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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS1991

Latent-failure risk estimates for computer control

It is shown that critical computer controls employing unmonitored safety circuits are unsafe. Analysis supporting this result leads to two additional, important conclusions: (1) annual maintenance checks of safety circuit function do not, as widely believed, eliminate latent failure risk; (2) safety risk remains even if multiple, series-connected protection circuits are employed. Finally, it is shown analytically that latent failure risk is eliminated when continuous monitoring is employed.

Dunn, William R.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Robotic end-effector for rewaterproofing shuttle tiles

This paper summarizes work by Rockwell International's Space Systems Division's Robotics Group at Downey, California. The work is part of a NASA-led team effort to automate Space Shuttle rewaterproofing in the Orbiter Processing Facility at the Kennedy Space Center and the ferry facility at the Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility. Rockwell's effort focuses on the rewaterproofing end-effector, whose function is to inject hazardous dimethylethyloxysilane into thousands of ceramic tiles on the underside of the orbiter after each flight. The paper has five sections. First, it presents background on the present manual process. Second, end-effector requirements are presented, including safety and interface control. Third, a design is presented for the five end-effector systems: positioning, delivery, containment, data management, and command and control. Fourth, end-effector testing and integrating to the total system are described. Lastly, future applications for this technology are discussed.

Manouchehri, Davoud↗

NASA NTRS1994

Hot gas ingestion effects on fuel control surge recovery and AH-1 rotor drive train torque spikes

This report summarizes the work accomplished through computer simulation to understand the impact of the hydromechanical turbine assembly (TA) fuel control on rocket gas ingestion induced engine surges on the AH-1 (Cobra) helicopter. These surges excite the lightly damped torsional modes of the Cobra rotor drive train and can cause overtorqueing of the tail rotor shaft. The simulation studies show that the hydromechanical TA control has a negligible effect on drive train resonances because its response is sufficiently attenuated at the resonant frequencies. However, a digital electronic control working through the TA control's separate, emergency fuel metering system has been identified as a solution to the overtorqueing problem. State-of-the-art software within the electronic control can provide active damping of the rotor drive train to eliminate excessive torque spikes due to any disturbances including engine surges and aggressive helicopter maneuvers. Modifications to the existing TA hydromechanical control are relatively minor, and existing engine sensors can be utilized by the electronic control. Therefore, it is concluded that the combination of full authority digital electronic control (FADEC) with hydromechanical backup using the existing TA control enhances flight safety, improves helicopter performance, reduces pilot workload, and provides a substantial payback for very little investment.

Tokarski, Frank↗

NASA NTRS1995

Silicon Carbide-Based Hydrogen and Hydrocarbon Gas Detection

Hydrogen and hydrocarbon detection in aeronautical applications is important for reasons of safety and emissions control. The use of silicon carbide as a semiconductor in a metal-semiconductor or metal-insulator-semiconductor structure opens opportunities to measure hydrogen and hydrocarbons in high temperature environments beyond the capabilities of silicon-based devices. The purpose of this paper is to explore the response and stability of Pd-SiC Schottky diodes as gas sensors in the temperature range from 100 to 400 C. The effect of heat treating on the diode properties as measured at 100 C is explored. Subsequent operation at 400 C demonstrates the diodes' sensitivity to hydrogen and hydrocarbons. It is concluded that the Pd-SiC Schottky diode has potential as a hydrogen and hydrocarbon sensor over a wide range of temperatures but further studies are necessary to determine the diodes' long term stability.

Hunter, Gary W.↗

NASA NTRS1997

Shielding Strategies for Human Space Exploration

A group of twenty-nine scientists and engineers convened a 'Workshop on Shielding Strategies for Human Space Exploration' at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. The provision of shielding for a Mars mission or a Lunar base from the hazards of space radiations is a critical technology since astronaut radiation safety depends on it and shielding safety factors to control risk uncertainty appear to be great. The purpose of the workshop was to define requirements for the development and evaluation of high performance shield materials and designs and to develop ideas regarding approaches to radiation shielding. The workshop was organized to review the recent experience on shielding strategies gained in studies of the 'Space Exploration Initiative (SEI),' to review the current knowledge base for making shield assessment, to examine a basis for new shielding strategies, and to recommend a strategy for developing the required technologies for a return to the moon or for Mars exploration. The uniqueness of the current workshop arises from the expected long duration of the missions without the protective cover of the geomagnetic field in which the usually small and even neglected effects of the galactic cosmic rays (GCR) can no longer be ignored. It is the peculiarity of these radiations for which the inter-action physics and biological action are yet to be fully understood.

