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NASA NTRS2003

Ultra-High-Temperature Ceramics Evaluated for Aeropropulsion Use

Ultra-high-temperature ceramics (UHTC) are a group of materials consisting of zirconium diboride (ZrB2) or hafnium diboride (HfB2) plus silicon carbide (SiC), and in some instances, carbon (C). They offer a combination of properties that make them candidates for airframe leading edges on sharp-bodied reentry vehicles. These UHTCs perform well in the environment for such applications (i.e., air at low pressures). The purpose of this study at the NASA Glenn Research Center was to examine three of these materials under conditions more representative of a propulsion environment: that is, higher oxygen partial pressure and total pressure. Relatively long, multiple-exposure cycles were emphasized. We completed an in-house study of ZrB2 plus 20 vol% SiC (abbreviated as ZS), ZrB2 plus 14 vol% SiC and 30 vol% C (ZSC), and SCS-9a SiC fiber-reinforced ZrB2 plus 20 vol% SiC (ZSS). HfB2-based compositions were not included in the study because of their high cost. The capability of UHTC for propulsion applications must be compared with that of mature, available, and commercially used ceramics such as silicon nitride (e.g., AS-800) to put things in proper perspective. In terms of mechanical properties, UHTCs fall short in terms of strength and fracture toughness. At about 1300 C, the creep resistance of ZS appears to be superior to the creep resistance reported for AS-800. However, the stress rupture life for Si3N4 under stress and temperature conditions similar to those used in this study is measured in hundreds of hours. Because of oxidation, ZS could not achieve such lives. In terms of oxidation resistance, acceptable amounts of material recession in 1 hour to thousands of hours, depending on the specific propulsion application, are on the order of 100 to 300 mm. This converts to an acceptable range of parabolic recession rate constants kp" of approximately less than or equal to 10(exp -1) to 10(exp -2) square millimeters per hour for a 1-hr application. For a 100-hr application, an acceptable range of kp" would be less than or equal to those values divided by 100. For the more oxidation resistant ZS material, measured parabolic recession rate constants were 4.7 x 10(exp -3) millimeters per hour at 1327 C, 7.8 x 10(exp -2) square millimeters per hour at 1627 C, and 1.3 millimeters per hour at 1927 C. Thus, recession rate constants for ZS are acceptable at 1327 C for a 1-hr application, but here silicon nitride is a superior material. At 1627 C, ZS oxidation is marginal for a 1-hr application, but dimensional growth would be an issue. In a 100-hr application, ZS cannot be considered at any temperature. Our cursory examination of thermal shock, both from a theoretical and experimental viewpoint, indicated that the ZS and ZSC UHTCs are inferior to AS-800 silicon nitride. On the basis of this limited study, UHTCs are not ready to be considered as aeropropulsion materials for any applications longer than a few minutes. Current materials suffer from aggressive oxidation and moisture attack (Quynhgiao Nguyen, NASA Glenn, and Raymond C. Robinson, QSS Group, Inc., Cleveland, OH, 2002, private communication), and they are susceptible to thermal shock. For long-term propulsion applications, major improvements in environmental durability are needed. Work is in progress to improve the oxidation resistance of UHTC materials.

Levine, Stanley R.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Thermostable Shelf Life Study

The objective of this project is to determine the shelf life end-point of various food items by means of actual measurement or mathematical projection. The primary goal of the Advanced Food Technology Project in these long duration exploratory missions is to provide the crew with a palatable, nutritious and safe food system while minimizing volume, mass, and waste. The Mars missions could be as long as 2.5 years with the potential of the food being positioned prior to the crew arrival. Therefore, it is anticipated that foods that are used during the Mars missions will require a 5 year shelf life. Shelf life criteria are safety, nutrition, and acceptability. Any of these criteria can be the limiting factor in determining the food's shelf life. Due to the heat sterilization process used for the thermostabilized food items, safety will be preserved as long as the integrity of the package is maintained. Nutrition and acceptability will change over time. Since the food can be the sole source of nutrition to the crew, a significant loss in nutrition may determine when the shelf life endpoint has occurred. Shelf life can be defined when the food item is no longer acceptable. Acceptability can be defined in terms of appearance, flavor, texture, or aroma. Results from shelf life studies of the thermostabilized food items suggest that the shelf life of the foods range from 0 months to 8 years, depending on formulation.

