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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploring Methods to Collect and Analyze Data on Human Contributions to Aviation Safety: A Panel Discussion

Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures in aviation. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of aviation safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety-producing behaviors in addition to safety-reducing behaviors. Opportunities and challenges in collecting and analyzing the largely unexploited data on desired, safety-producing operator behaviors are discussed.

Aviation Safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploring Methods to Collect and Analyze Data on Human Contributions to Aviation Safety: A Panel Discussion

Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures in aviation. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of aviation safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety producing behaviors in addition to safety reducing behaviors. The panel will discuss opportunities and challenges in collecting and analyzing the largely unexploited data on desired, safety-producing operator behaviors.

aviation safety↗
NASA NTRS2015

Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team

A team is defined as: "two or more individuals who interact socially and adaptively, have shared or common goals, and hold meaningful task interdependences; it is hierarchically structured and has a limited life span; in it expertise and roles are distributed; and it is embedded within an organization/environmental context that influences and is influenced by ongoing processes and performance outcomes" (Salas, Stagl, Burke, & Goodwin, 2007, p. 189). From the NASA perspective, a team is commonly understood to be a collection of individuals that is assigned to support and achieve a particular mission. Thus, depending on context, this definition can encompass both the spaceflight crew and the individuals and teams in the larger multi-team system who are assigned to support that crew during a mission. The Team Risk outcomes of interest are predominantly performance related, with a secondary emphasis on long-term health; this is somewhat unique in the NASA HRP in that most Risk areas are medically related and primarily focused on long-term health consequences. In many operational environments (e.g., aviation), performance is assessed as the avoidance of errors. However, the research on performance errors is ambiguous. It implies that actions may be dichotomized into "correct" or "incorrect" responses, where incorrect responses or errors are always undesirable. Researchers have argued that this dichotomy is a harmful oversimplification, and it would be more productive to focus on the variability of human performance and how organizations can manage that variability (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) (Category III1). Two problems occur when focusing on performance errors: 1) the errors are infrequent and, therefore, difficult to observe and record; and 2) the errors do not directly correspond to failure. Research reveals that humans are fairly adept at correcting or compensating for performance errors before such errors result in recognizable or recordable failures. Astronauts are notably adept high performers. Most failures are recorded only when multiple, small errors occur and humans are unable to recognize and correct or compensate for these errors in time to prevent a failure (Dismukes, Berman, Loukopoulos, 2007) (Category III). More commonly, observers record variability in levels of performance. Some teams commit no observable errors but fail to achieve performance objectives or perform only adequately, while other teams commit some errors but perform spectacularly. Successful performance, therefore, cannot be viewed as simply the absence of errors or the avoidance of failure Johnson Space Center (JSC) Joint Leadership Team, 2008). While failure is commonly attributed to making a major error, focusing solely on the elimination of error(s) does not significantly reduce the risk of failure. Failure may also occur when performance is simply insufficient or an effort is incapable of adjusting sufficiently to a contextual change (e.g., changing levels of autonomy).

Landon, Lauren Blackwell↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Cognitive Challenges of Flying a Remotely Piloted Aircraft

A large variety of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) designs are currently in production or in development. These aircraft range from small electric quadcopters that are flown close to the ground within visual range of the operator, to larger systems capable of extended flight in airspace shared with conventional aircraft. Before RPA can operate routinely and safely in civilian airspace, we need to understand the unique human factors associated with these aircraft. The task of flying an RPA in civilian airspace involves challenges common to the operation of other highly-automated systems, but also introduces new considerations for pilot perception, decision-making, and action execution. RPA pilots participated in focus groups where they were asked to recall critical incidents that either presented a threat to safety, or highlighted a case where the pilot contributed to system resilience or mission success. Ninety incidents were gathered from focus-groups. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Some of these concerns have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. The presentation will focus on issues that are poorly understood, and have not yet been the subject of extensive human factors study. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.

remote pilot station↗
NASA NTRS1984

Thermoelectric property measurements with computer controlled systems

A joint JPL-NASA program to develop an automated system to measure the thermoelectric properties of newly developed materials is described. Consideration is given to the difficulties created by signal drift in measurements of Hall voltage and the Large Delta T Seebeck coefficient. The benefits of a computerized system were examined with respect to error reduction and time savings for human operators. It is shown that the time required to measure Hall voltage can be reduced by a factor of 10 when a computer is used to fit a curve to the ratio of the measured signal and its standard deviation. The accuracy of measurements of the Large Delta T Seebeck coefficient and thermal diffusivity was also enhanced by the use of computers.

