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At least 379 records · Page 21

Thermal Analysis Evaluations Using the Dry Cask Simulator

Different thermal analysis models were developed to simulate the dry cask simulator (DCS). The DCS is an experiment designed to simulate dry storage of a single boiling water reactor fuel assembly under a variety of heat loads and internal pressures. The DCS was set up and tested in both a vertical and horizontal configuration to determine cladding temperatures in vertical and horizontal dry cask storage systems. The models included a detailed STAR-CCM+ model with the fuel assembly geometry explicitly modeled, a porous STAR-CCM+ model with the fuel assembly geometry modeled as porous media region with calculated effective properties, and a COBRA-SFS model. COBRA-SFS is a thermal-hydraulic code developed for steady-state and transient analysis of multi assembly spent-fuel storage and transportation systems. STAR-CCM+ is a commercial computation fluid dynamics (CFD) code. Both a detailed and porous STARCCM+ model were developed to look at the effective thermal conductivity (keff) approach to modeling a fuel assembly. A keff fuel model is typically model in CFD thermal analyses due to its significantly lower computational costs. The models were run for a combination of low and high canister pressures (100 kPa and 800 kPa) and low and high internal heat loads (0.5 kW and 5 kW). Results from all three models were compared against experimental data taken from the DCS for the peak cladding temperature (PCT) and inlet air mass flow.

Suffield, Sarah R.↗

Impact of Fuel Failure on Criticality Safety of Used Nuclear Fuel

Commercial used nuclear fuel (UNF) in the United States is expected to remain in storage for considerably longer periods than originally intended (e.g., <40 years). Extended storage (ES) time and irradiation of nuclear fuel to high-burnup values (>45 GWd/t) may increase the potential for fuel failure during normal and accident conditions involving storage and transportation. Fuel failure, depending on the severity, can result in changes to the geometric configuration of the fuel, which has safety and regulatory implications. The likelihood and extent of fuel reconfiguration and its impact on the safety of the UNF is not well understood. The objective of this work is to assess and quantify the impact of fuel reconfiguration due to fuel failure on criticality safety of UNF in storage and transportation casks. This effort is primarily motivated by concerns related to the potential for fuel degradation during ES periods and transportation following ES. The criticality analyses consider representative UNF designs and cask systems and a range of fuel enrichments, burnups, and cooling times. The various failed-fuel configurations considered are designed to bound the anticipated effects of individual rod and general cladding failure, fuel rod deformation, loss of neutron absorber materials, degradation of canister internals, and gross assembly failure. The results quantify the potential impact on criticality safety associated with fuel reconfiguration and may be used to guide future research, design, and regulatory activities. Although it can be concluded that the criticality safety impacts of fuel reconfiguration during transportation subsequent to ES are manageable, the results indicate that certain configurations can result in a large increase in the effective neutron multiplication factor, k eff . Future work to inform decision making relative to which configurations are credible, and therefore need to be considered in a safety evaluation, is recommended.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Additional Studies of the Criticality Safety of Failed Used Nuclear Fuel

Commercial used nuclear fuel (UNF) in the United States is expected to remain in storage for periods potentially greater than 40 years. Extended storage (ES) time and irradiation to high-burnup values (>45 GWd/t) may increase the potential for fuel failure during normal and accident conditions involving storage and transportation. Fuel failure, depending on the severity, could result in changes to the geometric configuration of the fuel, which has safety and regulatory implications. The likelihood and extent of fuel reconfiguration and its impact on the safety of the UNF is not well understood. The objective of this work is to assess and quantify the impact of fuel reconfiguration due to fuel failure on criticality safety of UNF in storage and transportation casks. Criticality analyses are conducted considering representative UNF designs covering a range of enrichments and burnups in multiple cask systems. Prior work developed a set of failed fuel configuration categories and specific configurations were evaluated to understand trends and quantify the consequences of worst-case potential reconfiguration progressions. These results will be summarized here and indicate that the potential impacts on subcriticality can be rather significant for certain configurations (e.g., >20% keff). It can be concluded that the consequences of credible fuel failure configurations from ES or transportation following ES are manageable (e.g., <5% keff). The current work expands on these efforts and examines some modified scenarios and modified approaches to investigate the effectiveness of some techniques for reducing the calculated increase in keff. The areas included here are more realistic modeling of some assembly types and the effect of reconfiguration of some assemblies in the storage and transportation canister.

