SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “FAILURE MODES”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 379 records · Page 21

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2010

An Experimental Investigation of Silicone-to-Metal Bond Strength in Composite Space Docking System Seals

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently developing a new universal docking mechanism for future space exploration missions called the Low Impact Docking System (LIDS). A candidate LIDS main interface seal design is a composite assembly of silicone elastomer seals vacuum molded into grooves in an electroless nickel plated aluminum retainer. The strength of the silicone-tometal bond is a critical consideration for the new system, especially due to the presence of small areas of disbond created during the molding process. In the work presented herein, seal-to-retainer bonds of subscale seal specimens with different sizes of intentional disbond were destructively tensile tested. Nominal specimens without intentional disbonds were also tested. Tension was applied either uniformly on the entire seal circumference or locally in one short circumferential length. Bond failure due to uniform tension produced a wide scatter of observable failure modes and measured load-displacement behaviors. Although the preferable failure mode for the seal-to-retainer bond is cohesive failure of the elastomer material, the dominant observed failure mode under the uniform loading condition was found to be the less desirable adhesive failure of the bond in question. The uniform tension case results did not show a correlation between disbond size and bond strength. Localized tension was found to produce failure either as immediate tearing of the elastomer material outside the bond region or as complete peel-out of the seal in one piece. The obtained results represent a valuable benchmark for comparison in the future between adhesion loads under various separation conditions and composite seal bond strength.

Gaier, James R.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Investigation of advanced fault insertion and simulator methods

The cooperative agreement partly supported research leading to the open-literature publication cited. Additional efforts under the agreement included research into fault modeling of semiconductor devices. Results of this research are presented in this report which is summarized in the following paragraphs. As a result of the cited research, it appears that semiconductor failure mechanism data is abundant but of little use in developing pin-level device models. Failure mode data on the other hand does exist but is too sparse to be of any statistical use in developing fault models. What is significant in the failure mode data is that, unlike classical logic, MSI and LSI devices do exhibit more than 'stuck-at' and open/short failure modes. Specifically they are dominated by parametric failures and functional anomalies that can include intermittent faults and multiple-pin failures. The report discusses methods of developing composite pin-level models based on extrapolation of semiconductor device failure mechanisms, failure modes, results of temperature stress testing and functional modeling. Limitations of this model particularly with regard to determination of fault detection coverage and latency time measurement are discussed. Indicated research directions are presented.

Dunn, W. R.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Coupled Thermomechanical Micromechanics Modeling of the Influence of Thermally Grown Oxide Layer in an Environmental Barrier Coating System

Environmental Barrier Coatings (EBCs) have emerged as a promising means of protecting critical components for high temperature applications (e.g., aircraft engines). EBCs are often used to protect an underlying material (substrate) from extreme thermal/chemical environments. However, systems that utilize EBCs are susceptible to a number of failure modes including oxidation/delamination. Environmental Barrier Coatings (EBCs) have emerged as a promising means of protecting silicon based ceramic matrix composite (CMC) components for high temperature applications (e.g., aircraft engines). EBCs are often used to protect an underlying material (substrate) such as silicon carbide from extreme thermal/chemical environments. In a typical CMC/EBC system, an EBC may or may not be adhered to an underlying substrate with a bond coat (e.g., silicon). Irrespective, systems that utilize EBCs are susceptible to a number of failure modes including oxidation/delamination, recession, chemical attack and dissolution, thermo-mechanical degradation, erosion, and foreign object damage. Current work at NASA Glenn Research Center is aimed at addressing these failure modes in EBC systems and developing robust analysis tools to aid in the design process. The Higher-Order Theory for Functionally Graded Materials (HOTFGM), a precursor to the High-Fidelity Generalized Method of Cells micromechanics approach, was developed to investigate the coupled thermo-mechanical behavior of functionally graded composites and will be used herein to assess the development and growth of a low-stiffness thermally grown oxide (TGO) layer in EBC/CMC systems without a silicon bond coat. To accomplish this a sensitivity study is conducted to examine the influence of uniformly and non-uniformly grown oxide layer on the associated driving forces leading to mechanical failure (spallation) of EBC layer when subjected to isothermal loading, recession, chemical attack and dissolution, thermomechanical degradation, erosion, and foreign object damage. Current work at NASA Glenn Research Center is aimed at addressing these failure modes in EBC systems and developing robust analysis tools to aid in the design process. The Higher-Order Theory for Functionally Graded Materials (HOTFGM), a precursor to the High-Fidelity Generalized Method of Cells micromechanics approach, was developed to investigate the coupled thermo-mechanical behavior of functionally graded composites (Aboudi et al., 1999, Composites B). For example, HOTFGM was previously used (Arnold et al, 1995, NASA CP 10178, paper 34), to assess interlaminar stresses (including free edge effects) in a substrate with a thermal barrier coating (TBC). In this study, HOTFGM micromechanics analyses will be used to assess the development and growth of a low-stiffness thermally grown oxide (TGO) layer between a silicon carbide substrate and a ytterbium disilicate EBC. In order to realistically simulate TGO growth, an evolution law will be incorporated into HOTFGM. In addition, the effect of TGO roughness will be explored consistent with previous TBC work (Pindera et al., 2000. Material Science and Engineering, A284, pp. 158-175). This model represents a first step in developing a robust analysis tool that can ultimately be used to design durable EBC systems. Additional failure modes will be considered as part of a future work.

