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At least 379 records · Page 21

Instrumentation, control, and human system interface contributions to historical severe accidents - 301

In 2015 EPRI completed a study of historical severe accidents. This study was intended to identify the lessons that these events had for instrumentation and control (I and C), and human systems interfaces (HSI) for nuclear power plants. The project studied 19 severe accidents that were identified by a parallel study that was underway for the International Atomic Energy Agency. I and C or HSI issues made significant contributions to 18 of the 19 events studied. This paper will summarize the I and C and HSI deficiencies that contributed to the propagation of the accidents, discuss the likely causes of these deficiencies and describe the role of I and C and HSI in finally terminating the events. (authors)

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Migration to a fully-integrated control room - 349

The nuclear industry is faced with a pressing need to reduce operating costs in order to remain competitive with other forms of electric generation. While current industry initiatives are focused on incremental gains by streamlining work processes and reducing worker burdens, very few, if any, involve significant reductions in the base workload of a nuclear plant. Migration to a fully-integrated control room affords just such an opportunity. This report describes an NPP digital instrumentation and control (I and C) system design, along with its corresponding human systems interface (HSI) design, which achieves high plant availability, while selectively applying digital equipment redundancy and integrating traditional I and C system partitions, to minimize the digital equipment needed, and thereby minimize initial installation costs and ongoing operations and maintenance (O and M) costs. An additional key component of digital equipment minimization is optimization of the digital interface to conventional plant sensors and controlled plant devices (e.g., pumps, valves), which requires no disturbance to plant cables and results in eliminating thousands of electro-mechanical relay control components. The design is rooted in the highly integrated digital technology applied to the most recent advanced light water reactors under United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) design certification review and approval. While this design employs technology from new plants, that technology has been adapted to the modernization of current operating NPPs. Hence, the highly integrated digital I and C and HSI design is referred to as the compact control room digital modernization (CDM). Along with minimal digital equipment, the corresponding HSI design employs compact operator workstations with visual display units (VDU) and soft controls for both the main control room (MCR) and remote shutdown room (RSR), to immediately improve human performance and ultimately facilitate operating staff reduction. Some advanced light water reactors have demonstrated this staff reduction through full scope simulator testing of normal and abnormal plant conditions, with U.S. licensed operating crews from currently-operating U.S. plants. Digital equipment minimization, compact operator workstations, and optimized plant component interfaces that require no disturbance to field cables, also facilitate implementation of the CDM over multiple phases, most of which can be conducted during normal refueling shutdown windows. This phased implementation method includes a novel transition of the I and C, MCR and RSR with an operations centered focus. This paper presents the CDM design, along with qualitative cost/benefit comparisons to currently operating plants with conventional analog I and C and HSI technology; this generation of I and C/HSI is referred to as a conventional control room (CCR). A CCR also includes NPPs that have been upgraded with digital systems, but retain the current partitions between plant I and C systems (i.e., no I and C integration) and retain the current plant system to control board configuration of current NPP control rooms. Even though these comparisons are qualitative, a compelling case is presented for the CDM. (authors)

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A preliminary user-friendly, digital console for the control room parameters supervision in old-generation Nuclear Plants

Improvements in the awareness of a system status is an essential requirement to achieve safety in every kind of plant. In particular, in the case of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), a progress is crucial to enhance the Human Machine Interface (HMI) in order to optimize monitoring and analyzing processes of NPP operational states. Firstly, as old-fashioned plants are concerned, an upgrading of the whole console instrumentation is desirable in order to replace an analog visualization with a full-digital system. In this work, we present a novel instrument able to interface the control console of a nuclear reactor, developed by using CompactRio, a National Instruments embedded architecture and its dedicated programming language. This real-time industrial controller composed by a real-time processor and FPGA modules has been programmed to visualize the parameters coming from the reactor, and to storage and reproduce significant conditions anytime. This choice has been made on the basis of the FPGA properties: high reliability, determinism, true parallelism and re-configurability, achieved by a simple programming method, based on LabVIEW real-time environment. The system architecture exploits the FPGA capabilities of implementing custom timing and triggering, hardware-based analysis and co-processing, and highest performance control algorithms. Data stored during the supervisory phase can be reproduced by loading data from a measurement file, re-enacting worthwhile operations or conditions. The system has been thought to be used in three different modes, namely Log File Mode, Supervisory Mode and Simulation Mode. The proposed system can be considered as a first step to develop a more complete Decision Support System (DSS): indeed this work is part of a wider project that includes the elaboration of intelligent agents and meta-theory approaches. A synoptic has been created to monitor every kind of action on the plant through an intuitive sight. Furthermore, another important aim of this work is the possibility to have a front panel available on a web interface: CompactRio acts as a remote server and it is accessible on a dedicated LAN. This supervisory system has been tested and validated on the basis of the real control console for the 1-MW TRIGA reactor RC-1 at the ENEA, Casaccia Research Center. In this paper we show some results obtained by recording each variable as the reactor reaches its maximum level of power. The choice of a research reactor for testing the developed system relies on its training and didactic importance for the education of plant operators: in this context a digital instrument can offer a better user-friendly tool for learning and training. It is worthwhile to remark that such a system does not interfere with the console instrumentation, the latter continuing to preserve the total control. (authors)

