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NASA NTRS1992

Data management for community research projects: A JGOFS case study

Since the mid 1980s, much of the marine science research effort in the United Kingdom has been focused into large scale collaborative projects involving public sector laboratories and university departments, termed Community Research Projects. Two of these, the Biogeochemical Ocean Flux Study (BOFS) and the North Sea Project incorporated large scale data collection to underpin multidisciplinary modeling efforts. The challenge of providing project data sets to support the science was met by a small team within the British Oceanographic Data Centre (BODC) operating as a topical data center. The role of the data center was to both work up the data from the ship's sensors and to combine these data with sample measurements into online databases. The working up of the data was achieved by a unique symbiosis between data center staff and project scientists. The project management, programming and data processing skills of the data center were combined with the oceanographic experience of the project communities to develop a system which has produced quality controlled, calibrated data sets from 49 research cruises in 3.5 years of operation. The data center resources required to achieve this were modest and far outweighed by the time liberated in the scientific community by the removal of the data processing burden. Two online project databases have been assembled containing a very high proportion of the data collected. As these are under the control of BODC their long term availability as part of the UK national data archive is assured. The success of the topical data center model for UK Community Research Project data management has been founded upon the strong working relationships forged between the data center and project scientists. These can only be established by frequent personal contact and hence the relatively small size of the UK has been a critical factor. However, projects covering a larger, even international scale could be successfully supported by a network of topical data centers managing online databases which are interconnected by object oriented distributed data management systems over wide area networks.

Lowry, Roy K.↗
NASA NTRS2015

A Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing and Analysis Platform for Validation of Mission and Fault Management Algorithms to Reduce Risk for NASAs Space Launch System

The engineering development of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) new Space Launch System (SLS) requires cross discipline teams with extensive knowledge of launch vehicle subsystems, information theory, and autonomous algorithms dealing with all operations from pre-launch through on orbit operations. The nominal and off-nominal characteristics of SLS's elements and subsystems must be understood and matched with the autonomous algorithm monitoring and mitigation capabilities for accurate control and response to abnormal conditions throughout all vehicle mission flight phases, including precipitating safing actions and crew aborts. This presents a large and complex systems engineering challenge, which is being addressed in part by focusing on the specific subsystems involved in the handling of off-nominal mission and fault tolerance with response management. Using traditional model-based system and software engineering design principles from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the vehicle are crafted and vetted in Integrated Development Teams (IDTs) composed of multiple development disciplines such as Systems Engineering (SE), Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and the major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), and liquid engines. These model-based algorithms and their development lifecycle from inception through FSW certification are an important focus of SLS's development effort to further ensure reliable detection and response to off-nominal vehicle states during all phases of vehicle operation from pre-launch through end of flight. To test and validate these M&FM algorithms a dedicated test-bed was developed for full Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing (VMET). For addressing fault management (FM) early in the development lifecycle for the SLS program, NASA formed the M&FM team as part of the Integrated Systems Health Management and Automation Branch under the Spacecraft Vehicle Systems Department at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). To support the development of the FM algorithms, the VMET developed by the M&FM team provides the ability to integrate the algorithms, perform test cases, and integrate vendor-supplied physics-based launch vehicle (LV) subsystem models. Additionally, the team has developed processes for implementing and validating the M&FM algorithms for concept validation and risk reduction. The flexibility of the VMET capabilities enables thorough testing of the M&FM algorithms by providing configurable suites of both nominal and off-nominal test cases to validate the developed algorithms utilizing actual subsystem models such as MPS, GNC, and others. One of the principal functions of VMET is to validate the M&FM algorithms and substantiate them with performance baselines for each of the target vehicle subsystems in an independent platform exterior to the flight software test and validation processes. In any software development process there is inherent risk in the interpretation and implementation of concepts from requirements and test cases into flight software compounded with potential human errors throughout the development and regression testing lifecycle. Risk reduction is addressed by the M&FM group but in particular by the Analysis Team working with other organizations such as S&MA, Structures and Environments, GNC, Orion, Crew Office, Flight Operations, and Ground Operations by assessing performance of the M&FM algorithms in terms of their ability to reduce Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) probabilities. In addition, through state machine and diagnostic modeling, analysis efforts investigate a broader suite of failure effects and associated detection and responses to be tested in VMET to ensure reliable failure detection, and confirm responses do not create additional risks or cause undesired states through interactive dynamic effects with other algorithms and systems. VMET further contributes to risk reduction by prototyping and exercising the M&FM algorithms early in their implementation and without any inherent hindrances such as meeting FSW processor scheduling constraints due to their target platform - the ARINC 6535-partitioned Operating System, resource limitations, and other factors related to integration with other subsystems not directly involved with M&FM such as telemetry packing and processing. The baseline plan for use of VMET encompasses testing the original M&FM algorithms coded in the same C++ language and state machine architectural concepts as that used by FSW. This enables the development of performance standards and test cases to characterize the M&FM algorithms and sets a benchmark from which to measure their effectiveness and performance in the exterior FSW development and test processes. This paper is outlined in a systematic fashion analogous to a lifecycle process flow for engineering development of algorithms into software and testing. Section I describes the NASA SLS M&FM context, presenting the current infrastructure, leading principles, methods, and participants. Section II defines the testing philosophy of the M&FM algorithms as related to VMET followed by section III, which presents the modeling methods of the algorithms to be tested and validated in VMET. Its details are then further presented in section IV followed by Section V presenting integration, test status, and state analysis. Finally, section VI addresses the summary and forward directions followed by the appendices presenting relevant information on terminology and documentation.

