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DOE OSTI2025

Graphite waste classification and disposal cost estimation for high temperature gas and salt reactors

As high-temperature reactor designs progress to demonstration, managing the radioactive wastes from these systems presents unique challenges. This work explores the irradiated graphite source term produced by three reactor designs: The Modular High Temperature Gas reactor (MHTGR), a pebble-bed High Temperature Gas Reactor (pb-HTGR), and a Fluoride-cooled High-temperature Reactor (FHR). We predicted a C-14 concentration of 4.3 Ci/m 3 for the MHTGR, 1.2 Ci/m 3 for the pebble bed HTGR, and 2.5 Ci/m 3 for the gFHR after 20 years of operation. The final C-14 concentration highly depended on the graphite nitrogen impurity, a major precursor for C-14. The C-14 concentration in all reactor types exceeded the 0.8 Ci/m3 threshold, resulting in a Class C waste classification. The costs associated with accepting the graphite after 20 years in a low-level waste disposal facility were projected to be 255 dollars per kWe for the MHTGR, 248 dollars per kWe for the pb-HTGR, and 56.8 dollars per kWe for the FHR.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Decommissioning of the V1 Nuclear Power Plant Jaslovske Bohunice - 20270

The paper focuses on introducing the approach and method applied for decommissioning of the V1 nuclear power plant (further the 'V1 NPP') located in Jaslovske Bohunice in the Slovak Republic, to the conference participants. The Paper outlines activities and steps necessary to comply with the requirements contained in the decision of the Slovak government from 1999 regarding the early shutdown of the V1 NPP. The company responsible for the V1 NPP decommissioning is Jadrova a vyradovacia spolocnost, a.s., (further JAVYS) with the State as a sole shareholder. On the basis of the V1 NPP Decommissioning Conceptual Plan, out of four assessed options, JAVYS selected the immediate decommissioning option (the 'IDO') for the V1 NPP. On the basis of multi-criteria analysis, the IDO specified the approach of immediate and continuous dismantling of equipment followed by demolition of buildings and preparation of the site for its further potential use. The IDO also included the summary of technical, environmental, legislative information as well as the determination of assumed costs for decommissioning of the V1 NPP. Prior to commencement of the V1 NPP decommissioning, within the process of termination of operation, activities connected with de-fuelling, monitoring, processing of historical waste and, not to forget, the process of obtaining the license for the V1 NPP decommissioning were executed. JAVYS decided to divide the decommissioning process into two stages. In 2011, JAVYS obtained a license for the first stage of the V1 NPP decommissioning. Within this stage, dismantling of inactive equipment, demolitions of inactive buildings, monitoring of systems and preparatory works for the upcoming stage of decommissioning were implemented. In 2015, in line with the license for the 2. stage of the V1 NPP decommissioning, the activities of decontamination and dismantling of contaminated and active equipment as well as demolitions of remaining buildings began. In this stage radioactive waste (RAW) produced during the decommissioning is to be processed. After decontamination, the material fulfilling the free release criteria is to be released into the environment, the site is to be cleared from the scope of the Atomic Act and released from the surveillance of the national regulators. Future application of certain methods and techniques for decontamination and dismantling in similar environments might bring an added value to the operators. Paper includes a description of best practices for Nuclear Power Plant VVER type reactors decommissioning. Schedule comparison is given to show how the critical path of certain projects is being managed. Application of the International Standard for Decommissioning Costing (ISDC) methodology provides a uniform method which enables comparison of cost estimates to other nuclear facilities under decommissioning. The cost estimate for the V1 NPP decommissioning has been continuously updated based on more advanced and detailed information on the decommissioning activities and projects. Monitoring of progress of the V1 NPP decommissioning is performed via four key-performance indicators. The Earned Value Management (EVM) methodology is used for evaluating time and cost aspect of decommissioning activities while waste conditioning index is calculated by comparing the actually produced waste to planned values of waste for a respective monitored period. Radiological safety index is assessed by comparison of the personnel records on the individual yearly doses received by each respective employee to the boundary value. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Potential for Transport of Cesium as Bio-colloids in a High Ionic Strength System

