Applying understanding of likelihood and consequences to demonstrate post-closure criticality safety of a geological disposal facility - 14377
Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of criticality safety under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal, controls (e.g. fissile material limits and/or water barriers) will ensure that waste packages are sub-critical. These controls, plus the containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will also ensure that criticality is prevented for a long time after disposal. However, over post-closure timescales conditions in the GDF will evolve, and therefore underpinning knowledge is required to demonstrate: under what conditions criticality could occur; what the likelihood of such conditions developing is; and what the consequences would be if a post-closure criticality did occur. These requirements are set out in the UK environment agencies' Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation of a GDF. This paper discusses the disposal of Pressurised Water Reactor fuel, as an example of a waste type that may require disposal. It briefly selects relevant research to combine and summarise results from three recent RWM research projects. The first 'Likelihood of Criticality' considered under what conditions post-closure criticality could occur, whilst a second 'Modelling of Consequences of Hypothetical Criticality' focused on understanding the local physical consequences (temperature rise, power and rock response) of hypothetical 'what-if' post-closure criticality. The paper then explains how this understanding is applied to make safety arguments as to why post-closure criticality is not a significant concern. This is achieved via a third, stream of work that has considered the effects of a potential criticality on pathways that might give rise to a post-closure risk in the future, such as transport of radionuclides in groundwater. Collectively RWMs post-closure criticality safety work allows us to conclude in our generic environmental safety case that a post closure criticality is a low likelihood event, and even if one of these low likelihood events was to occur its consequences would be insignificant to GDF performance. This paper also serves to give context to two companion UK post-closure criticality safety papers which communicate further information on our modelling development and more detailed results underpinning our demonstration of post-closure criticality safety. (authors)