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NASA NTRS2008

Bridging the Generation Gap: A Rapid Early Career Hire Training Program

This paper describes a training program to provide Early Career Hires (ECHs) in the aerospace industry with real, rapid, hands-on exposure to multiple phases and multiple disciplines of flight project development. Such a program has become necessary to close the Generation Gap and ensure that aerospace organizations maintain a highly skilled workforce as experienced personnel begin to retire. This paper discusses the specific motivations for and implementation of such a program at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. However, the essential features are widely applicable to other NASA centers and organizations delivering large llight systems. This paper details the overall program concept, stages of participation by an ECH, oversight and mentoring, program assessment, training project selection, and facilities requirements.

Workforce↗
NASA NTRS2015

Center Planning and Development: Multi-User Spaceport Initiatives

The Vehicle Assembly building at NASAs Kennedy Space Center has been used since 1966 to vertically assemble every launch vehicle, since the Apollo Program, launched from Launch Complex 39 (LC-39). After the cancellation of the Constellation Program in 2010 and the retirement of the Space Shuttle Program in 2011, the VAB faced an uncertain future. As the Space Launch System (SLS) gained a foothold as the future of American spaceflight to deep space, NASA was only using a portion of the VABs initial potential. With three high bays connected to the Crawler Way transportation system, the potential exists for up to three rockets to be simultaneously processed for launch. The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Master plan, supported by the Center Planning and Development (CPD) Directorate, is guiding Kennedy toward a 21st century multi-user spaceport. This concept will maintain Kennedy as the United States premier gateway to space and provide multi-user operations through partnerships with the commercial aerospace industry. Commercial aerospace companies, now tasked with transporting cargo and, in the future, astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) via the Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) and Commercial Crew Program (CCP), are a rapidly growing industry with increasing capabilities to make launch operations more economical for both private companies and the government. Commercial operations to Low Earth Orbit allow the government to focus on travel to farther destinations through the SLS Program. With LC-39B designated as a multi-use launch pad, companies seeking to use it will require an integration facility to assemble, integrate, and test their launch vehicle. An Announcement for Proposals (AFP) was released in June, beginning the process of finding a non-NASA user for High Bay 2 (HB2) and the Mobile Launcher Platforms (MLPs). An Industry Day, a business meeting and tour for interested companies and organizations, was also arranged to identify and answer any additional questions posed by potential proposers. After amending the AFP and posting additional material for potential users to consider, proposals are being accepted until July 31, at which point they will be evaluated to determine the proposer which best meets the objectives of the government. By identifying VAB HB2 as available and seeking proposals from the commercial sector for VAB HB2 and MLP use, Center Planning and Development is ensuring Kennedy Space Centers relevance in the evolving launch industry of the 21st century.

AFP↗
NASA NTRS2015

Green Propellant Demonstration with Hydrazine Catalyst of F-16 Emergency Power Unit

Some space vehicle and aircraft Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) use hydrazine propellant for generating power. Hydrazine is a toxic, hazardous fuel which requires special safety equipment and processes for handling and loading. In recent years, there has been development of two green propellants that could enable their use in APU's: the Swedish LMP-103S and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) AF-M315E. While there has been work on development of these propellants for thruster applications (Prisma and Green Propulsion Infusion Mission, respectively), there has been less focus on the application to power units. Beginning in 2012, an effort was started by the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) on the APU application. The MSFC plan was to demonstrate green propellants with residual Space Shuttle hardware. The principal investigator was able to acquire a Solid Rocket Booster gas generator and an Orbiter APU. Since these test assets were limited in number, an Air Force equivalent asset was identified: the F-16 Emergency Power Unit (EPU). In June 2013, two EPU's were acquired from retired aircraft located at Davis Monthan Air Force Base. A gas generator from one of these EPU's was taken out of an assembly and configured for testing with a version of the USAF propellant with a higher water content (AF-M315EM) to reduce decomposition temperatures. Testing in November 2014 has shown that this green propellant is reactive with the Hydrazine catalyst (Shell 405) generating 300 psi of pressure with the existing F-16 EPU configuration. This paper will highlight the results of MSFC testing in collaboration with AFRL.

