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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2016

Perceived Noise Analysis for Offset Jets Applied to Commercial Supersonic Aircraft

A systems analysis was performed with experimental jet noise data, engine/aircraft performance codes and aircraft noise prediction codes to assess takeoff noise levels and mission range for conceptual supersonic commercial aircraft. A parametric study was done to identify viable engine cycles that meet NASA's N+2 goals for noise and performance. Model scale data from offset jets were used as input to the aircraft noise prediction code to determine the expected sound levels for the lateral certification point where jet noise dominates over all other noise sources. The noise predictions were used to determine the optimal orientation of the offset nozzles to minimize the noise at the lateral microphone location. An alternative takeoff procedure called "programmed lapse rate" was evaluated for noise reduction benefits. Results show there are two types of engines that provide acceptable mission range performance; one is a conventional mixed-flow turbofan and the other is a three-stream variable-cycle engine. Separate flow offset nozzles reduce the noise directed toward the thicker side of the outer flow stream, but have less benefit as the core nozzle pressure ratio is reduced. At the systems level for a three-engine N+2 aircraft with full throttle takeoff, there is a 1.4 EPNdB margin to Chapter 3 noise regulations predicted for the lateral certification point (assuming jet noise dominates). With a 10% reduction in thrust just after clearing the runway, the margin increases to 5.5 EPNdB. Margins to Chapter 4 and Chapter 14 levels will depend on the cumulative split between the three certification points, but it appears that low specific thrust engines with a 10% reduction in thrust (programmed lapse rate) can come close to meeting Chapter 14 noise levels. Further noise reduction is possible with engine oversizing and derated takeoff, but more detailed mission studies are needed to investigate the range impacts as well as the practical limits for safety and takeoff regulations.

Turbofans↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’S Current Efforts and Applications of NDE to Improve Space Flight Safety

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continues to push the boundary of manned flight. Current mission profiles include flights to the moon and mars. Many of these missions require advance manufacturing and planned off planet resource utilization. As NASA continues to develop highly advance materials and manufacturing techniques to meet these mission profiles, inspection of these increasingly complex parts has had to evolve as well. Additive manufacturing is coming to the forefront as a primary manufacturing technique but offers unique challenges when inspection and certification are required. NASA has been working diligently to be a leader in developing and utilizing inspection techniques capable of inspecting these highly advanced parts. Additionally additive manufacturing techniques can also be used to build parts in space and provides a vehicle for in-situ resource utilization for off world missions. As NASA and its commercial crew partners move forward inspection techniques will need to continue to advance to ensure safe manned space flight. In this talk NASA will highlight many of the advanced nondestructive evaluation efforts going on across the agency. As well as highlights for points of infusion for helping NASA meet it’s future missions.

NDE↗
NASA NTRS2004

Toward Synthesis, Analysis, and Certification of Security Protocols

Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.

Schumann, Johann↗
DOE OSTI2025

ORNL Package Testing Program Overview

Radioactive materials are widespread in our everyday activities which are used in many different types of industries: Consumer products, Medicine, Industry, Energy, and Defense. In the United States there is about 3 million shipments of radioactive materials per year. With radioactive material being very widespread the number of new applications to ship these quantities increases daily. As such, ensuring the safe and secure transport of these materials is paramount, necessitating stringent packaging, transportation, and certification requirements. Shipments of radioactive materials have been made from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the past 65 years. Since the 1940s ORNL has been at the forefront of the early development of regulations pertaining to the transport of radioactive shipments and associated regulatory testing. The early involvement resulted in ORNL being one of the leaders in the development of regulations and testing standards pertaining to the testing and design of packages. Today all package testing activities are conducted under the Package Testing Program (PTP) at ORNL at the Package Evaluation Facility (PEF). The PTP develops and evaluates testing solutions – ensuring that they are safe, efficient, and meet regulatory requirements ORNL PTP has extensive experience in the regulatory testing of radioactive material packages, supporting certification of Type A, Type, B, Type AF, and special form packages. The PEF serves as a one-stop-shop for design, testing, and certification of a wide variety of packages needed for shipment of radioactive materials. The facility provides the space, expertise, and equipment necessary to conduct rigorous performance testing under both normal and accident conditions or transport environments including free drop, dynamic crush, puncture, penetration, compression, vibration, water spray, water immersion, and thermal test. The PTP remains a key contributor to the safety and compliance of radioactive material transportation. This presentation will provide an overview of the program’s history, capabilities, and its ongoing role in advancing regulatory standards and transportation safety.

