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Ocean & Geohazard Analysis Tool

The Ocean & Geohazard Analysis (OGA) software tool is designed to summarize insights into key offshore hazards drawing from a diverse set of approaches, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, probabilistic and statistical, and offshore data sources. The offshore hazards that can be analyzed include submarine landslides, extreme wind/wave/current event probabilities, earthquakes, and metocean pathways (CIAM Climatological Isolation and Attraction Model–Climatological Lagrangian Coherent Structures - Submissions - EDX (doe.gov)). Currently, the tool is developed for use in the Gulf of Mexico. The data underlying the offshore hazard analyses can be found here: https://edx.netl.doe.gov/dataset/gulf-of-mexico-risk-analysis-database-gomrad This work was conducted under the Advanced Offshore Research Portfolio, FWP Number 1022409 at National Energy Technology Laboratory, U.S. Dept. of Energy. Disclaimer This project was funded by the United States Department of Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory, in part, through a site support contract. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor the support contractor, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

AIML↗

FY2019 Performance Assessment Annual Review for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

The Savannah River Site (SRS) E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) consists of six types of disposal units described in the Performance Assessment (PA) (WSRC, 2008): Low Activity Waste Vault (LAWV), Intermediate Level Vault (ILV), Trenches [Slit Trenches (STs), Engineered Trenches (ETs), and Component-in-Grout (CIG) Trenches], and Naval Reactor Component Disposal Areas (NRCDAs). The ELLWF is a part of the Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF). SWMF is managed and operated by the SRS Management and Operations prime contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Within SRNS, the Solid Waste Management (SWM) organization is responsible for operating the SWMF, and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the technical agency responsible for preparing and maintaining the PA. SWMF operations have been performed at SRS since 1952. The mission of the SWMF is to provide storage, processing, disposal, and shipment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste. The SWMF is committed to treat, store, and dispose of these waste products in a manner that protects the environment and the health and safety of the facility worker, the co-located worker, and the offsite general public. Wastes handled in the SWMF include low level waste, transuranic waste, hazardous waste, Toxic Substances Control Act waste, and mixed waste (containing both hazardous and radioactive constituents).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Saltstone third quarter calendar year 2019 (3QCY19) toxicity characteristic leaching procedure (TCLP) results

The aqueous waste from Tank 50 (salt solution) is sampled quarterly for transfers to the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). Salt solution is treated at SPF and disposed of in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Per request of customer, X-TAR-Z-00008, Revision 01, two SDF waste form (saltstone) samples were prepared in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) from the Tank 50 Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) sample and Z-Area premix material for the third quarter of calendar year 2019 (3QCY19). One sample contained a Full Premix which included 10:45:45 (by weight) of cement, slag and fly ash. The second sample contained 60:40 (by weight) of slag and fly ash only referred to as the “Cement-Free grout sample”. Results from this technical report support Task 2: ‘Grout Leaching Analyses’ of the Task Technical Request (TTR) prepared by Savannah River Remediation (SRR). After a 28 day cure, a sample of each of the SDF waste forms was collected and shipped to a certified laboratory for analysis using the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP). The 3QCY19 saltstone (Full Premix) and the Cement-Free grout samples met the South Carolina (SC) Code of Regulations for Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (HWMR) 61-79.261.24 and 61-79-268.48 requirements for a non-hazardous waste form with respect to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) metals and Underlying Hazardous Constituents (UHCs), and also met the SPF WAC.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

FY2019 Performance Assessment Annual Review for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

The Savannah River Site (SRS) E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) consists of six types of disposal units described in the Performance Assessment (PA) (WSRC, 2008): Low Activity Waste Vault (LAWV), Intermediate Level Vault (ILV), Trenches [Slit Trenches (STs), Engineered Trenches (ETs), and Component-in-Grout (CIG) Trenches], and Naval Reactor Component Disposal Areas (NRCDAs). The ELLWF is a part of the Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF). SWMF is managed and operated by the SRS Management and Operations prime contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Within SRNS, the Solid Waste Management (SWM) organization is responsible for operating the SWMF, and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the technical agency responsible for preparing and maintaining the PA. SWMF operations have been performed at SRS since 1952. The mission of the SWMF is to provide storage, processing, disposal, and shipment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste. The SWMF is committed to treat, store, and dispose of these waste products in a manner that protects the environment and the health and safety of the facility worker, the co-located worker, and the offsite general public. Wastes handled in the SWMF include low level waste, transuranic waste, hazardous waste, Toxic Substances Control Act waste, and mixed waste (containing both hazardous and radioactive constituents).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Electrical Safety Practices Developed for Automotive Lithium Ion Battery Dismantlement