Perchonok, M. H.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Enhanced Oceanic Operations Human-In-The-Loop In-Trail Procedure Validation Simulation Study

The Enhanced Oceanic Operations Human-In-The-Loop In-Trail Procedure (ITP) Validation Simulation Study investigated the viability of an ITP designed to enable oceanic flight level changes that would not otherwise be possible. Twelve commercial airline pilots with current oceanic experience flew a series of simulated scenarios involving either standard or ITP flight level change maneuvers and provided subjective workload ratings, assessments of ITP validity and acceptability, and objective performance measures associated with the appropriate selection, request, and execution of ITP flight level change maneuvers. In the majority of scenarios, subject pilots correctly assessed the traffic situation, selected an appropriate response (i.e., either a standard flight level change request, an ITP request, or no request), and executed their selected flight level change procedure, if any, without error. Workload ratings for ITP maneuvers were acceptable and not substantially higher than for standard flight level change maneuvers, and, for the majority of scenarios and subject pilots, subjective acceptability ratings and comments for ITP were generally high and positive. Qualitatively, the ITP was found to be valid and acceptable. However, the error rates for ITP maneuvers were higher than for standard flight level changes, and these errors may have design implications for both the ITP and the study's prototype traffic display. These errors and their implications are discussed.

Murdoch, Jennifer L.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Thermostabilized Shelf Life Study

Perchonok, Michele H.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Use of Data Comm by Flight Crew in High-Density Terminal Areas

This paper describes a collaborative FAA and NASA experiment using 22 commercial airline pilots to determine the effect of using Datalink Communication (Data Comm) to issue messages in busy, terminal area operations. Four conditions were defined that span current day to future flight deck equipage levels (voice communication only, Data Comm only, Data Comm with Moving Map Display, Data Comm with Moving Map displaying taxi route), and each condition was used to create an arrival and a departure scenario at the Boston Logan Airport. These eight scenarios were repeated twice for a total of 16 scenarios for each of the eleven crews. Quantitative data was collected on subject reaction time and eye tracking information. Questionnaires collected subjective feedback on workload and acceptability to the flight crew for using Data Comm in a busy terminal area. 95% of the Data Comm messages were responded to by the flight crew within one minute; however, post experiment debrief comments revealed almost unanimous consensus that two minutes was a reasonable expectation for crew response. Eye tracking data indicated an insignificant decrease in head-up time for the Pilot Flying when Data Comm was introduced; however, the Pilot Monitoring had significantly less head-up time. Data Comm workload was rated as operationally acceptable by both crew members in all conditions in flight at any altitude above the Final Approach Fix in terms of response time and workload. Results also indicate the use of Data Comm during surface operations was acceptable, the exception being the simultaneous use of voice, Data Comm, and audio chime required for an aircraft to cross an active runway. Many crews reported they believed Data Comm messages would be acceptable after the Final Approach Fix or to cross a runway if the message was not accompanied by a chime and there was not a requirement to immediately respond to the uplink message.

Baxley, Brian T.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Evaluation of an Airborne Spacing Concept, On-Board Spacing Tool, and Pilot Interface

