Techno-economic sensitivity analysis for combined design and operation of a small modular reactor hybrid energy system
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Integration of advanced nuclear reactors to industrial processes in an integrated energy system (IES) has many potential advantages. The coupling of nuclear power to varied industrial processes introduces additional accident scenarios unique to the specific systems included in the IES. Similarly, noise in one system of the IES could potentially create negative effects in the other systems. Because of the limited amount of comparable nuclear IES operating experience, there is added value in scoping the inherent behavior of these systems in response to these transients. Here, this paper investigates the safety-related behavior of an open-source IES dynamic model of a fast spectrum molten salt reactor (MSR) powering a regenerative Rankine cycle for electricity production and a hybrid sulfur (HyS) cycle for hydrogen production. The simulations include a loss of cooling water to the Rankine cycle, a loss of sulfur in the HyS cycle, and the frequency characteristics of the entire IES across six orders of magnitude of frequency. The results show safe behavior in response to the two accident scenarios, wherein a disruption in heat transfer leads to increased salt temperatures and a decrease in reactor power. The frequency analysis shows that at higher frequencies, temperature changes propagating through an IES are increasingly damped to the point of negligibility.
Techniques, systems, and devices are disclosed for non-invasive monitoring and imaging of nuclear fuel inside a nuclear reactor using muon detector arrays. In one aspect, these detector arrays are placed outside the reactor vessel or building for investigating the reactors without access to the cores, therefore the imaging process is non-invasive. In some implementation, these detector arrays measure both muon scattering and absorption to enable imaging and characterizing not only the very high-Z fuel materials, but also other materials in the reactor, thereby obtaining a more complete picture of reactor status. When applied to damaged reactors, the disclosed proposed techniques, systems, and devices, through the process of providing an image, can reveal the presence (or absence) of damage to fuel rod assemblies or puddles of molten fuel at the bottom of the containment vessel, thus providing crucial information to guide decisions about remedial actions.
This paper provides an overview of the current MSR design space and lists unique features of the various designs under consideration. Some general considerations for source terms calculation for Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs) are explained. Applicability and limitations of terminology currently defined for legacy light water reactor (LWR) systems are discussed in the view of MSRs and the need for updated terminology is discussed. Calculations carried out for the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) are discussed with a qualitative comparison to the designs presented. The nature of the fission products (FPs) and actinides for Low enriched uranium, thorium and fast U/Pu fuel cycles employed in representative molten salt reactor systems are discussed. Computational results are obtained from a code (Serpent 2) with online reprocessing. Divergence in source terms when fission product bubbling is demonstrated. The source release for each molten salt reactor during postulated accidents is also presented.
This presentation discusses the Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR) or Fast Burst Reactor (FBR) and how available data from Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR) operation to can be used to create a benchmark report for inclusion in the ICSBEP, as a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) shielding benchmark. The evaluation of experimental data is also presented, specifically four experimental candidates are considered of potential value for the benchmark: 1. Neutron source estimation from a HPRR pulse (energy spectrum, fission yield), 2. Threshold Detector Unit (TDU) measurements at different distances from a HPRR pulse, shielded and unshielded, 3. Sulfur pellet activation at different distances from a HPRR pulse, shielded and unshielded, and 4. Total neutron fluence from a HPRR pulse measured by Bonner Sphere Spectrometry, shielded and unshielded. Additionally, a benchmark model overview is discussed as are sample calculation results.
The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation
This work presents the latest improvements to, and investigations performed with, the generic monolithic heat-pipe-cooled microreactor reference plant model for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This model serves as the foundation for the future detailed design evaluation models based on license applications. This model has been developed with the Comprehensive Reactor Analysis Bundle (BlueCRAB) and its specifications are based on open literature publications for the eVinci™ design . BlueCRAB is the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission non-light-water reactor analysis system based on MOOSE, the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment framework, which can couple the Griffin, BISON, and Sockeye applications to resolve the various physics that are essential for the safety analysis of this type of reactor system. The core specifications include tristructural isotropic fuel, graphite monolith, graphite reflectors, and drums composed of graphite and B 4 C.
In order to accurately predict the behavior of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) in the context of the FLEX strategies under the extended station black-out accident (SBO), we present a mechanistic model of the RCIC in this work. The control volume formulation of angular momentum conservation is employed to model the Terry turbine in the RCIC system. The two-phase nozzle flow model developed in the previous work is utilized to simulate the convergent-divergent nozzles in the Terry turbine. A nozzle flow table is generated to cover the operation range of the RCIC during beyond design basis accidents (BDBAs). The mechanistic RCIC turbine-pump model and the nozzle flow table are incorporated in a TRACE BWR model. Simulations of short-term and long-term SBO transients are performed to demonstrate dynamic RCIC responses. A system analysis code with the proposed mechanistic model of the RCIC system will have a better prediction of system safety response during SBO accidents. With the addition of such more realistic models, the system code will be capable of providing expanded understanding of safety margin, which can help help to form the technical basis for the successful implementation of the FLEX and SAMG measures under Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) conditions for BWR or PWR reactor designs.
