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At least 361 records · Page 20

Thermal creep model for CWSR zircaloy-4 cladding taking into account the annealing of the irradiation hardening

After irradiation and cooling in a pool, spent nuclear fuel assemblies are either transported for wet storage to a devoted site or loaded in casks for dry storage. During dry transportation or at the beginning of dry storage, the cladding is expected to be submitted to creep deformation under the hoop stress induced by the internal pressure of the fuel rod. The thermal creep is a potential mechanism that might lead to cladding failure. A new creep model was developed, based on a database of creep tests on as-received and irradiated cold-worked stress-relieved Zircaloy-4 cladding in a wide range of temperatures (310 degrees C to 470 degrees C) and hoop stress (80 to 260 MPa). Based on three laws-a flow law, a strain-hardening recovery law, and an annealing of irradiation hardening law this model allows the simulation of not only the transient creep and the steady-state creep, but also the early creep acceleration observed on irradiated samples tested in severe conditions, which was not taken into account in the previous models. The extrapolation of the creep model in the conditions of very long-term creep tests is reassuring, proving the robustness of the chosen formalism. The creep model has been assessed in progressively decreasing stress conditions, more representative of a transport. Set up to predict the cladding creep behavior under variable temperature and stress conditions, this model can easily be implemented into codes in order to simulate the thermomechanical behavior of spent fuel rods in various scenarios of postirradiation phases. (authors)

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The used nuclear fuel problem - can reprocessing and consolidated storage be complementary?

This paper describes our CISF (Consolidated Interim Storage Facilities) and Reprocessing Facility concepts and show how they can be combined with a geologic repository to provide a comprehensive system for dealing with spent fuels in the USA. The performance of the CISF was logistically analyzed under six operational scenarios. A 3-stage plan has been developed to establish the CISF. Stage 1: the construction at the CISF site of only a rail receipt interface and storage pad large enough for the number of casks that will be received. The construction of the CISF Canister Handling Facility, the Storage Cask Fabrication Facility, the Cask Maintenance Facility and supporting infrastructure are performed during stage 2. The construction and placement into operation of a water-filled pool repackaging facility is completed for Stage 3. By using this staged approach, the capital cost of the CISF is spread over a number of years. It also allows more time for a final decision on the geologic repository to be made. A recycling facility will be built, this facility will used the NUEX recycling process that is based on the aqueous-based PUREX solvent extraction process, using a solvent of tri-N-butyl phosphate in a kerosene diluent. It is capable of processing spent fuels at a rate of 5 MT per day, at burn-ups up to 50 GWD per ton of spent fuels and a minimum of 5 years out-of-reactor cooling.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Estimation of Inherent Safety Margins in Loaded Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Casks

We completed a novel assessment to determine the unquantified and uncredited safety margins (i.e., the difference between the licensing basis and as-loaded calculations) available in as-loaded spent nuclear fuel (SNF) casks. This assessment was performed as part of a broader effort to assess issues and uncertainties related to the continued safety of casks during extended storage and transportability following extended storage periods. Detailed analyses crediting the actual as-loaded cask inventory were performed for each of the casks at three decommissioned pressurized water reactor (PWR) sites to determine their characteristics relative to regulatory safety criteria for criticality, thermal, and shielding performance. These detailed analyses were performed in an automated fashion by employing a comprehensive and integrated data and analysis tool—Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation & Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS). Calculated uncredited criticality margins from 0.07 to almost 0.30 Δk eff were observed; calculated decay heat margins ranged from 4 to almost 22 kW (as of 2014); and significant uncredited transportation dose rate margins were also observed. The results demonstrate that, at least for the casks analyzed here, significant uncredited safety margins are available that could potentially be used to compensate for SNF assembly and canister structural performance related uncertainties associated with long-term storage and subsequent transportation. The results also suggest that these inherent margins associated with how casks are loaded could support future changes in cask licensing to directly or indirectly credit the margins. Work continues to quantify the uncredited safety margins in the SNF casks loaded at other nuclear reactor sites.