The number of commercial aircraft operations is predicted to increase in the next ten years, creating a need for improved operational efficiency. Two areas believed to offer significant increases in efficiency are optimized profile descents and dependent parallel runway operations. It is envisioned that during both of these types of operations, flight crews will precisely space their aircraft behind preceding aircraft at air traffic control assigned intervals to increase runway throughput and maximize the use of existing infrastructure. This paper describes a human-in-the-loop experiment designed to study the performance of an onboard spacing algorithm and pilots ratings of the usability and acceptability of an airborne spacing concept that supports dependent parallel arrivals. Pilot participants flew arrivals into the Dallas Fort-Worth terminal environment using one of three different simulators located at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA) Langley Research Center. Scenarios were flown using Interval Management with Spacing (IM-S) and Required Time of Arrival (RTA) control methods during conditions of no error, error in the forecast wind, and offset (disturbance) to the arrival flow. Results indicate that pilots delivered their aircraft to the runway threshold within +/- 3.5 seconds of their assigned arrival time and reported that both the IM-S and RTA procedures were associated with low workload levels. In general, pilots found the IM-S concept, procedures, speeds, and interface acceptable; with 92% of pilots rating the procedures as complete and logical, 218 out of 240 responses agreeing that the IM-S speeds were acceptable, and 63% of pilots reporting that the displays were easy to understand and displayed in appropriate locations. The 22 (out of 240) responses, indicating that the commanded speeds were not acceptable and appropriate occurred during scenarios containing wind error and offset error. Concerns cited included the occurrence of multiple speed changes within a short time period, speed changes required within twenty miles of the runway, and an increase in airspeed followed shortly by a decrease in airspeed. Within this paper, appropriate design recommendations are provided, and the need for continued, iterative human-centered design is discussed.

Swieringa, Kurt↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

NASA NTRS2013

Operational Evaluatioin of Dynamic Weather Routes at American Airlines

Dynamic Weather Routes (DWR) is a search engine that continuously and automatically analyzes inflight aircraft in en route airspace and proposes simple route amendments for more efficient routes around convective weather while considering sector congestion, traffic conflicts, and active Special Use Airspace. NASA and American Airlines (AA) are conducting an operational trial of DWR at the AA System Operations Center in Fort Worth, TX. The trial includes only AA flights in Fort Worth Center airspace. Over the period from July 31, 2012 through August 31, 2012, 45% of routes proposed by DWR and evaluated by AA users - air traffic control coordinators and flight dispatchers - were rated as acceptable as proposed or with some modifications. The wind-corrected potential flying time savings for these acceptable routes totals 470 flying min, and results suggest another 1,500 min of potential savings for flights not evaluated due to staffing limitations. A sector congestion analysis shows that in only two out of 83 DWR routes rated acceptable by AA staff were the flights predicted to fly through a congested sector inside of 30 min downstream of present position. This shows that users considered sector congestion data provided by DWR automation and in nearly all cases did not accept routes through over-capacity sectors. It is estimated that 12 AA flights were given reroute clearances as a direct result of DWR for a total savings of 67 flying min.

air traffic trajectory automation↗

NASA NTRS2016

Large Payload Ground Transportation and Test Considerations

During test and verification planning for the Altair lunar lander project, a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) study team identified several ground transportation and test issues related to the large payload diameter. Although the entire Constellation Program-including Altair-has since been canceled, issues identified by the Altair project serve as important lessons learned for payloads greater than 7 m diameter being considered for NASA's new Space Launch System (SLS). A transportation feasibility study found that Altair's 8.97 m diameter Descent Module would not fit inside available aircraft. Although the Ascent Module cabin was only 2.35 m diameter, the long reaction control system booms extended nearly to the Descent Module diameter, making it equally unsuitable for air transportation without removing the booms and invalidating assembly workmanship screens or acceptance testing that had already been performed. Ground transportation of very large payloads over extended distances is not generally permitted by most states, so overland transportation alone would not be an option. Limited ground transportation to the nearest waterway may be possible, but water transportation could take as long as 66 days per production unit, depending on point of origin and acceptance test facility; transportation from the western United States would require transit through the Panama Canal to access the Kennedy Space Center launch site. Large payloads also pose acceptance test and ground processing challenges. Although propulsion, mechanical vibration, and reverberant acoustic test facilities at NASA's Plum Brook Station have been designed to accommodate large spacecraft, special handling and test work-arounds may be necessary, which could increase cost, schedule, and technical risk. Once at the launch site, there are no facilities currently capable of accommodating the combination of large payload size and hazardous processing such as hypergolic fuels, pyrotechnic devices, and high pressure gasses. Ironically, the limiting factor to a national heavy lift strategy may not be the rocket technology needed to throw a heavy payload, but rather the terrestrial infrastructure-roads, bridges, airframes, and buildings-necessary to transport, acceptance test, and process large spacecraft. Failure to carefully consider where and how large spacecraft are manufactured, tested, and launched could result in unforeseen cost to modify existing (or develop new) infrastructure, or incur additional risk due to increased handling operations or eliminating key verifications.