Wilson J. W.↗

NASA NTRS2004

From Bridges and Rockets, Lessons for Software Systems

Although differences exist between building software systems and building physical structures such as bridges and rockets, enough similarities exist that software engineers can learn lessons from failures in traditional engineering disciplines. This paper draws lessons from two well-known failures the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in 1940 and the destruction of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986 and applies these lessons to software system development. The following specific applications are made: (1) the verification and validation of a software system should not be based on a single method, or a single style of methods; (2) the tendency to embrace the latest fad should be overcome; and (3) the introduction of software control into safety-critical systems should be done cautiously.

Holloway, C. Michael↗

NASA NTRS2005

Bond Testing for Effects of Silicone Contamination

In 2003 ATK Thiokol discovered that the smocks and coveralls worn by its operations personnel for safety and contamination control were themselves contaminated with a silicone defoamer and a silicone oil. As a growing list of items have been identified as having this form of contamination, it was desirable to devise a test method to determine if the contamination level detected could cause subsequent processing concerns. The smocks and coveralls could potentially contact bonding surfaces during processing so the test method focused on dry transfer of the silicone from the clothing to the bonding surface.

Plaia, James↗

NASA NTRS2005

Joint NASA Ames/Langley Experimental Evaluation of Integrated Air/Ground Operations for En Route Free Maneuvering

In order to meet the anticipated future demand for air travel, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is investigating a new concept of operations known as Distributed Air-Ground Traffic Management (DAG-TM). Under the En Route Free Maneuvering component of DAG-TM, appropriately equipped autonomous aircraft self separate from other autonomous aircraft and from managed aircraft that continue to fly under today s Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). Controllers provide separation services between IFR aircraft and assign traffic flow management constraints to all aircraft. To address concept feasibility issues pertaining to integrated air/ground operations at various traffic levels, NASA Ames and Langley Research Centers conducted a joint human-in-the-loop experiment. Professional airline pilots and air traffic controllers flew a total of 16 scenarios under four conditions: mixed autonomous/managed operations at three traffic levels and a baseline all-managed condition at the lowest traffic level. These scenarios included en route flights and descents to a terminal area meter fix in airspace modeled after the Dallas Ft. Worth area. Pilots of autonomous aircraft met controller assigned meter fix constraints with high success. Separation violations by subject pilots did not appear to vary with traffic level and were mainly attributable to software errors and procedural lapses. Controller workload was lower for mixed flight conditions, even at higher traffic levels. Pilot workload was deemed acceptable under all conditions. Controllers raised several safety concerns, most of which pertained to the occurrence of near-term conflicts between autonomous and managed aircraft. These issues are being addressed through better compatibility between air and ground systems and refinements to air and ground procedures.

Barhydt, Richard↗

NASA NTRS2010

What if Things Get Worse? Really Grand Challenges for Modeling and Simulation in a Risky and Complex World or Modeling and Simulation for the "Greater Good"?

Today Modeling and Simulation-- ---as an important practice or industry or area of expertise ----- is at a complex crossroad - a sort of cyber-highway--where these complexities meet-technical, economic, environmental, geopolitical and cultural. They may converge or collide. Let's not kid ourselves. It is all too much for anyone person or organization Malcolm Gladwell said it. "We have constructed a world in which the potential for high tech catastrophe is embedded in the fabric of everyday life." We are surrounded by problems that scream at us from our television, Internet and social networks along with billboards and protest signs. We face not just high tech catastrophes but, also, landslides, earthquakes, tornados, floods and hurricanes and large-scale criminality. Evil, war, famine and pestilence have not gone away. It is all too much to think about. My friend, George Peabody, who taught me everything I know about power said that addressing such issues requires that we constantly build our network, information resources and the credibility and visibility of our work. That is how we will build the power of simulation so it can change the world --even maybe, save it. We need all the help we can get and give one another because our human early warning systems appear to be out of kilter. We seem to have trouble imagining how small failings can continue to lead to catastrophic disaster. Think about O-rings and blowout preventers. One is reminded of the old nursery rhyme, "For want of a nail, a shoe was lost! for want of a shoe the horse was lost! for want of a rider the battle was lost and so the kingdom fell." Although the investigation will take more time for real answers, it is worrisome that a rig worker reported to the BBC that-- weeks before the explosion of Deep Ocean Horizon. -he identified a leak in the oil rig's safety equipment -the Control Pod of the blowout preventer which has giant shears designed to cut and seal off the well's main pipe. With both electronics and hydraulics, these are effectively the brains of the blowout preventer. No one fixed it, he alleges, they just shut it down and relied on the other control pod -an act deemed unacceptable by petroleum expert, Tad Patzek, at the University of Texas. The US Congress has identified numerous other problems with the blowout preventer, including design problems and unexpected modifications.

