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At least 361 records · Page 20

Protecting drinking water utilities from cyberthreats

Cyber-security challenges have the potential for becoming one of the defining issues of our time. Cyber-attacks have become an ever-increasing threat and the United States (US) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) now ranks cyber-crime as one of its most important law enforcement activities. In addition to the general problems associated with cyber-crime, critical infrastructure (CI) related to energy production, manufacturing, water supply and other systems have come under attack. For example, drinking water utilities are increasingly incorporating computer technology into their routine operations and are therefore increasingly vulnerable to cyber- threats. Systems control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems used to manage automated physical processes essential to water treatment and distribution systems have become standard in medium to large drinking water utilities and in many small water systems. However, even with the application of standard information technology cybersecurity best practices these types of systems have proven to be vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In 2015, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responded to 25 cybersecurity incidents in the Water Sector and to 46 incidents in the Energy Sector. Comparatively, between 2014 and 2015, the reported number of Water Sector incidents actually increased by 78.6% (from 14 to 25). The DHS is in a collaborative partnership with the US Environmental Protection Agency to ensure cybersecurity in the Water Sector. As a result of this partnership a number of guidance documents and techniques have been developed to counter cyber-attacks and minimize cyber vulnerability. These approaches are documented along with a summary of common vulnerabilities. However, a new approach which has great promise in protecting drinking water systems against hacking and cyber-attacks, based on the concept of unidirectional gateways, is presented and discussed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering (CCE)

The Idaho National Lab (INL) is leading a high-impact, national security-level initiative to reprioritize the way the nation looks at high-consequence risk within the industrial control systems (ICS) environment of the country’s most critical infrastructure and other national assets. The Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) effort provides both private and public organizations with the steps required to examine their own environments for high-impact events/risks; identify implementation of key devices and components that facilitate that risk; illuminate specific, plausible cyber attack paths to manipulate these devices; and develop concrete mitigations, protections, and tripwires to address the high-consequence risk. The ultimate goal of the CCE effort is to help organizations take the steps necessary to thwart cyber attacks from even top-tier, highly resourced adversaries that would result in a catastrophic physical effect. CCE participants are encouraged to work collaboratively with each other and with key U.S. Government (USG) contributors to establish a coalition, maximizing the positive effect of lessons-learned and further contributing to the protection of critical infrastructure and other national assets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Towards generic memory forensic framework for programmable logic controllers

A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a microprocessor-based controller that is used to automate physical processes in critical infrastructure and various other industries and manufacturing sectors. Initially, PLCs were completely isolated from the Internet, and cyber security was not incorporated at the time of development. The introduction of industry 4.0 and the evolution of ICS systems to communicate over public IP addresses from the Internet enhanced productivity and efficiency, but Internet connectivity exposed the systems and their vulnerabilities, which led to an increase in cyber attacks. When a system is sabotaged/compromised, security analysts need to get to the root cause of the attack as quickly as possible to recover the system. To do so, memory forensic analysis is critical to provide a unique insight into the run-time memory activities and extract a reliable source of evidence. In this paper, we analyze the memory structure of the Schneider Electric Modicon M221 PLC. To build a memory profile, we reverse engineer the communication protocol and conduct differential analysis to gain knowledge about the structure of the memory and the low-level representation of control logic instructions. We then identify dynamic and static memory regions by modifying different project fields and conducting differential analysis, which allows us to identify boundaries of critical memory structures and extract important forensic artifacts that can be found in the memory. The Python implementation of the memory profile can help reduce the time and effort required for manual analysis in case of cyber incident or system failure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

National SCADA Test Bed Substation Automation Evaluation Report

Increased awareness of the potential for cyber attack has recently resulted in improved cyber security practices associated with the electrical power grid. However, the level of practical understanding and deployment of cyber security practices has not been evenly applied across all business sectors. Much of the focus has been centered on information technology business centers and control rooms. This report explores the current level of substation automation, communication, and cyber security protection deployed in electrical substations throughout existing utilities in the United States. This report documents the evaluation of substation automation implementation and associated vulnerabilities. This evaluation used research conducted by Newton-Evans Research Company for some of its observations and results. The Newton Evans Report aided in the determination of what is the state of substation automation in North American electric utilities. Idaho National Laboratory cyber security experts aided in the determination of what cyber vulnerabilities may pose a threat to electrical substations. This report includes cyber vulnerabilities as well as recommended mitigations. It also describes specific cyber issues found in typical substation automation configurations within the electric utility industry. The evaluation report was performed over a 5-month period starting in October 2008

