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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2001

Extracellular signaling through the microenvironment: a hypothesis relating carcinogenesis, bystander effects, and genomic instability

Cell growth, differentiation and death are directed in large part by extracellular signaling through the interactions of cells with other cells and with the extracellular matrix; these interactions are in turn modulated by cytokines and growth factors, i.e. the microenvironment. Here we discuss the idea that extracellular signaling integrates multicellular damage responses that are important deterrents to the development of cancer through mechanisms that eliminate abnormal cells and inhibit neoplastic behavior. As an example, we discuss the action of transforming growth factor beta (TGFB1) as an extracellular sensor of damage. We propose that radiation-induced bystander effects and genomic instability are, respectively, positive and negative manifestations of this homeostatic process. Bystander effects exhibited predominantly after a low-dose or a nonhomogeneous radiation exposure are extracellular signaling pathways that modulate cellular repair and death programs. Persistent disruption of extracellular signaling after exposure to relatively high doses of ionizing radiation may lead to the accumulation of aberrant cells that are genomically unstable. Understanding radiation effects in terms of coordinated multicellular responses that affect decisions regarding the fate of a cell may necessitate re-evaluation of radiation dose and risk concepts and provide avenues for intervention.

NASA Discipline Radiation Health↗
NASA NTRS2003

Aerospace Communications Security Technologies Demonstrated

In light of the events of September 11, 2001, NASA senior management requested an investigation of technologies and concepts to enhance aviation security. The investigation was to focus on near-term technologies that could be demonstrated within 90 days and implemented in less than 2 years. In response to this request, an internal NASA Glenn Research Center Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance Aviation Security Tiger Team was assembled. The 2-year plan developed by the team included an investigation of multiple aviation security concepts, multiple aircraft platforms, and extensively leveraged datalink communications technologies. It incorporated industry partners from NASA's Graphical Weather-in-the-Cockpit research, which is within NASA's Aviation Safety Program. Two concepts from the plan were selected for demonstration: remote "black box," and cockpit/cabin surveillance. The remote "black box" concept involves real-time downlinking of aircraft parameters for remote monitoring and archiving of aircraft data, which would assure access to the data following the loss or inaccessibility of an aircraft. The cockpit/cabin surveillance concept involves remote audio and/or visual surveillance of cockpit and cabin activity, which would allow immediate response to any security breach and would serve as a possible deterrent to such breaches. The datalink selected for the demonstrations was VDL Mode 2 (VHF digital link), the first digital datalink for air-ground communications designed for aircraft use. VDL Mode 2 is beginning to be implemented through the deployment of ground stations and aircraft avionics installations, with the goal of being operational in 2 years. The first demonstration was performed December 3, 2001, onboard the LearJet 25 at Glenn. NASA worked with Honeywell, Inc., for the broadcast VDL Mode 2 datalink capability and with actual Boeing 757 aircraft data. This demonstration used a cockpitmounted camera for video surveillance and a coupling to the intercom system for audio surveillance. Audio, video, and "black box" data were simultaneously streamed to the ground, where they were displayed to a Glenn audience of senior management and aviation security team members.

Griner, James H.↗
NASA NTRS2007

PillCam(TradeMark), a Noninvasive Endoscopic Device for the Measurement of Gastrointestinal Motility Changes