Rucker, Michelle A.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, and process controls. These sources often dominate component level reliability or risk of failure probability. While consequences of failure is often understood in assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence will likely underestimate the risk. Managers and decision makers often use the probability of occurrence in determining whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. Due to the absence of system level test and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be appropriately characterized for decision making purposes. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account system integration risks such as those attributable to manufacturing and assembly. These sources often dominate component level risk. While consequence of failure is often understood, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence may underestimate the actual risk. Managers and decision makers use the probability of occurrence to influence the determination whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. The actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be fully understood due to the absence of system level test data or operational data. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Risk of Performance Decrement and Crew Illness Due to an Inadequate Food System

NASA is preparing for long duration manned missions beyond low-Earth orbit that will be challenged in several ways, including long-term exposure to the space environment, impacts to crew physiological and psychological health, limited resources, and no resupply. The food system is one of the most significant daily factors that can be altered to improve human health, and performance during space exploration. Therefore, the paramount importance of determining the methods, technologies, and requirements to provide a safe, nutritious, and acceptable food system that promotes crew health and performance cannot be underestimated. The processed and prepackaged food system is the main source of nutrition to the crew, therefore significant losses in nutrition, either through degradation of nutrients during processing and storage or inadequate food intake due to low acceptability, variety, or usability, may significantly compromise the crew's health and performance. Shelf life studies indicate that key nutrients and quality factors in many space foods degrade to concerning levels within three years, suggesting that food system will not meet the nutrition and acceptability requirements of a long duration mission beyond low-Earth orbit. Likewise, mass and volume evaluations indicate that the current food system is a significant resource burden. Alternative provisioning strategies, such as inclusion of bioregenerative foods, are challenged with resource requirements, and food safety and scarcity concerns. Ensuring provisioning of an adequate food system relies not only upon determining technologies, and requirements for nutrition, quality, and safety, but upon establishing a food system that will support nutritional adequacy, even with individual crew preference and self-selection. In short, the space food system is challenged to maintain safety, nutrition, and acceptability for all phases of an exploration mission within resource constraints. This document presents the evidence for the Risk of Performance Decrement and Crew Illness Due to an Inadequate Food System and the gaps in relation to exploration, as identified by the NASA Human Research Program (HRP). The research reviewed here indicates strategies to establish methods, technologies, and requirements that increase food stability, support adequate nutrition, quality, and variety, enable supplementation with grow-pick-and-eat salad crops, ensure safety, and reduce resource use. Obtaining the evidence to establish an adequate food system is essential, as the resources allocated to the food system may be defined based on the data relating nutritional stability and food quality requirements to crew performance and health.

Douglas, Grace L.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Appreciation of the 2015 JGR Space Physics Peer Reviewers

The Editors of the Journal of Geophysical Research Space Physics are deeply indebted to the many people among the research community that serve this journal through peer review. The journal could not exist without the time and effort invested by the community through this voluntary activity, providing expert evaluations and thoughtful assessments of the work of others. In 2015, the journal had 1506 scientists contribute to the process with at least one peer review, for a total of 3575 reviews completed, including additional reviews of resubmitted manuscripts. There were 277 reviewers that contributed four or more reports in 2015. The average number of reviews per referee in 2015 was, therefore, 2.4. Note that the total number of manuscript final decisions (i.e., accept or reject) for Journal of Geophysical Research (JGR) Space Physics was 1147 in 2015. Of this, 774 were accepted and 373 were declined, for an acceptance rate of 67% last year. If the 1334 "revision" decisions are included in the tally, then the total number of decisions made in 2015 was 2481. Working out the arithmetic, it means that on average, a manuscript gets about 1.2 revision decisions before a final accept-or-reject decision. This explains the ~3.1 average number of reviews per manuscript throughout each paper's lifetime in the submission-revision editorial process. We are pleased and happy that the research community is willing and able to devote their resources toward this service endeavor. We appreciate each and every one of you that helped maintain the high quality of papers in JGR Space Physics last year. We look forward to another excellent year working with all of you through the year ahead.