Robinson, Joel W.↗
NASA NTRS2015

A Year of Progress: NASA's Space Launch System Approaches Critical Design Review

NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) made significant progress on the manufacturing floor and on the test stand in 2014 and positioned itself for a successful Critical Design Review in mid-2015. SLS, the world's only exploration-class heavy lift rocket, has the capability to dramatically increase the mass and volume of human and robotic exploration. Additionally, it will decrease overall mission risk, increase safety, and simplify ground and mission operations - all significant considerations for crewed missions and unique high-value national payloads. Development now is focused on configuration with 70 metric tons (t) of payload to low Earth orbit (LEO), more than double the payload of the retired Space Shuttle program or current operational vehicles. This "Block 1" design will launch NASA's Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) on an uncrewed flight beyond the Moon and back and the first crewed flight around the Moon. The current design has a direct evolutionary path to a vehicle with a 130t lift capability that offers even more flexibility to reduce planetary trip times, simplify payload design cycles, and provide new capabilities such as planetary sample returns. Every major element of SLS has successfully completed its Critical Design Review and now has hardware in production or testing. In fact, the SLS MPCV-to-Stage-Adapter (MSA) flew successfully on the Exploration Flight Test (EFT) 1 launch of a Delta IV and Orion spacecraft in December 2014. The SLS Program is currently working toward vehicle Critical Design Review in mid-2015. This paper will discuss these and other technical and programmatic successes and challenges over the past year and provide a preview of work ahead before the first flight of this new capability.

Askins, Bruce↗
NASA NTRS2015

SSME to RS-25: Challenges of Adapting a Heritage Engine to a New Vehicle Architecture

Following the cancellation of the Constellation program and retirement of the Space Shuttle, NASA initiated the Space Launch System (SLS) program to provide next-generation heavy lift cargo and crew access to space. A key constituent of the SLS architecture is the RS-25 engine, also known as the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The RS-25 was selected to serve as the main propulsion system for the SLS core stage in conjunction with the solid rocket boosters. This selection was largely based on the maturity and extensive experience gained through 135 missions, 3000+ ground tests, and over a million seconds total accumulated hot-fire time. In addition, there were also over a dozen functional flight assets remaining from the Space Shuttle program that could be leveraged to support the first four flights. However, while the RS-25 is a highly mature system, simply unbolting it from the Space Shuttle boat-tail and installing it on the new SLS vehicle is not a "plug-and-play" operation. In addition to numerous technical integration details involving changes to significant areas such as the environments, interface conditions, technical performance requirements, operational constraints and so on, there were other challenges to be overcome in the area of replacing the obsolete engine control system (ECS). While the magnitude of accomplishing this effort was less than that needed to develop and field a new clean-sheet engine system, the path to the first flight of SLS has not been without unexpected challenges.

Ballard, Richard O.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Colonoscopy Screening in the US Astronaut Corps

BACKGROUND: Historically, colonoscopy screenings for astronauts have been conducted to ensure that astronauts are in good health for space missions. Recently this historical data has been identified as being useful for developing an occupational surveillance requirement. It can be used to assess overall colon health and to have a point of reference for future tests in current and former astronauts, as well as to follow-up and track rates of colorectal cancer and polyps. These rates can be compared to military and other terrestrial populations. In 2003, the active astronaut colonoscopy requirements changed to require less frequent colonoscopies. Since polyp removal during a colonoscopy is an intervention that prevents the polyp from potentially developing into cancer, the procedure decreases the individual's risk for colon cancer. The objective of this study is to evaluate the possible effect of increased follow-up times between colonoscopies on the number and severity of polyps identified during the procedures among both current and former NASA astronauts. Initial results and forward work regarding astronaut colonoscopy screenings will be presented. METHODS: A retrospective study of all colonoscopy procedures performed on NASA astronauts between 1962 and 2015 (both during active career and retirement) was conducted by review of the JSC Clinic Electronic Medical Record and Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health (LSAH) database for colonoscopy screening procedures and pathology reports. The timeframe of interest was from the time of selection into the Astronaut Corps through May 2015 or death. For each colonoscopy report, the following data were captured: date of procedure, age at time of procedure, reason for procedure, quality of bowel prep, completion of procedure and/or reason for termination of procedure, findings of procedure, subsequent treatment (if any), recommended follow-up interval, actual follow up interval, family history of polyps or colon cancer, and other significant items or discrepancies. The population consisted of 338 astronauts: 52 females, 286 males. Of these, 56 were deceased, and 11 astronauts had no record of any colonoscopies. Because of a screening requirement change in 2003, analyses were conducted to determine if there were differences between the two time periods. One-sided Wilcoxon rank sum tests were used to identify statistically significant differences between the two time periods. RESULTS: There was a combined total of 1,964 colonoscopy screenings identified. The average follow-up intervals between colonoscopies were indeed longer after the screening requirement change than before the change. The mean follow-up interval pre -2003 was 3.59 years, while post-2003 it increased to 4.35 years. The statistical significance of this difference was confirmed using a one sided Wilcoxon rank sum test which yielded p<.001. Colonoscopies performed after the requirement change tended to have a higher incidence and greater severity of polyps. From pre-2003 to post-2003 the percentage of colonoscopy procedures yielding no polyps decreased from 83.77% to 74.70%. Not only did post-2003 procedures yield more polyp findings, but the polyps recorded were more often of severe pathology. Before 2003 3.62% of colonoscopy findings were polyps of the hyperplastic type (the least severe polyp type) and only 3.35% were of greater severity. Post-2003, 4.21% of findings were hyperplastic polyps while 11.44% were of greater severity. Upon the investigation of other possible contributing factors to these results, we also found that mean age post-2003 was 54.55 years which was significantly higher than during the pre-2003 timeframe (47.32 years). This was observed with a one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test, resulting in a p<0.001. The increased average age of astronauts could also be a contributing factor to the greater number of polyps found since the risk of developing polyps increases with age. Further work is needed to better understand the increased incidence and greater severity of polyps found in astronaut colonoscopy outcomes.