Introduction: Bioavailability and effectiveness of drugs given by mouth are governed in part by gastrointestinal (GI) motility and function. Microgravity has been shown to decrease GI motility as indicated by a 3 fold increase in gastrointestinal transit time (GITT). The PillCam(TradeMark), an endoscopic camera embedded in a capsule, is a novel noninvasive and unobtrusive device that is used for the diagnosis of GI pathology. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the usefulness of PillCam(TradeMark) as an alternative to the Lactulose Breath Hydrogen Test (LBHT) for estimating GI motility. The sensitivity and applicability of this device for detection and estimation of the effect of promethazine, a deterrent, and caffeine, a prokinetic, on GI motility were also examined. Method: In this semi-randomized cross-over design study, six male and six female subjects were administered the following 4 treatments: PillCam(TradeMark) alone, PillCam(TradeMark)+Lactulose (10g), PillCam(TradeMark)+caffeine (200mg), and PillCam(TradeMark)+Promethazine (50mg). Results: GITT ranged between 1:24 and 7:52 hr:min. Lactulose did not alter GITT. A significant increase in GITT was noticed after administration of PMZ when compared to values from PillCam(TradeMark) treatment alone or PillCam(TradeMark)+Lactulose treatment. No difference in GITT after caffeine treatment was noticed. While there were no gender related differences in GITT after administration of PillCam(TradeMark) or with lactulose, a significant difference (p<.05) between genders was observed after promethazine administration with mean GITT higher in males (5:50 hr:min) than females (4:15 hr:min). Conclusion: The PillCam(TradeMark) capsule is applicable for the determination of GITT using time stamped GI images. It can be successfully used for the assessment of drug induced changes in GI motility and therefore, may be applicable for microgravity and analog environment studies on GI motility and function.

Vaksman, Zahman↗
NASA NTRS1978

Radiation Hazard Detector

NASA technology has made commercially available a new, inexpensive, conveniently-carried device for protection, of people exposed to potentially dangerous levels of microwave radiation. Microwaves are radio emissions of extremely high frequency. They can be hazardous but the degree of hazard is not yet well understood. Generally, it is believed that low intensity radiation of short duration is not harmful but that exposure to high levels can induce deep internal burns, affecting the circulatory and nervous systems, and particularly the eyes. The Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has established an allowable safe threshold of exposure. However, people working near high intensity sources of microwave energy-for example, radar antennas and television transmitters-may be unknowingly exposed to radiation levels beyond the safe limit. This poses not only a personal safety problem but also a problem for employers in terms of productivity loss, workman's compensation claims and possible liability litigation. Earlier-developed monitoring devices which warn personnel of dangerous radiation levels have their shortcomings. They can be cumbersome and awkward to use while working. They also require continual visual monitoring to determine if a person is in a dangerous area of radiation, and they are relatively expensive, another deterrent to their widespread adoption. In response to the need for a cheaper and more effective warning system, Jet Propulsion Laboratory developed, under NASA auspices, a new, battery-powered Microwave Radiation Hazard Detector. To bring the product to the commercial market, California Institute Research Foundation, the patent holder, granted an exclusive license to Cicoil Corporation, Chatsworth, California, an electronic components manufacturer.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2008

Contamination Sources Effects Analysis (CSEA) - A Tool to Balance Cost/Schedule While Managing Facility Availability

A CSEA is similar to a Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA). A CSEA tracks risk, deterrence, and occurrence of sources of contamination and their mitigation plans. Documentation is provided spanning mechanical and electrical assembly, precision cleaning, thermal vacuum bake-out, and thermal vacuum testing. These facilities all may play a role in contamination budgeting and reduction ultimately affecting test and flight. With a CSEA, visibility can be given to availability of these facilities, test sequencing and trade-offs. A cross-functional team including specialty engineering, contamination control, electrostatic dissipation, manufacturing, testing, and material engineering participate in an exercise that identifies contaminants and minimizes the complexity of scheduling these facilities considering their volatile schedules. Care can be taken in an efficient manner to insure correct cleaning processes are employed. The result is reduction in cycle time ("schedule hits"), reduced cost due to rework, reduced risk and improved communication and quality while achieving adherence to the Contamination Control Plan.

Wilcox, Margaret↗
NASA NTRS2005

Field Evaluations Test Plan for Validation of Alternative Low-Emission Surface Preparation/Depainting Technologies for Structural Steel