Liemohn, Michael W.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Method for Tracking and Communicating Aggregate Risk Through the Use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) Tools

Large, complex projects can identify a significant number and variety of risks, throughout the project life cycle. These risks are analyzed, mitigated, closed or accepted as independent uncertainties. Once closed or accepted, it is easy for projects to lose awareness of their impact. In reality, each of these risks contributes some amount to the overall risk posture of the project. The ability to track and effectively communicate this aggregate risk has represented a challenge to project management. There have been previous attempts to create a schema to communicate the aggregate effect of risks, without notable success. Most of these attempts have centered on some additive metric derived from the scoring of likelihood and consequence values. This, in and of itself, is a logical approach, but all too often the scores were then aggregated to a level where all context was lost. One weakness has been a lack of attempt to create linkages or logical groups of the risks upon which useful aggregation could then occur. The overall move to model-based (systems) engineering (MBSE) has opened up a vast frontier of opportunities to better integrate all project data. MBSE provides an underlying layer that links data items to each other. Objectives link to requirements, which then link to functions, functions to physical architecture items, and so on, as far down as projects want to model. While it started with a focus on modeling requirements based on things like use cases, efforts are now underway to integrate safety and mission assurance (S&MA) information and analyses, such as risks. This effort, called Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA), is yielding models that are more useful and are a more accurate representations of the systems. MBSE models, with this ability to link related items, provide a new means of tracking and communicating aggregate risks. In the proposed method, risks are added into the models as distinct items, having attributes that communicate a scoring derived from the likelihood and consequence values as charted on the standard NASA 5x5 risk matrix. Like earlier efforts, each box in the 5x5 has an associated scoring, which may include both a current score and potential post-mitigation/control score. The risk items are then linked to elements of the model, such as system objectives/goals, requirements, functions, or physical architecture items, with "Risk to" relationships. These risks will then be communicated by use of reports generated from the model, detailing all risks and/or hazards linked to model elements. These reports can include aggregate impacts, including a current scoring and potential future state scoring based on the planned mitigations and/or controls. These reports will show all risks, open, accepted, and closed, linked to project objectives or requirements. When run as part of an upcoming risk acceptance discussion, these reports will serve to remind the team of all previous risks that relate to the effected portion of the system. When included as part of periodic program or project reviews, risk reviews, and safety reviews, this method can improve the overall understanding of the system's true risk posture. This proposed method takes full advantage of the advances that modern modeling techniques provide, with a minimal investment of additional time. Utilizing the model environment also enables a near constant access to current state of aggregate risks.

model based mission assurance↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems

In late fiscal year 2020, the Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) project began the process of formulating an investment strategy to support development of the technologies required for a high-power (megawatt-class) nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) system capable of performing human-scale missions. This activity was initiated concurrent with several high-level studies and assessments were either under way or had just concluded. Studies of human-scale Mars missions have been performed several times over the past two decades. One of the most recent studies examined opposition-class human Mars missions to occur in the late 2030s timeframe [1,2]. The mission architecture assumed a hybrid NEP/chem-propelled vehicle that used a high specific impulse (Isp) NEP-system and a liquid oxygen (LOx)-liquid methane high thrust chemical stage (two 110 kN (25 klbf) thrust, 365 s Isp engines) for maneuvers performed to enter and exit gravity wells. Trajectory analyses performed in this study showed that such a mission could be performed with 2-4 MWe directed into the electric propulsion system (operating for 20,000+ hours), with the large range representing different opposition-class Mars mission opportunities and permutations on the trajectory design, concept of operations, and technology choices. In 2020, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) performed a study to evaluate the maturity of the different technologies required for nuclear propulsion systems [3]. The executive summary of this report provided the following top-level conclusions: • “The majority of critical technologies for… NEP/Chem… systems are relatively immature” • “TRLs [technology readiness levels] in the literature are often overestimated” • “The majority of critical technologies… for NEP/Chem… systems are at a relatively high level of advancement degree of difficulty (AD2 > 4) for maturation, requiring a dual development approach” • “The proper assessment of baseline TRL and AD2 values and the estimation of requirements and resources required for advancement have been consistent issues for NEP,” • “Non-advocate reviews should occur at the start of a technology program and at all key milestones.” In 2021, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) issued a separate report [4] identifying the “primary technical and programmatic challenges, merits, and risks for maturing space nuclear propulsion technologies of interest to a future human Mars exploration mission.” That work contained several important findings, including: • “Developing a MWe-class NEP system for the baseline mission would require increasing power by orders of magnitude relative to NEP system flight- or ground-based technology demonstrations completed to date.” • “Subscale in-space flight testing of NEP systems cannot address many of the risks and potential failure modes associated with the baseline mission NEP system. With sufficient M&S [modeling & simulation] and ground testing, including modular subsystem tests at full scale and power, flight qualification requirements can be met by the cargo missions that will precede the first crewed mission to Mars. Fully integrated ground testing may not be required.” • “As a result of low and intermittent investment over the past several decades, it is unclear if even an aggressive program would be able to develop an NEP system capable of executing the baseline mission in 2039.” These efforts motivated the SNP project to investigate the technologies available for a megawatt-class high power nuclear electric propulsion system. That system is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 and is comprised of five separate top-level critical technology elements (CTEs). 1. Nuclear Reactor – Thermal power source for the system, utilizing high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the nuclear fuel. Reactor radiation shielding is also included in this CTE. 2. Power Conversion – Operates as a thermodynamic cycle, accepting nuclear reactor thermal power as an input and converting it to mechanical power. 3. Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) – Accepts as an input mechanical power from the power conversion system, which is used to generate electrical power. The PMAD system also distributes the generated electrical power to all other parts of the spacecraft, including the high-power EP system. The PMAD system may also perform duties such as isolation, fault detection, and power transformation/rectification for different spacecraft systems, including the thrusters. 4. Electric Propulsion (EP) – Accepts as an input electrical power, which is used to accelerate a propellant to high speeds to produce thrust. This system includes the power processing unit (PPU), which converts the power it receives to the correct current and voltage required by the thrusters, and the propellant storage and feed systems, which contain and meter the flow of propellant to the thrusters. 5. Thermal Management (Radiators/Heat Rejection) – The cold side of the thermodynamic power conversion cycle, accepts thermal power from the power conversion system and radiatively rejects that heat to space. In this paper, we describe the SNP project formulation and investment strategy that aims to accomplish the research and development required to advance the technology readiness for each CTE. The strategy relies heavily upon experimental testing supported by modeling and simulation to yield realistic assessments of the technologies, which in turn will be used to inform future NEP system-level design decisions and any potential technology downselects.

Kurt A Polzin↗

NASA NTRS2021

Modernizing NASA’s Space Flight Safety and Mission Success (S&MS) Assurance Framework In Line With Evolving Acquisition Strategies and Systems Engineering Practices

This paper presents the objectives-driven, case-based safety and mission success (S&MS) assurance framework being developed by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), including its motivations and its implementation via a S&MS Assurance Standard that is under development, supplemented by supporting standards including an S&MS Analysis Management Standard that is also under development. A need to evolve NASA’s S&MS assurance framework has emerged in recent years, resulting from the need to accommodate new acquisition models; the need to accommodate evolving systems engineering (SE) practices; the need to stipulate acceptable levels of S&MS risk; the need for improved integration of S&MS into SE; and the need for clearer risk acceptance accountability. The objectives-driven, case-based S&MS assurance framework proposed here is responsive to that need. Its key features include: • The establishment, by NASA Acquirers, of fundamental S&MS performance objectives that define limits of acceptability for the likelihoods that mission technical objectives will be accomplished and that people, assets, and environments put at risk by the mission will not be adversely affected; • The development and approval of Providers’ S&MS plans for meeting Acquirers’ S&MS performance objectives, including commitments to support Acquirer audit, investigation, and reporting needs; • The development, by Providers, of S&MS assurance cases that argue, supported by evidence, that the Provider has met, or is on track to meeting, the fundamental S&MS objectives; • The evaluation, throughout the program/project life cycle, of Provider S&MS assurance cases as the primary S&MS-related technical basis for Acquirer risk acceptance and the granting to the Provider of authority to proceed through the program/project life cycle. This proposed S&MS assurance framework is notable for its lack of prescription of traditional S&MS requirements and strategies such as defined failure tolerances, margins, or analysis requirements. Instead, Providers are given latitude to propose their own strategies for meeting the fundamental S&MS performance objectives, subject to independent review and Acquirer approval. The result is a framework for S&MS assurance that is at once both rigorous and flexible.

