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NASA NTRS1994

Safety concerns for first entry operations of orbiting spacecraft

The Space Station Freedom crew will face operational problems unique to the spacecraft environment due to the absence of convection currents and the confined atmosphere within the habitable modules. Airborne contaminants from the materials offgassing or contingency incidents like thermodegradation may accumulate until they reach hazardous concentrations. Flow modeling and experiences from previous space flight missions confirm that caution must be exercised during first-entry operations. A review of the first-entry procedures performed during the Skylab Program will be presented to highlight the necessity for carefully planned operations. Many of the environmental conditions that can be expected on the Space Station are analogous to those which exist in confined storage or work spaces in the industrial setting. Experience with closed-loop environmental operations (e.g., atmospheric control of submarines) have also demonstrated that the buildup of trace contaminant gases could result in conditions that lead to mission termination or loss of crew. Consequently, some first-entry issues for the Station can be addressed by comparing them to familiar techniques developed on Earth. The instruments of the Environmental Health System (EHS) will provide the necessary monitoring capability to protect crew health and safety during the planned first-entry procedures of the MTC phase of the SSF Program. The authors of this paper will describe those procedures and will cite an example of the consequences when proper first-entry procedures are not followed.

Wilson, Steven H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Moon to Mars (M2M): Exploration Atmosphere

As humans leave the bounds of Earth to explore the lunar surface and beyond, crew will don extravehicular activity (EVA) suits to learn more about these extraterrestrial environments, establish sustained presence, and perform needed upgrades and maintenance to their space vehicle and habitation systems. Spacefaring vehicle and habitation design will need to support these EVA excursions while ensuring crew health and safety. A crucial technological design advancement towards this goal is the use of a lower pressure exploration atmosphere (EA) that enables high efficiency EVA, rather than the sea level atmosphere of 14.7 psia, 21% oxygen (O 2 ) found on the International Space Station, Shuttle, and most other Russian and Chinese space vehicles and stations. Early space vehicles (Mercury through Apollo Programs) used a 5 psia, 100% O 2 environment, which eliminated the need for pre-EVA denitrogenation protocols, simplified the life support system to a single gas, and saved structural mass. For longer duration missions (Skylab), a diluent gas was added, changing the atmosphere to 5 psia, 70-74% O 2 to prevent atelectasis while remaining normoxic. As in-flight science became a top priority, Shuttle and ISS atmospheres were chosen to operate at sea level allowing for simpler ground-based study control conditions. Consequently this led to long pre-EVA denitrogenation protocols involving up to 4 hours of O 2 prebreathe because the EVA suit still operated at a low pressure of 4.3 psid. To increase operational efficiency, the Shuttle was retroactively certified to operate using 10.2 psia, 26.5% O 2 , reducing O 2 prebreathe time to 40-75 min. Current plans for M2M habitats on the Lunar surface require EVA, thus EA recommendation became 8 psia and 32% O 2 but was revised to 8.2 psia and 34% O 2 to decrease hypoxia exposure. Unfortunately, the benefits of EA in support of safe and efficient EVAs comes with the challenge of fire management in a higher-than-normal O 2 % environment. Although known for decades, the recommended forward work to address fire management has only recently begun. Current flammability tests include examining material propagation and ignition sources as well as fire mitigation processes to better understand these properties for proposed new EA environments. Fire safety, DCS risk, and mission design all contribute to the multifaceted parameters of EA. Thus while it is clear that EA is required to achieve the goals of future exploratory space missions, final specifications are still being evaluated for optimizing crew health and safety.

space atmosphere↗
NASA NTRS1991

Assured Crew Return Vehicle

The developmental status is discussed regarding the 'lifeboat' vehicle to enhance the safety of the crew on the Space Station Freedom (SSF). NASA's Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) is intended to provide a means for returning the SSF crew to earth at all times. The 'lifeboat' philosophy is the key to managing the development of the ACRV which further depends on matrixed support and total quality management for implementation. The risk of SSF mission scenarios are related to selected ACRV mission requirements, and the system and vehicle designs are related to these precepts. Four possible ACRV configurations are mentioned including the lifting-body, Apollo shape, Discoverer shape, and a new lift-to-drag concept. The SCRAM design concept is discussed in detail with attention to the 'lifeboat' philosophy and requirements for implementation.