Headquarters National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) chartered the Acquisition Pollution Prevention (AP2) Office to coordinate agency activities affecting pollution prevention issues identified during system and component acquisition and sustainment processes. The primary objectives of the AP2 Office are to: (1) Reduce or eliminate the use of hazardous materials (HazMats) or hazardous processes at manufacturing, remanufacturing, and sustainment locations. (2) Avoid duplication of effort in actions required to reduce or eliminate HazMats through joint center cooperation and technology sharing. To achieve a substrate condition suitable for the application of a coating system, both new and old (in-situ) substrates must undergo some type of surface preparation and/or depainting operation to ensure adhesion of the new coating system. The level of cleanliness or anchor profile desired is typically a function of the type of coating to be applied and the specification being adhered to. In high performance environments, cleanliness and surface profile requirements for carbon steel (the dominant substrate for facilities, structures and equipment) dictates the use of abrasive media. Many of the abrasive media currently used across NASA and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) installations generate large quantities of fugitive particulate emissions and waste. The high quantities of airborne dust and waste generated from these operations pose significant environmental concern. Efforts to contain emissions and the reduce quantity of waste generated have significant implications on project cost; this is often a deterrent to engaging in maintenance activities. In response to recent technological developments and NASA's and AFSPC's need to undertake environmentally conscious corrosion prevention projects, a review of the industry needs to be undertaken to evaluate surface preparation technologies (materials and processes) for embrace. This project will identify, evaluate and approve alternative surface preparation technologies for use at NASA and AFSPC installations. Materials and processes will be evaluated with the goal of selecting those processes that will improve corrosion protection at critical systems, facilitate easier maintenance activity, extend maintenance cycles, eliminate flight hardware contamination and reduce the amount of hazardous waste generated. This Field Evaluations Test Plan defines the field evaluation and testing requirements for validating alternative surface preparation/depainting technologies and supplements the JTP. The field evaluations will be performed at Stennis Space Center, Mississippi, under the oversight of the Project Engineer. Additional field evaluations may be performed at other NASA centers or AFSPC facilities.

Lewis, Pattie↗
NASA NTRS2004

Hard Real-Time: C++ Versus RTSJ

In the domain of hard real-time systems, which language is better: C++ or the Real-Time Specification for Java (RTSJ)? Although ordinary Java provides a more productive programming environment than C++ due to its automatic memory management, that benefit does not apply to RTSJ when using NoHeapRealtimeThread and non-heap memory areas. As a result, RTSJ programmers must manage non-heap memory explicitly. While that's not a deterrent for veteran real-time programmers-where explicit memory management is common-the lack of certain language features in RTSJ (and Java) makes that manual memory management harder to accomplish safely than in C++. This paper illustrates the problem for practitioners in the context of moving data and managing memory in a real-time producer/consumer pattern. The relative ease of implementation and safety of the C++ programming model suggests that RTSJ has a struggle ahead in the domain of hard real-time applications, despite its other attractive features.

programming model↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Nuclear Devices for Planetary Defense

This paper summarizes the perspectives of panelists participating in the discussion of “Nuclear Devices for Planetary Defense” (PANEL-17) at the AIAA ASCEND conference in November 2020. The panelists’ backgrounds, and therefore their individual contributions below, cover the range of relevant disciplines: of course planetary defense threats and missions, but also space systems engineering, nuclear technologies, nuclear deterrence, and last but definitely not least space law. This approach helps illuminate the topic from multiple angles in order to encourage follow-on discussions among the communities of interest.

Jan Osburg↗
DOE OSTI2012

Los Alamos National Laboratory A National Science Laboratory

Our mission as a DOE national security science laboratory is to develop and apply science, technology, and engineering solutions that: (1) Ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the US nuclear deterrent; (2) Protect against the nuclear threat; and (3) Solve Energy Security and other emerging national security challenges.

Astronomy & Astrophysics(79)↗
DOE OSTI2011

Design of an Unattended Environmental Aerosol Sampling and Analysis System for Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