Masterova, K.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Configurable Aperture Space Telescope

In December 2014, we were awarded Center Innovation Fund to evaluate an optical and mechanical concept for a novel implementation of a segmented telescope based on modular, interconnected small sats (satlets). The concept is called CAST, a Configurable Aperture Space Telescope. With a current TRL is 2 we will aim to reach TLR 3 in Sept 2015 by demonstrating a 2x2 mirror system to validate our optical model and error budget, provide straw man mechanical architecture and structural damping analyses, and derive future satlet-based observatory performance requirements. CAST provides an alternative access to visible and/or UV wavelength space telescope with 1-meter or larger aperture for NASA SMD Astrophysics and Planetary Science community after the retirement of HST

Small Satellites↗
NASA NTRS2013

Effects of Airport Tower Controller Decision Support Tool on Controllers Head-Up Time

Despite that aircraft positions and movements can be easily monitored on the radar displays at major airports nowadays, it is still important for the air traffic control tower (ATCT) controllers to look outside the window as much as possible to assure safe operations of traffic management. The present paper investigates whether an introduction of the NASA's proposed Spot and Runway Departure Advisor (SARDA), a decision support tool for the ATCT controller, would increase or decrease the controllers' head-up time. SARDA provides the controller departure-release schedule advisories, i.e., when to release each departure aircraft in order to minimize individual aircraft's fuel consumption on taxiways and simultaneously maximize the overall runway throughput. The SARDA advisories were presented on electronic flight strips (EFS). To investigate effects on the head-up time, a human-in-the-loop simulation experiment with two retired ATCT controller participants was conducted in a high-fidelity ATCT cab simulator with 360-degree computer-generated out-the-window view. Each controller participant wore a wearable video camera on a side of their head with the camera facing forward. The video data were later used to calculate their line of sight at each moment and eventually identify their head-up times. Four sessions were run with the SARDA advisories, and four sessions were run without (baseline). Traffic-load levels were varied in each session. The same set of user interface - EFS and the radar displays - were used in both the advisory and baseline sessions to make them directly comparable. The paper reports the findings and discusses their implications.

airport surface operations↗
NASA NTRS2015

UAS Air Traffic Controller Acceptability Study: Evaluating Detect and Avoid Technology and Communication Delays in Simulation - 2

This study evaluated the effects of communications delays and winds on air traffic controller ratings of acceptability of horizontal miss distances (HMDs) for encounters between Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and manned aircraft in a simulation of the Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW) airspace. Fourteen encounters per hour were staged in the presence of moderate background traffic. Seven recently retired controllers with experience at DFW served as subjects. Guidance provided to the UAS pilots for maintaining a given HMD was provided by information from Detect and Avoid (DAA) self-separation algorithms (Stratway+) displayed on the Multi-Aircraft Control System. This guidance consisted of amber "bands" on the heading scale of the UAS navigation display indicating headings that would result in a loss of well clear between the UAS and nearby traffic. Winds tested were successfully handled by the DAA algorithms and did not affect the controller acceptability ratings of the HMDs. Voice communications delays for the UAS were also tested and included one-way delay times of 0, 400, 1200, and 1800 msec. For longer communications delays, there were changes in strategy and communications flow that were observed and reported by the controllers. The aim of this work is to provide useful information for guiding future rules and regulations applicable to flying UAS in the NAS. Information from this study will also be of value to the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 228 - Minimum Performance Standards for UAS.

