Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA)
Program review slides for the LWRS project's spring 2019 meeting.
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Program review slides for the LWRS project's spring 2019 meeting.
This poster presentation provides an overview of NETL’s work focused towards supporting the development of technical solutions to: 1) produce economical and low-carbon hydrogen from natural gas; 2) advance hydrogen sensing technologies for the existing natural gas pipelines; 3) evaluating new infrastructure to be used to transport hydrogen safely at a large scale; and 4) produce sustainable chemicals and fuels, such as ammonia, from natural gas resources, including methane emissions from flare gas.
This document outlines how to install Malcolm (https://inl.gov/national-security/ics-malcolm/) on an Amazon AWS EC2 instance. It's intended for a blog post to be released on the Amazon AWS blog.
LOS ALAMOS, New Mexico, December 16, 2008—An innovative application of a technology first used for medical imaging may enhance airport security if Los Alamos National Laboratory scientists are successful.
Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a powerful new hazard analysis method designed to go beyond traditional safety techniques - such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) - that overlook important causes of accidents like flawed requirements, dysfunctional component interactions, and software errors. While proving to be very effective on real systems, no formal structure has been defined for STPA and its application has been ad-hoc with no rigorous procedures or model-based design tools. This report defines a formal mathematical structure underlying STPA and describes a procedure for systematically performing an STPA analysis based on that structure. A method for using the results of the hazard analysis to generate formal safety-critical, model-based system and software requirements is also presented. Techniques to automate both the analysis and the requirements generation are introduced, as well as a method to detect conflicts between the safety and other functional model-based requirements during early development of the system.
Systems engineering today faces a wide array of challenges, ranging from new operational environments to disruptive technological — necessitating approaches to improve research and development (R&D) efforts. Yet, emphasizing the Aristotelian argument that the “whole is greater than the sum of its parts” seems to offer a conceptual foundation creating new R&D solutions. Invoking systems theoretic concepts of emergence and hierarchy and analytic characteristics of traceability, rigor, and comprehensiveness is potentially beneficial for guiding R&D strategy and development to bridge the gap between theoretical problem spaces and engineering-based solutions. In response, this article describes systems–theoretic process analysis (STPA) as an example of one such approach to aid in early-systems R&D discussions. STPA—a ‘top-down’ process that abstracts real complex system operations into hierarchical control structures, functional control loops, and control actions—uses control loop logic to analyze how control actions (designed for desired system behaviors) may become violated and drive the complex system toward states of higher risk. By analyzing how needed controls are not provided (or out of sequence or stopped too soon) and unneeded controls are provided (or engaged too long), STPA can help early-system R&D discussions by exploring how requirements and desired actions interact to either mitigate or potentially increase states of risk that can lead to unacceptable losses. This article will demonstrate STPA's benefit for early-system R&D strategy and development discussion by describing such diverse use cases as cyber security, nuclear fuel transportation, and US electric grid performance. Together, the traceability, rigor, and comprehensiveness of STPA serve as useful tools for improving R&D strategy and development discussions. In conclusion, leveraging STPA as well as related systems engineering techniques can be helpful in early R&D planning and strategy development to better triangulate deeper theoretical meaning or evaluate empirical results to better inform systems engineering solutions.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has a goal to develop solutions for the long-term, sustainable management of the nation's spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy's (DOE-NE) Office of Integrated Waste Management (IWM) is applying integrated waste management system analysis, system engineering, and decision analysis principles to inform future decisions regarding potential future nuclear waste management system architectures. One aspect of an integrated nuclear waste management system architecture is transportation of spent nuclear fuel from the fleet of commercial nuclear reactors to interim storage and/or disposal facilities. This paper presents a preliminary evaluation of the SNF transportation infrastructure at existing commercial nuclear power plant sites. Reactor site surveys performed by DOE in the 1990's and early 2000's that described the transportation infrastructure at commercial reactor sites at that time served as the starting point for the evaluation. Geographical information systems (GIS) and available open-source information about the reactor sites were used to identify changes in the transportation infrastructure at operating commercial nuclear power plant sites. The data and schematics contained within the previous surveys were comparatively analyzed alongside the GIS tools Google Earth, Google Maps, and DOE's Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START) to determine potential transportation modes and to identify improvements to the transportation infrastructure that may be needed at each of the sites. The preliminary results obtained and the insight gained from this effort support both integrated waste management system architecture analyses and future planning efforts. This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. (authors)