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a deep geologic repository for long-term disposal of transuranic, radioactive waste that is a byproduct from the nation's nuclear defense program. Most likely release scenario → human intrusion (potentially through drilling) (US DOE 1995; 1996). Brine may proceed through the Rustler formation (the most transmissive layer) (Perkins et al., 1999). There is a need to investigate halophilic microbes including their mobility in the Rustler formation and the potential for enhancing transport of cesium as a bio-colloid. Objectives: To quantify the change in mobility of Cs by interaction with microbes (Chromohalobacter) that may be present near Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. What is Chromohalobacter?: a halophilic microbe, isolated from near the WIPP site, able to thrive in the high salt concentrations relevant to the repository. Does the microbe growth phase effect uptake of Cs? Experiments conducted with actively growing and stationary phase Chromohalobacter. Uptake may differ if Cs{sup +} is mistaken for K{sup +} in an actively growing (Log) phase versus stationary phase microbes (not actively reproducing). Materials: 1'' Teflon column packed with 1 gram of dolomite [355-500 μm, CaMg(CO{sub 3}){sub 2}] connected to a syringe pump and fraction collector via Teflon tubing. Chromohalobacter (100 million cells/mL) and dolomite collected near the WIPP. Synthetic brine - 15% NaCl (w/v ∼2.78 M) + 3 mM NaHCO{sub 3}. Methodology: Negative Control 5,000 ppb Cs initially injected into mini-columns with brine. Injection solution was then switched to only brine. Cs Experiments with Stationary Phase Chromo: Set 1: Viable stationary Chromo injected into minicolumns after reaction with 200 ppb Cs. Injection solution was then switched to only brine (without Cs or microbes). Set 2: Stressed stationary Chromo initially injected into mini-columns after reaction with 200 ppb Cs. Then, switched to brine only. Cs Experiments with Log phase Chromo: Set 1: Chromo injected into mini-columns after reaction with 5,000 ppb Cs. Injection then switched to only brine (without Cs or microbes). Set 2: Chromo grown with 5,000 ppb Cs and spiked with additional Cs before injection into columns. Preliminary Conclusions: Cs was not taken up or mobilized by Chromohalobacter in the actively growing or stationary phases or under stressed conditions. Competition may have occurred between Cs and K{sup +} at lower ionic strength, significantly greater concentrations of K{sup +} were present. Results suggest that Chromohalobacter can selectively uptake K{sup +} in the presence of Cs{sup +}. Future Research: K{sup +} and Cs{sup +} uptake will be monitored at high ionic strength in K{sup +} depleted media to consider uptake of Cs in the absence of K.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 132: Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management: Reasonable Assurance for Safety

Mr. Larry Camper organized a panel of experts to discuss approaches to better make risk-informed decisions in waste management, decommissioning, and the management of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The audience heard the perspectives from four panelists that addressed issues ranging from the technical basis used to make risk-informed decisions to for developing cleanup criteria and promulgating regulations and safety standards both domestically and abroad. A summary of each of the presentations given by the panelists is provided herein. This WMS BOD featured panel focused on the Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management and the Reasonable Assurance for Safety. The panelists addressed and discussed with the audience different approaches used for decision-making, summarizing ongoing probabilistic vs. deterministic approaches, including IAEA graded approach, and discussed policies/approaches to achieve reasonable assurance for safety rather than using absolute assurance. Panelists with presentations: Risk-Informed Decision Making - More than a Motto? (Paul Black); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid); Risk-Informed Decision-Making and Illustrative National Academies Studies (Charles Ferguson); IAEA's Revised Safety Guidance on Remediation (Michelle Roberts); NDA Radioactive Waste Strategy - A Risk Informed Approach (James McKinney)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Long-term Storage of ILW: Building Stores with the Appropriate Environmental Controls - 20294