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A novel priority selection system for nuclear power plant - 287

The priority selection system is an important component of security level instrument control platform for nuclear power plant, the main function of which is priority processing the manual or automatic command with various security levels and driving engineering safety features and field devices, such as pump and valve. Its stability and safety plays a crucial role in the operation of the power plant. The main objective of the present paper is to describe the new nuclear power plant-oriented priority selection system, which is developed independently by China Nuclear Control System Engineering Company. In this system, the control commands from 1E DCS, ECP and DAS systems are transmitted via hardwire, while those from NC DCS are transmitted by field-bus. The control commands experience priority output to control the field actuators. Meanwhile, in order to control key field devices when failure of the instrument control systems occurs, the issuing interface for native instructions with permissions setting is also offered. The whole system provides collection-feedback functions for field devices, high coverage self-diagnostic functions and periodic test functions for safety systems. Moreover, the feedback information of field devices, the results of self-diagnosis and periodic test will be submitted to DCS of nuclear power plant. In addition, the core part of priority selection system, namely priority selection module, is obtained by pure FPGA technology, which is different from DCS systems and could avoid common cause failure of software effectively. (authors)

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Development of an alpha/beta/gamma detector for radiation monitoring

For radiation monitoring at the site of nuclear power plant accidents such as Fukushima Daiichi, radiation detectors not only for gamma photons but also for alpha and beta particles are needed because some nuclear fission products emit beta particles and gamma photons and some nuclear fuels contain plutonium that emits alpha particles. We developed a radiation detector that can simultaneously monitor alpha and beta particles and gamma photons for radiation monitoring. The detector consists of three-layered scintillators optically coupled to each other and coupled to a photomultiplier tube. The first layer, which is made of a thin plastic scintillator (decay time: 2.4 ns), detects alpha particles. The second layer, which is made of a thin Gd{sub 2}SiO{sub 5} (GSO) scintillator with 1.5 mol.% Ce (decay time: 35 ns), detects beta particles. The third layer made of a thin GSO scintillator with 0.4 mol.% Ce (decay time: 70 ns) detects gamma photons. By using pulse shape discrimination, the count rates of these layers can be separated. With individual irradiation of alpha and beta particles and gamma photons, the count rate of the first layer represented the alpha particles, the second layer represented the beta particles, and the third layer represented the gamma photons. Even with simultaneous irradiation of the alpha and beta particles and the gamma photons, these three types of radiation can be individually monitored using correction for the gamma detection efficiency of the second and third layers. Our developed alpha, beta, and gamma detector is simple and will be useful for radiation monitoring, especially at nuclear power plant accident sites or other applications where the simultaneous measurements of alpha and beta particles and gamma photons are required.

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Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227

The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)

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Digital Sensor Technology

The nuclear industry has been slow to incorporate digital sensor technology into nuclear plant designs due to concerns with digital qualification issues. However, the benefits of digital sensor technology for nuclear plant instrumentation are substantial in terms of accuracy, reliability, availability, and maintainability. This report demonstrates these benefits in direct comparisons of digital and analog sensor applications. It also addresses the qualification issues that must be addressed in the application of digital sensor technology.

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Nuclear power plant instrumentation and control cyber security common vector access leading to relational common cause failures - 340

Nuclear power plants and facilities have been implementing digital system upgrades into their previously analog systems for well over twenty years. New nuclear facilities' control, security, and emergency preparedness systems are almost exclusively built on digital architectures with a high degree of communication between the various systems that are often integrated together into a central control station to aid in operation or security of the facility. As digital systems become more widespread in nuclear facility control system architectures, cyber security related issues have become a significant concern to operators, regulators, governments, and other groups. Among the many concerns related to digital systems and cyber security is the area of common cause and common mode failures. This paper introduces, defines, and discusses some sources of common cause failure from a cyber security perspective: common vector access. This refers to specific access points that an adversary can exploit through a single attack sequence that have the potential to provide relational failures through common cause on multiple components, subsystems, systems, or plants. This paper will further discuss interconnected processes where these access points may exist, the importance of limiting or controlling these pinch points, and some methods of protecting common vector access points. (authors)

