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Guidelines and instructions for the implementation of the SP&R system safety requirements applicable to STS payloads are provided. The initial contact meeting with the payload organization and the subsequent safety reviews necessary to comply with the system safety requirements of the SP&R document are described. Waiver instructions are included for the cases in which a safety requirement cannot be met.
Space Shuttle payload safety requirements are summarized. Consideration is given to NASA objectives on STS payloads, payload safety documents, STS payload safety management, safety implementation possibilities, the hazard control procedure, and significant technical requirements.
STS payload safety requirements for Earth-storable liquid propulsion systems are reviewed with respect to applicable safety documents. The effect of normal flight and emergency landing/abort launch profiles on propulsion system design is delineated. Spacecraft studied include Earth satellites, interplanetary spacecraft, and orbit transfer vehicles. Safety considerations for monopropellant (hydrazine), bipropellant (nitrogen tetroxide/monomethyl hydrazine), and ion (mercury) propulsion systems are described. Safety requirements for specific components of propulsion systems are reported. Analysis techniques for STS payload fracture control requirements for pressure vessels and critical support structure are discussed.
Complex research and technology operations present varied potential hazards which are addressed in a disciplined, independent safety review and approval process. Potential hazards vary from high energy fuels to hydrocarbon fuels, high pressure systems to high voltage systems, toxic chemicals to radioactive materials and high speed rotating machinery to high powered lasers. A Safety Permit System presently covers about 600 potentially hazardous operations. The Safety Management Program described is believed to be a major factor in maintaining an excellent safety record.
Complex research and technology operations present many varied potential hazards which must be addressed in a disciplined independent safety review and approval process. The research and technology effort at the Lewis Research Center is divided into programmatic areas of aeronautics, space and energy. Potential hazards vary from high energy fuels to hydrocarbon fuels, high pressure systems to high voltage systems, toxic chemicals to radioactive materials and high speed rotating machinery to high powered lasers. A Safety Permit System presently covers about 600 potentially hazardous operations. The Safety Management Program described in this paper is believed to be a major factor in maintaining an excellent safety record at the Lewis Research Center.
Safety issues involved in the disposal of nuclear wastes in space as a complement to mined geologic repositories are examined as part of an assessment of the feasibility of nuclear waste disposal in space. General safety guidelines for space disposal developed in the areas of radiation exposure and shielding, containment, accident environments, criticality, post-accident recovery, monitoring systems and isolation are presented for a nuclear waste disposal in space mission employing conventional space technology such as the Space Shuttle. The current reference concept under consideration by NASA and DOE is then examined in detail, with attention given to the waste source and mix, the waste form, waste processing and payload fabrication, shipping casks and ground transport vehicles, launch site operations and facilities, Shuttle-derived launch vehicle, orbit transfer vehicle, orbital operations and space destination, and the system safety aspects of the concept are discussed for each component. It is pointed out that future work remains in the development of an improved basis for the safety guidelines and the determination of the possible benefits and costs of the space disposal option for nuclear wastes.
Basic tenets of safety as applied to developmental aircraft programs are presented. The integration of safety into the project management aspects of planning, organizing, directing and controlling is illustrated by examples. The basis for project management use of safety and the relationship of these management functions to 'real-world' situations is presented. The rationale which led to the safety-related project decision and the lessons learned as they may apply to future projects are presented.
The operational safety of six axle locomotives is analyzed. A locomotive model with corresponding data on suspension characteristics, a method of track defect characterization, and a method of characterizing operational safety are used. A user oriented software package was developed as part of the methodology and was used to study the effect (on operational safety) of various locomotive parameters and operational conditions such as speed, tractive effort, and track curvature. The operational safety of three different locomotive designs was investigated.
The Space Transportation Operations (STO) safety policy is to minimize STO involvement in the payload and its GSE (ground support equipment) design process while maintaining the assurance of a safe operation. Requirements for assuring payload mission success are the responsibility of the payload organization and are beyond the scope of this document. The intent is to provide the overall safety policies and requirements while allowing for negotiation between the payload organization and the STO operator in the method of implementation of payload safety. This revision provides for a relaxation in the monitoring requirements for inhibits, allows the payload organization to pursue design options and reflects, additionally, some new requirements. As of the issue date of this NHB, payloads which have completed the formal safety assessment reviews of their preliminary design on the basis of the May 1979 issue will be reassessed for compliance with the above changes.
An assessment of NASA's safety performance for 1983 affirms that NASA Headquarters and Center management teams continue to hold the safety of manned flight to be their prime concern, and that essential effort and resources are allocated for maintaining safety in all of the development and operational programs. Those conclusions most worthy of NASA management concentration are given along with recommendations for action concerning; product quality and utility; space shuttle main engine; landing gear; logistics and management; orbiter structural loads, landing speed, and pitch control; the shuttle processing contractor; and the safety of flight operations. It appears that much needs to be done before the Space Transportation System can achieve the reliability necessary for safe, high rate, low cost operations.