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Technical Data to Justify Full Burnup Credit in Criticality Safety Licensing Analyses

Enercon Services, Inc. (ENERCON) was requested under Task Order #2 to identify scientific and technical data needed to benchmark and justify Full Burnup Credit, which adds 16 fission products and 4 minor actinides to Actinide-Only burnup credit. The historical perspective for Full Burnup Credit is discussed, and interviews of organizations participating in burnup credit activities are summarized as a basis for identifying additional data needs and making recommendation. Input from burnup credit participants representing two segments of the commercial nuclear industry is provided. First, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has been very active in the development of Full Burnup Credit, representing the interests of nuclear utilities in achieving capacity gains for storage and transport casks. EPRI and its utility customers are interested in a swift resolution of the validation issues that are delaying the implementation of Full Burnup Credit [EPRI 2010b]. Second, used nuclear fuel storage and transportation Cask Vendors favor improving burnup credit beyond Actinide-Only burnup credit, although their discussion of specific burnup credit achievements and data needs was limited citing business sensitive and technical proprietary concerns. While Cask Vendor proprietary items are not specifically identified in this report, the needs of all nuclear industry participants are reflected in the conclusions and recommendations of this report. In addition, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) were interviewed for their input into additional data needs to achieve Full Burnup Credit. ORNL was very open to discussions of Full Burnup Credit, with several telecoms and a visit by ENERCON to ORNL. For many years, ORNL has provided extensive support to the NRC regarding burnup credit in all of its forms. Discussions with ORNL focused on potential resolutions to the validation issues for the use of fission products. SNL was helpful in ENERCON's understanding of the difficult issues related to obtaining and analyzing additional cross section test data to support Full Burnup Credit. A PIRT (Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table) analysis was performed by ENERCON to evaluate the costs and benefits of acquiring different types of nuclear data in support of Full Burnup Credit. A PIRT exercise is a formal expert elicitation process with the final output being the ranking tables. The PIRT analysis (Table 7-4: Results of PIRT Evaluation) showed that the acquisition of additional Actinide-Only experimental data, although beneficial, was associated with high cost and is not necessarily needed. The conclusion was that the existing Radiochemical Assay (RCA) data plus the French Haut Taux de Combustion (HTC) and handbook Laboratory Critical Experiment (LCE) data provide adequate benchmark validation for Actinide-Only Burnup Credit. The PIRT analysis indicated that the costs and schedule to obtain sufficient additional experimental data to support the addition of 16 fission products to Actinide-Only Burnup Credit to produce Full Burnup Credit are quite substantial. ENERCON estimates the cost to be $50M to $100M with a schedule of five or more years. The PIRT analysis highlights another option for fission product burnup credit, which is the application of computer-based uncertainty analyses (S/U - Sensitivity/Uncertainty methodologies), confirmed by the limited experimental data that is already available. S/U analyses essentially transform cross section uncertainty information contained in the cross section libraries into a reactivity bias and uncertainty. Recent work by ORNL and EPRI has shown that a methodology to support Full Burnup Credit is possible using a combination of traditional RCA and LCE validation plus S/U validation for fission product isotopics and cross sections. Further, the most recent cross section data (ENDF/B-VII) can be incorporated into the burnup credit codes at a reasonable cost compared to the acquisition of equivalent experimental data. ENERCON concludes that even with the costs of code data library updating, the use of S/U analysis methodologies could be accomplished on a shorter schedule and a lower cost than the gathering of sufficient experimental data. ENERCON estimates of the costs of an updated S/U computer code and data suite are $5M to $10M with a schedule of two to three years. Recent ORNL analyses using the S/U analysis method show that the bias and uncertainty values for fission product cross sections are smaller than previously expected. This result is confirmed by a similar EPRI approach using different data and computer codes. ENERCON also found that some issues regarding the implementation of burnup credit appear to have been successfully resolved especially the axial burnup profile issue and the depletion parameter issue. These issues were resolved through data gathering activities at the Yucca Mountain Project and ORNL.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An Approach for Validating Actinide and Fission Product Burnup Credit Criticality Safety Analyses-Isotopic Composition Predictions