D A Stone↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Performance Support System to Aid in Anomaly Resolution: Concept of Operations

As missions progress into deep space, communication delays and disruptions will disenable the crew’s reliance on Earth experts. There are also limitations in the amount of data that can be downlinked to the ground. It is prudent to assume that critical, complex vehicle or habitat sub-systems will malfunction at a time when a lunar or Mars’ crew cannot rely on the Earth-Support team to detect, diagnose and resolve the problem and it is impractical to expect a small crew to step-in with the same level of expertise as 50+ authorities. The crew will need novel processes and advanced technological support to independently identify and resolve safety- and time-critical anomalies. That a self-reliant crew is unable to respond appropriately to time-critical anomalies is a significant risk to crew safety and mission success. This risk is driven by several factors; novel and unanticipated anomalies would not have been trained pre-flight, the crew could forget their pre-flight training or spaceflight stressors could impair the crew’s problem-solving ability. At last year’s IWS, Beard reported that a single spaceflight stressor (elevated CO2) could undermine the crew’s ability to independently respond to emergencies. Concept of Operations (ConOps) provide a common view of future system functions to all stakeholders. For the current project, a ConOps was developed that describes the operational processes, practices and capabilities needed by a crew of astronauts on deep space missions to autonomously respond to anticipated and unanticipated anomalies. It is crucial to recognize that, as of August 2018 existing technologies are unable to effectively support crew anomaly response to unanticipated events. “Intelligent technology” has not reached a maturity level that permits generalizing a solution to novel situations. For example, to train intelligent technology requires volumes of data that do not exist. The complexities involved in a manned mission to Mars cannot be compared to sending rovers to Mars using scripted software. This ConOps proposes a Crew Performance Support System (CPSS) that will push NASA and its industry partners toward what will be required for a safe and successful manned mission to Mars. Anomaly resolution during a deep space mission will take place within a dynamic, or changing, context. The figure to the left shows five broad contextual variables: the organizational culture, mission context, system characteristics, team characteristics and individual characteristics. The yellow arrow indicates that spaceflight and task-related stressors can affect system, team and individual crewmember characteristics and therefore anomaly response potential. The figure depicts a protective umbrella of Human-System Integration (HSI) principles that should be instituted during CPSS development including a balanced workload, shared situation awareness and building an appropriate level of trust in the automation. The figure also depicts two interrelated and cooperative components, an HSI Data System and other Enabling Capabilities will be required to support crew anomaly response and Earth-Support situation awareness. As we journey from ISS to Gateway to Mars, multiple, simultaneous and integrated research and development efforts (i.e., support systems co-evolution) must be implemented to meet the problem-solving challenges a self-reliant crew will face on a Mars’ mission. The crossovers between the capabilities are just as important as the discrete capabilities themselves. As the capabilities mature, the lines between the support subdomains will blur and an integrated system will emerge. The ConOps summarizes current knowledge about how highly trained people solve anomalies in safety- and time-critical situations, describes a group of capabilities that could help to reduce the extant risk and documents requirements levied on additional systems that provides critical inputs to the CPSS. Scenarios are used to promote a shared understanding of processes, practices and technological goals needed for safe and productive manned missions beyond LEO.

HSIA risk↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Early Assessments of Crew Timelines for the Lunar Surface Habitat