In the UK, containers for the storage and disposal of intermediate level radioactive waste (ILW) typically use stainless steel due to its excellent mechanical properties and corrosion resistance. The period of interim storage before a disposal facility is available, however, is longer than available engineering experience with stainless steels in relevant environmental conditions. Additionally, after disposal the ability of ILW containers to withstand further periods of exposure to the environment is expected to provide substantial benefits to the operation of a disposal facility and the safety case underpinning its closure. For these reasons, although there have been no instances of failure of stainless steels in indoor storage conditions, a focused R and D programme has been carried out to identify the environmental envelope over which the material does not significantly degrade. In this study we summarise experimental and modelling studies carried out over the last decade to build a solid mechanistic understanding of the corrosion behaviour of stainless steels in indoor atmospheric conditions. We then identify suitable environmental regimes to minimise the risk of degradation processes and explore approaches to monitoring the storage conditions to gain confidence in the long-term performance of the system. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Implications of End Points on Remediation - 20476

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) is a federal environmental clean-up program. Its mandate is the remediation and local, long-term, safe management of approximately 1.7 million cubic metres of historic low-level radioactive waste in the adjacent communities of Port Hope and Port Granby in Southern Ontario, Canada. The PHAI is being undertaken by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL), on behalf of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, a federal Crown corporation. It is currently one of the largest environmental remediation projects in Canada. The safety of workers, the public and the environment while delivering the PHAI compliantly, on time and within budget is CNL's number one priority. The PHAI is being implemented as two projects - the Port Hope Project and the Port Granby Project. The Port Hope Project is the larger of the two and includes the cleanup of approximately 1.2 million cubic metres of historic waste. The Port Hope Project includes a unique and important component - the remediation of approximately 1,200 private residences and businesses to include both interior and exterior verification of soil and surface-contaminated objects. Planning and consultation for the PHAI clean-up criteria and remediation verification standard operating procedures (RVSOP) were initiated in the early 2000's. The criteria were developed through a cooperative effort involving the PHAI, scientific specialists, federal and provincial government agencies, peer reviewers, the municipalities and members of the public. Subsequent verification procedures which detail the unique systematic methods to verify compliance with the clean-up criteria were developed by CNL in consultation with federal regulators and relevant stakeholders. Now, specifically with the Port Hope Small-Scale Sites project having been underway for a year and approximately 38 properties in some stage of remediation, it has become increasingly evident that the practical application of the clean-up criteria and RVSOP methodology is posing unique challenges that are having direct impact on project execution. The current RVSOP approach is based on discrete sample verification not allowing failure of any one sample. When implemented in the field, particularly at the Small-Scale Sites, it leads to a much more extensive excavation than what was accounted for in the original design, the implications of which are substantial delays in project progress and much more significant impact on the individual properties than originally anticipated. This paper will examine the evolution of PHAI clean-up criteria, subsequent RVSOP methodology and its impact on current project execution and the justification for exploring potential revisions to methods of remediation verification. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Toward the performance assessment of advanced nuclear waste forms: temperature dependence of lanthanide borosilicate glass dissolution

Lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glasses are among the most promising waste forms for the immobilization of high-level radioactive waste generated from advanced nuclear fuel cycles. However, the temperature dependence of their dissolution kinetics remains poorly understood and constrained, limiting the integration of these materials into established performance assessment models. Here, we investigate the dissolution behavior of the legacy AmCm2-19 LaBS glass and the benchmark alkali aluminoborosilicate ISG-1 in deionized water between 50 °C and 250 °C using ASTM C1285 (Product Consistency Test-B) protocols. For AmCm2-19 LaBS glass, normalized elemental release rates for boron and silicon increase with temperature before plateauing near 150 °C, consistent with solubility-limited behavior. From data obtained at 50 °C and 100 °C, Arrhenius analysis yields activation energies of E a (B) = 24.8 ± 0.3 kJ mol⁻¹ and E a (Si) = 14.4 ± 0.2 kJ mol⁻¹, similar or slightly lower than those previously reported for two other compositions of LaBS glasses. No secondary phases or alteration layers were detected by SEM-EDX or pXRD. These results establish one of the first temperature-dependent kinetic datasets for LaBS glass dissolution, providing quantitative parameters to inform mechanistic corrosion models and predictive simulations of glass degradation in geological disposal environments.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Cost of (In-) Accurate Waste Characterization in the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry - 20066