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An operation verification strategy against network attack of DCS in nuclear power plant - 323

Digital Instrumentation and control (I and C) system serves as the 'senses and nervous system' of a nuclear power plant (NPP). It plays an important role in the safe and economic operation in the NPPs. Digital I and C system has a series of advantages compared with analogue ones, but the introduction of the operation system platform, the application software, and the network communication structure are causing security risk to the power plant. Different kinds of procedures have already been adopted against these risks such as the communication isolation, but the security attacks still occur from time to time in the industrial fields around the world. This paper presents two computer security methods based on the thought of software verification and validation with step-by-step operation identification. First, three scenarios of security attack are proposed according to the structure of a distributed control system (DCS). Then a method with two network bypasses and a security computer are adopted to obtain the operation commands, the actuation signal, and the operation feedback in case of the first two scenarios by identifying the consistency of the obtained data. Furthermore, the method is optimized by combining the operation procedure and the camera shot to identify the anomaly of the information flow, thus to improve the effectiveness against the computer security issues. In the end, the influence and feasibility of this method is discussed. (authors)

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Severe accident: hardening of standards and qualification requirements for nuclear pressure transmitters - 319

Nuclear power stations are designed according to the nuclear safety principle: the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue radiation hazards. This principle is applicable from the design to the dismantling of the power station, including normal and accident (and post-accident) operation. To take into account the world experience (incident or accident as Fukushima), international safety authorities recommends to reinforce safety functions and qualification requirements level. Concerning the instrumentation, devices like sensors are mainly impacted by the following constraint improvements: - Radiation resistance in normal and accident conditions: - Higher total dose; - Dose Rate; - Nature of radiation; - Pressure and Temperature profile in terms of: - Magnitude of pressure and / or temperature (higher); - Duration of higher constraints (longer). All these specifications induce: - The creation of a new qualification level - Severe Accident (SA) or equivalent; - An impact on the sensor technology to improve the resistance to harsh environment. Finally, the paper will present in details the evolution of the requirements and will sum up the advantages and disadvantages of different technologies to meet the severe accident conditions. (authors)

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Development of an update to ISA S67.04 and RP 67.04: 'Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Plants' - 146

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the update to International Society of Automation (ISA) Standard ISA S67.04 - 2006, 'Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Plants', and ISA RP 67.04-2000, 'Methodologies for Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation'. Significant advances have occurred on the utility, Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendor, and regulatory side, related to improved techniques for analysis and monitoring. These and other changes, including those related to Technical Specifications and surveillance interval extensions, are being included in the latest update to this primary standard for setpoint control in nuclear plants in the U.S. and around the world. In 2016, the ISA S67.04 Committee agreed to proceed with a revision to this Standard and Recommended Practice, with major updates in the following areas: 1. Definitions - Updates for improved definitions based on TSTF-493, Rev 4, RIS-2006-17 and NRC updated Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.105 2. 95/95 - Updates based on improved guidance on the development of component input data and analysis techniques for 95% probability/95% confidence calculations 3. TSTF-493, RIS 2006-17 updates for Technical Specification input and to support changes 4. NRC input from updates in the Regulatory Guide 1.105 and Branch Technical Position BTP-7-12 revision process. 5. Improved guidance from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in References 7, 8 and 9. These standards are being updated with a new version anticipated to be issued as a draft in 2017 and submitted for ISA approval in 2019. (authors)

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Ensuring operator reliability in digital control rooms - 102

The U.S. fleet of nuclear power plants is aging, and efforts are being made to modernize instrumentation and control systems including integration of digital human-machine interfaces (HMIs) into the control room. Automation and control technologies have advanced since original systems were installed in the plants. This presents unique opportunities and challenges in ensuring the replacements are a benefit to the operators and the overall safe and reliable operation of the plant. We discuss trends we have observed from assisting utilities in their modernization efforts. Automation and evolving control rooms come with their own host of problems that existing human factors and engineering methods fail to capture. Traditional approaches are analytical approaches to ensuring reliability. Here we discuss some of the shortfalls of these traditional approaches as plants become increasingly more complex. We suggest that ensuring reliability for modernized and next generation control room will require expanding the scope of what was traditionally considered human factors as well as exploring novel approaches and methodologies for dealing with complexity and rapidly advancing technology. (authors)

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Recent results from a testbed for the reliability of the digital instrumentation and control systems and cybersecurity in nuclear power plants - 392

