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Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Cardea: Providing Support for Dynamic Resource Access in a Distributed Computing Environment

The environment framing the modem authorization process span domains of administration, relies on many different authentication sources, and manages complex attributes as part of the authorization process. Cardea facilitates dynamic access control within this environment as a central function of an inter-operable authorization framework. The system departs from the traditional authorization model by separating the authentication and authorization processes, distributing the responsibility for authorization data and allowing collaborating domains to retain control over their implementation mechanisms. Critical features of the system architecture and its handling of the authorization process differentiate the system from existing authorization components by addressing common needs not adequately addressed by existing systems. Continuing system research seeks to enhance the implementation of the current authorization model employed in Cardea, increase the robustness of current features, further the framework for establishing trust and promote interoperability with existing security mechanisms.

Lepro, Rebekah↗

Sensored fiber reinforced polymer grate

Various technologies described herein pertain to a sensored grate that can be utilized for various security fencing applications. The sensored grate includes a grate framework and an embedded optical fiber. The grate framework is formed of a molded polymer such as, for instance, molded fiber reinforced polymer. Further, the grate framework includes a set of elongated elements, where the elongated elements are spaced to define apertures through the grate framework. The optical fiber is embedded in the elongated elements of the grate framework. Moreover, bending or breaking of one or more of the elongated elements can be detected based on a change in a characteristic of input light provided to the optical fiber compared to output light received from the optical fiber.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Integrating Cybersecurity with System Operations and Restoration

This presentation covers the interaction of the discipline of system operations with the discipline of cybersecurity. First is discussion of a number of fundamental concepts for system operators - organizational division of responsibilities, human and machine cooperation, goals, and priorities. The next section covers the importance of cybersecurity for a system operator organization and explains different risk management approaches based on the consequence and frequency of events. Finally the role of system operators in the security of the grid categorized by the NIST Cybersecurity Framework is discussed to present recommendations and ideas for future work.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Major Achievements of the Springfields Decommissioning Program - 16512

Since the 1940's, Springfields has manufactured fuel products for the UK's nuclear power stations and for international customers. The early operations were in support of the atomic weapons program, closely followed by fuel manufacture for electricity generation via the Magnox power stations commencing in the late 1950's. In 2005, responsibility for the assets and liabilities of Springfields was transferred to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). A new company, Springfields Fuels Limited, was created to run the site, which was managed and operated by Westinghouse Electric UK Ltd on the NDA's behalf. On April 1, 2010, Westinghouse entered into an agreement with the NDA for a long-term lease of the Springfields site, which transferred responsibility for the commercial fuel manufacturing business and Springfields Fuels Limited to Westinghouse. Today, the main Springfields activities include: - Oxide fuels for Advanced Gas-cooled and Light Water Reactors, as well as intermediate fuel products, such as powders, granules and pellets, - Manufacture of Uranium Hexafluoride (now in Care and Maintenance), - Processing and recovery of Uranium residues, - Decommissioning and demolition of redundant plants and buildings. Some 120 plant buildings and support facilities have been successfully decommissioned and demolished in the period 1996 to date. These range from 1940's buildings, subsequently converted for nuclear fuel manufacture, together with some of the formerly sealed chemical agent manufacture and storage facilities. Decommissioning of the now redundant Magnox manufacturing facilities is ongoing at Springfields without compromising the other site operations. Westinghouse is managing all activities related to the whole lifecycle, planning, design, safety case, radiation protection, Post Operational Clean Out (POCO), service diversions, characterization, decommissioning all phases through to ground remediation, waste disposal and agreed end states. Decommissioning of process plants starts with the removal of the majority of radiological activity or hazard contained within the plant. This is known as Post Operational Clean Out. Once this is complete, the plant may be dismantled. Work is scoped and defined within packages (at plant or cell level) to aid control and commercial monitoring as the decommissioning is progressed. This package approach also enables clean or lightly contaminated items to be removed separately to aid potential re-cycling and minimize decontamination and waste disposal costs. Westinghouse is further optimising work package delivery by planning parallel POCO and Decommissioning work phases within plant at a cell level to systematically remove redundant plant and reduce hazard earlier, whilst optimising use of both internal and external resources to reduce total project cost. Waste and Residues from all phases are disposed of via authorized disposal routes and in accordance with our environmental authorizations. On completion of decommissioning and removal of plant and equipment the building is re-assessed radiologically, categorized and appropriate remediation work progressed to render it safe for conventional demolition. The major elements of the success achieved to date can be attributed to the following elements: - Overall programme management with extensive experience of planning, cost, and risk management. Integration of the programme within a major commercial site without compromising safety or operations. - Complete site EHS management working within a complex regulatory framework including the Nuclear Site Licenses, Environmental Authorisations and Security requirements. - Avoiding safety complacency by use of rigorous and systematic process to emphasise safety over competing goals. Including structured use of Human Performance and Corrective Action and Learning processes. - Unique safety experiences attained through complex hazard reduction across a broad range of uranium manufacturing and chemical hazard/agent facilities. - Project leadership and excellence utilizing a core site team to deploy repeatable processes and safe practices to deliver complex scope within budget and schedule. - Optimised use of internal and external resources, with extensive use of Operating Experience to drive continuous improvement and problem resolution. - Management of Contractors from initial selection, pre-qualification, tender assessment and Performance using varied contract forms across delivery phases. - Use of Westinghouse expertise for safety case, waste management, uranium recovery, health physics and design. - Implementation of a work package to ensure gated discreet manageable packages. Underpinned by package specific method statements, with appropriate hold points to maintain management and control of the works. - Continuous local safety focus via safety planning, induction, plant specific training, proactive risk assessment, and a defined approach to decoupling operating plant safety cases enabling focussed and usable documentation. This paper will provide an overview of the latest decommissioning activities achieved on the Springfields site and will focus on best practices that allowed Westinghouse to maintain the program on time and on budget. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Experimental Guesswork with Quantum Side Information Using Twisted Light

