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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2001

The Advanced Technology Development Center (ATDC)

NASA is building the Advanced Technology Development Center (ATDC) to provide a 'national resource' for the research, development, demonstration, testing, and qualification of Spaceport and Range Technologies. The ATDC will be located at Space Launch Complex 20 (SLC-20) at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) in Florida. SLC-20 currently provides a processing and launch capability for small-scale rockets; this capability will be augmented with additional ATDC facilities to provide a comprehensive and integrated in situ environment. Examples of Spaceport Technologies that will be supported by ATDC infrastructure include densified cryogenic systems, intelligent automated umbilicals, integrated vehicle health management systems, next-generation safety systems, and advanced range systems. The ATDC can be thought of as a prototype spaceport where industry, government, and academia, in partnership, can work together to improve safety of future space initiatives. The ATDC is being deployed in five separate phases. Major ATDC facilities will include a Liquid Oxygen Area; a Liquid Hydrogen Area, a Liquid Nitrogen Area, and a multipurpose Launch Mount; 'Iron Rocket' Test Demonstrator; a Processing Facility with a Checkout and Control System; and Future Infrastructure Developments. Initial ATDC development will be completed in 2006.

Clements, G. R.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Integrated Systems Engineering, Safety, Reliability and Risk Management – Minimizing Black Swan Events

This paper examines key barriers that can possibly inhibit safe and reliable mission execution and, in the worst case, result in loss of human life due to many unknown contributory factors that can lead to Black Swan events. Some of the representative contributory factors include decision errors, overconfidence and a host of common causes including cultural and human factors. Decisions are always easy to criticize in hindsight when more information is available after a major accident. Depending on the type and complexity of the project and/or mission, the catastrophic risks of drifting into failure can be alleviated by implementing uniquely and strategically tailored Integrated-System-of-Systems, dynamic, risk-informed decision management processes. This paper presents some of the lessons learned from James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), NASA’s Human Space Flight program, and industry that provide motivation to organizations working on mega-complex missions to prudently accomplish targeted mission success. These lessons are important for future human Lunar, Mars and Beyond missions planned to be pursued by NASA through a public-private partnership using nimble but effective safety-conscious, proven sound engineering practices including implementation of integrated risk mitigation practices.

SLS↗
NASA NTRS2002

Simulation of the National Aerospace System for Safety Analysis

Work started on this project on January 1, 1999, the first year of the grant. Following the outline of the grant proposal, a simulator architecture has been established which can incorporate the variety of types of models needed to accurately simulate national airspace dynamics. For the sake of efficiency, this architecture was based on an established single-aircraft flight simulator, the Reconfigurable Flight Simulator (RFS), already developed at Georgia Tech. Likewise, in the first year substantive changes and additions were made to the RFS to convert it into a simulation of the National Airspace System, with the flexibility to incorporate many types of models: aircraft models; controller models; airspace configuration generators; discrete event generators; embedded statistical functions; and display and data outputs. The architecture has been developed with the capability to accept any models of these types; due to its object-oriented structure, individual simulator components can be added and removed during run-time, and can be compiled separately. Simulation objects from other projects should be easy to convert to meet architecture requirements, with the intent that both this project may now be able to incorporate established simulation components from other projects, and that other projects may easily use this simulation without significant time investment.

Pritchett, Amy↗
NASA NTRS2003

Archetypes for Organisational Safety

We propose a framework using system dynamics to model the dynamic behavior of organizations in accident analysis. Most current accident analysis techniques are event-based and do not adequately capture the dynamic complexity and non-linear interactions that characterize accidents in complex systems. In this paper we propose a set of system safety archetypes that model common safety culture flaws in organizations, i.e., the dynamic behaviour of organizations that often leads to accidents. As accident analysis and investigation tools, the archetypes can be used to develop dynamic models that describe the systemic and organizational factors contributing to the accident. The archetypes help clarify why safety-related decisions do not always result in the desired behavior, and how independent decisions in different parts of the organization can combine to impact safety.

Marais, Karen↗
NASA NTRS2013

Speech Recognition Interfaces Improve Flight Safety

"Alpha, Golf, November, Echo, Zulu." "Sierra, Alpha, Golf, Echo, Sierra." "Lima, Hotel, Yankee." It looks like some strange word game, but the combinations of words above actually communicate the first three points of a flight plan from Albany, New York to Florence, South Carolina. Spoken by air traffic controllers and pilots, the aviation industry s standard International Civil Aviation Organization phonetic alphabet uses words to represent letters. The first letter of each word in the series is combined to spell waypoints, or reference points, used in flight navigation. The first waypoint above is AGNEZ (alpha for A, golf for G, etc.). The second is SAGES, and the third is LHY. For pilots of general aviation aircraft, the traditional method of entering the letters of each waypoint into a GPS device is a time-consuming process. For each of the 16 waypoints required for the complete flight plan from Albany to Florence, the pilot uses a knob to scroll through each letter of the alphabet. It takes approximately 5 minutes of the pilot s focused attention to complete this particular plan. Entering such a long flight plan into a GPS can pose a safety hazard because it can take the pilot s attention from other critical tasks like scanning gauges or avoiding other aircraft. For more than five decades, NASA has supported research and development in aviation safety, including through its Vehicle Systems Safety Technology (VSST) program, which works to advance safer and more capable flight decks (cockpits) in aircraft. Randy Bailey, a lead aerospace engineer in the VSST program at Langley Research Center, says the technology in cockpits is directly related to flight safety. For example, "GPS navigation systems are wonderful as far as improving a pilot s ability to navigate, but if you can find ways to reduce the draw of the pilot s attention into the cockpit while using the GPS, it could potentially improve safety," he says.

