SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
To support the Laboratory’s pit mission, the Associate Laboratory Directorate for Plutonium Infrastructure on January 31, 2022, took the first step in establishing operations at TA-55 that run 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
A plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample 1000089 represents product-quality plutonium oxides produced in the Rocky Flats peroxide precipitation process currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over almost 13 years. The maximum observed gas pressure was 204 kPa and was related to a temperature excursion. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 126 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 86.7 kPa was due to the generation of hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Carbon dioxide, methane and carbon monoxide were minor components of the headspace gas. The material exhibited unusual behavior in that the atmosphere reached flammable levels of hydrogen and oxygen within the first 30 days and remained flammable for the duration of the experiment. It has been determined that the sample inside the reactor was a mixture of the AR material, material calcined at 800 °C, and material calcined at 950 °C. The experiment was terminated in 2012 and unloaded in 2016. A new reactor, SSR136A, was loaded with the original sample freshly calcined at 950 °C. The total pressure inside SSR136A remained close to the initial value of 93 kPa. The total pressure is composed of He (steady levels after the reloading) and hydrogen which is 10% of the reactor’s total pressure. Nitrogen and oxygen compose trace amounts of the reactor headspace. The internal components of SSR136 were inspected in 2021, five years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 4,576 days had an etched appearance, and pit-like features were observed in the microscopic analysis. No corrosion was observed on the SSR136A inner bucket that held the freshly calcined sample that was exposed for 1,303 days.
This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment, CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well, CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility, CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater, CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. This report covers calendar year 2021. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. This report will address all monitoring requirements noted in the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101, except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remained in effect until December 10, 2020. At the time of this report submittal, the new RCRA permit application was in review.
As part of the 3013 Surveillance Program, through-wall penetration from stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of the 3013 inner containers has been identified as the most credible condition for failure withing the 50- years lifetime. Chlorides contained in Pu-bearing material, together with intra-canister humidity levels, metallurgical conditions, and internal stresses have been found to produce corrosion in the Inner Container Closure Weld Region (ICCWR) of the 3013 canister system. A Laser Confocal Microscope (LCM) is used as part of the 3013 Surveillance Program protocol to identify the prevalence of corrosion and corrosionrelated cracking in the ICCWR2. With the LCM, a close visual examination is made of the ICCWR surface along with measurements of corrosion-related features. LCM inspections produce immense amounts of image data that is time intensive to analyze. There is also a 9-year backlog of images, with approximately 49 canisters that must be evaluated. To expedite data analysis and reduce the amount of generated data, a Wide Area 3D Measurement System (WAMS) microscope has been added to the examination protocol. Although WAMS is a lower resolution microscope, small features of interest can be still identified. The advantage of collecting data for the full circumference using the WAMS is that it can take about 1/16 of the time needed with the LCM. Both systems offer capabilities that combined can be utilized to expedite the examination of the ICCWR. The WAMS is an efficient system for screening and identification of corrosion features while the LCM can be utilized to obtain higher resolution images areas identified by the WAMS. This report explains and justifies the data collection methods used with the WAMS. It includes a summary of the data generated by WAMS in FY21. The goals set for data collection in FY21 were met. A total of twenty-two DE’s were imaged, and analysis was carried out on eleven samples. The analyzed samples showed large numbers of potential cracks and pits distributed throughout the surfaces. Lastly, to explain the advantages of the WAMS, its capabilities were compared to those of a simpler microscope. Micrographs of the samples imaged in FY21 and those analyzed are included in the appendices.
A plutonium/uranium oxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample CAN92 represents plutonium/uranium oxides stored in 3013 containers. The material originated in the analytical laboratory at Rocky Flats. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/400th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over 5 ½ years. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 117 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 77.5 kPa was largely due to the generation of nitrogen and carbon dioxide with minor amounts of hydrogen and nitrous oxide. The internal components of SSR147 were inspected 6.5 years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 1,937 days had an etched appearance and general corrosion. No pitting was observed on the inner bucket that held the sample.
The primary concern of this study is if experiments can be designed/conducted to provide technical justification to NCS in order to increase mass limits. This goal is in direct support of 30 pits per year mission, one of the top priorities for NNSA. The accelerated timeline is as follows: Initial tasking, June 2020; preliminary design completion (CED-1 equivalent), November 2020; final design completion (CED-2 equivalent), March 2021; part receipt and inspection completion (CED-3a equivalent), October 2021; experiment execution (CED-3b equivalent), December 2021; experiment documentation write-up completion (start CED-4a equivalent), January 2022; and ICSBEP target (CED-4a equivalent), Fall 2022.