Guesswork is an information–theoretic quantity which can be seen as an alternate security criterion to entropy. Recent work has established the theoretical framework for guesswork in the presence of quantum side information, which we extend both theoretically and experimentally. We consider guesswork when the side information consists of the BB84 states and their higher-dimensional generalizations. With this side information, we compute the guesswork for two different scenarios for each dimension. We then performed a proof-of-principle experiment using Laguerre–Gauss modes to experimentally compute the guesswork for higher-dimensional generalizations of the BB84 states. We find that our experimental results agree closely with our theoretical predictions. This work shows that guesswork can be a viable security criterion in cryptographic tasks and is experimentally accessible in a number of optical setups.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Application of DLT cybersecurity stack to TES applications for a scalable, cybersecure, and interoperable future

Transactive Energy Systems (TES) are expected to improve upon existing grid operations and capabilities by enabling the integration of traditional grid resources with distributed energy resources (DER). Distributed Ledger Technology or DLT (e.g., blockchain) presents itself as a viable instrument to support decentralized, autonomous, and tamper-evident applications, which can be leveraged within TES's ecosystem. DLTs can provide pertinent security controls including access controls, data immutability, and traceability in addition to other well-known advantages such as decentralization and scalability. This work demonstrates the DLT Cybersecurity stack and its applicability to TES-based use-cases/applications. The seven-layer DLT cybersecurity stack is a DLT-agnostic framework that can quickly be used to classify and group the individual needs of an application into the different processing and cybersecurity layers offered by a DLT using a common taxonomy and an architectural mapping framework. This enables application engineers to demystify and strengthen the overall security aspects of their systems while maintaining an open perspective towards features and drawbacks that may hinder their performance in real-world scenarios. The paper leverages the work performed by the IEEE P2418.5 - Blockchain for Energy Standards working group.