As NASA progresses towards sustained crewed space missions, crew timelines will become increasingly important to achieving mission goals. While it is desirable to spend as much time as possible during crewed space missions on science activities and experiments, there are a large number of activities that crew members must perform each day in order to maintain both crew and vehicle health and safety. The time available for science activities in space is highly dependent on mandatory tasks required for crew and vehicle health and safety. The different crewed activities need to be planned accordingly long before the start of a mission in order to optimize crew time for science. To begin assessing the potential crew time for available for science, an understanding of the requirements to maintain crew and vehicle health and safety is needed. These additional activities may include sleep, exercise, vehicle maintenance, logistics handling, crew personal time, as well as many other tasks. The remaining time outside of these required tasks, within a reasonable crew work schedule, can be dedicated to science operations. This paper will detail a collaborative effort to analyzing crew times for sustained spaceflight missions and how the results of that analysis are applied to the crew timeline for the proposed Lunar Surface Habitat (SH).To determine the crew time for all of these required activities, an analysis was conducted utilizing defined agency requirements and historical crewed mission data. Predicted crew activity times were integrated into a daily schedule in order to optimize the crew’s time during the mission. This methodology was utilized to produce expected crew timelines for NASA’s proposed Artemis Base Camp (ABC) missions. The current plans for the ABC contain two different sustained habitats, the Pressurized Rover (PR) and the Surface Habitat (SH). While the crew are separated between the two habitats, the timelines for each element are dependent on the other element’s operations, so the two element timelines are formed in conjunction with one another. The results described in this paper, however, will focus solely on the crew timeline in the SH. This paper will explain the methodology behind predicting the required crew time spent in the SH for each activity, and the process of incorporating these predicted crew times into a coherent schedule.

Crew Time↗
NASA NTRS2001

The Role of Space Medicine in Management of Risk in Spaceflight

The purpose of Space Medicine is to ensure mission success by providing quality and comprehensive health care throughout all mission phases to optimize crew health and performance and to prevent negative long-term health consequences. Space flight presents additional hazards and associated risks to crew health, performance, and safety. With an extended human presence in space it is expected that illness and injury will occur on orbit, which may present a significant threat to crew health and performance and to mission success. Maintaining crew health, safety and performance and preventing illness and injury are high priorities necessary for mission success and agency goals. Space flight health care should meet the standards of practice of evidence based clinical medicine. The function of Space Medicine is expected to meet the agency goals as stated in the 1998 NASA Strategic Plan and the priorities established by the Critical Path Roadmap Project. The Critical Path Roadmap Project is an integrated NASA cross-disciplinary strategy to assess, understand, mitigate, and manage the risks associated with long-term exposure to the space flight environment. The evidence based approach to space medicine should be standardized, objective process yielding expected results and establishing clinical practice standards while balancing individual risk with mission (programmatic) risk. The ability to methodically apply available knowledge and expertise to individual and mission health issues will ensure appropriate priorities are assigned and resources are allocated. NASA Space Medicine risk management process is a combined clinical and engineering approach. Competition for weight, power, volume, cost, and crew time must be balanced in making decisions about the care of individual crew with competing agency resources.

Clark, Jonathan B.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) Element Management Plan: Human Research Program

NASA s Human Research Program (HRP) is an applied research and technology program within the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) that addresses human health and performance risk mitigation strategies in support of exploration missions. The HRP research and technology development is focused on the highest priority risks to crew health and safety with the goal of ensuring mission success and maintaining long-term crew health. Crew health and performance standards, defined by the NASA Chief Health and Medical Officer (CHMO), set the acceptable risk level for exploration missions. The HRP conducts research to inform these standards as well as provide deliverables, such as countermeasures, that ensure standards can be met to maximize human performance and mission success. The Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) Element was formed as part of the HRP to develop a scientifically-based, integrated approach to understanding and mitigating the health risks associated with human spaceflight. These health risks have been organized into four research portfolios that group similar or related risks. A fifth portfolio exists for managing technology developments and infrastructure projects. The HHC Element portfolios consist of: a) Vision and Cardiovascular; b) Exercise and Performance; c) Multisystem; d) Bone; and e) Technology and Infrastructure. The HHC identifies gaps associated with the health risks and plans human physiology research that will result in knowledge required to more fully understand risks and will result in validated countermeasures to mitigate risks.

Norsk, Peter↗
NASA NTRS1990

Preliminary Subsystem Designs for the Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV), volumes 1-3