environmental barrier coating↗

NASA NTRS1987

Thermal barrier coating life prediction model development

The objectives of this program are to increase understanding of thermal barrier coating (TBC) degradation and failure modes, to generate quantitative ceramic failure life data under cyclic thermal conditions which simulate those encountered in gas turbine engine service, and to develop an analytical methodology for prediction of coating life in the engine. Observations of degradation and failure modes in plasma deposited ceramic indicate that spallation failure results from progressive cracking of the ceramic parallel to and adjacent to, but not coincident with the metal-ceramic interface.

Demasi, J. T.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the auxiliary power unit

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). The APUs are required to provide power to the Orbiter hydraulics systems during ascent and entry flight phases for aerosurface actuation, main engine gimballing, landing gear extension, and other vital functions. For analysis purposes, the APU system was broken down into ten functional subsystems. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. A preponderance of 1/1 criticality items were related to failures that allowed the hydrazine fuel to escape into the Orbiter aft compartment, creating a severe fire hazard, and failures that caused loss of the gas generator injector cooling system.

Barnes, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Space Shuttle Hot Cabin Emergency Responses

Methods: Human thermal tolerance, countermeasures, and thermal model data were reviewed and compared to existing shuttle ECS failure temperature and humidity profiles for each failure mode. Increases in core temperature associated with cognitive impairment was identified, as was metabolic heat generation of crewmembers, temperature monitoring, and communication capabilities after partial power-down and other limiting factors. Orbiter landing strategies and a hydration and salt replacement protocol were developed to put wheels on deck in each failure mode prior to development of significant cognitive impairment or collapse of crewmembers. Thermal tradeoffs for use of the Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES), Liquid Cooling Garment, integrated G-suit and Quick Don Mask were examined. candidate solutions involved trade-offs or conflicts with cabin oxygen partial pressure limits, system power-downs to limit heat generation, risks of alternate and emergency landing sites or compromise of Mode V-VIII scenarios. Results: Rehydration and minimized cabin workloads are required in all failure modes. Temperature/humidity profiles increase rapidly in two failure modes, and deorbit is recommended without the ACES, ICU and g-suit. This latter configuration limits several shuttle approach and landing escape modes and requires communication modifications. Additional data requirements were identified and engineering simulations were recommended to develop more current shuttle temperature and humidity profiles. Discussion: After failure of the shuttle ECS, there is insufficient cooling capacity of the ACES to protect crewmembers from rising cabin temperature and humidity. The LCG is inadequate for cabin temperatures above 76 F. Current shuttle future life policy makes it unlikely that major engineering upgrades necessary to address this problem will occur.

Stepaniak, P.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the atmospheric revitalization pressure control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Atmospheric Revitalization and Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) are documented. The ARPCS hardware was categorized into the following subdivisions: (1) Atmospheric Make-up and Control (including the Auxiliary Oxygen Assembly, Oxygen Assembly, and Nitrogen Assembly); and (2) Atmospheric Vent and Control (including the Positive Relief Vent Assembly, Negative Relief Vent Assembly, and Cabin Vent Assembly). The IOA analysis process utilized available ARPCS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Saiidi, M. J.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the Orbiter Experiment (OEX) subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Experiments hardware. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The Orbiter Experiments (OEX) Program consists of a multiple set of experiments for the purpose of gathering environmental and aerodynamic data to develop more accurate ground models for Shuttle performance and to facilitate the design of future spacecraft. This assessment only addresses currently manifested experiments and their support systems. Specifically this list consists of: Shuttle Entry Air Data System (SEADS); Shuttle Upper Atmosphere Mass Spectrometer (SUMS); Forward Fuselage Support System for OEX (FFSSO); Shuttle Infrared Laced Temperature Sensor (SILTS); Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package (ACIP); and Support System for OEX (SSO). There are only two potential critical items for the OEX, since the experiments only gather data for analysis post mission and are totally independent systems except for power. Failure of any experiment component usually only causes a loss of experiment data and in no way jeopardizes the crew or mission.