The expanded use of burnup credit in the United States (U.S.) for storage and transport casks, particularly in the acceptance of credit for fission products, has been constrained by the availability of experimental fission product data to support code validation. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has noted that the rationale for restricting the Interim Staff Guidance on burnup credit for storage and transportation casks (ISG-8) to actinide-only is based largely on the lack of clear, definitive experiments that can be used to estimate the bias and uncertainty for computational analyses associated with using burnup credit. To address the issues of burnup credit criticality validation, the NRC initiated a project with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to (1) develop and establish a technically sound validation approach for commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) criticality safety evaluations based on best-available data and methods and (2) apply the approach for representative SNF storage and transport configurations/conditions to demonstrate its usage and applicability, as well as to provide reference bias results. The purpose of this paper is to describe the isotopic composition (depletion) validation approach and resulting observations and recommendations. Validation of the criticality calculations is addressed in a companion paper at this conference. For isotopic composition validation, the approach is to determine burnup-dependent bias and uncertainty in the effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) due to bias and uncertainty in isotopic predictions, via comparisons of isotopic composition predictions (calculated) and measured isotopic compositions from destructive radiochemical assay utilizing as much assay data as is available, and a best-estimate Monte Carlo based method. This paper (1) provides a detailed description of the burnup credit isotopic validation approach and its technical bases, (2) describes the application of the approach for representative pressurized water reactor and boiling water reactor safety analysis models to demonstrate its usage and applicability, (3) provides reference bias and uncertainty results based on a quality-assurance-controlled prerelease version of the Scale 6.1 code package and the ENDF/B-VII nuclear cross section data.

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Effects of Lower Drying-Storage Temperature on the Ductility of High-Burnup PWR Cladding

The purpose of this research effort is to determine the effects of canister and/or cask drying and storage on radial hydride precipitation in, and potential embrittlement of, high-burnup (HBU) pressurized water reactor (PWR) cladding alloys during cooling for a range of peak drying-storage temperatures (PCT) and hoop stresses. Extensive precipitation of radial hydrides could lower the failure hoop stresses and strains, relative to limits established for as-irradiated cladding from discharged fuel rods stored in pools, at temperatures below the ductile-to-brittle transition temperature (DBTT).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Apparent Monte Carlo Source Convergence Problem with BWR Fuel Depleted with Partial Control Blade Insertion

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have initiated a multiyear project to investigate application of burnup credit (BUC) to boiling-water reactor (BWR) fuel in storage and transportation casks and spent fuel pools (SFPs). Ideally, a single combination of all operating parameters including moderator density and axial burnup profiles, control blade exposure, and others can be identified to allow a simple, bounding approach to BWR BUC. One aspect of this investigation involves examining the effect of control blade insertion during operation on discharged assembly reactivity. In the course of these calculations, an apparent source convergence problem was discovered for fuel that has experienced partial blade insertion for the entire lifetime of the assembly. The source convergence problem appears not to impact k{sub eff}, but it manifests in predictions of the axial fission density profile. This phenomenon is of interest in identifying areas of concern with BWR BUC since it has not been studied as thoroughly as BUC for pressurized-water (PWR) reactor fuel. There may also be interest in this configuration for further study of a realistic source Monte Carlo convergence problem as opposed to some earlier manufactured source convergence problems through careful selection of initial conditions. This summary presents the depletion conditions used to generate the problem, a description of the models, a background based on well-behaved calculations, the identification of the problem, and attempts made to resolve the problem. Only a brief description of the depletion conditions and models is possible within the limited scope of this summary. Finally, conclusions are presented. This summary identifies a source convergence problem in the process of investigating BUC for BWR spent fuel. The depletion scenario which created the depleted fuel and burnable absorber compositions included a control blade inserted in the bottom 14 nodes throughout the entire depletion. This insertion is slightly over half the length of the assembly, and it appears to create two regions of nearly equal reactivity. As expected, one region is near the top of the assembly, and the other region is near the middle of the assembly. This node includes significant {sup 239}Pu generation as a result of rodded operation, but it is also the top node of the full lattice zone. While the calculated k{sub eff} values appear to be statistically equivalent, the axial neutron production profile varies significantly among independent simulations of the same model. A range of standard approaches has been used to attempt to resolve the source convergence problem and determine the true axial neutron production profile. This profile is of interest in cask criticality safety analysis because it influences the interaction among assemblies loaded in the cask. The forthcoming SCALE 6.2 release will include source convergence testing based on Shannon entropy, which may assist in identifying these types of problems in the future. It should be noted that this source convergence problem results from the depletion conditions and the final distribution of fissile and absorber material within the discharged fuel assembly. The results, while entirely generated within the SCALE code system, are representative of any Monte Carlo program attempting to calculate k{sub eff} for such a system. The most important conclusion of this work is that the BUC criticality safety community must be aware of the potential for this type of source convergence problem. Analysts must approach such partially rodded scenarios with caution and critically examine the results. Fortunately, it is extremely unlikely that BWR assemblies would experience the bladed operation necessary to create this particular source convergence problem. These results may also have some bearing on the analysis of PWR BUC for new plant designs such as AP1000 that incorporate significant rodded operations. In a broader context, the source convergence problem identified here could have been magnified if it had occurred in a Monte Carlo depletion simulation. It may be possible to identify this type of problem in a depletion calculation by comparing the apparently converged fluxes between steps to ensure that no oscillations or other serious shifts are occurring. The depletion calculations performed in this work were performed with a two-dimensional deterministic code and are therefore not subject to this problem. These results may also raise questions about the validity of 2D depletion models with extruded geometry in the 3D k{sub eff} calculation. (authors)