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber–Physical System Security of Distribution Systems

The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) for control and monitoring of power systems is a layer on top of the physical power system infrastructure. The cyber system and physical power system components form a tightly coupled Cyber–Physical System (CPS). Sources of vulnerabilities arise from the computing and communication systems of the cyber–power grid. Cyber intrusions targeting the power grid are serious threats to the reliability of electricity supply that is critical to society and the economy. In a typical Information Technology environment, numerous attack scenarios have shown how unauthorized users can access and manipulate protected information from a network domain. The need for cyber security has led to industry standards that power grids must meet to ensure that the monitoring, operation, and control functions are not disrupted by cyber intrusions. Cyber security technologies such as encryption and authentication have been deployed on the CPS. Intrusion or anomaly detection and mitigation tools developed for power grids are emerging. Furthermore, this survey paper provides the basic concepts of cyber vulnerabilities of distribution systems and CPS security. The important ICT subjects for distribution systems covered in this paper include Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, Distributed Energy Resources, including renewable energy and smart meters.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Review on Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities for Urban Air Mobility

Recent developments of high-powered unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have allowed for urban air mobility (UAM) to become a reality. While the propulsive technology of these flying cars has almost reached an economic level, the infrastructure to allow for these vehicles to operate in an urban environment is still lacking. With numerous known vulnerabilities in UAVs and commercial aircraft, manufacturers have not addressed cybersecurity in the scope of urban air mobility. This paper presents a review of several known cybersecurity vulnerabilities and previous attacks associated with the core communication systems of UAVs and aircraft. Analyzing current solutions to each threat and incorporating early concepts for UAM, this paper then presents a basic framework featuring a blockchain-based PKI with secondary navigation systems to allow for the development of secure airspace.

Urban Air Mobility↗

Cybersecurity and Optimization in Smart “Autonomous” Buildings

Significant resources have been invested in making buildings “smart” by digitizing, networking and automating key systems and operations. Smart autonomous buildings create new energy efficiency, economic and environmental opportunities. But as buildings become increasingly networked to the Internet, they can also become more vulnerable to various cyber threats. Automated and Internet-connected buildings systems, equipment, controls, and sensors can significantly increase cyber and physical vulnerabilities that threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical systems in organizations. Securing smart autonomous buildings presents a national security and economic challenge to the nation. Ignoring this challenge threatens business continuity and the availability of critical infrastructures that are enabled by smart buildings. In this chapter, the authors address challenges and explore new opportunities in securing smart buildings that are enhanced by machine learning, cognitive sensing, artificial intelligence (AI) and smart-energy technologies. The chapter begins by identifying cyber-threats and challenges to smart autonomous buildings. Then it provides recommendations on how AI enabled solutions can help smart buildings and facilities better protect, detect and respond to cyber-physical threats and vulnerabilities. Next, the chapter will provide case studies that examine how combining AI with innovative smart-energy technologies can increase both cybersecurity and energy efficiency savings in buildings. The chapter will conclude by proposing recommendations for future cybersecurity and energy optimization research for examining AI enabled smart-energy technology.

Mylrea, Michael E.↗

Geothermal Sector Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment

A review of geothermal sector-specific cybersecurity vulnerabilities and risks (consequences) was conducted at the request of the Geothermal Technologies Office (GTO). The vulnerabilities and risks reviewed in this study have relevance to achieving the 2019 GeoVision Report (DOE GTO 2019) technological advancements and expected sector growth. The study offers areas for consideration but does not quantify the likelihood (frequency) of the consequences. This cybersecurity analysis project represents a proactive effort to identify areas to enhance cybersecurity in geothermal development and operations. It was not initiated to address any immediate threat or specific known risk. Of the eight identified vulnerabilities analyzed, the review identified reservoir data system monitoring as one that is unique to geothermal systems and may warrant further investigation to better understand risk and mitigation. A detailed analysis of the other vulnerabilities may highlight additional uniqueness relative to other industries. Further research actions are recommended to better quantify risk and enhance cybersecurity preparedness of the sector. As the geothermal industry grows, the cybersecurity strategies to be deployed will be of increasing importance to ensure resilient, reliable, and secure clean energy for years to come.

cyber-physical security↗

Achieving Runtime State Verification Assurance in Critical Cyber-Physical Infrastructures

Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) are an essential backbone of national critical infrastructures. They help monitor and control crucial cyber-enabled services such as energy generation. Commonly ICPS monitors the physical process through Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The SCADA ecosystem takes critical real-time and future system operational decisions based on the runtime state behavior of field sensors. Traditional SCADA systems use legacy and insecure communication protocols such as the Modbus protocol that lack adequate security mechanisms to provide robust runtime state behavior assurance of constrained field sensors. Therefore, constrained field sensors are commonly vulnerable to standard semantic attacks that gradually change the behavior state of infected devices. This paper discusses process integrity assurance techniques necessary to enhance the security of behavior-based protocols such as the Modbus protocol. The Runtime State Verification (RSV) protocol proposed in this paper aims to address semantic attacks in the SCADA ecosystem by integrating behavior-based Mandatory Results Automata (MRA) and a Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) network. The RSV protocol provides high process integrity assurance through enhanced behavior-based MRA suitable for the constrained field devices. A proof of concept of the RSV protocol has been evaluated in an emulated water-tube boiler. Preliminary evaluations of the RSV protocol aimed to measure the efficiency of the proposed protocol by monitoring an Combustion Efficiency (CE) process necessary to preserve optimal combustion, thus minimizing costs and future maintenance of water-tube boilers. We analyze the overall network overhead and latency of the proposed RSV protocol by evaluating the HLF network performance and comparing the proposed RSV protocol with the state-ofart BloSPAI protocol. Through the preliminary evaluations of the proposed RSV protocol, this paper demonstrates that the proposed RSV protocol overcomes the shortcomings and network overhead of the BloSPAI protocol by integrating behavior-based authentication through novel MRAs and HLF networks.

Rivera, Abel Gomez↗

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

BioSecure Digital Twin: Manufacturing Innovation and Cybersecurity Resilience

U.S. national security, prosperity, economy, and well-being require secure, flexible, and resilient Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing. The COVID-19 pandemic reaffirmed that the biomedical production value-chain is vulnerable to disruption and has been under attack from sophisticated nation-state adversaries. Current cyber defenses are inadequate, and the integrity of critical production systems and processes are inherently vulnerable to cyber-attacks, human error, and supply chain disruptions. The following chapter explores how a BioSecure Digital Twin will improve U.S. manufacturing resilience and preparedness to respond to these hazards by significantly improving monitoring, integrity, security, and agility of our manufacturing infrastructure and systems. The BioSecure Digital Twin combines a scalable manufacturing framework with a robust platform for monitoring and control to increase U.S. biopharma manufacturing resilience. Then, the chapter discusses some of the inherent vulnerabilities and challenges at the nexus of health and advanced manufacturing. Next, the chapter highlights that as the Pandemic evolves, we need agility and resilience to overcome significant obstacles. This section highlights an innovative application of Cyber Informed Engineering to developing and deploying a BioSecure Digital Twin to improve the resilience and security of the biopharma industrial supply chain and production processes. Finally, the chapter concludes with a process framework to complement the Digital Twin platform, called the Biopharma (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) OODA Loop Framework (BOLF), a four-step approach to decision-making outputs from the Digital Twin. The BOLF will help end users leverage twin technology by distilling the available information, focusing the data on context, and rapidly making the best decision while remaining cognizant of changes that can be made as more data becomes available.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Automated Programmable Logic Controller Memory Forensics Using RGB Image Analysis and Deep Learning

The introduction of Industry 4.0 and Internet-based technologies has enhanced industrial control system operations but have inadvertently increased their vulnerabilities to cyber attacks. When an industrial control system is compromised, security analysts need to identify the root cause quickly to start the recovery process and develop mitigation strategies. Memory forensics is critical in the incident analysis process to ascertain what occurred. Approaches for analyzing the persistent memory in industrial control devices are limited and almost nonexistent for volatile memory. This chapter proposes an automated methodology for programmable logic controller memory dump analysis using computer vision and deep learning techniques. The methodology converts the sequences of bytes in a programmable logic controller memory dump to red-green-blue pixels and employs a deep learning model that learns the underlying patterns and features of pre-labeled forensic artifacts in images and segments them into distinct regions. The trained model is employed to automatically segment new memory images and identify forensic artifacts. Evaluation of the methodology on a Schneider Electric Modicon M221 programmable logic controller under code injection and code modification attacks demonstrates its ability to detect attack artifacts in memory dumps.