Blockchain, blockchain interoperability, Cybersecu↗

Probabilistic Sizing of Energy Storage Systems for Reliability and Frequency Security in Wind-Rich Power Grids

The penetration of wind energy has increased significantly in the power grid in recent times. Although wind is abundant, environment-friendly, and cheap, it is variable in nature and does not contribute to system inertia as much as conventional synchronous generators. Coupled with the low inertia contribution, the generation intermittency of wind power leads to reliability and stability issues in the power system. Energy storage systems (ESSs) are among the most prominent alternatives to alleviate these concerns associated with high wind penetration. This paper proposes a planning strategy to size ESS for the reliability and frequency security of wind-rich power grids. A probabilistic methodology for ESS sizing is developed utilizing a composite reliability-based framework with sequential Monte Carlo simulation (MCS). The MCS generates composite reliability indices for the power system, which are employed to obtain the capacity for a reliability energy storage system (RESS). Simultaneously, the MCS-derived probability of synchronization of conventional generators is integrated into an analytical approach for sizing a frequency support energy storage system (FESS). The effect of wind farm dispersion across geographical regions is incorporated in the framework to study possible reductions in the ESS size while maintaining the system reliability and frequency security. Furthermore, the efficacy of the proposed strategy is demonstrated on the RTS-GMLC test system.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Bio-Inspired Cyber Security for Smart Grid Deployments

mart grid technologies are transforming the electric power grid into a grid with bi-directional flows of both power and information. Operating millions of new smart meters and smart appliances will significantly impact electric distribution systems resulting in greater efficiency. However, the scale of the grid and the new types of information transmitted will potentially introduce several security risks that cannot be addressed by traditional, centralized security techniques. We propose a new bio-inspired cyber security approach. Social insects, such as ants and bees, have developed complex-adaptive systems that emerge from the collective application of simple, light-weight behaviors. The Digital Ants framework is a bio-inspired framework that uses mobile light-weight agents. Sensors within the framework use digital pheromones to communicate with each other and to alert each other of possible cyber security issues. All communication and coordination is both localized and decentralized thereby allowing the framework to scale across the large numbers of devices that will exist in the smart grid. Furthermore, the sensors are light-weight and therefore suitable for implementation on devices with limited computational resources. This paper will provide a brief overview of the Digital Ants framework and then present results from test bed-based demonstrations that show that Digital Ants can identify a cyber attack scenario against smart meter deployments.

McKinnon, Archibald D.↗

Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The medical science DMZ: a network design pattern for data-intensive medical science

Abstract Objective We describe a detailed solution for maintaining high-capacity, data-intensive network flows (eg, 10, 40, 100 Gbps+) in a scientific, medical context while still adhering to security and privacy laws and regulations. Materials and Methods High-end networking, packet-filter firewalls, network intrusion-detection systems. Results We describe a “Medical Science DMZ” concept as an option for secure, high-volume transport of large, sensitive datasets between research institutions over national research networks, and give 3 detailed descriptions of implemented Medical Science DMZs. Discussion The exponentially increasing amounts of “omics” data, high-quality imaging, and other rapidly growing clinical datasets have resulted in the rise of biomedical research “Big Data.” The storage, analysis, and network resources required to process these data and integrate them into patient diagnoses and treatments have grown to scales that strain the capabilities of academic health centers. Some data are not generated locally and cannot be sustained locally, and shared data repositories such as those provided by the National Library of Medicine, the National Cancer Institute, and international partners such as the European Bioinformatics Institute are rapidly growing. The ability to store and compute using these data must therefore be addressed by a combination of local, national, and industry resources that exchange large datasets. Maintaining data-intensive flows that comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and other regulations presents a new challenge for biomedical research. We describe a strategy that marries performance and security by borrowing from and redefining the concept of a Science DMZ, a framework that is used in physical sciences and engineering research to manage high-capacity data flows. Conclusion By implementing a Medical Science DMZ architecture, biomedical researchers can leverage the scale provided by high-performance computer and cloud storage facilities and national high-speed research networks while preserving privacy and meeting regulatory requirements.