Trevino, Luis↗
NASA NTRS2004

An Approach to V&V of Embedded Adaptive Systems

Rigorous Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques are essential for high assurance systems. Lately, the performance of some of these systems is enhanced by embedded adaptive components in order to cope with environmental changes. Although the ability of adapting is appealing, it actually poses a problem in terms of V&V. Since uncertainties induced by environmental changes have a significant impact on system behavior, the applicability of conventional V&V techniques is limited. In safety-critical applications such as flight control system, the mechanisms of change must be observed, diagnosed, accommodated and well understood prior to deployment. In this paper, we propose a non-conventional V&V approach suitable for online adaptive systems. We apply our approach to an intelligent flight control system that employs a particular type of Neural Networks (NN) as the adaptive learning paradigm. Presented methodology consists of a novelty detection technique and online stability monitoring tools. The novelty detection technique is based on Support Vector Data Description that detects novel (abnormal) data patterns. The Online Stability Monitoring tools based on Lyapunov's Stability Theory detect unstable learning behavior in neural networks. Cases studies based on a high fidelity simulator of NASA's Intelligent Flight Control System demonstrate a successful application of the presented V&V methodology. ,

Liu, Yan↗
NASA NTRS1986

Review of methodology and technology available for the detection of extrasolar planetary systems

Anyone undertaking an interstellar voyage might wish to be assured of the existence of a safe planetary harbor at the other end! Aside from the obvious interest of the participants in this Symposium, astronomers and astrophysicists are also eager to detect and study other planetary systems in order to better understand the formation of our own Solar System. Scientists involved in the search for extraterrestrial intelligence argue that planets suitable for the evolution of life may abound elsewhere within our own Milky Way Galaxy. On theoretical grounds, they are probably correct, but they lack any observational support. For in spite of decades of claimed astrometric detections of planetary companions and the recent exciting and tantalizing observations from the IRAS satellite and the IR speckle observations of Van Biesbroeck 8 and other cool stars, there is no unambiguous proof for the existence of another planetary system beyond our own. In this paper we review the various methods for detecting extrasolar planets and briefly describe the Earth and space based technology currently available and discuss the near-term plans to implement these different search techniques. In each case an attempt is made to identify the limiting source of systematic error inherent to the methodology and to assess the potential for technological improvements.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS1994

