Evolution of Safety Management Within the Scaled Wind Farm Technology (SWiFT) Facility Program.
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Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).
Initially planned GDP duration often turns out to be an underestimate or an overestimate of the actual GDP duration. This, in turn, results in avoidable airborne or ground delays in the system. Therefore, better models of actual duration have the potential of reducing delays in the system. The overall objective of this study is to develop such models based on logs of GDPs. In a previous report, we described descriptive models of Ground Delay Programs. These models were defined in terms of initial planned duration and in terms of categorical variables. These descriptive models are good at characterizing the historical errors in planned GDP durations. This paper focuses on developing predictive models of GDP duration. Traffic Management Initiatives (TMI) are logged by Air Traffic Control facilities with The National Traffic Management Log (NTML) which is a single system for automated recoding, coordination, and distribution of relevant information about TMIs throughout the National Airspace System. (Brickman, 2004 Yuditsky, 2007) We use 2008-2009 GDP data from the NTML database for the study reported in this paper. NTML information about a GDP includes the initial specification, possibly one or more revisions, and the cancellation. In the next section, we describe general characteristics of Ground Delay Programs. In the third section, we develop models of actual duration. In the fourth section, we compare predictive performance of these models. The final section is a conclusion.
This report presents a summary of description information, facilities, and operating practices at the Nevada Test Site. It is concluded that NTS is not only a feasible location for surface and near-surface storage of low-level wastes, but also a potential site for underground storage of higher level wastes.
Fact sheet describes the Federal Energy Management Program and its mission, and outlines top priorities to achieve key federal agency statutory requirements for facility energy and water management.
Traditionally, air traffic management services have been provided by air traffic controllers and managers stationed in ground facilities, employed or contracted by the public sector, and supported by automation. These centralized, human-centric air traffic management services do not scale to accommodate increasing demands from conventional and new entrant operations for access to the national airspace system. One transformation that provides much needed scalability is increasing the level of autonomy of air traffic management by enabling edge agents of the system, including vehicles, operators, and third-party service suppliers, to collectively self-manage independently from the centralized service providers and enabling the automation to also take on more independent traffic management responsibility from the human agents. This paper identifies challenges to increasing the level of autonomy of air traffic management services. It describes a framework to enable a systematic identification of these challenges. The framework consists of a functional breakdown of air traffic management services and several dimensions characterizing different autonomy scales. The autonomy dimensions include the automation level between human and machine agents, the locus of control between centralized and distributed edge agents, cognitive activities for autonomous situation awareness and decision making, intelligence levels ranging from skill-based to expertise-based autonomous behavior, and uncertainty levels of the dynamics and environment in which autonomous agents operate. Several challenges are identified and categorized using the different dimensions of the autonomy framework.
Presented are some of the critical issues and objectives pertaining to configuration management for the NASA Western Aeronautical Test Range (WATR) of Ames Research Center. The primary mission of the WATR is to provide a capability for the conduct of aeronautical research flight test through real-time processing and display, tracking, and communications systems. In providing this capability, the WATR must maintain and enforce a configuration management plan which is independent of, but complimentary to, various research flight test project configuration management systems. A primary WATR objective is the continued development of generic research flight test project support capability, wherein the reliability of WATR support provided to all project users is a constant priority. Therefore, the processing of configuration change requests for specific research flight test project requirements must be evaluated within a perspective that maintains this primary objective.
This calculation documents the estimation of temperature and pressure rise inside a 55-gal TRU waste drum with a HEPA filter containing Titanium and Tantalum fume dust based on operational history.