Assurance Case↗

NASA NTRS2022

Recommendations on the Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions - Phase II

This assessment had two Phases. Phase I captured NASA Centers’ current practices for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts 1 used in spaceflight systems and ground support equipment (available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205011579) [ref. 1]. The Phase II report provides guidance for selecting and using COTS parts in NASA missions. The approaches proposed in this report differ from current agency practices. This top-level executive summary touches on these new approaches for using COTS parts but does not provide the detailed information that is critical in understanding the rationale behind these new approaches. Readers will need to read the entire report to gain full understanding and effectively use the recommendations herein. NASA’s historical approach to selecting and applying parts has been to define certain parts, primarily specific classes of military specification (MIL-SPEC) parts, as “standard”, leaving all others, including COTS parts, as nonstandard. Standard parts typically are used without further testing (“use-as-is”). Nonstandard parts are subjected to initial screening and subsequent lot acceptance testing of representative samples from each procured lot per MIL-SPEC or similar requirements. Decades later, top-tier commercial part manufacturers have evolved significant manufacturing, statistical control, and technological improvements that can now provide parts as reliable or more reliable than MIL-SPEC parts, when used within their datasheet limits. Concurrently, the space science and exploration community’s needs demand technological advances unavailable with MIL-SPEC parts. This ongoing change necessitates using COTS parts for space missions. Properly selected COTS parts in appropriate applications can offer performance and supply availability advantages compared to MIL-SPEC parts. Their utility and demonstrated reliability result from large volumes and automated production and testing processes. However, careful review and a thorough understanding of their specifications (i.e., datasheet limitations) is needed, and verifying that manufacturer specifications and reliability meet space hardware application needs are necessary. This report recommends MIL-SPEC screening and non-radiation-related lot acceptance testing be reduced or eliminated in cases where evidence of sufficient quality and reliability exists for COTS parts. The extent of NASA's insight into COTS manufacturers and the amount and nature of the needed evidence will differ by mission and will likely be driven by a mission's resources and associated risk posture. To facilitate this goal, two new terminologies have been defined and described: “Industry Leading Parts Manufacturer (ILPM)” and “Established COTS parts.” An ILPM is a COTS manufacturer that produces high quality and reliable parts. Some parts produced by ILPMs, defined as Established COTS parts, do not need any additional MIL-SPEC or NASA screening and lot acceptance testing to be used in space applications. This report provides guidance for selecting, procuring, and applying COTS parts and for performing part-, board-, and system-level COTS parts verification. The recommendation to select Established COTS parts from ILPMs will assure those COTS parts will have comparable quality to corresponding MIL-SPEC parts. Selecting, applying, and verifying Established COTS parts from ILPMs requires a holistic team approach, engaging parts engineers, circuit designers, quality, reliability, and systems engineers, procurement specialists, radiation specialists, avionics leads, and program/project managers. A mission-specific approach tailored to a project’s Mission, Environment, Applications and Lifetime (MEAL) [ref. 2] requirements should be developed and approved by program/project managers. Any associated risks should be clearly identified, quantified, mitigated, and/or accepted. Different approaches are recommended according to program/project Risk Classes A, B, C, and D [ref. 3] and human-rated missions [ref. 4]: 1. Recommend Classes A and B and human-rated missions consider a “MIL-SPEC parts- based design” approach. ”MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach is one in which most parts are MIL-SPEC parts and Established COTS parts from ILPMs are used only when an equivalent MIL-SPEC part does not meet functional or size, weight, and power (SWaP) or performance requirements, or is not available. 2. Recommend Classes D and Sub-D missions consider a “System of COTS” approach. “System of COTS” approach is one which most parts are Established COTS parts from ILPMs. 3. Recommend Class C missions determine which approach is the best for their projects; that is, use either a “MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach, “System of COTS” approach, or a combined approach utilizing elements of both. This report intends to provide guidance in using COTS parts for NASA missions with risk classifications of A through D and human-rated missions; but it does not address the costs of using COTS parts. Costs of using COTS parts in different NASA mission classes can vary significantly even if the same parts are used in different risk postures, due to differing verification levels needed. The guidance does not distinguish between critical or non-critical systems, and a given project will need to apply the appropriate guidance based on their risk posture. The intended audience of this report are NASA personnel and commercial practitioners who support NASA’s spaceflight missions, including spaceflight program or project managers, parts engineers, parts manufacturers, radiation engineers, avionics engineers, system engineers, circuit design engineers, reliability engineers, safety and mission assurance (SMA) personnel, and parts procurement specialists. The NEPP Program will perform a pathfinder study to explore implementing the guidance in this NESC report. An ILPM verification process is not the same as conventional vendor qualification processes performed according to military standards and specifications. This NESC report intends to provide guidance in utilizing available parts data from ILPM manufacturers for parts assurance assessments needed for NASA missions. The report also captured the current practices from DoD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Section 10. Note each DoD and FAA report was provided by the corresponding agencies regarding their practices, which are independent from the NESC recommendations in the report.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Progress on the Development and Qualification of a 12-kW Hall-Effect, Solar Electric Propulsion Thruster