High Performance Arcjet Engines

This effort sought to exploit advanced single crystal tungsten-tantalum alloy material for fabrication of a high strength, high temperature arcjet anode. The use of this material is expected to result in improved strength, temperature resistance, and lifetime compared to state of the art polycrystalline alloys. In addition, the use of high electrical and thermal conductivity carbon-carbon composites was considered, and is believed to be a feasible approach. Highly conductive carbon-carbon composite anode capability represents enabling technology for rotating-arc designs derived from the Russian Scientific Research Institute of Thermal Processes (NIITP) because of high heat fluxes at the anode surface. However, for US designs the anode heat flux is much smaller, and thus the benefits are not as great as in the case of NIITP-derived designs. Still, it does appear that the tensile properties of carbon-carbon can be even better than those of single crystal tungsten alloys, especially when nearly-single-crystal fibers such as vapor grown carbon fiber (VGCF) are used. Composites fabricated from such materials must be coated with a refractory carbide coating in order to ensure compatibility with high temperature hydrogen. Fabrication of tungsten alloy single crystals in the sizes required for fabrication of an arcjet anode has been shown to be feasible. Test data indicate that the material can be expected to be at least the equal of W-Re-HfC polycrystalline alloy in terms of its tensile properties, and possibly superior. We are also informed by our colleagues at Scientific Production Association Luch (NP0 Luch) that it is possible to use Russian technology to fabricate polycrystalline W-Re-HfC or other high strength alloys if desired. This is important because existing engines must rely on previously accumulated stocks of these materials, and a fabrication capability for future requirements is not assured.

Kennel, Elliot B.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana↗
NASA NTRS2017

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana L.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Case Study: Test Results of a Tool and Method for In-Flight, Adaptive Control System Verification on a NASA F-15 Flight Research Aircraft

Adaptive control technologies that incorporate learning algorithms have been proposed to enable autonomous flight control and to maintain vehicle performance in the face of unknown, changing, or poorly defined operating environments [1-2]. At the present time, however, it is unknown how adaptive algorithms can be routinely verified, validated, and certified for use in safety-critical applications. Rigorous methods for adaptive software verification end validation must be developed to ensure that. the control software functions as required and is highly safe and reliable. A large gap appears to exist between the point at which control system designers feel the verification process is complete, and when FAA certification officials agree it is complete. Certification of adaptive flight control software verification is complicated by the use of learning algorithms (e.g., neural networks) and degrees of system non-determinism. Of course, analytical efforts must be made in the verification process to place guarantees on learning algorithm stability, rate of convergence, and convergence accuracy. However, to satisfy FAA certification requirements, it must be demonstrated that the adaptive flight control system is also able to fail and still allow the aircraft to be flown safely or to land, while at the same time providing a means of crew notification of the (impending) failure. It was for this purpose that the NASA Ames Confidence Tool was developed [3]. This paper presents the Confidence Tool as a means of providing in-flight software assurance monitoring of an adaptive flight control system. The paper will present the data obtained from flight testing the tool on a specially modified F-15 aircraft designed to simulate loss of flight control faces.

Jacklin, Stephen A.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Challenges and Opportunities of International Cooperation for Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA) on the European Service Module (ESM) of the Orion Program

ESA is providing the ESM to NASA for the Orion Program in accordance with the Implementing Arrangement (IA) established between the two Agencies in 2012. This IA is a barter agreement, in which ESA provides Service Module vehicles for the first two flights of Orion in exchange for two servicing missions to the ISS. This arrangement has provided opportunities and challenges to both communities. It represents an important opportunity for ESA to build on its experience in the development and operations of ATV and play an active role in the development and flight of a manned space vehicle. This paper will explore some of the unique aspects of this arrangement as it affects Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA).The assessment of ESM compliance with applicable safety requirements is the responsibility of the Joint Safety and Engineering Review Panel (JSERP). The JSERP has two features that are relatively unique amongst NASA safety panels. First, NASA Engineering and SMA organizations co-chair this Panel. Previously, Safety has chaired, with Engineering as a member of the Panel. Inclusion of Engineering as a co-chair has offered greater leverage within the technical community. Second, the JSERP includes a second set of co-chairs from ESA Engineering and ESA Product Assurance and Safety (PA/S) organizations. This recognizes the international arrangement as one of partnership.Another source of both opportunity and challenge is the differing experience base of ESA and NASA. NASA has decades of experience in manned spaceflight, dating back to the Mercury program and following through Gemini, Apollo, Apollo-Soyuz, Skylab, Shuttle and the International Space Station. The risk posture for manned missions is much more rigorous than for unmanned missions. ESA brings a wealth of knowledge as well, with their flights of Ariane and Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), development and operation of the Columbus module on ISS, and satellite programs. The result is that both parties have developed paradigms related to risk and failure that contribute to ESM discussions.Orion represents humanity's first venture beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) in over fifty years. Much of that experience is captured in program documents, but first-hand knowledge is limited to a few spaceflight veterans. Missions to LEO have offered the opportunity of direct, near-instantaneous communications and assistance, and the ability to return to Earth within a matter of hours in case of emergency. Outward-bound missions do not have these features and will require a more autonomous spacecraft with attendant safety-related issues.This paper will explore these and other challenges as we approach the flight of the first Orion vehicle.