Proper disposal of waste has never been a human priority. Our history is full of examples of throwing away things with minimal effort or thought to consequence. That is until disease or toxicity become apparent and we realize we need to change. Unfortunately, we almost never have all the information we need at the time we make decisions. In addition to the technical and scientific issues, profits and politics are also factors. Newton's third law also applies to politics and so for every policy (action) put in place, there will be (opposite reaction) forces in play to push back against it. These forces are seldom balanced and so the reaction to the discovery of harm is to over-correct and destroy the benefit to be had. This of course causes those who want the benefit, or profit from it, to work to undermine or repeal those measures put in place to eliminate the harm. The issue is exacerbated when the problem to be solved is highly technical and at the edge of our science so that the harm and benefit cannot be easily or accurately quantified. At these times, reason often goes out the window and our decision makers are influenced by either greed or fear as these emotions are much easier to stoke. Those of us in the middle, with the charge to 'do the right thing for the least cost', are therefore frequently constrained and forced into actions that are neither technically the right thing to do and not cost effective. The cost of radioactive waste disposal is based on the concentrations of various radioisotopes in the waste. Some of these isotopes are relatively easy to quantify and some are not. Most laboratory methods for quantification are limited in the amount of activity that can be present during the measurement process. Current nuclear plants were not designed with the idea that taking truly representative waste samples would be important. The limits used to define waste class and therefore cost are precisely defined but the methods for determining those concentrations are far less precise. Improving the accuracy of radioactivity concentrations in waste and having consistent and reasonable oversight can reduce waste costs through active management of the process. So what can we do about it? Science may provide an answer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Presentation on the INL Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility FY-2023 Annual Summary Report

The abstract below is from the report INL/RPT-24-76103. The powerpoint presentation contains information taken from the report. This Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical basis documents for the Remote Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2023, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. Sixteen total waste-canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and 15 total waste canisters were emplaced.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Full Scale HEPA Filter Encapsulation in Ultra-High-Performance Grout - Proof of Concept

The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) currently being constructed to treat radioactive waste, includes vitrification facilities for both the high-level waste (HLW) and low activity waste (LAW) fractions. Operation of the WTP will produce contaminated high-efficiency particulate air filters (HEPA), as part of the solid secondary waste (SSW) stream. The HEPA filters receive off-gas from the vessel vent header and primary off-gas treatment system in LAW Facility and remove particulate contaminants including 99 Tc and 129 I salts. The current disposal method for HEPA filters is encapsulation in metal containers using cementitious material (CM) and disposal in the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF). Results from the 2017 IDF Performance Assessment (PA) WRPS (2018) demonstrated that while compliance is maintained for the 1000 year compliance period mandated by DOE O 435.1 and its accompanying manual, release of constituents from the HEPA filters result in exceedance of the performance objective imposed as the groundwater regulatory limit at later times. For example, at about 1500 years post-closure, solid secondary waste (SSW), including HEPA filters is predicted to become a dominant contributor to 99 Tc release and over the 10,000-year sensitivity analysis period, SSW is the dominant contributor of 129 I release to the groundwater. The estimated release could potentially be reduced if the HEPA filters are not compacted and waste containers could be distributed throughout a large space, thereby diluting the contaminant release. Additionally, a better cementitious material could be used to encapsulate the HEPA filters. One alternative method for disposal of contaminated HEPA filters is encapsulation of the filters in ultra high-performance grout (UHPG). UHPG is a variation of ultra-high-performance concrete (UHPC) is commonly used in the prestressed concrete industry for large structural members. Recent studies of UHPG show it has excellent properties for containing radionuclides such as 99 Tc and 129 I Nichols and Kaplan (2021). This report presents the results of the first attempt to encapsulate a clean, full-size HEPA filter in UHPG and evaluate the effectiveness of the immobilization process and final waste form. A full-scale proof-of-concept simulated waste form was prepared by encapsulating a HEPA filter in a 110-gallon stainless steel (SS) drum using UHPG. A change from Type I/II PC to Type 1L PLC was made after American Rock Products informed the team that they would no longer be using Type I/II by the end of 2024 and the northwest was phasing out Type I/II PC overall. Type I/II PC used in previous studies of UHPG for encapsulation (Nichols and Kaplan 2021). After the UHPG was cured both the scaled mockup and the full-scale simulated waste forms were sectioned for visual examination. UHPG completely encapsulated the filters and bonded to the external surfaces of materials comprising the filters. No cracks were observed in the sectioned waste forms.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Relationship Between the Marginal Probability of Failure for a CPP Test and the Recommended Corrosion Control Requirements for Hanford Double Shell Waste Tanks