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Exploring the Use of Muon Momentum for Detection of Nuclear Material Within Shielded Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Casks

The inspection of the storage containers that house used nuclear fuel is an important issue facing the nuclear industry; currently, there are limited options available to provide for even minimal inspections. During the long storage life of the fuel, intermediate handling and transportation activities may take place that can create concerns regarding fuel integrity (safety) and continuity of knowledge (safeguards and security). Accidents and natural disasters also contribute to this concern. The reliable and safe management of used nuclear fuel is among the critical tasks to be addressed for the advancement of fission-based nuclear energy in the United States and elsewhere. Since the early 1950's, when the first nuclear power plant began to produce electricity, approximately 65,000 metric tons of used nuclear fuel have been generated in the United States. The postponement of the opening of a permanent repository until 2048 will lead to increased used fuel accumulation at reactor sites. A rapid increase in storage installations with more than 9,000 casks storing {approx}420,000 assemblies is anticipated by 2050 even if no new nuclear power plants are built. After used nuclear fuel has been placed inside a cask, the cask is sealed, not allowing for visual inspection. Conventional methods, e.g., x-rays, are limited in that they cannot penetrate dense, well-shielded objects. More sophisticated techniques, such as penetrating neutrons or proton radiography, require the use of an expensive accelerator. Efforts by Ziock et al. using neutron and gamma-ray imagers concluded that '...the signatures are deemed insufficient to uniquely identify individual casks of the same type...'. It was found that the gamma-ray and neutron images were dominated by diffusion and thermalization effects resulting from the large amount of shielding. One promising mode of inspection would use cosmic-ray muons. These muons are naturally generated, are able to penetrate dense materials, and are incident from all directions above the horizon. Tomography performed using these muons could potentially provide efficient, inexpensive, remote assessment of used nuclear fuel. However, current muon applications are limited in that they have not included momentum measurement. If momentum measurement could be incorporated, that would represent a big step forward because it would allow more accurate estimation of the muon observables, e.g., scattering variance. This approach has the potential to reconstruct the contents of a cask with improved resolution and identify partial defects, fuel assemblies, and individual fuel rods.

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A FRAMEWORK TO DEVELOP FLAW ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT OF MULTIPURPOSE CANISTERS FOR EXTENDED STORAGE OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL

A multipurpose canister (MPC) made of austenitic stainless steel is loaded with used nuclear fuel assemblies and is part of the transfer cask system to move the fuel from the spent fuel pool to prepare for storage, and is part of the storage cask system for on-site dry storage. This weld-sealed canister is also expected to be part of the transportation package following storage. The canister may be subject to service-induced degradation especially if exposed to aggressive environments during possible very long-term storage period if the permanent repository is yet to be identified and readied. Stress corrosion cracking may be initiated on the canister surface in the welds or in the heat affected zone because the construction of MPC does not require heat treatment for stress relief. An acceptance criteria methodology is being developed for flaw disposition should the crack-like defects be detected by periodic Inservice Inspection. The external loading cases include thermal accident scenarios and cask drop conditions with the contribution from the welding residual stresses. The determination of acceptable flaw size is based on the procedure to evaluate flaw stability provided by American Petroleum Institute (API) 579 Fitness-for-Service (Second Edition). The material mechanical and fracture properties for base and weld metals and the stress analysis results are obtained from the open literature such as NUREG-1864. Subcritical crack growth from stress corrosion cracking (SCC), and its impact on inspection intervals and acceptance criteria, is not addressed.