Comstock, James R., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2016

MoonDB: Restoration and Synthesis of Lunar Petrological and Geochemical Data

About 2,200 samples were collected from the Moon during the Apollo missions, forming a unique and irreplaceable legacy of the Apollo program. These samples, obtained at tremendous cost and great risk, are the only samples that have ever been returned by astronauts from the surface of another planetary body. These lunar samples have been curated at NASA Johnson Space Center and made available to the global research community. Over more than 45 years, a vast body of petrological, geochemical, and geochronological studies of these samples have been amassed, which helped to expand our understanding of the history and evolution of the Moon, the Earth itself, and the history of our entire solar system. Unfortunately, data from these studies are dispersed in the literature, often only available in analog format in older publications, and/or lacking sample metadata and analytical metadata (e.g., information about analytical procedure and data quality), which greatly limits their usage for new scientific endeavors. Even worse is that much lunar data have never been published, simply because no forum existed at the time (e.g., electronic supplements). Thousands of valuable analyses remain inaccessible, often preserved only in personal records, and are in danger of being lost forever, when investigators retire or pass away. Making these data and metadata publicly accessible in a digital format would dramatically help guide current and future research and eliminate duplicated analyses of precious lunar samples.

Lehnert, Kerstin A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Experiences with Extra-Vehicular Activities in Response to Critical ISS Contingencies

The maturation of the International Space Station (ISS) design from the proposed Space Station Freedom to today's current implementation resulted in external hardware redundancy vulnerabilities in the final design. Failure to compensate for or respond to these vulnerabilities could put the ISS in a posture where it could no longer function as a habitable space station. In the first years of ISS assembly, these responses were to largely be addressed by the continued resupply and Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) capabilities of the Space Shuttle. Even prior to the decision to retire the Space Shuttle, it was realized that ISS needed to have its own capability to be able to rapidly repair or replace external hardware without needing to wait for the next cargo resupply mission. As documented in a previous publication, in 2006 development was started to baseline Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA, or spacewalk) procedures to replace hardware components whose failure would expose some of the ISS vulnerabilities should a second failure occur. This development work laid the groundwork for the onboard crews and the ground operations and engineering teams to be ready to replace any of this failed hardware. In 2010, this development work was put to the test when one of these pieces of hardware failed. This paper will provide a brief summary of the planning and processes established in the original Contingency EVA development phase. It will then review how those plans and processes were implemented in 2010, highlighting what went well as well as where there were deficiencies between theory and reality. This paper will show that the original approach and analyses, though sound, were not as thorough as they should have been in the realm of planning for next worse failures, for documenting Programmatic approval of key assumptions, and not pursuing sufficient engineering analysis prior to the failure of the hardware. The paper will further highlight the changes made to the Contingency EVA preparation team structure, approach, goals, and the resources allocated to its work after the 2010 events. Finally, the authors will overview the implementation of these updates in addressing failures onboard the ISS in 2012, 2013, and 2014. The successful use of the updated approaches, and the application of the approaches to other spacewalks, will demonstrate the effectiveness of this additional work and make a case for putting significant time and resources into pre-failure planning and analysis for critical hardware items on human-tended spacecraft.

Van Cise, E. A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Enhancing Systems Engineering Education Through Case Study Writing

Developing and refining methods for teaching systems engineering is part of Systems Engineering grand challenges and agenda for research in the SE research community. Retention of systems engineering knowledge is a growing concern in the United States as the baby boom generation continues to retire and the faster pace of technology development does not allow for younger generations to gain experiential knowledge through years of practice. Government agencies, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), develop their own curricula and SE leadership development programs to "grow their own" systems engineers. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) conducts its own Center-focused Marshall Systems Engineering Leadership Development Program (MSELDP), a competitive program consisting of coursework, a guest lecture series, and a rotational assignment into an unfamiliar organization engaged in systems engineering. Independently, MSFC developed two courses to address knowledge retention and sharing concerns: Real World Marshall Mission Success course and its Case Study Writers Workshop and Writers Experience. Teaching case study writing and leading students through a hands-on experience at writing a case study on an SE topic can enhance SE training and has the potential to accelerate the transfer of experiential knowledge. This paper is an overview of the pilot experiences with teaching case study writing, its application in case study-based learning, and identifies potential areas of research and application for case study writing in systems engineering education.