The Hanford Site in Washington State currently stores millions of gallons of radioactive waste in underground, carbon steel, double shell tanks (DSTs) that were constructed between 1968 and 1986. A chemistry control and monitoring program has been established mitigate corrosion in order to extend the service life for the DSTs. The current waste temperatures in the DSTs are at historical lows (i.e., typically less than 50 °C). The previous chemistry control requirements were determined for conditions at temperatures significantly higher. SRNL undertook a statistically based investigation of the role of nitrate and halide ion (i.e., chloride and fluoride) induced pitting corrosion. The objective was to develop a comprehensive waste chemistry envelope for the simultaneous minimization of the pitting and SCC risks caused by halide and nitrate ions at the lower temperature conditions. On the basis of these tests, new chemistry control requirements were proposed and have since been implemented for pitting corrosion control.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Using a Hybrid ZIRCEX Process to Generate High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) - 20158

Idaho National Lab (INL) is investigating the feasibility of providing High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) by recovering Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and downblending the HEU with natural, low-enriched, or depleted uranium (NU, LEU, or DU). That investigation identified that significant quantities of HALEU could be produced with a Hybrid ZIRCEX process to further advanced reactor research while reducing INL's environmental liability. Many new advanced reactor designs are being developed with improved safety, efficiency, and economics. Most require nuclear fuel with U-235 enrichment between 5% and 20%, which is defined as HALEU. Although technically feasible, there is no current domestic capability to make HALEU in the US. While it is anticipated that industry will provide HALEU through commercial enrichment once advanced reactors mature, until a market is established, an interim source of HALEU is needed to enable research and demonstration. An interim source of HALEU could be provided by recovering the HEU in some DOE-managed SNF and downblending it to between 5% and 20% using the Hybrid ZIRCEX Process. ZIRCEX is a dry head-end process to remove cladding (zirconium or aluminum) from SNF. Drying of the SNF is needed prior to introduction to ZIRCEX. After cladding removal, uranium and fission products in the bed material are oxidized and elutriated. In a Hybrid ZIRCEX process, the HEU process stream is sent to a very compact, modular solvent extraction process for uranium purification. The uranyl nitrate from solvent extraction is denitrated and calcined to produce a HALEU product ready for fuel fabrication. The long-lived fission products from solvent extraction are immobilized in glass using a small in-can melt. By removing the cladding before dissolution, the volume of glass waste is reduced by a factor of up to 300 times (when compared to not removing the cladding from the fuel). Other radioactive wastes from the process could be disposed of as Class A or Class B low-level waste. In addition to producing HALEU for advanced reactors, consumption of SNF would reduce DoE's environmental liability. Incorporating low-enriched spent fuel (versus exclusive use of LEU, DU, or NU) into the downblending scheme could reduce the SNF inventory even further. Several downblending and enrichment scenarios using INL fuels were investigated in this study. The results of this analysis show that the Hybrid ZIRCEX process could make a significant contribution to needed HALEU feedstock and reduce the environmental liability of managing SNF at INL. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The HRA/Solarium Project: Feedback Based on 20 Years of Experience in Treatment of Medium Level Waste - 20185