I. Motivation and Background Beginning in 2014, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) began a project to increase the state of the art for the Hall-Effect Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) technology. The resulting Advanced Electric Propulsion System (AEPS) project has developed a 12 kW Hall Current Thruster in support of the NASA mission to establish a permanent human presence in lunar orbit and to land the next American astronauts on the South Pole of the Moon. The project is led by the NASA Glenn Research Center, supported by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and development, qualification & flight hardware all provided by L3 Harris Aerojet Rocketdyne (AR).The AEPS project has completed the development testing of a high power, solar electric propulsion Hall Current thruster that will be used on the NASA Power & Propulsion Element (PPE) of the Gateway space station. NASA initially built three Technology Development Units to understand key characteristics of the hall-effect rocket with magnetic shielding. The design led to development testing on two Engineering Test Unit Thrusters and multiple critical components. The project has begun production of the three flight thrusters and entered qualification testing at the component and thruster levels. II. Approach NASA and AR teams completed all development phases of the project, including full development and integration testing of the Engineering Model hardware, Critical Design Review, and ground test equipment validation, as well as fabrication and acceptance testing of the initial qualification thruster. Qualification and verification of the environmental and life requirements of the AEPS design was initiated in the Fall of 2023 and will be accomplished on two thruster units and using a series of component-level tests during 2024 and 2025. Environmental testing will incorporate functional reference firings, shock, vibration, and Thermal Vacuum (TVAC) testing. Life verification will assess the thruster wear and performance over the lifetime of the Gateway spacecraft. Critical component qualification tests include cathode heater, magnet coils, magnet heaters, temperature sensors, and a cathode assembly that will undergo life cycle testing on multiple units. Flight thrusters will complete assembly and acceptance testing and be delivered to the PPE program in early 2025. III. Preliminary and Anticipated Results The program has completed the acceptance testing, including dynamic testing and hot fire characterization, of the first qualification thruster. In the Fall of 2023, the program entered the environmental qualification phase for thruster testing. This paper will present an overview of the AEPS thruster project, thruster capabilities and flight design, preliminary results from the thruster acceptance and qualification testing, component life cycle testing and flight hardware status.

Clayton Kachele↗