This calculation documents the estimation of temperature and pressure rise inside a 55-gal TRU waste drum with a HEPA filter containing Titanium and Tantalum fume dust based on operational history. Actual Titanium values are believed to be less than 10g on any given filter. Actual Tantalum values are believed to be less than 1g on any given filter
Fast-charging infrastructure for electric vehicles (EVs) is needed to enable and achieve the national goals of transitioning the vehicle fleet toward more electrification. Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) have jointly worked to identify, evaluate, and mitigate potential cyber-related consequences associated with fast charger systems. NREL contributed by considering cyberattack scenarios and consequences associated with integrating distributed energy resources (DERs) at fast-charging stations. The dynamic nature of fast-charger load profiles would encourage site operators to incorporate solar for energy cost reduction and energy storage for peak demand cost management at future charging facilities with multiple fast chargers at a site. These energy resources would be monitored and coordinated via a site energy management controller with data exchange between devices and local power metering infrastructure; thus, networking between devices and the design of the system becomes important in the overall cybersecurity posture. In addition, component vendors and system operators might have remote interfaces to any of these systems. It is therefore important to understand the breadth of the cyberattack surface and potential strategies to mitigate impacts. This project has focused on components and protocols expected to be found within a local charging site that includes multiple chargers and DER resources. Our methods and results are summarized in this final report.
The purpose of this memo is to characterize Monsanto Research Corp. (MRC) model 2493 series radioactive sealed sources as US Department of Transportation (DOT) Special For Radioactive material. with the goal of achieving shipment, consolidation, interim storage, and final disposition.
7 Wall-to-wall inventories were completed between October 2 – December 11, 2023. The team viewed 12 technical areas. A total of 280 containers were verified against current WCATS data. We worked with WMCs team to schedule for all waste throughout WFO FOD. WMCs are doing an incredible job with keeping up with all their locations; The team only found one discrepancy that was resolved the same day, and The WMC also took the time to explain their process on how containers are labeled with closure days and why it was labeled as such.
8 Wall-to-wall inventories were completed between July 3rd – September 20th, 2023. The scheduling was broken down by FODs, and the team completed UI and IF. The team viewed 12 sites across 7 technical areas. A total of 249 containers were verified against current WCATS data. 2 containers were unable to be verified due to lack of WMC response. We worked with WMCs and Environmental Stewardship teams this quarter to schedule the wall-to-wall inventories. Discrepancies that were found were fixed by the WMCs in a timely manner. Most of the discrepancies were Labeling issues which were resolved the day of the walk down or within a week.
This report provides information on the inventory of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the United States located at Nuclear Power Reactor (NPR) and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) sites, as well as SNF and reprocessing waste located at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites and other research and development (R&D) centers as of the end of calendar year 2024. Actual quantitative values for current inventories are provided along with inventory forecasts derived from examining different future nuclear power generation scenarios, based on information available and assumptions made at the time the scenarios were developed. The report also includes select information on the characteristics associated with the wastes examined (e.g., type, packaging, heat generation rate, decay curves).
The Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Supply Chain Program Material Recovery and Waste Form Development (MRWFD) Campaign Off-gas Sigma Team has performed research and development on iodine control and iodine waste forms for the past several years. This research and development has included iodine adsorption tests using a laboratory-scale test system containing multiple-segmented fixed beds of iodine adsorbents. Iodine capture performance has been tested using non-radioactive synthetic gas mixtures blended from air, nitrogen, NO, NO2, water, and the target iodine compounds diatomic iodine (I2), representing likely inorganic iodides, and methyl iodide (iodomethane, CH3I) and 1-iodobutane (butyl iodide) a surrogates for potential organic iodides, that could exist in dissolver off-gas (DOG) and vessel off-gas (VOG) streams from used nuclear fuel aqueous reprocessing.