Since the 1980's the management of the historical site of Mol has been transferred to the National Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials (ONDRAF/NIRAS). Belgoprocess is entrusted by ONDRAF/NIRAS with the operational waste management and site remediation. One of the major challenges has been the characterization, treatment and conditioning of approximately 200 m{sup 3} of medium level waste. These waste packages were stored in poor conditions in storage vaults ('HRA') or concrete containers ('Solarium'). They have been produced in various research programs and reactor operations at the Belgian nuclear energy research centre SCK.CEN, isotope production, decontamination and dismantling operations from the 1960's up to the 1980's. Despite the limited volume, this historical waste consists of a great variation of waste characteristics and waste configurations. To tackle these liabilities, a new processing facility was built in the 1990's to allow safe transfers, handling, characterization and treatment of these packages. Also some auxiliary facilities have been built to deal with the by-products, like emptied concrete containers. The engineering of the installation, safety procedures and (characterization) methodology that has been developed generically have been proved to be successful. Nevertheless, the specific nature of some items made it necessary to organize a step-by-step treatment in distinct campaigns in which some relevant extra (safety) measures had to be taken into account. This dynamic approach made it possible to process a great variety of waste types in order to to ensure that this legacy is no longer left for subsequent generations. After about 20 years of operations, there has been a great build-up of experience and feed-back concerning the waste management of these specific waste streams. Some cases will be highlighted to specify the approach followed for treatment of e.g.: - Na/NaK containing equipment; - spent radioactive sources; - fuel element residues; - medium level waste originating from activation experiments; - radium bearing medium level waste originating from Ac-227 production research. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

NNSA-IAEC Science Area V Environmental ISR: Waste Management and Subsurface Science (Final Report FY18-FY20)

In August 2017, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) launched a joint waste management program to evaluate the feasibility of siting a radioactive waste repository at intermediate depths in Israel. The bilateral collaboration involves three National Laboratories (LLNL, LANL, and Sandia), and the Nuclear Research Center, Negev, Geological Survey of Israel, and Ben Gurion University in Israel. This research is designed to assist with the evaluation of locations for an intermediate nuclear waste repository in Israel. This final report is a high-level summary of the results from the past three years by the team that worked on the WM-2: Radionuclide colloid-facilitated transport in fractured carbonate rock project for Science Area V, Environmental ISR: Subsurface Science and Waste Management. We have completed all of our tasks and met all of our milestones. MW-2 had three integrated tasks. Task 1 was laboratory experiments investigating colloid transport of radionuclides in natural fractured carbonate rocks from the Avdat formation, Israel. Task 2 was field experiments injecting radionuclide analogues pre-sorbed to clay colloids into fractured carbonate rock, and task 3 was numerical modeling of laboratory and field experimental results to assess the importance of colloids in the migration of relevant radionuclides. This task was incorporated into tasks 1 and 2. A 4 th task was initiated in FY20, to investigate the role of organics in facilitating radionuclide transport under the same conditions explored in task 1 due to the high organic content of the rocks being investigated for the immediate borehole locations. Preliminary results will be summarized here and the work will continue in FY21-23. The overall objective of this research is to evaluate the role of colloids (naturally occurring < 1 micron particles) in facilitating the transport of long-lived radionuclides from a nuclear waste repository situated in fractured carbonate rocks. Currently little data exists on radionuclide transport in carbonate rocks, but this is the main rock type available for siting a repository in Israel. Laboratory experiments were carried out in both Israel and the U.S., field experiments have taken place in Israel, and reactive transport modeling involved LLNL, LANL and Israel partner institutions. LLNL hosted a graduate student, Emily Tran, from Ben Gurion University in FY18 and FY19 and much of the work presented here was part of her PhD research.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2020

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 annual summary report documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical basis documents for the Remote Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 Change 1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2020, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. Fifteen total waste-canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and 15 total waste canisters were emplaced.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