Ciancone, Michael L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Transformation -- Localizing the Remote and Connecting the Isolated

In motivating the Space Transformation theme for this year’s 4S symposium, the organizers provided the following context, “Transformation of economies are driven by a change in values and accelerated by new technologies.” These words rang particularly true when I read them at the beginning of the holiday season. Like so many others, I was in the early phases of my Christmas shopping procrastination campaign, and I’d just been reflecting on how Amazon Prime was the transformational tool I’d been waiting for. Basic limiting principles of time and space, supply and demand, were all but erased by the Amazon Prime phenomenon. Coupled with emerging 3D printing and other adaptive manufacturing technologies, a transformation from deliberate planning to “think it … have it” had occurred, empowering me to procrastinate longer than I’d ever dreamed possible. The organizers went on to ponder, “Will space transformation also affect society?”, just as our team at the Air Force Research Lab’s (AFRL) Center for Rapid Innovation (CRI) were working alongside partners within our larger Integrated Capabilities Directorate, NASA’s Flight Opportunities and Small Spacecraft Technology programs, and DARPA’s Luna-10 program to develop technologies and execute demonstration missions that leverage the space domain to genuinely connect even the most remote and austere domains on the timeline of need. Picking apart the miracle that is Amazon prime, where does the model fail, and why? More relevantly to the theme of this year’s symposium, how can the space domain be used to overcome its limitations and minimize its weaknesses? Perhaps it is best assessed in the context of Use Cases. What are the Amazon delivery cost, schedule, and cargo limiters to the Amundsen-Scott South Pole Research Station, or the Lunar South Pole Research Station? This paper will explore enabling infrastructure that allows Amazon prime to thrive and assess the transformational enabling technologies that would be necessary to extend that miracle to the truly remote or the truly austere. Localizing the Remote • First, it will evaluate the ability of the on-going AFRL Rocket Cargo and Space Initiatives Ringside Seats systems, coupled with Astrobotic’s Xodiak and Xogdor capabilities, developed to support the NASA Flight Opportunities Program (FOP), to supply orbital/suborbital delivery to both improved and austere sites on the Earth and Moon. • Then, it will add the surface terminal distribution leg, with an examination of Lunar Outpost’s Mobile Autonomous Prospecting Platform (MAPP), equipped with Mobile Autonomous Robotic Swarm (MARS) software, and Intuitive Machine’s Hopper, developed with support of AFRL and NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program. Connecting the Isolated From there, it will focus on the destination, asking what implied destination services are required to support highly assured autonomous delivery. • Specifically, it will highlight Astrobotic’s Skymage mesh-networked publish and subscribe communication and navigation service, as well as AFRL’s on-going developments of radioisotope and reactor nuclear-sourced thermoelectric power generation and distribution systems under development under the Joint Emergent Technology Supplying On-orbit Nuclear Power (JETSON) program by Lockheed Martin, Westinghouse, Intuitive Machines, and Zeno Power, to provide the power service to locations well off the grid. • Finally, the paper will connect to the “human machine”. What connects the remote or in-situ human consumer to the remote domain? What connects the diverse international government and commercial services to each other? The former will focus on AFRL’s OraCloud feeding their Space Defense Control and Characterization System (SDCCS) and Lunar Station’s MoonHacker systems, while the latter will focus on the BlueHalo/Tensor LunX Technology Platform for the Cislunar Commodity Marketplace. In 1984, Krafft Ehricke famously remarked that, “If God wanted man to become a spacefaring species, He would have given man a Moon.” This paper is not about the Moon, but is about humans as a spacefaring species, shedding the pesky land/air limitations of the Amazon Prime model … so that we can all live a procrastinator’s “think it … have it” existence.