Fifrey, Priscilla↗

NASA NTRS2012

Using the Design for Demise Philosophy to Reduce Casualty Risk Due to Reentering Spacecraft

Recently the reentry of a number of vehicles has garnered public attention due to their risk of human casualty due to fragments surviving reentry. In order to minimize this risk for their vehicles, a number of NASA programs have actively sought to minimize the number of components likely to survive reentry at the end of their spacecraft's life in order to meet and/or exceed NASA safety standards for controlled and uncontrolled reentering vehicles. This philosophy, referred to as "Design for Demise" or D4D, has steadily been adopted, to at least some degree, by numerous programs. The result is that many programs are requesting evaluations of components at the early stages of vehicle design, as they strive to find ways to reduce the number surviving components while ensuring that the components meet the performance requirements of their mission. This paper will discuss some of the methods that have been employed to ensure that the consequences of the vehicle s end-of-life are considered at the beginning of the design process. In addition this paper will discuss the technical challenges overcome, as well as some of the more creative solutions which have been utilized to reduce casualty risk.

Kelley, R. L.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Concept of Operations for a Prospective "Proving Ground" in the Lunar Vicinity

NASA is studying conceptual architectures for a "Proving Ground" near the Moon or in high lunar orbit to conduct human space exploration missions that bridge the gap between today's operations with the International Space Station (ISS) and future human exploration of Mars beginning in the 2030s. This paper describes the framework of a concept of operations ("Conops") for candidate activities in the Proving Ground. The Conops discusses broad goals that the Proving Ground might address, such as participation from commercial entities, support for human landings on the Moon, use of mature technologies, and growth of capability through a steady cadence of increasingly ambitious piloted missions. Additional Proving Ground objectives are outlined in a companion paper. Key elements in the Conops include the Orion spacecraft (with mission kits for docking and other specialized operations) and the Space Launch System (SLS) heavy-lift rocket. Potential additions include a new space suit, commercial launch vehicles and logistics carriers, Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) stages to move elements between different orbits and eventually take them on excursions to deep space, a core module with multiple docking ports, a habitation block, and robotic and piloted lunar landers. The landers might include reusable ascent modules which could remain docked to in-space elements between lunar sorties. A module providing advanced regenerative life support functions could launch to the ISS, and later move to the Proving Ground. The architecture will include infrastructure for launch preparation, communication, mission control, and range safety. The Conops describes notional missions chosen to guide the design of the architecture and its elements. One such mission might be the delivery of a approximately 10-t Transit Habitat element, comanifested with Orion on a Block 1B SLS launcher, to the Proving Ground. In another mission, the architecture might participate in direct human exploration of an asteroidal boulder brought to high lunar orbit by the Asteroid Redirect Mission. The Proving Ground stack could serve as a staging point and tele-operation center for robotic and piloted Moon landings. With the addition of a SEP stage, the architecture could support months-long excursions within and beyond the Earth's sphere of influence, possibly culminating in a year-long mission to land humans on a near-Earth asteroid. In the last case, after returning to near-lunar space, two of the asteroid explorers could join two crewmembers freshly arrived from Earth for a Moon landing, helping to quantify the risk of landing deconditioned crews on Mars. In a conceptual mission particularly stressing to system design, Proving Ground elements could transit to Mars orbit. Other possible design-driving operations include relocation of the stack with no crew on board, the unpiloted journey of the advanced life support module from ISS to the lunar vicinity, excursions to other destinations in near-Earth space, and additional support for Mars exploration in conjunction with the Evolvable Mars Campaign. The Proving Ground Conops concludes with a discussion of aborts and contingency operations