Marshall, William BJ J↗

EURATOM safeguards efforts in the development of spent fuel verification methods by non-destructive assay

The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle continues to develop. The European Commission, particularly the Nuclear Safeguards Directorate of the Directorate General for Energy, implements Euratom safeguards and needs to adapt to this situation. The verification methods for spent nuclear fuel, which EURATOM inspectors can use, require continuous improvement. Whereas the Euratom on-site laboratories provide accurate verification results for fuel undergoing reprocessing, the situation is different for spent fuel which is destined for final storage. In particular, new needs arise from the increasing number of cask loadings for interim dry storage and the advanced plans for the construction of encapsulation plants and geological repositories. Various scenarios present verification challenges. In this context, EURATOM Safeguards, often in cooperation with other stakeholders, is committed to further improvement of NDA methods for spent fuel verification. In this effort EURATOM plays various roles, ranging from definition of inspection needs to direct participation in development of measurement systems, including support of research in the framework of international agreements and via the EC Support Program to the IAEA. This paper presents recent progress in selected NDA methods. These methods have been conceived to satisfy different spent fuel verification needs, ranging from attribute testing to pin-level partial defect verification. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

FATIGUE BEHAVIOR OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL RODS IN SIMULATED TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENT

Nuclear fuel rod is composed of cladding tube and a specified number of fuel pellets contained. In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is expected to be transported to at least one storage facility before permanent disposal. The fatigue behavior of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods under reversed cyclic bending must be understood in order to evaluate their vibration integrity in a transportation environment. This is especially important for high-burnup SNFs (>45 GWd/MTU). This report presents the experimental results related to Zircaloy (Zry)-4 - based surrogate rods and high-burnup SNFs, based on recent work performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The surrogate rod was made of Zry-4 cladding and alumina pellets, and high-burnup fuel rods were discharged from H.B. Robinson pressurized water reactor. The reversed cyclic bending testing was conducted at 5 Hz under loading control. The effect of pre-hydriding and burnup or irradiation on the flexural rigidity and fatigue life of cladding-pellet system were discussed. The fatigue data obtained are extremely useful to the future certification of SNF storage and transportation cask.

Wang, Jy-An John↗

Dry Transfer Systems for Used Nuclear Fuel

The potential need for a dry transfer system (DTS) to enable retrieval of used nuclear fuel (UNF) for inspection or repackaging will increase as the duration and quantity of fuel in dry storage increases. This report explores the uses for a DTS, identifies associated general functional requirements, and reviews existing and proposed systems that currently perform dry fuel transfers. The focus of this paper is on the need for a DTS to enable transfer of bare fuel assemblies. Dry transfer systems for UNF canisters are currently available and in use for transferring loaded canisters between the drying station and storage and transportation casks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Used Fuel Disposition Campaign: Phase I Ring Compression Testing of High-Burnup Cladding

The purpose of ring compression testing is to generate data to support the development of the technical basis for extended storage and transportation of high-burnup fuel. Argonne National Laboratory developed the methodology of using ring compression tests (RCTs) for radial-hydride-treated (RHT) cladding to generate data for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on the behavior of high-burnup Zircaloy-4 (Zry-4) and ZIRLO™ cladding. The RHT/RCT methodology is an established test protocol accepted by NRC for generating data to support the technical basis for licensing storage and transportation casks with high-burnup fuel. In July 2011, Phase I testing for DOE on high-burnup M5 ® cladding was initiated under the ANL FY11 Work Package Transportation; Phase I testing for DOE on high-burnup M5 ® cladding continued into fiscal year 2012 under the ANL FY12 Work Package Engineering Materials Experimental. This report highlights the results of completed Phase I testing of high-burnup M5 ® cladding and the revised three-year test plan, which is included in the Appendix.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Qualitative and Quantitative Assessment of Nuclear Materials Contained in High-Activity Waste Arising from the Operations at the 'SHELTER' Facility