Chmielewski, A. B.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Miniature Telerobots in Space Applications

Ground controlled telerobots can be used to reduce astronaut workload while retaining much of the human capabilities of planning, execution, and error recovery for specific tasks. Miniature robots can be used for delicate and time consuming tasks such as biological experiment servicing without incurring the significant mass and power penalties associated with larger robot systems. However, questions remain regarding the technical and economic effectiveness of such mini-telerobotic systems. This paper address some of these open issues and the details of two projects which will provide some of the needed answers. The Microtrex project is a joint University of Washington/NASA project which plans on flying a miniature robot as a Space Shuttle experiment to evaluate the effects of microgravity on ground-controlled manipulation while subject to variable time-delay communications. A related project involving the University of Washington and Boeing Defense and Space will evaluate the effectiveness f using a minirobot to service biological experiments in a space station experiment 'glove-box' rack mock-up, again while subject to realistic communications constraints.

Venema, S. C.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Development of Methodology for Programming Autonomous Agents

A brief report discusses the rationale for, and the development of, a methodology for generating computer code for autonomous-agent-based systems. The methodology is characterized as enabling an increase in the reusability of the generated code among and within such systems, thereby making it possible to reduce the time and cost of development of the systems. The methodology is also characterized as enabling reduction of the incidence of those software errors that are attributable to the human failure to anticipate distributed behaviors caused by the software. A major conceptual problem said to be addressed in the development of the methodology was that of how to efficiently describe the interfaces between several layers of agent composition by use of a language that is both familiar to engineers and descriptive enough to describe such interfaces unambivalently

Erol, Kutluhan↗
NASA NTRS2016

Synergistic Allocation of Flight Expertise on the Flight Deck (SAFEdeck): A Design Concept to Combat Mode Confusion, Complacency, and Skill Loss in the Flight Deck

This paper presents a new design and function allocation philosophy between pilots and automation that seeks to support the human in mitigating innate weaknesses (e.g., memory, vigilance) while enhancing their strengths (e.g., adaptability, resourcefulness). In this new allocation strategy, called Synergistic Allocation of Flight Expertise in the Flight Deck (SAFEdeck), the automation and the human provide complementary support and backup for each other. Automation is designed to be compliant with the practices of Crew Resource Management. The human takes a more active role in the normal operation of the aircraft without adversely increasing workload over the current automation paradigm. This designed involvement encourages the pilot to be engaged and ready to respond to unexpected situations. As such, the human may be less prone to error than the current automation paradigm.

Schutte, Paul↗
NASA NTRS2017

Command and Control Software Development Memory Management

This internship was initially meant to cover the implementation of unit test automation for a NASA ground control project. As is often the case with large development projects, the scope and breadth of the internship changed. Instead, the internship focused on finding and correcting memory leaks and errors as reported by a COTS software product meant to track such issues. Memory leaks come in many different flavors and some of them are more benign than others. On the extreme end a program might be dynamically allocating memory and not correctly deallocating it when it is no longer in use. This is called a direct memory leak and in the worst case can use all the available memory and crash the program. If the leaks are small they may simply slow the program down which, in a safety critical system (a system for which a failure or design error can cause a risk to human life), is still unacceptable. The ground control system is managed in smaller sub-teams, referred to as CSCIs. The CSCI that this internship focused on is responsible for monitoring the health and status of the system. This team's software had several methods/modules that were leaking significant amounts of memory. Since most of the code in this system is safety-critical, correcting memory leaks is a necessity.

Programmin↗
NASA NTRS1991

Contextual specificity in perception and action

The visually guided control of helicopter flight is a human achievement, and, thus, understanding this skill is, in part, a psychological problem. The abilities of skilled pilots are impressive, and yet it is of concern that pilots' performance is less than ideal: they suffer from workload constraints, make occasional errors, and are subject to such debilities as simulator sickness. Remedying such deficiencies is both an engineering and a psychological problem. When studying the psychological aspects of this problem, it is desirable to simplify the problem as much as possible, and thereby, sidestep as many intractable psychological issues as possible. Simply stated, we do not want to have to resolve such polemics as the mind-body problem in order to contribute to the design of more effective helicopter systems. On the other hand, the study of human behavior is a psychological endeavor and certain problems cannot be evaded. Four related issues that are of psychological significance in understanding the visually guided control of helicopter flight are discussed. First, a selected discussion of the nature of descriptive levels in analyzing human perception and performance is presented. It is argued that the appropriate level of description for perception is kinematical, and for performance, it is procedural. Second, it is argued that investigations into pilot performance cannot ignore the nature of pilots' phenomenal experience. The conscious control of actions is not based upon environmental states of affairs, nor upon the optical information that specifies them. Actions are coupled to perceptions. Third, the acquisition of skilled actions in the context of inherent misperceptions is discussed. Such skills may be error prone in some situations, but not in others. Finally, I discuss the contextual relativity of human errors. Each of these four issues relates to a common theme: the control of action is mediated by phenomenal experience, the veracity of which is context specific.