The resources of the IAEA continue to be challenged by the rapid, worldwide expansion of nuclear energy production. Gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) represent an especially formidable dilemma to the application of safeguard measures, as the size and enrichment capacity of GCEPs continue to escalate. During the early part of the 1990's, the IAEA began to lay the foundation to strengthen and make cost-effective its future safeguard regime. Measures under Part II of 'Programme 93+2' specifically sanctioned access to nuclear fuel production facilities and environmental sampling by IAEA inspectors. Today, the Additional Protocol grants inspection and environmental sample collection authority to IAEA inspectors at GCEPs during announced and low frequency unannounced (LFUA) inspections. During inspections, IAEA inspectors collect environmental swipe samples that are then shipped offsite to an analytical laboratory for enrichment assay. This approach has proven to be an effective deterrence to GCEP misuse, but this method has never achieved the timeliness of detection goals set forth by IAEA. Furthermore it is questionable whether the IAEA will have the resources to even maintain pace with the expansive production capacity of the modern GCEP, let alone improve the timeliness in reaching current safeguards conclusions. New safeguards propositions, outside of familiar mainstream safeguard measures, may therefore be required that counteract the changing landscape of nuclear energy fuel production. A new concept is proposed that offers rapid, cost effective GCEP misuse detection, without increasing LFUA inspection access or introducing intrusive access demands on GCEP operations. Our approach is based on continuous onsite aerosol collection and laser enrichment analysis. This approach mitigates many of the constraints imposed by the LFUA protocol, reduces the demand for onsite sample collection and offsite analysis, and overcomes current limitations associated with the in-facility misuse detection devices. Onsite environmental sample collection offers the ability to collect fleeting uranium hexafluoride emissions before they are lost to the ventilation system or before they disperse throughout the facility, to become deposited onto surfaces that are contaminated with background and historical production material. Onsite aerosol sample collection, combined with enrichment analysis, provides the unique ability to quickly detect stepwise enrichment level changes within the facility, leading to a significant strengthening of facility misuse deterence. We report in this paper our study of several GCEP environmental sample release scenarios and simulation results of a newly designed aerosol collection and particle capture system that is fully integrated with the Laser Ablation, Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry (LAARS) uranium particle enrichment analysis instrument that was developed at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Transducer Signal Noise Analysis for Sensor Authentication

The abstract is being passed through STIMS for submision to the conference. International safeguards organizations charged with promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy employ unattended and remote monitoring systems supplemented with onsite inspections to ensure nuclear materials are not diverted for weaponization purposes. These systems are left unattended for periods of several months between inspections. During these periods physical security means are the main deterrent used to detect intentional monitoring system tampering. The information gathering components are locked in secure and sealed rooms. The sensor components (i.e. neutron and gamma detectors) are located throughout the plant in unsecure areas where sensor tampering could take place during the periods between inspections. Sensor tampering could allow the diversion of nuclear materials from the accepted and intended use to uses not consistent with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A method and an apparatus is presented that address the detection of sensor tampering during the periods between inspections. It was developed at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the Department of Energy (DOE) in support of the IAEA. The method is based on the detailed analysis of the sensor noise floor after the sensor signal is removed. The apparatus consists of a 2.1” x 2.6” electronic circuit board containing all signal conditioning and processing components and a laptop computer running an application that acquires and stores the analysis results between inspection periods. The sensors do not require any modification and are remotely located in their normal high radiation zones. The apparatus interfaces with the sensor signal conductors using a simple pass through connector at the normal sensor electronics interface package located in the already secure and sealed rooms. The apparatus does not require hardening against the effects of radiation due to its location. Presented is the apparatus design, the analysis method, and the test results as applied to tamper detection using three HE3 neutron sensors and two gamma sensors designed and built for safeguards monitoring.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2013

Techno-Economic Analysis of BEV Service Providers Offering Battery Swapping Services (Presentation)

Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) could significantly reduce the nation's gasoline consumption and greenhouse gas emissions rates. However, both the upfront cost and the limited range of the vehicle are perceived to be deterrents to the widespread adoption of BEVs. A service provider approach to marketing BEVs, coupled with a battery swapping infrastructure deployment could address both issues and accelerate BEV adoption. This presentation examines customer selection, service usage statistics, service plan fees and driver economics. Our results show it is unlikely that a battery swapping service plan will be more cost-effective than ownership of a conventional vehicle. A battery swapping service plan may be a more cost-effective solution than a directly owned BEV for some single-vehicle, high-mileage consumers. However, other factors not considered in this analysis could decrease the viability of such a service.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2013

Hardware device to physical structure binding and authentication

Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a hardware device for authenticating a binding of the hardware device and a physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes an internal physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generate an internal PUF value. Binding logic is coupled to receive the internal PUF value, as well as an external PUF value associated with the physical structure, and generates a binding PUF value, which represents the binding of the hardware device and the physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit also includes a cryptographic unit that uses the binding PUF value to allow a challenger to authenticate the binding.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2013