A long term manned facility in space must include provisions for the safety of the crew. The resolution of this need was the design of an Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV). The main focus is on the braking and landing system of the ACRV. This subsystem of the ACRV was divided into three phases. The Phase 1 analysis showed that the use of a tether to aid in the reentry of the ACRV was infeasible due to cost and efficiency. Therefore, a standard rocket would be used for reentry. It was also found that the continental United States was an achievable landing site for the ACRV. The Phase 2 analysis determined the L/D of the vehicle to be 1.8, thus requiring the use of a lifting body for reentry. It was also determined that shuttle tiles would be used for the thermal protection system. In addition, a parachute sequence for further deceleration was included, namely a ringslot drogue chute, a pilot chute, and finally a ringsail main parachute. This sequence was found to be capable of slowing the vehicle to a descent velocity of 9 to 10 m/s, which is the required velocity for aerial recovery. The Phase 3 analysis proved that a Sikorsky CH-53E helicopter is capable of retrieving the ACRV at 5.5 km altitude with minimal g-forces induced on the ACRV and minimal induced moments on the helicopter upon hookup. The helicopter would be modified such that it could stabilize the ACRV close to the bottom of helicopter and carry it to the nearest designated trauma center.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2022

Safe Human Expeditions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO)

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conducted an interdisciplinary study and workshop focusing on capabilities needed for crew health and safety on long-duration deep space expeditions in support of the Artemis Program and missions to Mars. The study focused on integration among four disciplines: 1) space weather monitoring and forecasting, 2) shielding technologies, 3) human health research, and 4) human factors engineering tools. An integrated risk assessment was performed to inform characteristics of mission architecture and capabilities needed for safe, long-duration human expeditions beyond low Earth orbit. This report contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Low Earth Orbit↗
NASA NTRS2009

Worldwide Spacecraft Crew Hatch History

The JSC Flight Safety Office has developed this compilation of historical information on spacecraft crew hatches to assist the Safety Tech Authority in the evaluation and analysis of worldwide spacecraft crew hatch design and performance. The document is prepared by SAIC s Gary Johnson, former NASA JSC S&MA Associate Director for Technical. Mr. Johnson s previous experience brings expert knowledge to assess the relevancy of data presented. He has experience with six (6) of the NASA spacecraft programs that are covered in this document: Apollo; Skylab; Apollo Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), Space Shuttle, ISS and the Shuttle/Mir Program. Mr. Johnson is also intimately familiar with the JSC Design and Procedures Standard, JPR 8080.5, having been one of its original developers. The observations and findings are presented first by country and organized within each country section by program in chronological order of emergence. A host of reference sources used to augment the personal observations and comments of the author are named within the text and/or listed in the reference section of this document. Careful attention to the selection and inclusion of photos, drawings and diagrams is used to give visual association and clarity to the topic areas examined.

Johnson, Gary↗
NASA NTRS2011

Final Report: Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression Project, Exploration Technology Development Program

The Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression (FPDS) project is a technology development effort within the Exploration Technology Development Program of the Exploration System Missions Directorate (ESMD) that addresses all aspects of fire safety aboard manned exploration systems. The overarching goal for work in the FPDS area is to develop technologies that will ensure crew health and safety on exploration missions by reducing the likelihood of a fire, or, if one does occur, minimizing the risk to the crew, mission, or system. This is accomplished by addressing the areas of (1) fire prevention and material flammability, (2) fire signatures and detection, and (3) fire suppression and response. This report describes the outcomes of this project from the formation of the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) in October 2005 to September 31, 2010 when the Exploration Technology Development Program was replaced by the Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration Program. NASA s fire safety work will continue under this new program and will build upon the accomplishments described herein.

Ruff, Gary A.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Expansion of Microbial Monitoring Capabilities on the International Space Station (ISS)

Microbial monitoring is one of the tools that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses on the International Space Station (ISS) to help maintain crew health and safety. In combination with regular housekeeping and disinfection when needed, microbial monitoring provides important information to the crew about the quality of the environment. Rotation of astronauts, equipment, and cargo on the ISS can affect the microbial load in the air, surfaces, and water. The current ISS microbial monitoring methods are focused on culture-based enumeration during flight and require a significant amount of crew time as well as long incubation periods of up to 5 days there by proliferating potential pathogens. In addition, the samples require return to Earth for complete identification of the microorganisms cultivated. Although the current approach assess the quality of the ISS environment, molecular technology offers faster turn-around of information particularly beneficial in an off-nominal situation. In 2011, subject matter experts from industry and academia recommended implementation of molecular-based technologies such as quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) for evaluation to replace current, culture-based technologies. The RAZOR EX (BioFire Defense, Inc, Salt Lake City, UT) a ruggedized, compact, COTS (commercial off the shelf) qPCR instrument was tested, evaluated and selected in the 2 X 2015 JSC rapid flight hardware demonstration initiative as part of the Water Monitoring Suite. RAZOR EX was launched to ISS on SpaceX-9 in July 2016 to evaluate the precision and accuracy of the hardware by testing various concentrations of DNA in microgravity compared to ground controls. Flight testing was completed between September 2016 and March 2017. Data presented will detail the hardware performance of flight testing results compared to ground controls. Future goals include additional operational ground-based testing and assay development to determine if this technology can meet spaceflight microbial monitoring requirements.