Stevens, Jennifer Stenger↗
NASA NTRS2004

Lessons Learned Study Final Report for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate

This report is the final product of a 90-day study performed for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. The study was to assemble lessons NASA has learned from previous programs that could help the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate pursue the Exploration vision. It focuses on those lessons that should have the greatest significance to the Directorate during the formulation of program and mission plans. The study team reviewed a large number of lessons learned reports and data bases, including the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and Rogers Commission reports on the Shuttle accidents, accident reports from robotic space flight systems, and a number of management reviews by the Defense Sciences Board, Government Accountability Office, and others. The consistency of the lessons, findings, and recommendations validate the adequacy of the data set. In addition to reviewing existing databases, a series of workshops was held at each of the NASA centers and headquarters that included senior managers from the current workforce as well as retirees. The full text of the workshop reports is included in Appendix A. A lessons learned website was opened up to permit current and retired NASA personnel and on-site contractors to input additional lessons as they arise. These new lessons, when of appropriate quality and relevance, will be brought to the attention of managers. The report consists of four parts: Part 1 provides a small set of lessons, called the Executive Lessons Learned, that represent critical lessons that the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should act on immediately. This set of Executive Lessons and their supporting rationale have been reviewed at length and fully endorsed by a team of distinguished NASA alumni; Part 2 contains a larger set of lessons, called the Selected Lessons Learned, which have been chosen from the lessons database and center workshop reports on the basis of their specific significance and relevance to the near-term work of the Exploration Directorate. These lessons frequently support the Executive lessons but are more general in nature; Part 3 consists of the reports of the center workshops that were conducted as part of this activity. These reports are included in their entirety (approximately 200 pages) in Appendix G and have significance for specific managers; Part 4 consists of the remainder of the lessons that have been selected by this effort and assembled into a database for the use of the Explorations Directorate. The database is archived and hosted in the Lessons Learned Knowledge Network, which provides a flexible search capability using a wide variety of search terms. Finally, a spreadsheet lists databases searched and a bibliography identifies reports that have been reviewed as sources of lessons for this task. NASA has been presented with many learning opportunities. We have conducted numerous programs, some extremely successful and others total failures. Most have been documented with a formal lessons learned activity, but we have not always incorporated these learning opportunities into our normal modes of business. For example, the Robbins Report of 2001 clearly indicates that many project failures of the past two decades were the result of violating well documented best practices, often in direct violation of management instructions and directives. An overarching lesson emerges: that disciplined execution in accordance with proven best practices is the greatest single contributor to a successful program. The Lessons Learned task team offers a sincere hope that the lessons presented herein will be helpful to the Exploration Systems Directorate in charting and executing their course. The success of the Directorate and of NASA in general depends on our collective ability to move forward without having to relearn the lessons of those who have gone before.

Van Laak, Jim↗
NASA NTRS2016

Managing a Safe and Successful Multi-User Spaceport

Encouraged by the creation of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation within the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1984 and the Commercial Space Act of 1998, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) now relies on an extensive network of support from commercial companies and organizations. At NASA's Kennedy Space Center (KSC), this collaboration opens competitive opportunities for launch providers, including repurposing underutilized Shuttle Program resources, constructing new facilities, and utilizing center services and laboratories. The resulting multi-user spaceport fosters diverse activity, though it engenders risk from hazards associated with various spaceflight processing activities. The KSC Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate, in coordination with the center's Spaceport Integration and Center Planning & Development organizations, has developed a novel approach to protect NASA's workforce, critical assets, and the public from hazardous, space-related activity associated with KSC's multi-user spaceport. For NASA KSC S&MA, the transformation to a multi-user spaceport required implementing methods to foster safe and successful commercial activity while resolving challenges involving: Retirement of the Space Shuttle program; Co-location of multiple NASA programs; Relationships between the NASA programs; Complex relationships between NASA programs and commercial partner operations in exclusive-use facilities; Complex relationships between NASA programs and commercial partner operations in shared-use facilities. NASA KSC S&MA challenges were met with long-term planning and solutions involving cooperation with the Spaceport Integration and Services Directorate. This directorate is responsible for managing active commercial partnerships with customer advocacy and services management, providing a dedicated and consistent level of support to a wide array of commercial operations. This paper explores these solutions, their relevance to the current commercial space industry, and the challenges that continue to drive improvement with a focus on areas of safety management and risk assessment that have been crucial in KSC's evolution into a multi-user spaceport. These solutions may be useful to government entities and private companies looking to partner with the commercial space industry.