In FY20, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation Research and Development (NA-22) to build a machine learning based modeling pipeline that could extract proliferation events of interest from open text-based data sources. As a test case, the research team targeted the identification/fusion of events and indicators that fissile core fabrication would be executed at the Savannah River Site prior to its official announcement in May of 2018. The demonstration prototype proved successful by applying natural language processing and graph theoretical techniques to identify contextual shifts in key words and phrases that acted as indicators that pit production would be carried out at the Savannah River Site up to two years prior to the official announcement.
This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. This report will address all monitoring requirements noted in the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101, except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site.
Constrained optimization in the context of time dependent, partial differential equations (PDE) leads to a symmetric, block-tridiagonal system of nonlinear equations that must be solved repeatedly in an iterative solution strategy. The blocks represent spatial discretization, while the connection between the blocks represents a forward and backward integration in time. The focus of this project is to apply a parallel-in-time (PiT) solution technique to the large block-triangular system.
The DOE Office of Environmental Management is responsible for high level nuclear waste that must be safely isolated from humans and the environment for extremely long periods. The waste forms and containers are made of glass, ceramics, and metals. Verified safe disposal requires understanding the fundamental mechanisms of waste form degradation and the design of new waste forms with improved performance, which comprise the goals of the Energy Frontier Research Center known as the Center for the Performance and Design of Nuclear Waste Forms and Containers, WastePD. WastePD was constructed to develop innovative approaches and solutions to those goals through the synergistic interactions of individuals who are experts in the degradation behavior, modeling, and design of glasses, ceramics and metal alloys. WastePD is the first center ever created to address this diverse group of materials in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. The science goals are grouped into three common topics: corrosion mechanisms via advanced characterization, environmental impacts, and materials design. Synergistic interactions in these areas were a key component of WastePD. The fundamental understanding of the degradation mechanisms of the waste forms and containers as well as the development of new materials with improved properties will allow DOE to prevent environmental contamination and to explore totally new repository concepts. WastePD was operational from August 2016 through July 2022, but the DOE support was drastically reduced for the last two years. This final technical report covers the full period of performance. However, much of what was accomplished in the first four years is nicely summarized in a review paper published in 2021, which is appended to this report. Therefore, this final report focuses on the technical findings from the last two years of WastePD activities. Considerable progress was made in the areas of a) the environmental and compositional impacts on the corrosion of borosilicate and aluminosilicate glasses, b) the mechanism of glass corrosion and the structure and evolution of the surface alteration layer, c) the effects of environment and composition on the corrosion of pyrochlore, perovskite, hollandite, and other oxide ceramics, d) the corrosion mechanism of multi-principal element metallic alloys, and e) a new framework for understanding the pitting corrosion of metals.
The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program yields foundational scientific research and development (R&D) essential to growing SRNL’s core competencies, in alignment with SRNL’s Strategic Plan to provide long-term benefits to the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and other customers and stakeholders. Five strategic goals are outlined in SRNL’s strategic plan: 1) Provide applied science and engineering for EM’s active clean-up sites and LM’s post closure management sites; 2) Provide science-based solutions for gaps identified in nonproliferation strategic vision and support the government in actives impacting national security; 3) Lead ST&E as the central technical authority for processing tritium loaded reservoirs and support production of plutonium pits; 4) Align science and energy security programs by focusing modern modeling, simulation, and data analytics tools on materials engineering and performance applications; 5) Build a workforce for the future.
On November 16, Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Thom Mason answered questions from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) at a public hearing in Santa Fe about the safety of operations at the Laboratory’s plutonium facility and the pit production mission. Mason participated on a panel along with National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Administrator Jill Hruby, Deputy NNSA Administrator James McConnell, and NNSA Los Alamos Field Office Manager Ted Wyka.
This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): 1) CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; 2) CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; 3) CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; 4) CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; 5) CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; 6) CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calendar year 2020. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110, the site fence, gate, lock, and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remained in effect until December 10, 2020. At the time of this report submittal, the new RCRA permit application was in review.
Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are in the process of returning the area where Building 175 existed to beneficial use for future site development. The completed assessment will help LLNS and DOE to outline project scope and costs associated with the removal, characterization, and disposal of materials generated when the concrete slab for the former building and any associated remaining subsurface structures are demolished. Slab removal under the Transition & Disposition process requires full screening for potential site contamination to determine appropriate future land use. Borehole locations and depths were designed to correctly assess DOE’s future liability for characterizing residual vadose zone contamination. If a residual source area is identified at depth, DOE will need to evaluate the additional cost of future subsurface cleanup (with limited access) due to planned development. This is necessary to leave the location in a “ready-to-build” status. As a result, Phase II sampling requirements may in some cases extend beyond the construction zone required for slab removal to ensure the necessary due diligence. To avoid the potential spread of contamination and/or the creation of an environmental release by impacting the integrity of known contamination areas (e.g., pit within room 102 and the east to west boundary seam), these locations were not sampled for this project. During demolition of the slab, these locations and their underlying soils should be further evaluated. The assessment was conducted in accord with the May 2022 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Former Building 175 Assessment Soil Sampling and Analysis Plan / Quality Assurance Plan. Thirty-six, direct-push borings were advanced, along with collecting concrete (where present) and soil samples for laboratory analyses. Thirty-two of the borings were advanced to a depth of 25 feet below ground (bgs), and four borings were advanced to a depth of 55 feet bgs. The concrete slab for former Building 175 ranged from approximately 8 inches to over two feet in thickness. Soils encountered during the investigation consisted primarily of clayey silt, with interbeds of sandy gravel and silty sand to the total depth explored of 55 feet bgs. Field photoionization detector readings – checking for volatile organic compound (VOC) vapors in soils, ranged from zero (0) to a peak of 33 parts per million at 25 feet bgs in boring PC-B175- 028. The cause for the peak reading is unknown, however, no visually discolored or odorous soils were encountered during the assessment and all VOC results were below Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL’s) Soil Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) soil screening levels (SSL). Groundwater was not encountered during the assessment and is expected to occur at roughly 65 feet bgs in the project area. No metals were detected at concentrations of concern in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. Low gross alpha and beta activity concentrations were detected in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The detected activity concentrations would appear to be from naturally occurring radioactive isotopes, i.e., potassium 40, present in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Tritium was not detected above the testing laboratory's Method Detection Limit (MDL) in any of the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 214, lead 212, lead 214, potassium 40, radium 226, radium 228, and thallium 208, were detected at low activity concentrations in the concrete core samples analyzed. Based on the detected activity concentrations, the isotopes would appear to be naturally occurring in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Acetone – a common laboratory contaminant, was detected in nine of the soil samples collected and analyzed. Concentrations of two other volatile organic compounds (benzene and tetrachloroethene) were detected in five of the soil samples analyzed. All concentrations were below SSLs. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel range organics were detected at 43.9 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as motor oil were detected at 7.20 mg/kg in the 15-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-001, and at 20.7 mg/kg in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. The SSL for diesel-range TPHs is 260 mg/kg. LLNL does not have an SSL for motor oil range TPHs. No indications of a release, e.g., visibly stained, or odorous soil, were present at the boring locations. No samples collected contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in concentrations above the laboratory reporting limit. Arsenic was detected above its SSL of 8.51 mg/kg in the 25-foot bgs routine sample collected from boring PC-B175-023. Nickel was detected above its SSL of 86.0 mg/kg in the 10-foot bgs routine sample from boing PC-B175-005, the 20-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-025, and the 25-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-034. The detected concentrations, however, were well below ten times (10x) their respective STLCs. Gross alpha and/or gross beta were detected above their respective SSL activity concentrations in three routine soil samples. Retesting (two per sample) of the samples showed that the initial reported activity concentrations were anomalous. Tritium was not detected in any of the routine or duplicate soil samples collected and analyzed during the investigation. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 212 and 214, lead 212 and 214, potassium 40, radium 224, 226 and 228, thallium 208, thorium 234 and uranium, were detected at low activity concentrations in the soil samples analyzed for radioactive constituents. The detected isotopes and their associated activity concentrations are typical of those naturally occurring in the marine-type sedimentary deposits underlying the Livermore Valley. No radiological controls are necessary for the soil evaluated.
This document recommends isotopic compositions to represent selected Pu supplies that might be made available for use in VTR driver fuel. These compositions are intended to be conservative representations suitable for determination of environmental impacts associated with use of the selected Pu supplies, but not upper bounds of all possible compositions. The selected Pu supplies under consideration are themselves representations of a more complicated set of possibilities, defined in a manner to allow efficient but conservative analysis of impacts. The source definitions to be considered are as follows: 1) Foreign sources of reactor-grade plutonium. This material would be provided as polished material in an oxide form and is assumed to be transported from Europe (France or England); 2) Domestic, non-weapon sources of plutonium such as unused FFTF fuel, Hanford metal (stored at SRS), and various oxides; 3) Domestic sources of weapons-grade plutonium, including metal from dismantled pits and otherwise excess to stockpile needs.