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Effect of Control Blade History, and Axial Coolant Density and Burnup Profiles on BWR Burnup Credit

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have initiated a multiyear project to investigate the application of burnup credit (BUC) for boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel in storage and transportation systems (often referred to as casks) and spent fuel pools (SFPs). This work is divided into two main phases. The first phase investigated the applicability of peak reactivity methods currently used in SFPs to transportation and storage casks and the validation of reactivity calculations and spent fuel compositions within these methods. The second phase focuses on extending BUC beyond peak reactivity. This paper documents the analysis of the effects of control blade insertion history, and moderator density and burnup axial profiles for extended BWR BUC.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Effects of Lower Drying-Storage Temperatures on the DBTT of High-Burnup PWR Cladding

The purpose of this research effort is to determine the effects of canister and /or cask drying and storage on radial hydride precipitation in, and potential embrittlement of, high-burnup (HBU) pressurized water reactor (PWR) cladding alloys during cooling for a range of peak drying-storage temperatures and hoop stresses. Extensive precipitation of radial hydrides could lower the failure hoop stresses and strains, relative to limits established for as-irradiated cladding from discharged fuel rods stored in pools, at temperatures below the ductile- to-brittle transition temperature (DBTT).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

First Road / River Barge Security Transport of SNF under the New German Transport Security Guidelines - 19102

A transfer of 342 spent fuel assemblies from NPP Obrigheim to NPP Neckarwestheim, both located alongside the river Neckar in the south of Germany, is required to promote the decommissioning process of NPP Obrigheim, which started in 2008 after the NPP had been shut down three years before. The spent fuel storage facility in Neckarwestheim offers sufficient storage space to accept the 342 SNF assemblies, stored in fifteen dry casks type CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK. After several transport feasibility studies had been conducted, Daher Nuclear Technologies GmbH was awarded the commission to plan, prepare and conduct the SNF transport. Since the combined road / river barge transport promised to be the most suitable mode of transportation Daher Nuclear Technologies started to prepare its security concept, a prerequisite to apply for and attain the transport license mandatory for transporting spent nuclear fuel in Germany. In March 2014 the company applied for the transport license, which, after more than three years and numerous amendments to the security concept, was finally granted to Daher Nuclear Technologies on May 16, 2017 by the German Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (successor organization of the BfS). Simultaneously to the license application phase the transport equipment - amongst others the heavy-duty trucks and trailers, the pusher tugs, the river barge and transport frames - had to be provided and modified to meet the intensified requirements of the New German Transport Security Guidelines Road / Rail as well as several other legal regulations referring to the transport of dangerous goods by road and inland waterways (e.g. ADR - European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road and ADN - European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways). The planning process involved various meetings with representatives of different authorities and administrative bodies incl. accredited experts as well as subcontractors. Tremendous training efforts had to be undertaken to train more than 100 transport participants regarding security measures, health, safety and environmental measures, as well as the proper handling of radioactive material. This also included the training of the security staff, that had to be qualified in compliance with the new Transport Security Guidelines Road and Rail. Finally, in June 2017, when all preparations where complete, all requirements met, and all permits obtained, the first ever security SNF transport on a German river was performed. Three laden CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK transport and storage casks were transported in one batch via heavy-duty truck-trailer from the NPP Obrigheim to the NPP's own harbor, to be rolled on to the river barge, that would carry the three casks upstream the river Neckar to the approx. fifty kilometer distant NPP Neckarwestheim. The journey on the river took about eleven hours, in which several bridges and locks had to be passed. The entire transport was escorted by qualified security staff and auxiliary police forces on waterways and alongside on roads. It attracted nationwide public attention, due to its pioneer status and the fact, that there hadn't been any SNF or HLW shipments in Germany since 2011. After the convoy safely arrived at NPP Neckarwestheim's pier the three laden CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK casks were rolled off the river barge via heavy-duty truck-trailers to be stored in the on-site interim storage facility. This first transport was a success and was followed by four additionally successful security transports in September, October, November and December 2017. The public attention receded significantly during the transport campaign, which ended on December 19, 2017 with the transfer of the last three of fifteen casks to the on-site interim storage facility in Neckarwestheim. With the last cask safely transferred to the interim storage facility Daher Nuclear Technologies successfully completed the transport campaign on schedule, meeting one of EnBW's fundamental objectives to finish the transfer of the 342 SNF assemblies by the end of 2017. (authors)

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A Threshold Helium Leakage Detection Switch with Ultra Low Power Operation