Peisert, Sean↗

A New Remote Communications Link to Reduce Residential PV Solar Costs

Monitoring of PV/DER site production is expensive to install and unreliable. Among third party systems providers, lost communications links are a growing concern. Nearly 20% of links are failing, provisioning is complex, recovery is expensive, production data is lost, and access is fragmented. FleetLink is a new concept in DER system communications, purpose built for lowering the cost of maintaining active contact with residential end user sites and ensuring that production data is reliably available to third party systems providers. Systems providers require accurate, secure system monitoring and reporting of production data and system faults while driving down overall costs to compete effectively. This plug and play, independently operating communications solution lowers the cost of fleet contact from typically .08 dollars-$.12/W down to .02 dollars -.03/W including installation and maintenance expenses. FleetLink establishes a breakthrough in simplicity that facilitates rapid expansion of residential solar by reducing initial capital outlay and lowering installation labor time and skill levels. The solution also facilitates higher DER installation growth rates by driving down maintenance costs and eliminating communications trouble calls. This is accomplished by the FleetLink’s unique network technology that enables dynamic network configuration for fast changes, and active, self-healing DER site contact for uptime assurance. Using an open source network framework with proprietary, application specific enhancements, FleetLink independently manages connectivity, security, recovery, grid control communications, and fleet expansion while presenting a compliant SunSpec interface to the third party operations centers. The net system cost savings of at least .05 dollars/W supports the SunShot cost goals and the flexibility and scalability of the solution accelerates the velocity and ubiquitous adoption of solar.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Data-Centric Communication Framework for Multicast IEC 61850 Routable GOOSE Messages over the WAN in Modern Power Systems

In this paper, a data-centric communication framework is proposed for multicast routable generic object-oriented substation event (GOOSE) messages (MRGM) over the wide area network (WAN) for effective substation-to-substation (SS2SS) and substation to control center (SS2CC) communications. In this structure, the IEC 61850 GOOSE message is transmitted over the WAN using the data distribution service (DDS) as a fast, reliable, and secure data-centric communication middleware. The main feature of this framework is its multicast capability, where several authorized subscribers can receive a published message simultaneously. This can significantly improve the system monitoring and control of the protection systems in modern smart grids, where intelligent schemes can be applied. The effectiveness of the proposed platform, in terms of total end-to-end delay between participants, is evaluated through experimental results obtained from the actual hardware-based test setup developed at the Florida International University (FIU) smart grid testbed. The results demonstrate that the latency between sending and receiving a GOOSE message among participants is within its maximum time span defined by the IEC 61850-90-5 working group for communications over the WAN.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Multilateral, regional and bilateral energy trade governance

The current international energy trade governance system is fragmented and multi-layered. Streamlining it for greater legal cohesiveness and international political and economic cooperation would promote global energy security. The current article explores three levels of energy trade governance: multilateral, regional and bilateral. Most energy-rich countries are part of the multilateral trading system, which is institutionalized by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The article analyzes the multilateral energy trade governance system by focusing on the WTO and energy transportation issues. Regionally, the article focuses on five major regional agreements and their energy-related aspects and examines the various causes that explain the proliferation of regional trade agreements, their compatibility with WTO law, and then provides several examples of regional energy trade governance throughout the world. When it comes to bilateral energy trade governance, this article only addresses the European Union’s (EU) bilateral energy trade relations. The article explores ways in which gaps could be filled and overlaps eliminated whilst remaining true to the high-level normative framework, concentrating on those measures that would enhance EU energy security.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Food security under high bioenergy demand toward long-term climate goals

Bioenergy is expected to play an important role in the achievement of stringent climate-change mitigation targets requiring the application of negative emissions technology. Using a multi-model framework, we assess the effects of high bioenergy demand on global food production, food security, and competition for agricultural land. Various scenarios simulate global bioenergy demands of 100, 200, 300, and 400 exajoules (EJ) by 2100, with and without a carbon price. Six global energy-economy-agriculture models contribute to this study, with different methodologies and technologies used for bioenergy supply and greenhouse-gas mitigation options for agriculture. We find that the large-scale use of bioenergy, if not implemented properly, would raise food prices and increase the number of people at risk of hunger in many areas of the world. For example, an increase in global bioenergy demand from 200 to 300 EJ causes a -11% to +40% change in food crop prices and decreases food consumption from -45 to -2 kcal person -1 day -1 , leading to an additional 0 to 25 million people at risk of hunger compared with the case of no bioenergy demand (90th percentile range across models). This risk does not rule out the intensive use of bioenergy but shows the importance of its careful implementation, potentially including regulations that protect cropland for food production or for the use of bioenergy feedstock on land that is not competitive with food production.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