Commercial photovoltaic array installations, which include residential and intermediate applications, are subject to building and electrical codes and to product safety standards. The National Electrical Code (NEC) Article 690, titled Solar Photovoltaic Systems, contains provisions defining acceptable levels of system safety and emphasizes the system design and its installation. The Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL), document titled: Proposed First Edition of the Standard for Flat Plate Photovoltaic Modules and Panels, UL-1703, identifies module and panel construction requirements that ensure product safety. Together these documents describe requirements intended to minimize hazards such as shock and fire. Although initial focus of these requirements is on single crystal silicon modules, they are generic in nature, and are equally applicable to high voltage ( 30 Vdc), multikilowatt, thin film systems. A major safety concern is insulation breakdown within the module or array wiring system, or discontinuities within the electrical conductors. These failures can result in ground faults, in circuit arcs, or exposure to hazardous electrical parts. Safeguards are discussed.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) launched the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's (JPL) two Voyager spacecraft to Jupiter in 1977, each using three radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) supplied by the Department of Energy (DOE) for onboard electric power. In 1986 NASA will launch JPL's Galileo spacecraft to Jupiter equipped with two DOE supplied RTGs of an improved design. NASA and JPL are also responsible for obtaining a single RTG of this type from DOE and supplying it to the European Space Agency as part of its participation in the International Solar Polar Mission. As a result of these missions, JPL has been deeply involved in space nuclear safety as a user. This paper will give a brief review of the user contributions by JPL - and NASA in general - to the nuclear safety processes and relate them to the overall nuclear safety program necessary for the launch of an RTG. The two major safety areas requiring user support are the ground operations involving RTGs at the launch site and the failure modes and probabilities associated with launch accidents.
The space station, a permanently-inhabited orbiting laboratory, places new demands on spacecraft fire safety. Long-duration missions may call for more-constrained fire controls, but the accessibility of the space station to a variety of users may call for less-restrictive measures. This paper discusses fire safety issues through a review of the state of the art and a presentation of key findings from a recent NASA Lewis Research Center Workshop. The subjects covered are the fundamental science of low-gravity combustion and the technology advances in fire detection, extinguishment, materials assessment, and atmosphere selection. Key concerns are for the adoption of a fire-safe atmosphere and the substitution for the effective but toxic extinguishant, halon 1301. The fire safety studies and reviews provide several recommendations for further action. One is the expanded research in combustion, sensors, and materials in the low-gravity environment of space. Another is the development of generalized fire-safety standards for spacecraft through cooperative endeavors with aerospace and outside Government and industry sources.
NASA's sounding rocket and balloon goal is to successfully and safely perform scientific research. This is reflected in the design, planning, and conduct of sounding rocket and balloon operations. The purpose of this paper is to acquaint the sounding rocket and balloon scientific community with flight safety philosophy and methodologies, and how range safety affects their programs. This paper presents the flight safety philosophy for protecting the public against the risk created by the conduct of sounding rocket and balloon operations. The flight safety criteria used to implement this philosophy are defined and the methodologies used to calculate mission risk are described.
The space station, a permanently-inhabited orbiting laboratory, places new demands on spacecraft fire safety. Long-duration missions may call for more-constrained fire controls, but the accessibility of the space station to a variety of users may call for less-restrictive measures. This paper discusses fire safety issues through a review of the state of the art and a presentation of key findings from a recent NASA Lewis Research Center Workshop. The subjects covered are the fundamental science of low-gravity combustion and the technology advances in fire detection, extinguishment, materials assessment, and atmosphere selection. Key concerns are for the adoption of a fire-safe atmosphere and the substitution for the effective but toxic extinguishant, halon 1301. The fire safety studies and reviews provide several recommendations for further action. One is the expanded research in combustion, sensors, and materials in the low-gravity environment of space. Another is the development of generalized fire-safety standards for spacecraft through cooperative endeavors with aerospace and outside Government and industry sources.
Definitions, overall descriptions, and preliminary apparatus and instrumentation requirements are presented for three spacecraft fire-safety experiments appropriate for inclusion in a growth-version of the Space Station. The experiments are as follows: 1. Combustion and Flame Spread of Typical Spacecraft Materials in a Low Velocity Convective Flow in Low Gravity 2. Fire and Fire-Extinguishant Interactions with Various Fire Scenarios in Low Gravity 3. Smoldering and Deep-Seated Combustion in Low Gravity. The experiments were selected from an assessment of recommendations for advanced technologies for prevention, detection, and control of fires in spacecraft. The experiments and their facilities are intended to constitute a portion of a Spacecraft Fire Safety Technology Development Mission (TDM). Basic requirements for the mission study are that the Space Station is essential for the accomplishment of the experimental objectives and that the technology being developed is appropriate for the growth version of the Space Station. The advantages of these three experiments are that, not only do they explore problems relevant to the Space Station operation and utilization, but also they constitute tests adaptable to two multiuse facilities installed in the Space Station laboratory module, the Combustion Tunnel Facility and the Combustion Facility. Three additional spacecraft fire-safety experiments, essential precursors to the TD M for near-term performance, are also described as follows: 1. Near-Term Testing of Materials for Combustion and Flame Spread 2. Near-Term Extinguishment of Fires in a Low-Gravity Test Bed 3. Post-Fire Recovery of Sensitive Electrical and Electronic Equipment. For all the experiments, the study defines accommodations in terms of first-order space, mass, power, consumables, and crew-time estimates. The study also reviews the key problems to be addressed, namely experiment safety hazards, non-intrusive diagnostics development and waste-products disposal. A preliminary task and time schedule for design, development, and experiment fabrication is proposed.
Recent discussions of psychology's involvement in spaceflight have emphasized its role in enhancing space living conditions and incresing crew productivity. While these goals are central to space missions, behavioral scientists should not lose sight of a more basic flight requirement - that of crew safety. This paper examines some of the processes employed in the American space program in support of crew safety and suggests that behavioral scientists could contribute to flight safety, both through these formal processes and through less formal methods. Various safety areas of relevance to behavioral scientists are discussed.
Before technical safety guidelines and requirements are established, a common understanding of their origin and importance must be shared between Space Station Program Management, the User Community, and the Safety organizations involved. Safety guidelines and requirements are driven by the nature of the experiments, and the degree of crew interaction. Hazard identification; development of technical safety requirements; operating procedures and constraints; provision of training and education; conduct of reviews and evaluations; and emergency preplanning are briefly discussed.