Proffitt, Dennis R.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Case Study: Influences of Uncertainties and Traffic Scenario Difficulties in a Human-in-the-Loop Simulation

This paper presents a case study of how factors such as wind prediction errors and metering delays can influence controller performance and workload in Human-In-The-Loop simulations. Retired air traffic controllers worked two arrival sectors adjacent to the terminal area. The main tasks were to provide safe air traffic operations and deliver the aircraft to the metering fix within +/- 25 seconds of the scheduled arrival time with the help of provided decision support tools. Analyses explore the potential impact of metering delays and system uncertainties on controller workload and performance. The results suggest that trajectory prediction uncertainties impact safety performance, while metering fix accuracy and workload appear subject to the scenario difficulty.

air traffic control↗
NASA NTRS1977

Using model order tests to determine sensory inputs in a motion study

In the study of motion effects on tracking performance, a problem of interest is the determination of what sensory inputs a human uses in controlling his tracking task. In the approach presented here a simple canonical model (FID or a proportional, integral, derivative structure) is used to model the human's input-output time series. A study of significant changes in reduction of the output error loss functional is conducted as different permutations of parameters are considered. Since this canonical model includes parameters which are related to inputs to the human (such as the error signal, its derivatives and integration), the study of model order is equivalent to the study of which sensory inputs are being used by the tracker. The parameters are obtained which have the greatest effect on reducing the loss function significantly. In this manner the identification procedure converts the problem of testing for model order into the problem of determining sensory inputs.

Repperger, D. W.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Increased User Satisfaction Through an Improved Message System

With all of the enhancements in software methodology and testing, there is no guarantee that software can be delivered such that no user errors occur, How to handle these errors when they occur has become a major research topic within human-computer interaction (HCI). Users of the Multimission Spacecraft Analysis Subsystem(MSAS) at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), a system of X and motif graphical user interfaces for analyzing spacecraft data, complained about the lack of information about the error cause and have suggested that recovery actions be included in the system error messages...The system was evaluated through usability surveys and was shown to be successful.

Human-computer interaction error handling direct m↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Human Challenges of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) range from small electric quadcopters that are flown close to the ground within visual range of the operator, to larger systems capable of extended flight in airspace shared with conventional aircraft. Before RPA can operate routinely and safely in civilian airspace, we need to understand the unique human factors associated with these aircraft. RPA pilots participated in focus groups where they were asked to recall critical incidents that either presented a threat to safety, or highlighted a case where the pilot contributed to system resilience or mission success. Ninety incidents were gathered from focus-groups. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Some of these concerns have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.

Hobbs, Alan↗
NASA NTRS1978

An extension of the quickened display for manual control

It is very difficult (or even impossible) for a human to control plants of third order or more with little or no damping by just knowing the instantaneous error. It has been shown that adding first and/or higher order derivatives to the error signal and displaying the combined signal are effective in facilitating human control over such plants. This signal quickening technique by Birmingham and Taylor is further extended to incorporate the future trajectory variation into the displayed signal so as to minimize the tracking error. A method for tuning free parameters in ordinary and extended quickening is established by applying discrete-time optimal control. Experimental results for a triple integrator plant indicate the effectiveness of the proposed method to achieve high quality tracking.

Tomizuka, M.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Quantification of airport community noise impact in terms of noise levels, population density, and human subjective response

The Fraction Impact Method (FIM), developed by the National Research Council (NRC) for assessing the amount and physiological effect of noise, is described. Here, the number of people exposed to a given level of noise is multiplied by a weighting factor that depends on noise level. It is pointed out that the Aircraft-noise Levels and Annoyance MOdel (ALAMO), recently developed at NASA Langley Research Center, can perform the NRC fractional impact calculations for given modes of operation at any U.S. airport. The sensitivity of these calculations to errors in estimates of population, noise level, and human subjective response is discussed. It is found that a change in source noise causes a substantially smaller change in contour area than would be predicted simply on the basis of inverse square law considerations. Another finding is that the impact calculations are generally less sensitive to source noise errors than to systematic errors in population or subjective response.

Deloach, R.↗