Range↗
NASA NTRS2016

UAS Air Traffic Controller Acceptability Study-2: Effects of Communications Delays and Winds in Simulation

This study evaluated the effects of Communications Delays and Winds on Air Traffic Controller ratings of acceptability of horizontal miss distances (HMDs) for encounters between UAS and manned aircraft in a simulation of the Dallas-Ft. Worth East-side airspace. Fourteen encounters per hour were staged in the presence of moderate background traffic. Seven recently retired controllers with experience at DFW served as subjects. Guidance provided to the UAS pilots for maintaining a given HMD was provided by information from self-separation algorithms displayed on the Multi-Aircraft Simulation System. Winds tested did not affect the acceptability ratings. Communications delays tested included 0, 400, 1200, and 1800 msec. For longer communications delays, there were changes in strategy and communications flow that were observed and reported by the controllers. The aim of this work is to provide useful information for guiding future rules and regulations applicable to flying UAS in the NAS.

Comstock, James R., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2015

UAS in the NAS Air Traffic Controller Acceptability Study-1: The Effects of Horizontal Miss Distances on Simulated UAS and Manned Aircraft Encounters

This study examined air traffic controller acceptability ratings based on the effects of differing horizontal miss distances (HMDs) for encounters between UAS and manned aircraft. In a simulation of the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) East-side airspace, the CAS-1 experiment at NASA Langley Research Center enlisted fourteen recently retired DFW air traffic controllers to rate well-clear volumes based on differing HMDs that ranged from 0.5 NM to 3.0 NM. The controllers were tasked with rating these HMDs from "too small" to "too excessive" on a defined, 1-5, scale and whether these distances caused any disruptions to the controller and/or to the surrounding traffic flow. Results of the study indicated a clear favoring towards a particular HMD range. Controller workload was also measured. Data from this experiment and subsequent experiments will play a crucial role in the FAA's establishment of rules, regulations, and procedures to safely and efficiently integrate UAS into the NAS.

Ghatas, Rania W.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Improvements to the Tendon-Actuated Lightweight In-Space MANipulator (TALISMAN)

Devices for manipulating and precisely placing payloads are critical for efficient space operations including berthing of spacecraft, in-space assembly, construction and repair. Key to the success of many NASA space activities has been the availability of long-reach crane-like devices such as the Shuttle Remote Manipulation System (SRMS) and the Space Station Remote Manipulation System (SSRMS). These devices have been used for many operations including berthing visiting spacecraft to the International Space Station, deployment of spacecraft, space station assembly, astronaut positioning, payload transfer, and spacecraft inspection prior to atmospheric re-entry. Retiring the Space Transportation System has led to the removal of the SRMS from consideration for in-space missions, thus creating a capability gap. Recognizing this gap, work was initiated at NASA on a new architecture for long-reach space manipulators. Most current devices are constructed by joining revolute joints with carbon composite tubes, with the joints accounting for the majority of the device mass. For example in the case of the SRMS, the entire device mass is 410 kg (904 lbm); the joint structure, motors, gear train, cabling, etc., accounts for the majority of the system mass because the carbon composite tubes mass is 46 kg (101 lbm). An alternate space manipulator concept, the Tendon-Actuated Lightweight In-Space MANipulator (TALISMAN) was created to address deficiencies in the current state-of-the-art in long-reach manipulators. The antagonistic tendon actuated joint architecture allows the motors actuating the joint to be removed from the joint axis, which simplifies the joint design while simultaneously providing mechanical advantage for the motors. The improved mechanical advantage, in turn, reduces the size and power requirements for the motor and gear train. This paper will describe recent architectural improvements to the TALISMAN design that: 1) improve the operational robustness of the system by enabling maneuvers not originally possible by varying the TALISMAN geometry; 2) enable efficient active antagonistic control of a joint while sharing cable between antagonistic tension networks; and 3) uses a unique arrangement of differential capstans to reduce motor torque requirements by an order of magnitude. The paper will also summarize recent efforts to enable autonomous deployment of a TALISMAN including the deployment concept of operations and associated hardware system design. The deployment forces are provided by the same motor systems that are used for articulation, thus reducing the mass associated with the deployment system. The deployment approach is being tested on a TALISMAN prototype which is designed to provide the same operational performance as a shuttle-class manipulator. The prototype has been fabricated and is operational in a new facility at NASA Langley Research Center that has a large area (15.2 m by 21.3 m [50 ft by 70 ft]) air-bearing floor.

Doggett, William R.↗