As the United States transitions toward a clean energy economy, an opportunity exists for redeveloping the more than 17,000 mine land sites located across the nation with clean energy technologies, which have a combined potential for generating more than 85 GW of clean electricity. This report provides an overview of the potential of demonstrating and deploying clean energy projects on current and former mine land. Clean energy project refers to a project that demonstrates one or more of the following technologies: solar; microgrids; geothermal; direct air capture; fossil-fueled electricity generation with carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration; energy storage, including pumped storage hydropower and compressed air energy storage; and advanced nuclear technologies. The report discusses the following technologies and their potential for creating jobs and generating tax revenue that would result in direct and indirect benefits to the local economy: Solar photovoltaics (PV) is being developed on current and former mine land in various parts of the world, including the United States. This approach is attractive because it requires limited infrastructure investment and would utilize the bare surfaces of mines and tailing ponds. Solar resource availability may be greater in the southern regions, including the Interior and Appalachian Basins and the southwestern United States. However, since some mine land sites include areas of significant change in elevation, the deployment of PV on mine land may require sophisticated planning to account for shading and irradiance, or may require regrading of the areas. PV does not create significant environmental risks and generally does not face public resistance; Geothermal systems are often spatially and genetically associated with ore deposits, and in some cases, they have been discovered while in search for epithermal mineral resources. Numerous diverse geothermal applications have been employed at mine land around the world, including power generation, mineral extraction from geothermal brines, process heating, direct use for other mining operations, and direct use for non-mining operations and subsurface energy storage, including geothermal heat pumps. Case studies highlighting these applications provide key lessons relating to identifying drivers and barriers to geothermal resource deployment and can be used to create screening tools for identifying the types and locations of mine land most amenable to utilizing geothermal resources; Carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration technologies include direct air capture (DAC) and enhanced weathering. DAC technologies include air contactors, regeneration systems, and CO 2 compression systems. Captured CO 2 can be converted to valuable feedstocks or possibly injected into abandoned subsurface mines where it would be absorbed by alkaline rock waste and mine tailings or by the porous minerals along the walls of the mine. DAC systems can be coupled with energy sources such as wind, solar, grid, or geothermal. Many DAC systems require a source of water or steam; however, some are expected to be net producers of water. Local impacts of DAC systems are expected to be low, and are related to land footprint, material disposal, and upstream impacts of energy and material production; Compressed air energy storage is an established energy storage technology in salt caverns. It has the potential for implementation in underground mines by pressurizing and storing a large amount of air using electrical compressors when excess electricity is available. When a need for discharge emerges, the air is used to spin turbines and produce the necessary volume of electricity. Abandoned or unused mine openings, including shafts, adits, access tunnels, and mined workings of any orientation, offer potential for vast amounts of compressed air energy storage if the site characteristics meet operational requirements; Pumped hydropower storage can be implemented in surface and subsurface mines. In surface mine applications, both reservoirs may be located in a mine pit or artificial reservoirs made of excavated materials. In subsurface mines, the lower reservoir may be implemented by waterproofing and flooding mine shafts and tunnels. The water is then pumped from the lower reservoir to the upper reservoir during periods of low load and high production, and it is discharged through the turbines during periods of peak demand. The potential environmental damages associated with acidity of mine water or the presence of toxic chemicals incentivizes the development of closed-loop technologies, in which water circulates inside the pumped hydropower facility without being discharged into the external water basins; Advanced nuclear energy technologies include small modular reactors, which can be deployed locally to produce electricity and heat. Such units require seismic stability and a supply of cooling water, but population constraints may exist in some areas. Therefore, remote mine land could represent an optimal location for siting advanced nuclear energy technologies.
As educational institutions of New Mexico, develop educational, training, and research programs in support of the pit manufacturing related STEM fields, which directly benefit LANL with critical hires.
Halogen impurities are poisonous and/or corrosive • Poison for catalysts and equipment • Causes pitting in most austenitic stainless steels • Minimized to prevent damage over time • Prone to appear in certain processes • Appear if certain materials degrade (i.e., elastomers, etc.) • Present as trace impurities in a large number of metals and zeolites (<200 ppm)