The Case for the Application of Worldwide Marine Radioactivity Studies In the Search for Undeclared Facilities and Activities

Undeclared nuclear facilities unequivocally remain the most difficult safeguards challenge facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recent cases of undeclared facilities revealed in Iran and Syria, which are NPT signatory States, show both the difficulty and the seriousness of this threat to nonproliferation. In the case of undeclared nuclear facilities, the most effective deterrent against proliferation is the application of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES); however, WAES is currently cost-prohibitive. As with any threat, the most effective countering strategy is a multifaceted approach. Some of the approaches applied by the IAEA include: open source analysis, satellite imagery, on-site environmental sampling, complementary access under the Additional Protocol (where in force), traditional safeguards inspections, and information provided by member States. These approaches, naturally, are focused on specific States. Are there other opportunities not currently within the IAEA purview to assess States that may provide another opportunity to detect clandestine facilities? In this paper, the author will make the case that the IAEA Department of Safeguards should explore the area of worldwide marine radioactivity studies as one possible opportunity. One such study was released by the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratory in January 2005. This technical document focused on 90Sr, 137Cs, and 239/240Pu. It is clearly a challenging area because of the many sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the world’s oceans and seas including: nuclear weapons testing, reprocessing, accidents, waste dumping, and industrial and medical radioisotopes, whose distributions change based on oceanographic, geochemical, and biological processes, and their sources. It is additionally challenging where multiple States share oceans, seas, and rivers. But with the application of modern science, historical sampling to establish baselines, and a focus on the most relevant radionuclides, the potential is there to support this challenging IAEA safeguards mission.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Hardware device binding and mutual authentication

Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic unit within a computing device for binding multiple hardware devices and mutually authenticating the devices. The cryptographic unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generates a binding PUF value. The cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF value during an enrollment phase and subsequent authentication phases. During a subsequent authentication phase, the cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF values of the multiple hardware devices to generate a challenge to send to the other device, and to verify a challenge received from the other device to mutually authenticate the hardware devices.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2011

How DARHT Works - the World's Most Powerful X-ray Machine

The Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory is an essential scientific tool that supports Stockpile Stewardship at the Laboratory. The World's most powerful x-ray machine, it's used to take high-speed images of mock nuclear devices - data that is used to confirm and modify advanced computer codes in assuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Verification Challenges at Low Numbers

Many papers have dealt with the political difficulties and ramifications of deep nuclear arms reductions, and the issues of “Going to Zero”. Political issues include extended deterrence, conventional weapons, ballistic missile defense, and regional and geo-political security issues. At each step on the road to low numbers, the verification required to ensure compliance of all parties will increase significantly. Looking post New START, the next step will likely include warhead limits in the neighborhood of 1000 . Further reductions will include stepping stones at1000 warheads, 100’s of warheads, and then 10’s of warheads before final elimination could be considered of the last few remaining warheads and weapons. This paper will focus on these three threshold reduction levels, 1000, 100’s, 10’s. For each, the issues and challenges will be discussed, potential solutions will be identified, and the verification technologies and chain of custody measures that address these solutions will be surveyed. It is important to note that many of the issues that need to be addressed have no current solution. In these cases, the paper will explore new or novel technologies that could be applied. These technologies will draw from the research and development that is ongoing throughout the national laboratory complex, and will look at technologies utilized in other areas of industry for their application to arms control verification.

Nuclear Weapons↗
DOE OSTI2014

Concealed identification symbols and nondestructive determination of the identification symbols

The concealing of one or more identification symbols into a target object and the subsequent determination or reading of such symbols through non-destructive testing is described. The symbols can be concealed in a manner so that they are not visible to the human eye and/or cannot be readily revealed to the human eye without damage or destruction of the target object. The identification symbols can be determined after concealment by e.g., the compilation of multiple X-ray images. As such, the present invention can also provide e.g., a deterrent to theft and the recovery of lost or stolen objects.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