Transition from analog to digital instrumentation and control systems requires a systematic study of the modifications, and assessment of their reliability. Such studies are often carried out on a test bed. The test bed developed earlier includes a commercially available triple modular redundant (TMR) programmable logic controller (PLC) for testing not only the reliability of the digital I and C but also the cyber-security of the system during plant operation. This paper reports results of our preliminary analyses carried out using the test bed following the injection of faults mimicking faulty sensors. The fault injection tool generates faulty signals in single or multiple sensors located in the primary loop. These scenarios studied under steady-state operation conditions simulate a bad sensor, a cut wire, noise, etc. The faults injected can lead to information being displayed in the main control room (MCR) to not match the conditions in the plant. In addition to a fault injection module, a result analyzer module is also a part of this testbed. Operator actions can be based on information displayed in the MCR, or they can be informed by the result analyzer. Potential operator actions following these single- or multiple faulty signals are assessed. It is concluded that the result analyzer in some cases can be helpful in guiding operators to make the right decisions. (authors)

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Identification of Significant NPP Cyber-Attack Scenarios based on Risk Information

For the last decades, analog instrumentation and control (I and C) systems have been replaced with digital systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs). While there are various advantages of the digital technology for the plant safety, new threats have been introduced such as cyber security. In fact, there have been cyber-attacks on nuclear facilities adopting digital systems. The cyber-attack on the Iran nuclear facility is a typical example which shows the possibility of a cyber-attack on safety critical infrastructures with intra-network. Cyber security has been introduced as one of the significant issues for NPP safety and recently its importance has been more highlighted, but the research in this field is not mature yet. Moreover, there is not much information about cyber security of NPPs. In this work, as a fundamental research for risk evaluation of cyber-attacks, a method to identify significant cyber-attack scenarios on NPPs was proposed based on the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) method which is widely used for evaluating the safety of NPPs. (authors)

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A Bayesian and HRA-Aided Method for the Novel Reliability Analysis of Software

Technological advancements and nuclear power plant modernization has inspired considerable research in the areas of safety and reliability, yet there remains a lack of consensus for the reliability assessment of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. Motivated by the lack of consensus for reliability analysis methods, this work employs a novel framework that incorporates Bayesian, human reliability, and common-cause failure (CCF) modeling techniques. The novel framework allows the use of state-of-the-art or classical modeling techniques when accounting for human and CCF effects on system reliability. The Bayesian and HRA-Aided Method for the Reliability Analysis of Software (BAHAMAS) is demonstrated by a case study for the quantification of software hazards found in a previous analysis of a digital reactor trip system. The results demonstrate the ability of BAHAMAS to account for human activities during the software development life cycle and their influence on software reliability. BAHAMAS is a flexible tool for extending the coverage of conventional probabilistic risk assessments to include modernized digital I&C systems.

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Beryllium reflected cavity reactor for UF6 critical experiments

Experiments and theoretical studies are being conducted for NASA on critical assemblies with one-meter diam by one-meter long low-density cores surrounded by a thick beryllium reflector. These assemblies make extensive use of existing nuclear propulsion reactor components, facilities, and instrumentation. Due to excessive porosity in the reflector, the initial critical mass was 19 kg U(93.2). Addition of a 17-cm-thick by 89-cm-diam beryllium flux trap in the cavity reduced the critical mass to 7 kg when all the uranium was in the zone just outside the flux trap. A mockup aluminum UF6 container was placed inside the flux trap and fueled with uranium-graphite elements. Fission distributions and reactivity worths of fuel and structural materials are available. These results will be used to guide the design of a prototype plasma core reactor which will test energy removal by optical radiation.

Jarvis, G. A.↗

A business case for nuclear plant control room modernization - 352

This paper presents a generic business case for implementation of technology that supports Control Room Modernization (CRM) in existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). The business case is based on advanced digital instrumentation and control (I and C), human-system interface (HSI), and work process technologies that allow NPP operators to conduct control room operations with improved human factors and efficiency, and therefore operate with fewer operational events. Labor savings can be harvested in terms of reduced overtime and redistribution of work. Significant savings are also demonstrated as reduced time to bring the plant back on line after completion of outages. The benefits are quantified to a rough order of magnitude, providing directional guidance to NPPs that are interested in developing similar business cases. The technologies employed in CRM include large overview displays, task-based operator displays, computer-based procedures, advanced alarm systems, computerized operator support systems, and wireless networks, among others. The CRM business case is founded on the following categories of cost savings: - Integrated Computer-Based Procedures for Operators; - Reduction in Corrective Action Program Work Due to Operator Error; - Reduction in Outage Critical Path Time; - Operation of Local Control Panels; - Reduction in Control Room Support; - Reduction in Plant Events Resulting in Generation Loss; - Paperless Control Room Processes. In addition to cost savings, these technologies also offer improvements to indirect ways that have impact on key performance indicators of the plant. (authors)

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