The existing fluence monitor wire scanning system at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) was designed and installed for use in the Engineering Test Reactor (ETR) when it began operation in 1958. The wire scanner was operated in ETR for over 20 years until ATR began operation, when it was moved to the ATR west canal area in 1971 and subsequently moved to the west canal in 2006 where it presently resides. With a continued service life of 65 years the system is well beyond the typical design life of 20 years for these types of systems. The need to update the data acquisition and control system was identified, and the benefits of replacing the existing sodium iodide (NaI) detector with an electronically cooled high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector are discussed.
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Nuclear power plants are crucial to meeting net zero emission goals and achieving energy sustainability. Integrating these plants with clean energy technologies such as high-temperature steam electrolysis (HTSE) may improve the efficiency and economic competitiveness of these plants. Here, the current study investigates the design and operation of a thermal power dispatch (TPD) system for coupling boiling water reactors (BWRs) to HTSE plants. The TPD system extracts a portion of the steam from the reactor’s main steam line and transfers its thermal energy to an HTSE plant through a power transport loop. A TPD system for 5 % steam extraction has been designed and the system performance during steady and transient operations has been analyzed. The TPD system dispatched a total of 197 MW thermal energy to the HTSE plant under nominal design conditions. Saturated steam at 7.17 MPa from the BWR plant was condensed and subcooled to a temperature of 168 °C, while a mass flow rate of 91.1 kg/s of superheated steam was dispatched to the HTSE plant. Furthermore, the system performance during transient operation showed a continuous transition from the initial hot standby mode to the nominal power dispatch level. The transient simulation results emphasized the importance of investigating component level performance for the TPD system design. The current results will guide future works on the development of integrated energy systems for hydrogen production or process heat applications.
Tristructural-isotropic (TRISO) fuel particles have been developed as a high-performance fuel for use in high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) systems due to their high efficiency and stability under both normal and off-normal conditions. Broader deployment of this technology in advanced nuclear applications may benefit from quantitative quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) methods that directly link TRISO properties to downstream performance. A key TRISO property is the SiC layer microstructure, which influences fission product retention during irradiation. However, existing QA/QC for the TRISO-SiC microstructure comprises only a qualitative visual inspection; therefore, there is a clear opportunity for the development of quantitative methods for TRISO QA/QC. Here, to this end, previous work has demonstrated an image processing approach to grain boundary (GB) identification and subsequent extraction of microstructural metrics; however, extensive twinning within the SiC layer complicates such analyses because twin GBs significantly influence microstructural metrics but are not expected to contribute to fission product transport. This study presents the initial development, training, and testing of an ML-based image segmentation algorithm designed to identify and remove twin GBs from standard backscattered electron micrographs, providing an industrially applicable, quantitative, and physically meaningful QA/QC approach for the TRISO-SiC microstructure. Although pixel-wise performance metrics for the twin predictions are low, the change in grain area and the number of GB pixels after twin removal predicted by the ML workflow are within 1% of the true values calculated using crystallographic data. This suggests that the model is well capable of predicting overall twin boundary structures and grain morphology, and continued advancement of this approach could enable automated, scalable, and physics-informed QA/QC for TRISO-SiC microstructures, supporting the reliable qualification of coated particle fuels for next-generation reactor systems.
The existing fluence monitor wire scanning system at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) was designed and installed for use in the Engineering Test Reactor (ETR) when it began operation in 1958. The wire scanner was operated in ETR for over 20 years until ATR began operation, when it was moved to the ATR west canal area in 1971 and subsequently moved to the west canal in 2006 where it presently resides. With a continued service life of 65 years the system is well beyond the typical design life of 20 years for these types of systems. The need to update the data acquisition and control system was identified, and the benefits of replacing the existing sodium iodide (NaI) detector with an electronically cooled high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector are discussed. The wirescanner system in the ATR canal is utilized after every reactor cycle by the ATR Radiation Measurements Laboratory (RML) to assess the activation of cobalt and nickel dosimeter wires during the cycle. These wires become activated through exposure to thermal and fast neutrons respectively during the irradiation cycle and are highly radioactive upon shutdown. It is for this reason that the wirescanner is used in the ATR canal rather than transporting the dosimeters to another facility. A scoping study was performed to develop a base-line design to ensure that existing capabilities could be replaced with a new system. The new hardware will enable automated measuring of several flux monitor holders without necessitating the removal of the flux wires. In this way, flux wire measurements will be performed with minimal dose to the technicians and will not be limited by canal operations as is presently the case. The new control and acquisition software will be based on commercially available and supported systems that have a wide user-base to provide long-term stability. An electronically cooled HPGe detector will be used to provide high-resolution gamma-ray measurements, an improvement from the low-resolution sodium-iodide detector that is presently deployed. The electronic cooler eliminates the need for liquid nitrogen to cool the detector head. A new collimator has been designed to house the new detector and allow for sufficient counting rates.