Charles Finley↗
NASA NTRS2018

Using ADOPT Algorithm and Operational Data to Discover Precursors to Aviation Adverse Events

The US National Airspace System (NAS) is making its transition to the NextGen system and assuring safety is one of the top priorities in NextGen. At present, safety is managed reactively (correct after occurrence of an unsafe event). While this strategy works for current operations, it may soon become ineffective for future airspace designs and high density operations. There is a need for proactive management of safety risks by identifying hidden and "unknown" risks and evaluating the impacts on future operations. To this end, NASA Ames has developed data mining algorithms that finds anomalies and precursors (high-risk states) to safety issues in the NAS. In this paper, we describe a recently developed algorithm called ADOPT that analyzes large volumes of data and automatically identifies precursors from real world data. Precursors help in detecting safety risks early so that the operator can mitigate the risk in time. In addition, precursors also help identify causal factors and help predict the safety incident. The ADOPT algorithm scales well to large data sets and to multidimensional time series, reduce analyst time significantly, quantify multiple safety risks giving a holistic view of safety among other benefits. This paper details the algorithm and includes several case studies to demonstrate its application to discover the "known" and "unknown" safety precursors in aviation operation.

aviation safet↗
NASA NTRS2003

Discrete Abstractions of Hybrid Systems: Verification of Safety and Application to User-Interface Design

Human interaction with a complex control system involves the user, the automation’s discrete mode logic, and the underlying continuous dynamics of the physical system. The user-interface of such systems always displays a reduced set of information about the entire system. Designing interfaces such that all the pertinent information is available and assuring that this information is correct is important for any user-interface, but especially so for safety-critical systems such as automotive systems and autopilots. Here we describe a methodology for the analysis of hybrid control systems that incorporate user interaction, with the goal of assuring that the information provided to the user is correct. That is, the user-interface must contain all information necessary to safely complete a desired procedure or task. We begin with a hybrid system model which incorporates discrete mode logic as well as nonlinear continuous dynamics. Using a hybrid computational tool for reachability, we find the largest region of the state-space in which we can guarantee the state of the system can always remain – this is the safe region of operation. By implementing a controller for safety which arises from this computation, we mathematically guarantee that this safe region is invariant, meaning that the system will always remain within the safe region if the determined controller is used on the boundary of the safe region. Verification within a hybrid framework allows us to account for the continuous dynamics underlying the discrete representations displayed to the user. Using the computed invariant regions as discrete states, we can abstract a discrete event system from this hybrid system with safety restrictions. This abstraction can be used to determine what information must be provided on the display. Furthermore, in cases in which an interface already exists, the abstraction provides the necessary input into existing interface verification methods. We provide two examples: a car traveling through a yellow light at an intersection and an aircraft autopilot in an automatic landing/go-around maneuver. The examples demonstrate the applicability of this methodology to hybrid systems that have operational constraints we can pose in terms of safety. This methodology differs from existing work in hybrid system verification in that we directly account for the user’s interactions with the system.