Martinez, Oscar [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000181814046)↗
NASA NTRS1992

Mission management aircraft operations manual

This manual prescribes the NASA mission management aircraft program and provides policies and criteria for the safe and economical operation, maintenance, and inspection of NASA mission management aircraft. The operation of NASA mission management aircraft is based on the concept that safety has the highest priority. Operations involving unwarranted risks will not be tolerated. NASA mission management aircraft will be designated by the Associate Administrator for Management Systems and Facilities. NASA mission management aircraft are public aircraft as defined by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Maintenance standards, as a minimum, will meet those required for retention of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness certification. Federal Aviation Regulation Part 91, Subparts A and B, will apply except when requirements of this manual are more restrictive.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2007

An Overview of the Space Shuttle Orbiter's Aging Aircraft Program

The Space Shuttle Orbiter has well exceeded its original design life of 10 years or 100 missions. The Orbiter Project Office (OPO) has sponsored several activities to address aging vehicle concerns, including a Corrosion Control Review Board (CCRB), a mid-life certification program, and most recently the formation of the Aging Orbiter Working Group (AOWG). The AOWG was chartered in 2004 as a proactive group which provides the OPO oversight for aging issues such as corrosion, non-destructive inspection, non-metallics, wiring and subsystems. The core team consists of mainly representatives from the Materials and Processes Problem Resolution Team (M&P PRT) and Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Subsystem engineers and subject matter experts are called in as required. The AOWG has functioned by forming issues based sub-teams. Examples of completed sub-teams include adhesives, wiring and wing leading edge metallic materials. Current sub-teams include Composite Over-Wrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV), elastomeric materials and mechanisms.

Russell, Richard W.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Synthesis from Design Requirements of a Hybrid System for Transport Aircraft Longitudinal Control

Volume I of this report presents a new method for synthesizing hybrid systems directly from desi gn requirements, and applies the method to design of a hybrid system for longitudinal control of transport aircraft. The resulting system satisfies general requirement for safety and effectiveness specified a priori, enabling formal validation to be achieved. Volume II contains seven appendices intended to make the report accessible to readers with backgrounds in human factors, flight dynamics and control, and formal logic. Major design goals are (1) system design integrity based on proof of correctness at the design level, (2) significant simplification and cost reduction in system development and certification, and (3) improved operational efficiency, with significant alleviation of human-factors problems encountered by pilots in current transport aircraft. This report provides for the first time a firm technical basis for criteria governing design and certification of avionic systems for transport aircraft. It should be of primary interest to designers of next-generation avionic systems.

Hynes, Charles S.↗
DOE OSTI2023

A Barrier-Certificated Reinforcement Learning Approach for Enhancing Power System Transient Stability

Increasing integration of renewable resources brings more flexibility and poses new challenges to modern power systems, leading to highly nonlinear and complex dynamics. Here, this paper aims to provide a general solution framework to traditional control problems, such as frequency control and voltage control, which attempt to maintain the stability of either synchronous generators-governed or inverter-governed systems when subjected to a disturbance and simultaneously guarantee operational constraints, providing a complete complement to existing works on control design. Building on reinforcement learning (RL) and control barrier functions, the framework includes two subsystems, i.e., a model-free controller and a barrier-certification system, which discover RL-based control actions and sequentially filter them using a barrier certificate to satisfy operational constraints. Calculating a barrier function is generally challenging for a complex power system. This is addressed by representing the barrier function using neural networks (NNs) and data-based approaches. An adaptive method is introduced to certify the neural barrier function that perseveres barrier conditions, which is more compatible with online implementation. The proposed framework synthesizes a stabilizing controller that satisfies predefined safety regions. The effectiveness of the proposed framework is demonstrated via several comparative case studies.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2007

Cockpit Technology for Prevention of General Aviation Runway Incursions

General aviation accounted for 74 percent of runway incursions but only 57 percent of the operations during the four-year period from fiscal year (FY) 2001 through FY2004. Elements of the NASA Runway Incursion Prevention System were adapted and tested for general aviation aircraft. Sixteen General Aviation pilots, of varying levels of certification and amount of experience, participated in a piloted simulation study to evaluate the system for prevention of general aviation runway incursions compared to existing moving map displays. Pilots flew numerous complex, high workload approaches under varying weather and visibility conditions. A rare-event runway incursion scenario was presented, unbeknownst to the pilots, which represented a typical runway incursion situation. The results validated the efficacy and safety need for a runway incursion prevention system for general aviation aircraft.