As a result of the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl NPP in 1986, the explosion dispeesed nuclear materials contained in the nuclear fuel of the reactor core over the destroyed facilities at Unit No. 4 and over the territory immediately adjacent to the destroyed unit. The debris was buried under the Cascade Wall. Nuclear materials at the SHELTER can be characterized as spent nuclear fuel, fresh fuel assemblies (including fuel assemblies with damaged geometry and integrity, and individual fuel elements), core fragments of the Chernobyl NPP Unit No. 4, finely-dispersed fuel (powder/dust), uranium and plutonium compounds in water solutions, and lava-like nuclear fuel-containing masses. The new safe confinement (NSC) is a facility designed to enclose the Chernobyl NPP Unit No. 4 destroyed by the accident. Construction of the NSC involves excavating operations, which are continuously monitored including for the level of radiation. The findings of such monitoring at the SHELTER site will allow us to characterize the recovered radioactive waste. When a process material categorized as high activity waste (HAW) is detected the following HLW management operations should be involved: HLW collection; HLW fragmentation (if appropriate); loading HAW into the primary package KT-0.2; loading the primary package filled with HAW into the transportation cask KTZV-0.2; and storing the cask in temporary storage facilities for high-level solid waste. The CDAS system is a system of 3He tubes for neutron coincidence counting, and is designed to measure the percentage ratio of specific nuclear materials in a 200-liter drum containing nuclear material intermixed with a matrix. The CDAS consists of panels with helium counter tubes and a polyethylene moderator. The panels are configured to allow one to position a waste-containing drum and a drum manipulator. The system operates on the ‘add a source’ basis using a small Cf-252 source to identify irregularities in the matrix during an assay. The platform with the source is placed under the measurement chamber. The platform with the source material is moved under the measurement chamber. The design allows one to move the platform with the source in and out, thus moving the drum. The CDAS system and radioactive waste containers have been built. For each drum filled with waste two individual measurements (passive/active) will be made. This paper briefly describes the work carried out to assess qualitatively and quantitatively the nuclear materials contained in high-level waste at the SHELTER facility. These efforts substantially increased nuclear safety and security at the facility.

Cherkas, Dmytro↗

Reference Fuel Development for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

The Savannah River Site (SRS) L Area Facility provides for the safe receipt, storage, handling, and shipping of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and has received more than 47,000 SNF assemblies since 1964. In order to consolidate receipt and storage analysis, L Area criticality safety has historically used several aluminum-clad “reference fuels” to establish bounding storage, handling, and cask loading limits and then applied a reactivity comparison approach to demonstrate that candidate fuels may be processed under the reference fuel limits. Currently, only aluminum-clad SNF from off-site research reactors are transferred on-site. The Accelerated Basin De-Inventory (ABD) program will begin the removal of bundled Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel (NASNF) from the L Area disassembly basin for dissolution and disposition, which has driven the need for a non-aluminum reference fuel. This paper discusses the process and results of creating a new fictional homogenous NASNF highly enriched uranium reference fuel, “MITZ,” to be used in nuclear criticality safety evaluations for upcoming SNF disposition operations. Data demonstrating the relationship between neutron multiplication behavior and fuel spacing is generated for the new reference fuel MITZ as well as existing reference fuels representing several types of SNF assemblies.

Reference Fuel↗

Reference Fuel Development for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

The Savannah River Site (SRS) L Area Facility provides for the safe receipt, storage, handling, and shipping of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and has received more than 47,000 SNF assemblies since 1964. In order to consolidate receipt and storage analysis, L Area criticality safety has historically used several aluminum-clad “reference fuels” to establish bounding storage, handling, and cask loading limits and then applied a reactivity comparison approach to demonstrate that candidate fuels may be processed under the reference fuel limits. Currently, only aluminum-clad SNF from off-site research reactors are transferred on-site. The Accelerated Basin De-Inventory (ABD) program will begin the removal of bundled Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel (NASNF) from the L Area disassembly basin for dissolution and disposition, which has driven the need for a non-aluminum reference fuel. This paper discusses the process and results of creating a new fictional homogenous NASNF highly enriched uranium reference fuel, “MITZ,” to be used in nuclear criticality safety evaluations for upcoming SNF disposition operations. Data demonstrating the relationship between neutron multiplication behavior and fuel spacing is generated for the new reference fuel MITZ as well as existing reference fuels representing several types of SNF assemblies.