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NASA NTRS2003

Building Safer Systems With SpecTRM

System safety, an integral component in software development, often poses a challenge to engineers designing computer-based systems. While the relaxed constraints on software design allow for increased power and flexibility, this flexibility introduces more possibilities for error. As a result, system engineers must identify the design constraints necessary to maintain safety and ensure that the system and software design enforces them. Safeware Engineering Corporation, of Seattle, Washington, provides the information, tools, and techniques to accomplish this task with its Specification Tools and Requirements Methodology (SpecTRM). NASA assisted in developing this engineering toolset by awarding the company several Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts with Ames Research Center and Langley Research Center. The technology benefits NASA through its applications for Space Station rendezvous and docking. SpecTRM aids system and software engineers in developing specifications for large, complex safety critical systems. The product enables engineers to find errors early in development so that they can be fixed with the lowest cost and impact on the system design. SpecTRM traces both the requirements and design rationale (including safety constraints) throughout the system design and documentation, allowing engineers to build required system properties into the design from the beginning, rather than emphasizing assessment at the end of the development process when changes are limited and costly.System safety, an integral component in software development, often poses a challenge to engineers designing computer-based systems. While the relaxed constraints on software design allow for increased power and flexibility, this flexibility introduces more possibilities for error. As a result, system engineers must identify the design constraints necessary to maintain safety and ensure that the system and software design enforces them. Safeware Engineering Corporation, of Seattle, Washington, provides the information, tools, and techniques to accomplish this task with its Specification Tools and Requirements Methodology (SpecTRM). NASA assisted in developing this engineering toolset by awarding the company several Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts with Ames Research Center and Langley Research Center. The technology benefits NASA through its applications for Space Station rendezvous and docking. SpecTRM aids system and software engineers in developing specifications for large, complex safety critical systems. The product enables engineers to find errors early in development so that they can be fixed with the lowest cost and impact on the system design. SpecTRM traces both the requirements and design rationale (including safety constraints) throughout the system design and documentation, allowing engineers to build required system properties into the design from the beginning, rather than emphasizing assessment at the end of the development process when changes are limited and costly.

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NASA NTRS1970

Space Transportation System Technology Symposium: Operations, Maintenance, and Safety (Including Cryogenic Systems) - Volume 5

The prospect of undertaking a reusable launch vehicle development led the NASA Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) to request the Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART) to organize and direct a program to develop the technology that would aid in selecting the best system alternatives and that would support the ultimate development of an earth-to-orbit shuttle. Such a Space Transportation System Technology Program has been initiated. OART, OMSF, and NASA Flight and Research Centers with the considerable inputs of Department of Defense personnel have generated the program through the efforts of several Technology Working Groups and a Technology Steering Group. Funding and management of the recommended efforts is being accomplished through the normal OART and OMSF line management channels. The work is being done in government laboratories and under contract with industry and universities. Foreign nations have been invited to participate in this work as well. Substantial funding, from both OART and OMSF, was applied during the second half of fiscal year 1970. The Space Transportation System Technology Symposium held at the NASA Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, July 15-17, 1970, was the first public report on that program. The Symposium goals were to consider the technology problems, their status, and the prospective program outlook for the benefit of the industry, government, university, and foreign participants considered to be contributors to the program. In addition, it offered an opportunity to identify the responsible individuals already engaged in the program. The Symposium sessions were intended to confront each presenter with his technical peers as listeners, and this, I believe, was substantially accomplished. Because of the high interest in the material presented, and also because the people who could edit the output are already deeply involved in other important tasks, we have elected to publish the material essentially as it was presented, utilizing mainly the illustrations used by the presenters along with brief words of explanation. Those who heard the presentations, and those who are technically astute in specialty areas, can probably put this story together again. We hope that more will be gained by compiling the information in this form now than by spending the time and effort to publish a more finished compendium later.

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NASA NTRS1973

Safety monitoring system for radioisotope thermoelectric generators

System alerts personnel of hazards which may develop while they are performing tests on radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG). Remedial action is initiated to minimize damage. Five operating conditions are monitored: hot junction temperature, cold junction temperature, thermal shroud coolant flow, vacuum in test chamber, and alpha radiation.

Zoltan, A.↗
NASA NTRS1973

Implementing instructions for KSC systems and safety training

The requirements for the safety training program are reported for KSC including transportation, inspection, checkout operations, maintenance of launch vehicles, spacecraft, ground support equipment, and launch teams. The responsibilities and mechanics for implementing the program are outlined.