Prinzel, Lawrence J., III↗
NASA NTRS2010

Certification

Objective 1: Provide regulators with a methodology for development of airworthiness requirements for certification of UAS. a) Rationale: a comprehensive methodology does not currently exist to support development of regulation for certification of UAS. Regulation is essential to enable routine access to the NAS. b) Approach: 1) assess existing approaches and classification schemes for deriving acceptable means of compliance to airworthiness requirements. 2) investigate a service-based approach to classification of UAS. 3) conduct comparative analysis of different methodologies. 4) work with FAA to determine best approach and conduct case study. 5) participate in regulatory/standards organizations developing safety and performance requirements for UAS. Objective 2: Provide regulators and industry with hazard and risk-related data to support criteria for UAS type design. a) Rationale: There is presently little UAS specific data (incident, accident, and reliability), especially in a civil context, to support risk assessment and development of standards and regulation. b) Approach: Identify gaps in existing data, provide measured data as needed, and formulate recommendations by: 1) evaluating UAS incident/accident data collection efforts and determining additional support necessary for regulation. 2) assessing UAS-specific hazards and risks. 3) evaluating need for reliability data for UAS-unique systems, components and subsystem, and determining additional measurement requirements. 4) developing guidance and best practices for UAS type design.

Hayhurst, Kelly↗
NASA NTRS2007

Synthesis from Design Requirements of a Hybrid System for Transport Aircraft Longitudinal Control

Volume I of this report presents a new method for synthesizing hybrid systems directly from design requirements, and applies the method to design of a hybrid system for longitudinal control of transport aircraft. The resulting system satisfies general requirement for safety and effectiveness specified a priori, enabling formal validation to be achieved. Volume II contains seven appendices intended to make the report accessible to readers with backgrounds in human factors, fli ght dynamics and control. and formal logic. Major design goals are (1) system desi g n integrity based on proof of correctness at the design level, (2), significant simplification and cost reduction in system development and certification, and (3) improved operational efficiency, with significant alleviation of human-factors problems encountered by pilots in current transport aircraft. This report provides for the first time a firm technical basis for criteria governing design and certification of avionic systems for transport aircraft. It should be of primary interest to designers of next-generation avionic systems.

Hynes, Charles S.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Automatic Certification of Kalman Filters for Reliable Code Generation

AUTOFILTER is a tool for automatically deriving Kalman filter code from high-level declarative specifications of state estimation problems. It can generate code with a range of algorithmic characteristics and for several target platforms. The tool has been designed with reliability of the generated code in mind and is able to automatically certify that the code it generates is free from various error classes. Since documentation is an important part of software assurance, AUTOFILTER can also automatically generate various human-readable documents, containing both design and safety related information. We discuss how these features address software assurance standards such as DO-178B.

Denney, Ewen↗
NASA NTRS2011

Development and Certification of Ultrasonic Background Noise Test (UBNT) System for use on the International Space Station (ISS)

As a next step in the development and implementation of an on-board leak detection and localization system on the International Space Station (ISS), there is a documented need to obtain measurements of the ultrasonic background noise levels that exist within the ISS. This need is documented in the ISS Integrated Risk Management System (IRMA), Watch Item #4669. To address this, scientists and engineers from the Langley Research Center (LaRC) and the Johnson Space Center (JSC), proposed to the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) and the ISS Vehicle Office a joint assessment to develop a flight package as a Station Development Test Objective (SDTO) that would perform ultrasonic background noise measurements within the United States (US) controlled ISS structure. This document contains the results of the assessment

Prosser, William H.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Best Practices for Crash Modeling and Simulation