Compton, J. M.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Common Cause Failures and Ultra Reliability

A common cause failure occurs when several failures have the same origin. Common cause failures are either common event failures, where the cause is a single external event, or common mode failures, where two systems fail in the same way for the same reason. Common mode failures can occur at different times because of a design defect or a repeated external event. Common event failures reduce the reliability of on-line redundant systems but not of systems using off-line spare parts. Common mode failures reduce the dependability of systems using off-line spare parts and on-line redundancy.

reliability↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the DPS subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to independently determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Data Processing System (DPS) hardware are documented. The DPS hardware is required for performing critical functions of data acquisition, data manipulation, data display, and data transfer throughout the Orbiter. Specifically, the DPS hardware consists of the following components: Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM); General Purpose Computer (GPC); Multifunction CRT Display System (MCDS); Data Buses and Data Bus Couplers (DBC); Data Bus Isolation Amplifiers (DBIA); Mass Memory Unit (MMU); and Engine Interface Unit (EIU). The IOA analysis process utilized available DPS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Due to the extensive redundancy built into the DPS the number of critical items are few. Those identified resulted from premature operation and erroneous output of the GPCs.

Lowery, H. J.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the life support and airlock support subsystems

Arbet, Jim↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the nose wheel steering subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) hardware are documented. The NWS hardware provides primary directional control for the Orbiter vehicle during landing rollout. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The original NWS design was envisioned as a backup system to differential braking for directional control of the Orbiter during landing rollout. No real effort was made to design the NWS system as fail operational. The brakes have much redundancy built into their design but the poor brake/tire performance has forced the NSTS to upgrade NWS to the primary mode of directional control during rollout. As a result, a large percentage of the NWS system components have become Potential Critical Items (PCI).

Mediavilla, Anthony Scott↗

NASA NTRS1988

Fatigue damage mapping

Observations of fatigue crack nucleation and early growth are presented. The state of stress/strain was shown to play a significant role in this process. Early growth occurs on planes experiencing the largest range of shear strain (Mode 2) or normal strain (Mode 1) depending on the stress state, strain amplitude, and microstructure. These observations were summarized in a fatigue map for each material. These maps provide regions where one fatigue failure mode dominates the behavior. Each failure mechanism results in a different failure mode. Once the expected failure mode is identified, bulk deformation models based on the cyclic stresses and strains can be used to obtain reliable estimates of fatigue lives for complex loading situations.

Socie, Darrell↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the pyrotechnics subsystem

Robinson, W. W.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the communication and tracking subsystem

Gardner, J. R.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the manned maneuvering unit

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve indepedence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) hardware. The MMU is a propulsive backpack, operated through separate hand controllers that input the pilot's translational and rotational maneuvering commands to the control electronics and then to the thrusters. The IOA analysis process utilized available MMU hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware subsystems, assemblies, components, and hardware items. Final levels of detail were evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the worst case severity of the effect for each identified failure mode. The IOA analysis of the MMU found that the majority of the PCIs identified are resultant from the loss of either the propulsion or control functions, or are resultant from inability to perform an immediate or future mission. The five most severe criticalities identified are all resultant from failures imposed on the MMU hand controllers which have no redundancy within the MMU.

Bailey, P. S.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the mechanical actuation subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). The IOA analysis process utilized available MAS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Bacher, J. L.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the orbital maneuvering system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware are documented. The OMS provides the thrust to perform orbit insertion, orbit circularization, orbit transfer, rendezvous, and deorbit. The OMS is housed in two independent pods located one on each side of the tail and consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization; Propellant Storage and Distribution; Orbital Maneuvering Engine; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control. The IOA analysis process utilized available OMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluted and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was asigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Prust, C. D.↗