Reference Fuel↗

Analysis of Radiological Release From Fueled Irradiation Experiments During Manual Handling (Slides)

Irradiation experiments are manually handled at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) by qualified operators using long handled tools. Standard handling evolutions include insertion and removal from the reactor vessel, transfer to/from a storage location or cask in the ATR canal, and handling/reconfigurations at a canal working tray. Such routine handling has the potential to result in mechanical damage to the experiment boundary which is credited to retain fission products. Since damage can occur due to operator error, this is an anticipated occurrence. This work determines the radiological consequences to receptors inside the ATR facility, as well as public receptors. Given the wide variety of fuel types tested at the ATR, a generic approach to the analysis is taken. The radiological inventory is determined to bound a variety of fuel types (e.g., ceramic and molten fuel matrices) and fission powers on the U-235 enrichment spectrum. The source term analysis considers different release fractions to bound different fuel types and burnups. The postulated handling events occur underwater; thus, retention of the released isotopic content is considered within the canal water column. Retention of radionuclides in the water column is determined using a modified approach of United States (US) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183. Radiological dose to the facility receptor is determined using a compartment release model. Dose to the public receptor is determined using atmospheric dispersion models using site specific atmospheric conditions with the use of the Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) program version 7.2.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Evaluation of salt particle collection device for preventing SCC on canister - Effect on particle collection rate by electric field

Now, in Japan, while metal casks are used for spent nuclear fuel storage, a practical use of concrete casks is under review because of its cost effectiveness and procurement easiness. In reviewing the practical use, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of a canister container in the concrete cask becomes an issue and is needed to be resolved soon. A natural ventilation system is generally adopted for the storage facilities, especially in Japan where facilities are built near coasts so that the cooling air includes sea salt particles. Therefore, the occurrence of SCC is concerned when the sea salt particles adhere to welded parts of the canisters. In this study, we proposed a salt particle collection device with low pressure loss which does not interfere with the air flow into the building or the concrete casks. The device is composed of a stack of 10 parallel stainless steel plates, the air is free to circulate in the space between them. Pressure loss tests in a laboratory and salt particle collection tests in the field have been performed. It has been clarified that the pressure loss of the device is one-thirtieth to one-twentieth of that of a commercial filter and 40% of the particles in the air could be collected and the device would not influence the heat removal performance. Moreover, we evaluated the effect of electric field on the particle collection under supposing the particle charge. In the case of electric field over 10{sup 3} kV/m the particle collection rate could be improved dramatically.

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Damaged Fuel in the United States - 20325

Throughout the history of commercial nuclear power plant operations in the U.S., many fuel assemblies have lost the capability to perform all of their desired functions. Since they can no longer be handled, stored, or transported in accordance with established regulations, they are classified as damaged fuel. The causes of these failed assemblies are diverse and plant-specific. The majority of these failed assemblies are contained in damaged fuel cans to be used in conjunction with storage and/or transportation systems. These systems have a limited number of slots that can be filled with damaged fuel cans. A damaged fuel can is generally a stainless-steel container that confines damaged spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and is closed at one end by mesh endpoints that allow gaseous and liquid media to escape but minimize the dispersal of gross particulate material. Out of extreme caution, a few reactors have loaded high burnup fuel into damaged fuel cans. Damaged fuel is not licensed for storage or transport in the U.S. because relevant regulations do not specify exactly how to classify damaged fuel. Instead, these regulations license/certify packages that specify approved contents. Damaged fuel must be included among the approved contents to be considered acceptable. In many cases, damaged SNF is encapsulated in damaged fuel cans to ensure it can confine gross fuel particles, debris, and/or damaged assemblies to known volumes within loaded casks. A damaged fuel can may then be utilized in the same way as an assembly in a storage and transportation system. Some storage cask systems utilize top and bottom plugs to confine debris in damaged fuel. The most recent domestic documentation on damaged SNF was published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), which used data from U.S. reactors compiled from 1968 to June 30, 2013, to produce Form GC-859, 'Nuclear Fuel Data Survey.' According to this form, there were 136,821 boiling water reactor (BWR) SNF assemblies and 104,647 pressurized water reactor (PWR) SNF assemblies, for a combined total of 241,468. Of these, 4,521 were classified as failed. Some were also disassembled and the fuel rods or pieces of fuel rods combined to make consolidated assemblies. These consolidated assemblies may include damaged fuel or were perhaps consolidated as part of a demonstration project. The GC-859 data includes 2,550 consolidated assemblies containing 0 - 264 entire fuel rods. These consolidated assemblies could be placed in single assembly canisters and stored in the spent fuel pool. For dry storage and transportation, a single assembly canister is generally placed in each damaged fuel can. In addition to the consolidated assemblies, 2,391 un-canistered fuel rod pieces exist, which were removed from 494 assemblies. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Damaged Fuel in the United States