Khodadad, Christina L.↗
NASA NTRS2021

Advanced Multimodal Solutions for Information Presentation

High-workload, fast-paced, and degraded sensory environments are the likeliest candidates to benefit from multimodal information presentation. For example, during extra-vehicular activity (EVA) and telerobotic operations, the sensory restrictions associated with such a hostile environment provide a major challenge to maintaining the situation awareness (SA) required for safe operations. In particular, orientation, navigation, and collision avoidance are critical aspects of EVA tasks that need to be addressed to ensure the safety of the crew and the success of the mission. Multimodal displays hold promise to enhance situation awareness and task performance by utilizing different sensory modalities and maximizing their effectiveness based on appropriate interaction between modalities. Multimodal displays will also play an important role for long-duration information systems and will likely begin to be developed in the early phases of cislunar Gateway, and later lunar or Mars transit missions. Information systems are envisioned for LDEMs that require spacecraft with greater crew autonomy and increased dependence on computer-provided information needed to perform routine tasks, as well as time- and safety critical tasks. Such a system will require a single, common interface that is easy to learn and use and accesses key information from all relevant vehicle/habitat systems to enable task performance in both nominal and emergency conditions. Understanding of multimodal display technologies and their interactions will help to inform interface guidelines for LDEMs. The scope of the current report is an analysis of potential multimodal display technologies for long duration missions and, in particular, will focus on their potential role in EVA activities. The review will address multimodal (combined visual, auditory and/or tactile) displays investigated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), industry, and Department of Defense (DoD). It also considers the need for adaptive information systems to accommodate a variety of operational contexts such as crew status (e.g., fatigue, workload level) and task environment (e.g., EVA, habitat, rover, spacecraft). Current approaches to guidelines and best practices for combining modalities for the most effective information displays are also reviewed. Potential issues in developing interface guidelines for LDEMs are briefly considered.

multimodal displays↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA Strategy to Safely Live and Work in the Space Radiation Environment

In space, astronauts are constantly bombarded with energetic particles. The goal of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the NASA Space Radiation Project is to ensure that astronauts can safely live and work in the space radiation environment. The space radiation environment poses both acute and chronic risks to crew health and safety, but unlike some other aspects of space travel, space radiation exposure has clinically relevant implications for the lifetime of the crew. Among the identified radiation risks are cancer, acute and late CNS damage, chronic and degenerative tissue decease, and acute radiation syndrome. The term "safely" means that risks are sufficiently understood such that acceptable limits on mission, post-mission and multi-mission consequences can be defined. The NASA Space Radiation Project strategy has several elements. The first element is to use a peer-reviewed research program to increase our mechanistic knowledge and genetic capabilities to develop tools for individual risk projection, thereby reducing our dependency on epidemiological data and population-based risk assessment. The second element is to use the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory to provide a ground-based facility to study the health effects/mechanisms of damage from space radiation exposure and the development and validation of biological models of risk, as well as methods for extrapolation to human risk. The third element is a risk modeling effort that integrates the results from research efforts into models of human risk to reduce uncertainties in predicting the identified radiation risks. To understand the biological basis for risk, we must also understand the physical aspects of the crew environment. Thus, the fourth element develops computer algorithms to predict radiation transport properties, evaluate integrated shielding technologies and provide design optimization recommendations for the design of human space systems. Understanding the risks and determining methods to mitigate the risks are keys to a successful radiation protection strategy.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Strategy to Safely Live and Work in the Space Radiation Environment