Meeko Oishi↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Critical Ablative TPS Capabilities Sustainment for Future NASA Missions

We plan to present an approach for NASA to maintain critical ablative TPS capabilities through small, sus-tained, smart and targeted investment. Historically, we have been pound foolish and penny wise for decades and paid very little attention to sustainability of abla-tive TPS and as a result, spent couple of decades in learning what we lost and inventing newer technology solutions. NASA’s ablative TPS history has been one of in-vesting in new and unique capabilities in anticipation of needs, and once flight proven, letting the capability atrophy due to lack of subsequent near-term mission needs [1]. When the need arises, NASA has resorted to two options: (1) revive the capability at considerable cost impact, or (2) develop an alternate capability with considerable schedule impact. Both these options have had considerable mission impact. The third alternate is to maintain proven capabilities in a cost effective manner. A risk informed decision process in terms of maintaining ablative TPS capabilities is feasible with planning and sustained support. Assured TPS availa-bility will allow the science community to propose competed missions with confidence and at a lower risk for selection. We submitted a white paper to the cur-rent Decadal Survey [2] on the need for and im-portance of sustainability. Since then, we have been formulating an executable cost effective strategy. The intent of this presentation is to outline the develop-ments since the submission of the white paper. NASA and DoD have had a working group related to critical technologies to periodically assess and make recommendations on at-risk items from a national need perspective. This inter-agency working group typically focuses on raw materials availability. While we agree that at-risk raw materials are important, fo-cus solely on them is not sufficient. Instead, we advo-cate for a broader focus that includes not only raw material but also industrial manufacturing and processing, and NASA expertise in design, testing and flight hardware certification. In this proposed presentation, we will give a brief overview of NASA’s ablative TPS history along with recent examples of atrophy to highlight case studies related to the PICA and Carbon-Phenolic TPS. We will present the rationale for sustaining PICA, HEEET and 3MDCP for future NASA missions. We will present an approach for how targeted small investments could lead to maintaining mission critical capabilities over long periods.

E Venkatapathy↗
NASA NTRS2017

Security Vulnerability Profiles of NASA Mission Software: Empirical Analysis of Security Related Bug Reports

NASA develops, runs, and maintains software systems for which security is of vital importance. Therefore, it is becoming an imperative to develop secure systems and extend the current software assurance capabilities to cover information assurance and cybersecurity concerns of NASA missions. The results presented in this report are based on the information provided in the issue tracking systems of one ground mission and one flight mission. The extracted data were used to create three datasets: Ground mission IVV issues, Flight mission IVV issues, and Flight mission Developers issues. In each dataset, we identified the software bugs that are security related and classified them in specific security classes. This information was then used to create the security vulnerability profiles (i.e., to determine how, why, where, and when the security vulnerabilities were introduced) and explore the existence of common trends. The main findings of our work include:- Code related security issues dominated both the Ground and Flight mission IVV security issues, with 95 and 92, respectively. Therefore, enforcing secure coding practices and verification and validation focused on coding errors would be cost effective ways to improve mission's security. (Flight mission Developers issues dataset did not contain data in the Issue Category.)- In both the Ground and Flight mission IVV issues datasets, the majority of security issues (i.e., 91 and 85, respectively) were introduced in the Implementation phase. In most cases, the phase in which the issues were found was the same as the phase in which they were introduced. The most security related issues of the Flight mission Developers issues dataset were found during Code Implementation, Build Integration, and Build Verification; the data on the phase in which these issues were introduced were not available for this dataset.- The location of security related issues, as the location of software issues in general, followed the Pareto principle. Specifically, for all three datasets, from 86 to 88 the security related issues were located in two to four subsystems.- The severity levels of most security issues were moderate, in all three datasets.- Out of 21 primary security classes, five dominated: Exception Management, Memory Access, Other, Risky Values, and Unused Entities. Together, these classes contributed from around 80 to 90 of all security issues in each dataset. This again proves the Pareto principle of uneven distribution of security issues, in this case across CWE classes, and supports the fact that addressing these dominant security classes provides the most cost efficient way to improve missions' security. The findings presented in this report uncovered the security vulnerability profiles and identified the common trends and dominant classes of security issues, which in turn can be used to select the most efficient secure design and coding best practices compiled by the part of the SARP project team associated with the NASA's Johnson Space Center. In addition, these findings provide valuable input to the NASA IVV initiative aimed at identification of the two 25 CWEs of ground and flight missions.