Over the years of commercial nuclear power plant operations in the United States (U.S.), many fuel assemblies have lost the capability to perform all of their desired functions. These assemblies have lost the capability to be handled, stored, or transported to meet regulations resulting in them being classified as damaged fuel. The causes of these failed assemblies are diverse and plant-specific. The majority of these failed assemblies are contained in a damaged fuel can that will be used in conjunction with a storage and/or transportation system. The storage and transportation systems have a limit on how many slots can be filled with damaged fuel cans. A damaged fuel can is generally a stainless steel container that confines damaged SNF and is closed on its end by screened openings. These screened openings allow gaseous and liquid media to escape but minimize the dispersal of gross particulate material. Out of an abundance of caution a few reactors have loaded high burnup fuel into damaged fuel cans. Damaged fuel is not licensed for storage or transport in the U.S., because the regulations for storage and transport do not specify exactly how to classify damaged fuel. Instead the regulations license/certify packages that specify approved contents. Damaged fuel must be included in the approved contents to be a viable option. In many cases damaged SNF is encapsulated in a damaged fuel can to ensure it can confine gross fuel particles, debris, and or damaged assemblies to a known volume within a loaded cask. This damaged fuel can may then be utilized in the same way as an assembly in a storage and transportation design system. Some storage cask systems utilize top and bottom plugs to confine debris in damaged fuel. The most recent domestic documentation on damaged SNF was performed by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and used data from U.S. reactors concluding in June 30th 2013 to produce Form GC-859, “Nuclear Fuel Data Survey”. Based on this form there were 136,821 boiling water reactor (BWR) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies and 104,647 pressurized water reactor (PWR) SNF assemblies for a total of 241,468 SNF assemblies in the U.S. Out of these 241,468 SNF assemblies, 4,521 assemblies were classified as failed. Some assemblies were also disassembled and the fuel rods or pieces of fuel rods were combined together to make a consolidated assembly. A consolidated assembly may include damaged fuel, or it could have been consolidated as part of a demonstration project. The GC-859 data includes 2,550 consolidated assemblies containing between 0 and 264 whole fuel rods. These consolidated assemblies could be placed in single assembly canisters and stored in the spent fuel pool. For dry storage and transportation, a single assembly canister is generally placed in a damaged fuel can. In addition to the consolidated assemblies, 2,391 uncanistered fuel rod pieces exist, which were removed from 494 assemblies.

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Friction Experiment Data Analysis