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NASA NTRS1975

Space flight hazards catalog

The most significant hazards identified on manned space flight programs are listed. This summary is of special value to system safety engineers in developing safety checklists and otherwise tailoring safety tasks to specific systems and subsystems.

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NASA NTRS1978

NASA aviation safety reporting system

Reports describing various types of communication problems are presented along with summaries dealing with judgment and decision making. Concerns relating to the ground proximity warning system are summarized and several examples of true terrain proximity warnings are provided. An analytic study of reports relating to profile descents was performed. Problems were found to be associated with charting and graphic presentation of the descents, with lack of uniformity of the descent procedures among facilities using them, and with the flight crew workload engendered by profile descents, particularly when additional requirements are interposed by air traffic control during the execution of the profiles. A selection of alert bulletins and responses to them were reviewed.

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NASA NTRS1977

NASA aviation safety reporting system

A decline in reports concerning small aircraft was noted; more reports involved transport aircraft, professional pilots, instrument meteorological conditions, and weather problems. A study of 136 reports of operational problems in terminal radar service areas was made. Pilot, controller, and system factors were found to be associated with these occurrences. Information transfer difficulties were prominent. Misunderstandings by pilots, and in some cases by controllers, of the policies and limitations of terminal radar programs were observed.

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NASA NTRS1978

NASA aviation safety reporting system

An analytical study of reports relating to cockpit altitude alert systems was performed. A recent change in the Federal Air Regulation permits the system to be modified so that the alerting signal approaching altitude has only a visual component; the auditory signal would continue to be heard if a deviation from an assigned altitude occurred. Failure to observe altitude alert signals and failure to reset the system were the commonest cause of altitude deviations related to this system. Cockpit crew distraction was the most frequent reason for these failures. It was noted by numerous reporters that the presence of altitude alert system made them less aware of altitude; this lack of altitude awareness is discussed. Failures of crew coordination were also noted. It is suggested that although modification of the altitude alert system may be highly desirable in short-haul aircraft, it may not be desirable for long-haul aircraft in which cockpit workloads are much lower for long periods of time. In these cockpits, the aural alert approaching altitudes is perceived as useful and helpful. If the systems are to be modified, it appears that additional emphasis on altitude awareness during recurrent training will be necessary; it is also possible that flight crew operating procedures during climb and descent may need examination with respect to monitoring responsibilities. A selection of alert bulletins and responses to them is presented.

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NASA NTRS1978

NASA aviation safety reporting system

A sample of reports relating to operations during winter weather is presented. Several reports involving problems of judgment and decisionmaking have been selected from the numerous reports representative of this area. Problems related to aeronautical charts are discussed in a number of reports. An analytic study of reports involving potential conflicts in the immediate vicinity of uncontrolled airports was performed; the results are discussed in this report. It was found that in three-fourths of 127 such conflicts, neither pilot, or only one of the pilots, was communicating position and intentions on the appropriate frequency. The importance of providing aural transfer of information, as a backup to the visual see and avoid mode of information transfer is discussed. It was also found that a large fraction of pilots involved in potential conflicts on final approach had executed straight-in approaches, rather than the recommended traffic pattern entries, prior to the conflicts. A selection of alert bulletins and responses to them by various segments of the aviation community is presented.

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NASA NTRS1978

NASA aviation safety reporting system

The study deals with 165 inadvertent operations on or into inappropriate portions of the aircraft areas at controlled airports. Pilot-initiated and controller-initiated incursions are described and discussed. It was found that a majority of the pilot-initiated occurrences involved operation without a clearance; controller-initiated occurrences usually involved failure to maintain assured separation. The factors associated with these occurrences are analyzed. It appears that a major problem in these occurrences is inadequate coordination among the various system participants. Reasons for this, and some possible solutions to various aspects of the problem, are discussed. A sample of reports from pilots and controllers is presented. These relate to undesired occurrences in air transport, general aviation, and air traffic control operations; to ATC coordination problems; and to a recurrent problem in ASRS reports, parachuting operations. A sample of alert bulletins and responses to them is presented.

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NASA NTRS1976

Space transportation system payload safety guidelines handbook

This handbook provides the payload developer with a uniform description and interpretation of the potential hazards which may be caused by or associated with a payload element, operation, or interface with other payloads or with the STS. It also includes guidelines describing design or operational safety measures which suggest means of alleviating a particular hazard or group of hazards, thereby improving payload safety.

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NASA NTRS1980

NASA aviation safety reporting system

Knowledge of limitations of the Air Traffic Control system in conflict avoidance capabilities is discussed. Assumptions and expectations held by by airmen regarding the capabilities of the system are presented. Limitations related to communication are described and problems associated with visual approaches, airspace configurations, and airport layouts are discussed. A number of pilot and controller reports illustrative of three typical problem types: occurrences involving pilots who have limited experience; reports describing inflight calls for assistance; and flights in which pilots have declined to use available radar services are presented. Examples of Alert Bulletins and the FAA responses to them are included.

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