vulnerability↗
NASA NTRS1997

NASA X-34 Technology in Motion

The X-34 technology development program is a joint industry/government project to develop, test, and operate a small, fully-reusable hypersonic flight vehicle. The objective is to demonstrate key technologies and operating concepts applicable to future reusable launch vehicles. Integrated in the vehicle are various systems to assure successful completion of mission objectives, including the Main Propulsion System (MPS). NASA-Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is responsible for developing the X-34's MPS including the design and complete build package for the propulsion system components. The X-34 will be powered by the Fastrac Engine, which is currently in design and development at NASA-MSFC. Fastrac is a single-stage main engine, which burns a mixture of liquid oxygen (LOX) and kerosene(RP-1). The interface between the MPS and Fastrac engine are critical for proper system operation and technologies applicable to future reusable launch vehicles. Deneb's IGRIP software package with the Dynamic analysis option provided a key tool for conducting studies critical to this interface as well as a mechanism to drive the design of the LOX and RP-1 feedlines. Kinematic models were created for the Fastrac Engine and the feedlines for various design concepts. Based on the kinematic simulation within Envision, design and joint limits were verified and system interference controlled. It was also critical to the program to evaluate the effect of dynamic loads visually, providing a verification tool for dynamic analysis and in some cases uncovering areas that had not been considered. Deneb's software put the X-34 technology in motion and has been a key factor in facilitating the strenuous design schedule.

Beech, Geoffrey↗
NASA NTRS2016

Cost-Benefit Analysis for the Advanced Near Net Shape Technology (ANNST) Method for Fabricating Stiffened Cylinders

Low Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) and high levels of uncertainty make it challenging to develop cost estimates of new technologies in the R&D phase. It is however essential for NASA to understand the costs and benefits associated with novel concepts, in order to prioritize research investments and evaluate the potential for technology transfer and commercialization. This paper proposes a framework to perform a cost-benefit analysis of a technology in the R&D phase. This framework was developed and used to assess the Advanced Near Net Shape Technology (ANNST) manufacturing process for fabricating integrally stiffened cylinders. The ANNST method was compared with the conventional multi-piece metallic construction and composite processes for fabricating integrally stiffened cylinders. Following the definition of a case study for a cryogenic tank cylinder of specified geometry, data was gathered through interviews with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), with particular focus placed on production costs and process complexity. This data served as the basis to produce process flowcharts and timelines, mass estimates, and rough order-of-magnitude cost and schedule estimates. The scalability of the results was subsequently investigated to understand the variability of the results based on tank size. Lastly, once costs and benefits were identified, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to assess the relative value of these achieved benefits for potential stakeholders. These preliminary, rough order-of-magnitude results predict a 46 to 58 percent reduction in production costs and a 7-percent reduction in weight over the conventional metallic manufacturing technique used in this study for comparison. Compared to the composite manufacturing technique, these results predict cost savings of 35 to 58 percent; however, the ANNST concept was heavier. In this study, the predicted return on investment of equipment required for the ANNST method was ten cryogenic tank barrels when compared with conventional metallic manufacturing. The AHP study results revealed that decreased final cylinder mass and improved quality assurance were the most valued benefits of cylinder manufacturing methods, therefore emphasizing the relevance of the benefits achieved with the ANNST process for future projects.

Ivanco, Marie L.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Advancements in the Aerosol Robotic Network (AERONET) Version 3 database – automated near-real-time quality control algorithm with improved cloud screening for Sun photometer aerosol optical depth (AOD) measurements

