of HLRM. In 2024, DOE’s Atlas railcar project completed the design, fabrication and testing of three railcar types: transportation cask-carrying, buffer, and security escort, resulting in AAR conditional approval to operate on freight rail networks in North America. DOE decided to combine the required security and safety systems into one system, and this combined system is the subject of the current effort. DOE is developing and proposes to implement the ISSMS for these railcars as part of the build out of the railcar fleet. DOE began planning for development of the ISSMS in February 2020. The project is divided into seven phases starting with conceptual design and continuing through production design, as shown in Figure 1. An earlier version of the system was tested as part of the Atlas railcar consist demonstration test run in 2023. This paper describes the design features and system testing using the Atlas project railcars, and laboratory testing completed to date. The paper will also describe the activities planned to support the DOE project to ship the High Burn-Up Research Cask (HBRC) in 2027.
A digital twin has intelligent modules that continuously monitor the condition of the individual components and the whole of a system. Digital twins can provide nuclear power plants (NPP) operators an unprecedented level of monitoring, control, supervision, and security by contributing a greater volume of data for more comprehensive data analysis and increased accuracy of insights and predictions for decision making throughout the entire NPP lifecycle. NPP operators and managers have historically relied on limited, second hand or incomplete data. With proper implementation, digital twins can provide a central hub of all intel that allows for a multidisciplinary view of an NPP. This equips operators and managers with the ability to have more information, context, and intel that can be used for greater granularity during planning and decision making. Digital twins can be used in many activities as the technology has many different concepts surrounding it. From the various definitions of a digital twin within the industry, digital twins can be differentiated by levels of integration/automation. The three main models include digital model, digital shadow, and digital twin. Digital twins offer many potential advancements to the nuclear industry that could reduce costs, improve designs, provide safer operation, and improve their overall security.
In international nuclear safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is tasked with inspecting and verifying nuclear facilities and their activities. Data analytics and machine learning to support inspections require large amounts of data that nuclear facility operators may consider proprietary or sensitive, so the IAEA may not have full access. Allowing computation over private data without compromising its security therefore has value for safeguards inspections and analysis. Privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) consists of security-focused techniques that allow data analytics and machine learning algorithms to run on sensitive data without revealing it. This includes ideas like homomorphic encryption (HE), secure multiparty computation (SMPC), and secure enclaves. HE allows algorithms and mathematical operations to be conducted directly on the encrypted data instead of first decrypting it. With SMPC, multiple entities collaboratively compute over distributed data such that no party is able to directly view any others’ original data. Secure enclaves allow computation to take place in a separate and heavily blocked-off section of a CPU. Techniques like these allow for several potential use cases in which the security of data is essential. With SMPC, machine learning models can be trained over the input data from multiple entities, resulting in a model that all users can benefit from without leaking the input data from any particular entity. With SMPC or a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), an algorithm returning some single answer or truth value can be run on someone else’s data without ever needing to see that data, potentially allowing for verification or proof of some underlying question. HE can allow for outsourcing computation on data to a hostile or untrusted environment. Although most of the research in this field resides within the health and financial domains, tools from PPML may have similar applications in nuclear safeguards. Allowing the IAEA to compute over proprietary information, such as process models and raw sensor data using PPML techniques, provides the baseline for running complex analytics without needing direct unencrypted access to the underlying data, maintaining its privacy. Important limitations to consider for these techniques include the efficiency and level of security required. The security of HE and SMPC come at the cost of speed—the significant amount of overhead means that algorithms implemented in these protocols and encryption schemes are slower than when run on plaintext. Additionally, several important parameters determine what techniques or protocols are used based on the security requirements. SMPC protocols may need to be selected for resistance against a party that attempts to deviate from the protocol to distort the result or gain access to additional information, and a protocol secure against these attacks may further increase the overhead of the algorithm.