Asmar Awad, Rima [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000233407742)↗

AOI-2, A Novel Access Control Blockchain Paradigm for Cybersecure Sensor Infrastructure in Fossil Power Generation Systems

Fossil power generation systems are increasingly vulnerable to attack from both cybercriminals as well as internal threats. These vulnerabilities demand that emerging technologies such as blockchains be utilized to secure the data involved in the information flows within the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems of the fossil power generation plants. The publicly accessible blockchain protocols, although secure, are visible to everyone. Even private blockchains currently are unable to support different levels of access to different participants, which is a critical requirement for the existing SCADA systems running the power plants. In light of the above, novel blockchain protocols that are specifically adapted to fossil power generation environments need to be developed in order to achieve the goal of cybersecure sensor networks. In this work, we address this question by creating a novel blockchain technology, namely smart private ledger, for cybersecure communication within the fossil power generation systems. A lab-scale sensor network consisting of strain and temperature sensors is constructed to develop the ledger. The technology has hierarchical access control which is compatible with the existing SCADA systems in fossil power plants. The sensor data is used with cryptographic digital signatures and secret sharing protocols within the nodes of the blockchain technology. The research results will lead to cybersecurity for machine-to-machine interactions, infrastructure for secure data logging for sensors, decentralized data storage, and second-layer technologies for high volume machine-to-machine interactions in the power plants. The work aims to largely address the concerns for the security of distributed sensor networks in such systems that can be compromised by insider threats and by cybercriminals. The research has led to the training of the next generation of engineers and scientists in the important areas of sensor engineering and blockchain technology.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Dynamic Risk-Aware Patch Scheduling

A program that defines and assesses the dynamic risk of software vulnerabilities and considers the dynamic risks into patch scheduling to reduce security risks posed by vulner­abilities and provide formal guidance to security operations at various organizations.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Emerging Threats in Transportation Security Related to Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)

Transport of high-consequence shipments requires a resilient and robust systems of systems to guarantee cargo arrival. Furthermore, rising adoption of technologies such as connected and automated vehicles (CAVs), intelligent infrastructure, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication presents unique challenges for securing transportation systems. Within these Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), several additional vulnerabilities exist that create pathways for adversarial attacks and cargo interception. For example, connectivity provides cyber pathways directly into vehicle systems and infrastructure for malicious actors. Furthermore, advanced vehicle automation exposes additional vehicle control necessary for shipment interception otherwise unavailable to adversaries. Within this paper, we will discuss the specific threats introduced by ITS-enabled technologies currently deployed and in development. These include those mentioned related to connectivity and automation, but will be expanded into grid, infrastructure, and vehicle specific threats. In addition, we will discuss how to potentially mitigate these emerging challenges as well as how to safeguard transportation systems from next generation attacks.

Cook, Adian [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000160825395)↗

Methodology Development for Cybersecurity Robustness and Vulnerability Assessment of University Research Reactors

In 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) formed a working group in collaboration with the Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR) group to review cyber security programs at US nuclear nonpower reactor (NPR) facilities. Following their review of cyber security at four different university NPR (i.e. university research reactor (URR)) facilities, the NRC staff made recommendations for improvements at URR including 1) augmenting the URR licensees’ understanding of the protective features provided with their physical security systems, 2) educating URR facility staff on cyber security issues, and 3) developing guidance to help the URR facilities maintain adequate cyber security going forward. This three-year project to develop and implement a cyber-security risk assessment methodology and defense-in-depth mitigation strategy for application at URR facilities provides solutions effectively addressing each of the recommendations given in the NRC review referenced above. In support of this project, cyber security documentation and guidance from the NRC, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were reviewed. Most of this documentation did not take the unique resources, configuration, and infrastructure associated with URR facilities into account. The NRC-TRTR effective practices document provides useful guidance for implementing cyber security protections at URR, but lacks a structured framework for systematically auditing facility digital control assets (DCA) and evaluating associated cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and risk. The outcomes from this project, therefore, seek to build on the general resources above by providing a straightforward DCA auditing and risk assessment methodology, as well as mitigation strategies, that may be implemented to address the risk of cyber-attack at URR facilities.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Museum security and the Thomas Crown Affair.