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed and tested engineered sorbents to separate and capture volatile fission products such iodine, xenon (Xe), and krypton (Kr) from off-gas streams. As noble gases, Xe and Kr can be difficult to capture and separate. Historically, cryogenic distillation has been used to execute the separation. However, performing this separation from bulk air streams is expensive and can pose significant hazards. INL has successfully developed two different sorbents for Xe and Kr capture, silver mordenite polyacrylonitrile and hydrogen mordenite polyacrylonitrile (HZ-PAN). Adsorption studies to date successfully separated and captured Kr from carrier gas streams, but those studies focused primarily on initial separation and capture. Successful utilization in a used nuclear fuel (UNF) reprocessing facility, however, requires further concentration of the Kr to minimize long term storage volumes. This study focuses on the concentration of Kr utilizing HZ PAN as the concentrating media. Concentrating Kr during desorption is ideal for two reasons: one, to produce Kr that can be used for commercial and research applications, or two, to minimize the volume of the radioactive gaseous waste stream for disposal. This report investigates the Kr concentrating potential of HZ-PAN by running multiple Kr adsorption-desorption cycles, collecting the desorbed effluent from a saturated HZ-PAN column, and loading it onto a fresh column. This study demonstrates that four adsorption-desorption cycles can transform a 150 ppmv Kr stream into a 37.5% Kr stream, an overall concentration factor of 2497. Each concentration step results in successively smaller volumes desorbed, reducing volume by a factor of approximately 40,000. Depending on the operational goals, during desorption one could collect smaller volume fractions of high concentration Kr (~ 67%). This demonstration should be considered proof-of-concept. Further refinement is necessary to develop optimum operating schemes to integrate into UNF off-gas treatment.
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One of the responsibilities of the federal government is to estimate sound and defensible life-cycle baseline costs for use in federal budget estimates and to meet federal financial reporting requirements. To accomplish this, the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) have partnered together to ensure that the liabilities documented in each Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) site's life-cycle baseline are specifically tailored. FUSRAP was created in the mid-1970's to clean up radiological contamination resulting from the early development of nuclear weapons. DOE was responsible for FUSRAP until October 1997, when Congress transferred the administration and execution of FUSRAP site cleanups to USACE. By 1997, DOE had completed the cleanup of 25 of the 46 sites that were active within the program and had begun cleanup at 13 additional sites. USACE was assigned responsibility for the cleanup of the 21 remaining FUSRAP sites, and at 8 additional sites that had since been referred for cleanup. The LM mission for the FUSRAP sites is to perform long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M). Currently, LM provides long-term stewardship for 34 completed FUSRAP sites. Another 20 sites are under active remediation by USACE. Within the last 5 years, USACE has completed the cleanup at five FUSRAP sites and the LTS and M responsibility has been transferred to LM. By 2029, USACE will compete remediation at eight additional sites and LTS and M for those sites will transfer to LM. Because responsibilities for the FUSRAP sites transfer between USACE and LM upon completion of remedial actions, both agencies maintain life-cycle baselines for different stages of the project and both must have a strong understanding of the needs and requirements for each site. This understanding ensures that the life-cycle baselines form a complete and accurate picture of what is required for the site and for the FUSRAP program. LM focuses on several things when customizing the life-cycle baseline estimates for the FUSRAP sites, including (1) Understanding the unique requirements for each site. By reviewing site-specific documents prepared by USACE, such as Feasibility Studies and Records of Decision, and partnering with USACE to gain additional insight about site conditions and requirements for stewardship, as well as potential risks, LM can better develop the life-cycle baselines. (2) Developing site-specific labor breakdowns. This ensures the required labor mix is baselined for specific activities by comparing the labor mix required to perform activities at (a) other LM-managed FUSRAP sites and (b) non-FUSRAP LM sites and (c) by USACE at active FUSRAP sites. (3) Taking a tiered approach to life-cycle baseline planning. Estimates for sites transferring to LM in the near term (5 years) are more definitive than for sites transferring in the out-year period. Remedial actions at the near-term sites are at or near completion, providing LM a strong understanding of the LTS and M requirements and remaining liabilities. This in turn allows for site-specific customization of the baseline. (4) Using a robust risk management approach to ensure that liabilities specific to each site are identified, evaluated by probability and severity, and documented in relation to the impact to cost or schedule. To ensure the most accuracy within all the baselines, the FUSRAP life-cycle baselines are updated as needed to support program, project, and contract management needs. (authors)