Love, Stanley G.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Concept of Operations for a Prospective "Proving Ground" in the Lunar Vicinity

NASA is studying a "Proving Ground" near the Moon to conduct human space exploration missions in preparation for future flights to Mars. This paper describes a concept of operations ("conops") for activities in the Proving Ground, focusing on the construction and use of a mobile Cislunar Transit Habitat capable of months-long excursions within and beyond the Earth-Moon system. Key elements in the conops include the Orion spacecraft (with mission kits for docking and other specialized operations) and the Space Launch System heavy-lift rocket. Potential additions include commercial launch vehicles and logistics carriers, solar electric propulsion stages to move elements between different orbits and eventually take them on excursions to deep space, a node module with multiple docking ports, habitation and life support blocks, and international robotic and piloted lunar landers. The landers might include reusable ascent modules which could remain docked to in-space elements between lunar sorties. The architecture will include infrastructure for launch preparation, communication, mission control, and range safety. The conops describes "case studies" of notional missions chosen to guide the design of the architecture and its elements. One such mission is the delivery of a ~10-ton pressurized element, co-manifested with an Orion on a Block 1B Space Launch System rocket, to the Proving Ground. With a large solar electric propulsion stage, the architecture could enable a year-long mission to land humans on a near-Earth asteroid. In the last case, after returning to near-lunar space, two of the asteroid explorers could join two crewmembers freshly arrived from Earth for a Moon landing, helping to safely quantify the risk of landing deconditioned crews on Mars. The conops also discusses aborts and contingency operations. Early return to Earth may be difficult, especially during later Proving Ground missions. While adding risk, limited-abort conditions provide needed practice for Mars, from which early return is likely to be impossible.

Love, Stanley G.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Flight Test Overview for UAS Integration in the NAS Project

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is conducting a series of flight tests intended to support the reduction of barriers that prevent unmanned aircraft from flying without the required waivers from the Federal Aviation Administration. The most recent testing supported two separate test configurations. The first investigated the timing of Detect and Avoid (DAA) alerting thresholds using a radar-equipped unmanned vehicle and multiple live intruders flown at varying encounter geometries. The second configuration included a surrogate unmanned vehicle (flown from a ground control station, with a safety pilot on board) flying a mission in a virtual air traffic control airspace sector using research pilot displays and DAA advisories to maintain separation from live and virtual aircraft. The test was conducted over a seven-week span in the summer of 2015. The data from over 100 encounter sorties will be used to inform the RTCA Phase 1 Detect and Avoid and Command and Control Minimum Operating Performance Standards (MOPS) intended to be completed by the summer of 2016. Follow-on flight-testing is planned for the spring of 2016 to capture remaining encounters and support validation of the MOPS.

UAS↗

NASA NTRS2017

Operational Overview for UAS Integration in the NAS Project Flight Test Series 3

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System Project has conducted a series of flight tests intended to support the reduction of barriers that prevent unmanned aircraft from flying without the required waivers from the Federal Aviation Administration. The 2015 Flight Test Series 3, supported two separate test configurations. The first configuration investigated the timing of Detect and Avoid alerting thresholds using a radar equipped unmanned vehicle and multiple live intruders flown at varying encounter geometries. The second configuration included a surrogate unmanned vehicle (flown from a ground control station, with a safety pilot on board) flying a mission in a virtual air traffic control airspace sector using research pilot displays and Detect and Avoid advisories to maintain separation from live and virtual aircraft. The test was conducted over an eight-week span within the R-2508 Special Use Airspace. Over 200 encounters were flown for the first configuration, and although the second configuration was cancelled after three data collection flights, Flight Test 3 proved to be invaluable for the purposes of planning, managing, and execution of this type of integrated flight test.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

NASA NTRS2018

Spanwise Adaptive Wing

This presentation discusses the NASA Armstrong PTERA-SAW flight simulation. The uses of this simulation are to study the aerodynamic effects of moving outer wing panels in flight, develop a flight control system, flight safety analysis, mission planning, flight envelope expansion, and post-flight data analysis.

flutter↗

NASA NTRS2018

Research and Development of The Immersive Simulations and Engineering Environment