Over the years, I've daydreamed about stealing a Vermeer, a Picasso, or Rembrandt. It tickles me, as much as watching the reboot of The Thomas Crown Affair. Why is it, do you suppose, so much fun to think about stealing a world renowned piece off the wall of a major metropolitan museum? Is it the romantic thoughts of getting away with it, walking past infrared detectors, and pressure sensors ala Indiana Jones with the sack of sand to remove the idol without triggering the security system? Is it the idea of snatching items with such fantastic prices, where the romance of possessing an item of such value is less intoxicating than selling it to a private collector for it to never be seen again? I suspect others share my daydreams as they watch theater or hear of a brazen daylight heist at museums around the world, or from private collections. Though when reality sets in, the mind of the security professional kicks in. How could one do it, why would one do it, what should you do once it's done? The main issue a thief confronts when acquiring unique goods is how to process or fence them. They become very difficult to sell because they are one-of-a-kind, easy to identify, and could lead to the people involved with the theft. The whole issue of museum security takes up an ironic twist when one considers the secretive British street artist 'Banksy'. Banksy has made a name for himself by brazenly putting up interesting pieces of art in broad daylight (though many critics don't consider his work to be art) on building walls, rooftops, or even museums. I bring him up for a interesting take on what may become a trend in museum security. In March of 2005, Banksy snuck a piece of his called 'Vandalized Oil Painting' into the Brooklyn Museum's Great Historical Painting Wing, plus 3 other pieces into major museums in New York. Within several days, 2 paintings had been torn down, but 2 stayed up much longer. In his home country of the UK, a unauthorized piece he created and placed in the British Museum known as 'Early Man Goes to Market' received different treatment when placed inside the walls. It was adopted into the permanent collection! I like his story because it's so counter-intuitive. Who would have thought that modern museum security might involve preventing people not just from stealing art, but from sneaking 'unauthorized' art into museums? What is next, tampering with the archive records in order to make it look like the piece in question has always been there? To learn more about museum security, I interviewed multiple experts in the field. It turns out that the glamorous lifestyle of Thomas Crown is not particularly relevant. In fact, usually nobody can point to a Mr. Big of the underworld coordinating thefts, though some organized crime families have been known to use stolen art as black market chips to trade. The common consensus among experts in the field of art theft is that, instead of most high-value pieces being stolen by outsiders with a blue print in hand and rappelling from a ceiling skylight, in reality, 80 percent of art thefts involve insiders or accomplices that execute the crime over a period of time while working or volunteering in the museum. Indeed, according to FBI statistics, between 70 and 80 percent of all solved art theft cases involve insider participation of some kind, yet according to Tom Cremers of the Musuem Security Network, 'Having been involved in risk assessments in over hundreds of museums over the past ten years, it is quite astonishing how rarely the risk of insider participation is discussed.' In regards to the insider threat, a museum is not much different from any corporation or other organization. There are directors, employees, interns, and cleaning staff (very often outsourced), security guards (again outsourced, typically with very high turnover rates). Unlike corporations, most museums also have volunteer staff, docents, and authorized visiting scholars. All these people can potentially take advantage of their position, or to be exploited by a clever attacker on the outside or inside using social engineering. After discussing where museum security is headed with several people involved in the field, the consensus seems to be that it is going to be completely digital at the behest of companies designing new security products. By this I mean that nearly every security sensor and alarm is being designed so that it is compatible or adaptable to Cat 5/6 Ethernet cable. Museum security sensors are usually connected to the network infrastructure, which then gets tied back to a server monitoring the security sensors. This approach should make us feel uneasy. This is security that rides on top of technology that time and time again has proven to be highly vulnerable, and very often implemented by closed source vendors who do not release details of their code or hardware because of it being proprietary. Being proprietary is not consistent with having good security.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering for Protecting BESS

This white paper synthesizes an array of crucial grid services provided by BESS technology, assesses its architecture and communications, and presents a case study for analysis against the principles introduced by Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). Furthermore, in walking through the analysis, this paper presents a framework to evaluate risks and solutions when considering BESS components. Asset owners and buyers could perform this analysis to assess their BESS product implementations, alternative inverter-based resources (IBR), and energy management systems (EMS). Battery systems fulfill various roles contingent on the unique market demands and the specific challenges presented by regional grid infrastructures. These roles also vary due to the differing utility models for ownership and operation, which are adapted to meet regional and local capabilities and requirements. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for adversaries to exploit knowledge of battery operational patterns to orchestrate decisive attacks. However, the security of operational data for these systems may not be the primary vulnerability, as much of this information is already well-understood within the community. Applying a modest degree of subject matter expertise can often yield valuable predictions regarding how a battery will respond under certain conditions, such as grid emergencies, high or low-temperature days, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, and outages. The operational characteristics of batteries are well-documented, and their capabilities, including the risks associated with misoperation and the resulting consequences, are published and understood within the industry. CIE practices represent the next step in gaining functional assurance and providing an acceptable level of risk, regardless of whether a battery vendor can support a trusted and validated supply chain. While this issue has exacerbated supply chain challenges, it is not an isolated condition. This foreign supply route is the primary source of BESS for the U.S. market. Significant efforts are underway through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) to change that. Still, strategic short-term operational mitigations are needed to ensure the security of our operational technology (OT) systems, which are enhanced by instilling trust and are separate from vendors implementing CIE principles.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