Detecting helium leakage is important in many applications, such as in dry cask nuclear waste storage systems. This work develops a helium detection system based on the relative permittivity (dielectric constant) difference between air and helium. This difference changes the status of an electrostatic microelectromechanical system (MEMS) switch. The switch is a capacitive-based device and requires a very negligible amount of power. Exciting the switch’s electrical resonance enhances the MEMS switch sensitivity to detect low helium concentration. This work simulates two different MEMS switch configurations: a cantilever-based MEMS modeled as a single-degree-freedom model and a clamped-clamped beam MEMS molded using the COMSOL Multiphysics finite-element software. While both configurations demonstrate the switch’s simple operation concept, the clamped-clamped beam was selected for detailed parametric characterization due to its comprehensive modeling approach. The beam detects at least 5% helium concentration levels when excited at 3.8 MHz, near electrical resonance. The switch performance decreases at lower excitation frequencies or increases the circuit resistance. The MEMS sensor detection level was relatively immune to beam thickness and parasitic capacitance changes. However, higher parasitic capacitance increases the switch’s susceptibility to errors, fluctuations, and uncertainties.

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GNS Castor V/21 Headspace Gas Sampling 2014

Prior to performing an internal visual inspection, samples of the headspace gas of the GNS Castor V/21 cask were taken on June 12, 2014. These samples were taken in support of the CREIPI/Japanese nuclear industry effort to validate fuel integrity without visual inspection by measuring the 85 Kr content of the cask headspace

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Technical Basis for Peak Reactivity Burnup Credit for BWR Spent Nuclear Fuel in Storage and Transportation Systems

Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission have initiated a multiyear project to investigate application of burnup credit for boiling-water reactor (BWR) fuel in storage and transportation casks. This project includes two phases. The first phase (1) investigates applicability of peak reactivity methods currently used in spent fuel pools (SFPs) to storage and transportation systems and (2) evaluates validation of both reactivity (k eff ) calculations and burnup credit nuclide concentrations within these methods. The second phase will focus on extending burnup credit beyond peak reactivity. This paper documents the first phase, including an analysis of lattice design parameters and depletion effects, as well as both validation components. Initial efforts related to extended burnup credit are discussed in a companion paper. Peak reactivity analyses have been used in criticality analyses for licensing of BWR fuel in SFPs over the last 20 years. These analyses typically combine credit for the gadolinium burnable absorber present in the fuel with a modest amount of burnup credit. Gadolinium burnable absorbers are used in BWR assemblies to control core reactivity. The burnable absorber significantly reduces assembly reactivity at beginning of life, potentially leading to significant increases in assembly reactivity for burnups less than 15–20 GWd/MTU. The reactivity of each fuel lattice is dependent on gadolinium loading. The number of gadolinium-bearing fuel pins lowers initial lattice reactivity, but it has a small impact on the burnup and reactivity of the peak. The gadolinium concentration in each pin has a small impact on initial lattice reactivity but a significant effect on the reactivity of the peak and the burnup at which the peak occurs. The importance of the lattice parameters and depletion conditions are primarily determined by their impact on the gadolinium depletion. Criticality code validation for BWR burnup credit at peak reactivity requires a different set of experiments than for pressurized-water reactor burnup credit analysis because of differences in actinide compositions, presence of residual gadolinium absorber, and lower fission product concentrations. A survey of available critical experiments is presented along with a sample criticality code validation and determination of undercoverage penalties for some nuclides. The validation of depleted fuel compositions at peak reactivity presents many challenges which largely result from a lack of radiochemical assay data applicable to BWR fuel in this burnup range. In addition, none of the existing low burnup measurement data include residual gadolinium measurements. An example bias and uncertainty associated with validation of actinide-only fuel compositions is presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Technical basis for peak reactivity burnup credit for BWR spent nuclear fuel in storage and transportation systems - 14601

Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission have initiated a multiyear project to investigate application of burnup credit for boiling-water reactor (BWR) fuel in storage and transportation casks. This project includes two phases. The first phase (1) investigates applicability of peak reactivity methods currently used in spent fuel pools (SFPs) to storage and transportation systems and (2) evaluates validation of both reactivity (k{sub eff}) calculations and burnup credit nuclide concentrations within these methods. The second phase will focus on extending burnup credit beyond peak reactivity. This paper documents the first phase, including an analysis of lattice design parameters and depletion effects, as well as both validation components. Initial efforts related to extended burnup credit are discussed in a companion paper. Peak reactivity analyses have been used in criticality analyses for licensing of BWR fuel in SFPs over the last 20 years. These analyses typically combine credit for the gadolinium burnable absorber present in the fuel with a modest amount of burnup credit. Gadolinium burnable absorbers are used in BWR assemblies to control core reactivity. The burnable absorber significantly reduces assembly reactivity at beginning of life, potentially leading to significant increases in assembly reactivity for burnups less than 15-20 GWd/MTU. The reactivity of each fuel lattice is dependent on gadolinium loading. The number of gadolinium-bearing fuel pins lowers initial lattice reactivity, but it has a small impact on the burnup and reactivity of the peak. The gadolinium concentration in each pin has a small impact on initial lattice reactivity but a significant effect on the reactivity of the peak and the burnup at which the peak occurs. The importance of the lattice parameters and depletion conditions are primarily determined by their impact on the gadolinium depletion. Criticality code validation for BWR burnup credit at peak reactivity requires a different set of experiments than for pressurized-water reactor burnup credit analysis because of differences in actinide compositions, presence of residual gadolinium absorber, and lower fission product concentrations. A survey of available critical experiments is presented along with a sample criticality code validation and determination of undercoverage penalties for some nuclides. The validation of depleted fuel compositions at peak reactivity presents many challenges which largely result from a lack of radiochemical assay data applicable to BWR fuel in this burnup range. In addition, none of the existing low burnup measurement data include residual gadolinium measurements. An example bias and uncertainty associated with validation of actinide-only fuel compositions is presented. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Oxyhydroxides on aluminum spent nuclear fuel: formation studies and removal practices to prevent radiolytic gas production

Aluminum-clad nuclear fuel has been at the forefront in research and commercial reactors. After being removed from the reactor, the spent nuclear fuel is placed in large-volume water basins (wet storage) that are constantly monitored for water quality to minimize corrosion/deterioration. The water provides both radiation shielding and cooling for the freshly removed fuel. It is highly desired to have a pathway for fuel to be transitioned to dry storage in sealed casks, so that spent nuclear fuel can be safely transported and dispositioned in a permanent repository, and basin capacity can be made available for temporary wet storage of fresher spent fuel. A challenge for safe, road-ready dry storage is the hydrated aluminum oxides (oxyhydroxides) that are prevalent on aluminum spent nuclear fuel that has been stored under water for years. If water is released from the oxyhydroxides during dry storage, it can create corrosion within the storage canister, and hydrogen can be generated through radiolysis of the oxyhydroxides, causing pressurization and flammability risks. The focus of this project is to develop knowledge of the oxyhydroxide growth and production of gases through radiolysis and to apply empirical models for predicting these phenomena. The expertise developed will be used to formulate conditions and parameters for oxyhydroxide removal/dehydration from fuel cladding through vacuum or forced-air gas drying, to prevent problems during permanent dry storage.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Operational Challenges of Extended Dry Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel - 12550

As a result of the termination of the Yucca Mountain used fuel repository program and a continuing climate of uncertainty in the national policy for nuclear fuel disposition, the likelihood has increased that extended storage, defined as more than 60 years, and subsequent transportation of used nuclear fuel after periods of extended storage may become necessary. Whether at the nation's 104 nuclear energy facilities, or at one or more consolidated interim storage facilities, the operational challenges of extended storage and transportation will depend upon the future US policy for Used Fuel Management and the future Regulatory Framework for EST, both of which should be developed with consideration of their operational impacts. Risk insights into the regulatory framework may conclude that dry storage and transportation operations should focus primarily on ensuring canister integrity. Assurance of cladding integrity may not be beneficial from an overall risk perspective. If assurance of canister integrity becomes more important, then mitigation techniques for potential canister degradation mechanisms will be the primary source of operational focus. If cladding integrity remains as an important focus, then operational challenges to assure it would require much more effort. Fundamental shifts in the approach to design a repository and optimize the back-end of the fuel cycle will need to occur in order to address the realities of the changes that have taken place over the last 30 years. Direct disposal of existing dual purpose storage and transportation casks will be essential to optimizing the back end of the fuel cycle. The federal used fuel management should focus on siting and designing a repository that meets this objective along with the development of CIS, and possibly recycling. An integrated approach to developing US policy and the regulatory framework must consider the potential operational challenges that they would create. Therefore, it should be integral to these efforts to redefine retrievability to apply to the dual purpose cask, and not to apply to individual assemblies. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