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has a goal to develop solutions for the long-term, sustainable management of the nation's spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The DOE is planning for an integrated waste management system to transport, store, and dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from commercial electricity generation, as well national defense activities. The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition's (SFWD) Integrated Waste Management (IWM) program is applying integrated waste management system analysis, system engineering, and decision analysis principles to inform future decisions regarding potential future nuclear waste management system architectures. Integrated waste management system architecture analyses are being conducted to support the future deployment of a comprehensive system for managing nuclear waste that considers all aspects of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle (transportation, storage, and disposal). One aspect of a potential future nuclear waste management system is transportation of spent nuclear fuel from the fleet of commercial nuclear reactors to destinations where waste management facilities, such as an interim storage facility, would be located. Example rail transportation routes from commercial nuclear reactor sites to various locations in the continental U.S. - chosen as hypothetical locations for future waste management system facilities - were evaluated in 2014 using DOE's GIS-based Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START). The objective of that evaluation was to identify and parameterize generic transportation routes for use in integrated waste management system analyses, the associated uncertainty in these selections, and the uncertainty associated with different transportation route selection criteria. The analysis presented herein considers rail transportation routes from commercial nuclear reactor sites to hypothetical destinations within the continental U.S. (authors)
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This capstone offers the introduction of Lean concepts to an office activity to demonstrate the versatility of Lean. Traditionally Lean has been associated with process improvements as applied to an industrial atmosphere. However, this paper will demonstrate that implementing Lean concepts within an office activity can result in significant process improvements. Lean first emerged with the conception of the Toyota Production System. This innovative concept was designed to improve productivity in the automotive industry by eliminating waste and variation. Lean has also been applied to office environments, however the limited literature reveals most Lean techniques within an office are restricted to one or two techniques. Our capstone confronts these restrictions by introducing a systematic approach that utilizes multiple Lean concepts. The approach incorporates: system analysis, system reliability, system requirements, and system feasibility. The methodical Lean outline provides tools for a successful outcome, which ensures the process is thoroughly dissected and can be achieved for any process in any work environment.
The requirements for United States nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their large operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Physical Security Pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. This pathway will analyze and minimize the conservatisms built into current security postures in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within this pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force (FOF) modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrated them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System or Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance of the use of the framework. Such an assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants. NOTE: The work performed in this report is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are in the report. No plant’s sensitive information is discussed in this report. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the MASS-DEF methodology.
The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.
The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.
As the power grid incorporates increasing amounts of distributed energy resources (DER) that provide new generation sources, new opportunities are created for improving operation of the grid while large challenges also arise for preserving grid reliability and security. To improve grid performance, DERs can be utilized to provide important support functionality, such as supporting frequency and voltage levels, especially if they are assisted by communication schemes as part of an advanced distribution management system (ADMS). Unfortunately, such connectivity and grid support functionality also creates additional cyber security risk with the potential for degradation of grid services, especially under conditions with high amounts of distributed generation. This paper will first discuss the communications needed by DERs to support system and interoperability objectives, as well as the security requirements and impact of securing these communications. Some common security mechanisms are discussed in relation to DERs, and a simulated 15-bus model of a distribution feeder is used to demonstrate aspects of the DER communications and impact to grid performance. These results help to advance understanding of the benefits, requirements, and mechanisms for securely implementing DER communications while ensuring that grid reliability is maintained.
Control Systems and their associated instrumentation must meet reliability, availability, maintainability, and resiliency criteria in order for high temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) to be economically competitive. Research, perhaps requiring several years, may be needed to develop control systems to support plant availability and resiliency. This report functionally analyzes the gaps between traditional and resilient control systems as applicable to HTGRs, which includes the Next Generation Nuclear Plant; defines resilient controls; assesses the current state of both traditional and resilient control systems; and documents the functional gaps existing between these two controls approaches as applicable to HTGRs. This report supports the development of an overall strategy for applying resilient controls to HTGRs by showing that control systems with adequate levels of resilience perform at higher levels, respond more quickly to disturbances, increase operational efficiency, and increase public protection.
Not provided.
The Molokai, Hawaii, Energy to Communities (E2C) Energyshed project represents a collaborative effort between the National Laboratory of the Rockies, Shake Energy Collaborative, the Molokai Clean Energy Hui, Sustainable Molokai, and Ho'ahu Energy Cooperative Molokai to advance Molokai's Community Energy Resilience Action Plan (CERAP). Supported by Hawaiian Electric Company and the Hawaii State Energy Office, the initiative aims to develop a community-defined portfolio of renewable energy solutions that enhance energy resilience while aligning with the Hawaiian Electric Integrated Grid Plan (IGP) and Molokai's energy goals. Phase 1 focused on technical analyses and community engagement to co-design feasible energy scenarios. Challenges such as grid upgrades, storage sizing, and inverter ride-through standards were addressed to align technical and operational requirements with community preferences. The project equips Molokai with actionable data and insights to implement energy initiatives while ensuring resilient and culturally informed solutions. Future efforts aim to finalize project designs, secure interconnection agreements, and deploy energy projects that reflect community priorities and technical feasibility.