March of 2018 marked the conclusion of the primary updates to the immersive Simulations and Engineering Environment (iSEE) at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Many of the problems that had arisen during the previous semester have been addressed and rectified. These included the malfunction to one of the lab's primary routers, the inefficiency of the capture environment, and various interface issues in the analysis software, Jack. This semester was primarily research and development oriented with some focus on implementation of the new hardware and software that was received last semester. The new computers and cameras that arrived sometime during the winter were installed, and the lab received its second operation opportunity. The second operation was a major milestone for the lab, both in terms of what the abilities were and what can be learned from its use. The operation performed was a virtual simulation of a critical task that would occur, if it should be needed, in the Multi Payload Processing Facility. It was done to gather human factors data on its safety and process controls. The technicians were able to come to a number of conclusions about how to perform their task as a result of utilizing iSEE. Another key breakthrough this semester was the introduction to Jack Script, a scripting language built into our analysis software that further extend Jack capabilities. In addition to the aforementioned, many preparations were made for family day, an exposition for KSC families to come out and tour the spaceport. Due to family day being moved to the spring, the video made last fall had to be updated with recent environment changes in preparation for the Family Day demonstrations.

Motion Capture↗

NASA NTRS2011

TPSAS-NF1676L-13712-DND

I was recently tasked to work on an FAA funded task to investigate how the introduction of adaptive systems into air space management or avionics would impact software safety. Talking to control theory experts got a control theory answer, not a software answer and talking to software people got me answers about software in general. In this talk I discuss these two different viewpoints. Where the views of each group fall in the DO-178 process and how the collision of software and control theory cultures showed up when writing a new standard for Model Based Design. Some slides contain opinions and I hope the audience will feel free to respond with their own observations.

Alwyn E Goodloe↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In-Trail Procedures (ITP)

Aircraft in oceanic and remote non-radar airspace frequently fly for extended periods of time in the same direction, at the same time, along similar flight paths as other aircraft. Since there is no radar surveillance, controllers use procedural separation to ensure that aircraft remain separated. Procedural separation distances are typically larger than radar separation distances and as a result aircraft operating in oceanic airspace are sometimes held at non-optimal flight levels due to conflicting traffic at intervening flight levels. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In-Trail Procedures (ITP) were developed to enable flight level change maneuvers that would otherwise not be possible with current procedural separation standards. Aircraft operators choosing to equip with an ADS-B transceiver and an appropriate onboard decision support system would be able to take advantage of these procedures when operating in proximity to aircraft equipped with a suitable ADS-B transmitter (“ADS-B Out”). The ability to perform in-trail maneuvers to achieve more time at optimum altitudes could result in more efficient and predictable flight profiles thereby saving fuel and in some cases allowing operators to make beneficial operational decisions. NASA first began developing ADS-B ITP in 2003 as a result of a desire to develop methodologies, concepts, and procedures to reduce separation requirements for future air transportation systems using airborne ADS-B. The objectives were to provide insight into the details necessary to reduce separation requirements for the future and to develop applications that could provide incentives for operators to voluntarily equip with transformational technologies. From 2003 to 2008, NASA conducted research that supported the development of ITP including batch simulations, human-in-the-loop experiments and avionics and separation standards development. This research showed enough maturity and benefit that in 2008, the FAA Surveillance and Broadcast Services (SBS) program adopted ADS-B ITP as one of their three key, near-term applications to make use of ADS-B-In. The FAA developed an agreement with NASA to transition the technology and established an FAA project for the purpose of performing an operational trial of ADS-B ITP in revenue service in the summer of 2011. The objectives of the project are to a) validate the operational performance and economic benefits of ITP; and b) develop and validate ADS-B ITP Minimum Operational Performance Specifications (MOPS) material. As a part of this project, the FAA established agreements with United Airlines and Honeywell. The agreements include the work necessary for the development, certification and installation of onboard systems for twelve United Airlines 747-400s. ITP system development is nearly complete and certification activities are underway. The FAA project has also been working with Oakland Oceanic Control Center (ZOA) and the FAA’s Oceanic and Offshore Operations Office to develop controller procedures and safety analyses that are required to support the flight trial. The FAA has also been working on the development of an ITP Operational Specification that should be approved this April. The presentation will cover some of the key aspects of the development, challenges, and integration required to successfully transition ADS-B ITP from a concept in 2003 to flight trials in revenue service in 2011.

Kenneth M Jones↗