The goal of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the Space Radiation Project is to ensure that astronauts can safely live and work in the space radiation environment. The space radiation environment poses both acute and chronic risks to crew health and safety, but unlike some other aspects of space travel, space radiation exposure has clinically relevant implications for the lifetime of the crew. The term safely means that risks are sufficiently understood such that acceptable limits on mission, post-mission and multi-mission consequences (for example, excess lifetime fatal cancer risk) can be defined. The Space Radiation Project strategy has several elements. The first element is to use a peer-reviewed research program to increase our mechanistic knowledge and genetic capabilities to develop tools for individual risk projection, thereby reducing our dependency on epidemiological data and population-based risk assessment. The second element is to use the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory to provide a ground-based facility to study the understanding of health effects/mechanisms of damage from space radiation exposure and the development and validation of biological models of risk, as well as methods for extrapolation to human risk. The third element is a risk modeling effort that integrates the results from research efforts into models of human risk to reduce uncertainties in predicting risk of carcinogenesis, central nervous system damage, degenerative tissue disease, and acute radiation effects. To understand the biological basis for risk, we must also understand the physical aspects of the crew environment. Thus the fourth element develops computer codes to predict radiation transport properties, evaluate integrated shielding technologies and provide design optimization recommendations for the design of human space systems. Understanding the risks and determining methods to mitigate the risks are keys to a successful radiation protection strategy.

Corbin, Barbara J.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Building on the Past - Looking to the Future: A Focus on Payload Safety

The history of the space industry stretches far and above lunar landings to the construction of the International Space Station. For years, humans have sought to understand the nature of the universe. As society grows in knowledge and curiosity of space, the focus of maintaining the safety of the crew and vehicle habitability is of utmost importance to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) community. Through the years, Payload Safety has developed not only as a Panel, but also as part of the NASA community, striving to enhance the efficiency and understanding of how business should be conducted as more International Partners become involved. This is the first in a series of papers and presentations in what is hoped to be an annual update that provides continuous challenges and lessons learned in the areas of communication, safety requirements and processes and other areas which have been vital to the Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP).

Nash, Sally K.↗
NASA NTRS2012

An Analysis of Shuttle Crew Scheduling Violations

From the early years of the Space Shuttle program, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Shuttle crews have had a timeline of activities to guide them through their time on-orbit. Planners used scheduling constraints to build timelines that ensured the health and safety of the crews. If a constraint could not be met it resulted in a violation. Other agencies of the federal government also have scheduling constraints to ensure the safety of personnel and the public. This project examined the history of Space Shuttle scheduling constraints, constraints from Federal agencies and branches of the military and how these constraints may be used as a guide for future NASA and private spacecraft. This was conducted by reviewing rules and violations with regard to human aerospace scheduling constraints, environmental, political, social and technological factors, operating environment and relevant human factors. This study includes a statistical analysis of Shuttle Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) related violations to determine if these were a significant producer of constraint violations. It was hypothesized that the number of SCSC violations caused by EVA activities were a significant contributor to the total number of violations for Shuttle/ISS missions. Data was taken from NASA data archives at the Johnson Space Center from Space Shuttle/ISS missions prior to the STS-107 accident. The results of the analysis rejected the null hypothesis and found that EVA violations were a significant contributor to the total number of violations. This analysis could help NASA and commercial space companies understand the main source of constraint violations and allow them to create constraint rules that ensure the safe operation of future human private and exploration missions. Additional studies could be performed to evaluate other variables that could have influenced the scheduling violations that were analyzed.

Bristol, Douglas↗
NASA NTRS2006

Technology Development for Fire Safety in Exploration Spacecraft and Habitats

Fire during an exploration mission far from Earth is a particularly critical risk for exploration vehicles and habitats. The Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression (FPDS) project is part of the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) and has the goal to enhance crew health and safety on exploration missions by reducing the likelihood of a fire, or, if one does occur, minimizing the risk to the mission, crew, or system. Within the past year, the FPDS project has been formalized within the ETDP structure and has seen significant progress on its tasks in fire prevention, detection, and suppression. As requirements for Constellation vehicles and, specifically, the CEV have developed, the need for the FPDS technologies has become more apparent and we continue to make strides to infuse them into the Constellation architecture. This paper describes the current structure of the project within the ETDP and summarizes the significant programmatic activities. Major technical accomplishments are identified as are activities planned for FY07.

Ruff, Gary A.↗