Aviation safety can be greatly enhanced by the expeditious use of computer simulations of crash impact. Unlike automotive impact testing, which is now routine, experimental crash tests of even small aircraft are expensive and complex due to the high cost of the aircraft and the myriad of crash impact conditions that must be considered. Ultimately, the goal is to utilize full-scale crash simulations of aircraft for design evaluation and certification. The objective of this publication is to describe "best practices" for modeling aircraft impact using explicit nonlinear dynamic finite element codes such as LS-DYNA, DYNA3D, and MSC.Dytran. Although "best practices" is somewhat relative, it is hoped that the authors' experience will help others to avoid some of the common pitfalls in modeling that are not documented in one single publication. In addition, a discussion of experimental data analysis, digital filtering, and test-analysis correlation is provided. Finally, some examples of aircraft crash simulations are described in several appendices following the main report.

Fasanella, Edwin L.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Explicate '78: Uncovering the Implicit Assurance Case in DO-178C

For about two decades, compliance with Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification (DO-178B/ED-12B) has been the primary means for receiving regulatory approval for using software on commercial airplanes. A new edition of the standard, DO-178C/ED-12C, was published in December 2011, and recognized by regulatory bodies in 2013. The purpose remains unchanged: to provide guidance 'for the production of software for airborne systems and equipment that performs its intended function with a level of confidence in safety that complies with airworthiness requirements.' The text of the guidance does not directly explain how its collection of objectives contributes to achieving this purpose; thus, the assurance case for the document is implicit. This paper presents an explicit assurance case developed as part of research jointly sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Holloway, C. Michael↗
NASA NTRS2015

Argument-Based Airworthiness Assurance of Small UAS

Presently, there are three avenues by which Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations are authorized in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS): obtaining either (i) a certificate of authorization (COA), or (ii) a special airworthiness certificate (SAC) in either the experimental, or the restricted category, or (iii) an exemption from an airworthiness certificate together with a civil COA. The first is meant primarily for public entities, such as NASA; the remaining two are the only available means for civil UAS operations. Recently, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has also proposed a regulatory framework targeted for certain small UAS, specifically those weighing 55 pounds or less, although final rulemaking remains pending. We have previously shown how an assurance case can aggregate heterogeneous reasoning and safety evidence, with application to UAS safety. In this paper, we describe how assurance cases can serve as a common framework to justify overall system safety, unifying both operational aspects and airworthiness, in particular system design assurance. We also show how this approach can coexist with, and augment, existing safety analysis processes and best-practices, by transforming the artifacts they produce into structured assurance arguments. To illustrate the applicability and utility of our approach, we have been applying it for the design assurance of an unmanned rotorcraft system, intended for precision agriculture operations, as part of the NASA Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project.

Rotocraft↗
NASA NTRS2002

Synthesizing Certified Code

Code certification is a lightweight approach to demonstrate software quality on a formal level. Its basic idea is to require producers to provide formal proofs that their code satisfies certain quality properties. These proofs serve as certificates which can be checked independently. Since code certification uses the same underlying technology as program verification, it also requires many detailed annotations (e.g., loop invariants) to make the proofs possible. However, manually adding theses annotations to the code is time-consuming and error-prone. We address this problem by combining code certification with automatic program synthesis. We propose an approach to generate simultaneously, from a high-level specification, code and all annotations required to certify generated code. Here, we describe a certification extension of AUTOBAYES, a synthesis tool which automatically generates complex data analysis programs from compact specifications. AUTOBAYES contains sufficient high-level domain knowledge to generate detailed annotations. This allows us to use a general-purpose verification condition generator to produce a set of proof obligations in first-order logic. The obligations are then discharged using the automated theorem E-SETHEO. We demonstrate our approach by certifying operator safety for a generated iterative data classification program without manual annotation of the code.

Whalen, Michael↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assuring Safety-Critical Machine Learning Enabled Systems: Challenges and Promise

Machine learning is increasingly being used in safety-critical systems, where the public safety requires a rigorous assurance process. We shall outline how assurance processes work for conventional systems and identify the primary difficulty in applying them to machine learning enabled systems. We will then outline a path forward including identifying where considerable basic research remains.

machine learning↗