The Aerosol Robotic Network (AERONET) has provided highly accurate, ground-truth measurements of the aerosol optical depth (AOD) using Cimel Electronique Sun–sky radiometers for more than 25 years. In Version 2 (V2) of the AERONET database, the near-real-time AOD was semiautomatically quality controlled utilizing mainly cloud-screening methodology, while additional AOD data contaminated by clouds or affected by instrument anomalies were removed manually before attaining quality-assured status (Level 2.0). The large growth in the number of AERONET sites over the past 25 years resulted in significant burden to the manual quality control of millions of measurements in a consistent manner. The AERONET Version 3 (V3) algorithm provides fully automatic cloud screening and instrument anomaly quality controls. All of these new algorithm updates apply to near-real-time data as well as post-field-deployment processed data, and AERONET reprocessed the database in 2018. A full algorithm redevelopment provided the opportunity to improve data inputs and corrections such as unique filter-specific temperature characterizations for all visible and near-infrared wavelengths, updated gaseous and water vapor absorption coefficients, and ancillary data sets. The Level 2.0 AOD quality-assured data set is now available within a month after post-field calibration, reducing the lag time from up to several months. Near-real-time estimated uncertainty is determined using data qualified as V3 Level 2.0 AOD and considering the difference between the AOD computed with the pre-field calibration and AOD computed with pre-field and post-field calibration. This assessment provides a near-real-time uncertainty estimate for which average differences of AOD suggest a +0.02 bias and one sigma uncertainty of 0.02, spectrally, but the bias and uncertainty can be significantly larger for specific instrument deployments. Long-term monthly averages analyzed for the entire V3 and V2 databases produced average differences (V3–V2) of +0.002 with a ±0.02 SD (standard deviation), yet monthly averages calculated using time-matched observations in both databases were analyzed to compute an average difference of −0.002 with a ±0.004 SD. The high statistical agreement in multiyear monthly averaged AOD validates the advanced automatic data quality control algorithms and suggests that migrating research to the V3 database will corroborate most V2 research conclusions and likely lead to more accurate results in some cases.

David M. Giles↗
NASA NTRS2012

Evaluating Nighttime CALIOP 0.532 micron Aerosol Optical Depth and Extinction Coefficient Retrievals

NASA Cloud Aerosol Lidar with Orthogonal Polarization (CALIOP) Version 3.01 5-km nighttime 0.532 micron aerosol optical depth (AOD) datasets from 2007 are screened, averaged and evaluated at 1 deg X 1 deg resolution versus corresponding/co-incident 0.550 micron AOD derived using the US Navy Aerosol Analysis and Prediction System (NAAPS), featuring two-dimensional variational assimilation of quality-assured NASA Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) and Multi-angle Imaging Spectroradiometer (MISR) AOD. In the absence of sunlight, since passive radiometric AOD retrievals rely overwhelmingly on scattered radiances, the model represents one of the few practical global estimates available from which to attempt such a validation. Daytime comparisons, though, provide useful context. Regional-mean CALIOP vertical profiles of night/day 0.532 micron extinction coefficient are compared with 0.523/0.532 micron ground-based lidar measurements to investigate representativeness and diurnal variability. In this analysis, mean nighttime CALIOP AOD are mostly lower than daytime (0.121 vs. 0.126 for all aggregated data points, and 0.099 vs. 0.102 when averaged globally per normalised 1 deg. X 1 deg. bin), though the relationship is reversed over land and coastal regions when the data are averaged per normalised bin (0.134/0.108 vs. 0140/0.112, respectively). Offsets assessed within single bins alone approach +/- 20 %. CALIOP AOD, both day and night, are higher than NAAPS over land (0.137 vs. 0.124) and equal over water (0.082 vs. 0.083) when averaged globally per normalised bin. However, for all data points inclusive, NAAPS exceeds CALIOP over land, coast and ocean, both day and night. Again, differences assessed within single bins approach 50% in extreme cases. Correlation between CALIOP and NAAPS AOD is comparable during both day and night. Higher correlation is found nearest the equator, both as a function of sample size and relative signal magnitudes inherent at these latitudes. Root mean square deviation between CALIOP and NAAPS varies between 0.1 and 0.3 globally during both day/night. Averaging of CALIOP along-track AOD data points within a single NAAPS grid bin improves correlation and RMSD, though day/night and land/ocean biases persist and are believed systematic. Vertical profiles of extinction coefficient derived in the Caribbean compare well with ground-based lidar observations, though potentially anomalous selection of a priori lidar ratios for CALIOP retrievals is likely inducing some discrepancies. Mean effective aerosol layer top heights are stable between day and night, indicating consistent layer-identification diurnally, which is noteworthy considering the potential limiting effects of ambient solar noise during day.

aerosol optical depth↗