The Spent Fuel Waste Disposition (SFWD) program under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is planning a seismic shake table test of full-scale dry storage systems of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to close the gap related to the seismic loads on the fuel assemblies in dry storage systems. This test will allow for quantifying the strains and accelerations on surrogate fuel assembly during representative earthquakes. A concrete layer will be installed on the shake table before the test to simulate conditions representative of an ISFSI pad. In the shake table tests with the vertical cask, the cask will be free-standing because this is representative of all, except two, ISFSIs in the U.S. with vertical dry storage casks. The static and dynamic friction coefficients between the steel bottom of the cask and the concrete layer on the shake table are important parameters that will affect cask behavior during the test. These parameters must be known for the pre- and post-test modelling, data analysis, and model validation. The friction experiment was performed at the Engineering Department of the University of New Mexico (UNM) to determine the friction coefficients between a steel plate with the same finish as the bottom of the vertical cask manufactured for the test and different concrete surfaces. In this experiment the steel plate was fixed and the concrete sample was pulled over the plate with a constant displacement rate using an MTS machine. This allowed for collecting continuous horizontal force data over the length of the steel plate. Four displacement rates and three vertical loads were used. The tests were performed with four concrete blocks with different degrees of the surface roughness - light sandblast, light to medium sandblast, medium bush hammer, and heavy sandblast. The total number of tests was 48. The data were used to calculate static and dynamic friction coefficients.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Pretest Modeling A Spent Nuclear Fuel Seismic Shake Test

The U.S. Department of Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program is planning to conduct a series of full-scale shake table tests to simulate hypothetical earthquake conditions and record the response of surrogate spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies in a dry canister storage system mockup. The shake table motions will represent a range of hypothetical earthquake conditions at hypothetical locations in the continental U.S. to generally define the range of mechanical loads that SNF can be expected to experience during extended dry storage periods. This paper describes the pretest predictions made with LS-DYNA models of the mockup storage systems. The test will use two dry storage system configurations, a mockup vertical concrete cask (VCC) and a mockup horizontal storage module (HSM). The test will use a production-quality canister and basket. Within the canister will be four instrumented fuel assemblies with fuel rods containing surrogate mass and 28 instrumented dummy assemblies that are intended to match the mass and outer dimension of a fuel assembly. The finite element models include models of the VCC and HSM on the shake table to calculate the system level dynamic responses and separate single fuel assembly models to calculate stress and strain in fuel assembly components. Both types of models include nonlinear behavior like rod-to-rod contact and the ability for VCC’s to rock and slide. This paper presents the expected response of the VCC, HSM, and fuel assemblies to the shake table testing that is planned to start in April of 2024. The earthquake conditions represent seismic hazards in the 2,000-to-20,000-year return period range. The test data is expected to confirm the expectation that fuel rod cladding will remain intact, fuel assembly structural components like guide tubes will remain intact, and no significant VCC sliding or tipping will occur in the range of conditions to be tested with the shake table.

Klymyshyn, Nicholas A.↗

Fission Product Gas Monitoring During Fuel Drying Operations - 20094

The goal of the project was to devise and implement a method of accurately qualifying any noble gas emitted during fuel drying operations (part of the dry fuel storage process) in order to provide the data needed to validate the off-site dose calculations. The imputes of the project was the NRC publishing Information Notice 18-01, 'Noble Fission Gas Releases During Spent Fuel Cask Loading Operations' in February 2018. The information notice describes some industry events that occurred during vacuum drying operations as part of a dry fuel campaign. The solution was devised by Fort Calhoun Station staff in partnership with Mirion Technologies technical staff. The monitoring was accomplished by directing all the effluent from the fuel storage cask vacuum drying machine through a sample chamber containing a compact ISOCS characterized CZT based gamma spectrometer connected to a Mirion Data Analyst. This resulted near real-time quantification of the radionuclides of concern. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Used Fuel Cask Identification through Neutron Profile

Currently, most spent fuel is stored near reactors. An interim consolidated fuel storage facility would receive fuel from multiple sites and store it in casks on site for decades. For successful operation of such a facility there is need for a way to restore continuity of knowledge if lost as well as a method that will indicate state of fuel inside the cask. Used nuclear fuel is identifiable by its radiation emission, both gamma and neutron. Neutron emission from fission products, multiplication from remaining fissile material, and the unique distribution of both in each cask produce a unique neutron signature. If two signatures taken at different times do not match, either changes within the fuel content or misidentification of a cask occurred. It was found that identification of cask loadings works well through the profile of emitted neutrons in simulated real casks. Even casks with similar overall neutron emission or average counts around the circumference can be distinguished from each other by analyzing the profile. In conclusion, (1) identification of unaltered casks through neutron signature profile is viable; (2) collecting the profile provides insight to the condition and intactness of the fuel stored inside the cask; and (3) the signature profile is stable over time.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