ORNL is developing electrical safety practices for handling and disassembling automotive lithium ion batteries in a research environment. Online literature searches did not reveal any standard electrical safety practices for disassembling lithium ion battery stacks from automobiles. Until recently, there has been insufficient motivation to recycle or refurbish spent automotive lithium ion batteries due to limited volumes entering the secondary market. However, a growing volume of spent lithium ion batteries are beginning to collect in automobile salvage yards, recycling facilities, landfills, and other places due to a shortage of economically and environmentally viable end-of-life options. ORNL studied automotive battery pack, module, and cell dismantlement to understand the risks, hazards, and controls necessary to perform dismantlement safely and economically. Packs, modules, and cells were manually taken apart, while wearing appropriate personal protective equipment, with insulated hand tools. These dismantlement studies point out the hazards and risks associated with dismantling automotive lithium ion batteries and describe practices for controlling such hazards and risks while demonstrating the controls through a case study of a first-generation Chevrolet Volt battery pack.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

FY2020 performance assessment annual review for the E-area low-level waste facility

The Savannah River Site (SRS) E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) consists of six types of disposal units described in the Performance Assessment (PA) (WSRC, 2008): Low Activity Waste Vault (LAWV), Intermediate Level Vault (ILV), Trenches [Slit Trenches (STs), Engineered Trenches (ETs), and Component-in-Grout (CIG) Trenches], and Naval Reactor Component Disposal Areas (NRCDAs). The ELLWF is a part of the Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF). SWMF is managed and operated by the SRS Management and Operations prime contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Within SRNS, the Solid Waste Management (SWM) organization is responsible for operating the SWMF, and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the technical agency responsible for preparing and maintaining the PA. SWMF operations have been performed at SRS since 1952. The mission of the SWMF is to provide storage, processing, disposal, and shipment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste. The SWMF is committed to treat, store, and dispose of these waste products in a manner that protects the environment and the health and safety of the facility worker, the co-located worker, and the offsite general public. Wastes handled in the SWMF include low level waste, transuranic waste, hazardous waste, Toxic Substances Control Act waste, and mixed waste (containing both hazardous and radioactive constituents). The FY2020 PA Annual Review for the ELLWF affirms that the disposal facility continued to operate within the bounds of the current PA and Composite Analysis (CA) baseline and the subsequent SA’s and satisfied all the requirements, conditions, and limitations identified in the 2008 DAS (DOE 2008a), RWMB SRNL_STI-2020-00588 Revision 0 vi (McGill, 2020), and ELLWF Low-Level Waste Acceptance Criteria (SRS-1S, 2014). This annual review affirms that the supporting studies performed in FY2020 do not alter the conclusions of the ELLWF PA (WSRC, 2008) and that there is a reasonable expectation that the ELLWF will meet the performance objectives delineated in DOE Manual 435.1-1 (DOE 2011)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Application of Point Precipitation Frequency Estimates to Watersheds

This report documents work sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) as part of the RES project, “Application of Point Precipitation Frequency Estimates to Watersheds.” This project was implemented as part of the Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA) Research Program. The objective of the PFHA Research Program is to develop tools and guidance on the use of PFHA methods to risk-inform NRC’s licensing of new facilities as well as licensing and oversight of currently operating facilities as they relate to flooding hazards. Many nuclear power plants (NPPs) are located on or near rivers so riverine flooding hazards need to be considered in their design and operation. Probabilistic riverine flood models are important tools for realistic assessment of flooding risks. However, these models require areal estimates of the depth, duration, and frequency of rainfall distributed over the watershed, which are not often available. Point precipitation frequency estimates are more widely available. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has published NOAA Atlas 14, which provides point precipitation frequency estimates for 5-minute through 60-day durations at average recurrence intervals of 1-year through 1,000-year. The research documented in this report addresses areal reduction factors (ARFs), which can be used to convert the widely available point precipitation frequency estimates, to estimates of areal precipitation frequency over a watershed. The most widely used ARF source is Technical Paper 29 (TP-29) published by the then U.S. Weather Bureau in 1958. However, both the methods and the underlying precipitation data used to produce TP-29 are seriously out of date. For example, due to the small gauge network available at the time of TP-29’s compilation, ARF estimates developed are only for watersheds smaller than about 400 square miles. Due to the relatively short record lengths of precipitation data available, frequency considerations could not be accurately determined. Other factors such as regional climate and seasonality were not addressed. Several newer methods have been published since TP-29 was developed and both the type and quantity of precipitation data have increased significantly, along with computational resources and analytical tools such as geographic information systems. This report reviewed and assessed the available precipitation products and methods for conducting ARF analysis. The work applied up-to-date precipitation data products and analysis methods with a novel watershed-based approach to investigate how ARF estimates vary across different methods, data sources, geographical locations, return periods, and seasons. The overall findings reported here regarding basic ARF trends are in line with other recent studies showing that ARFs decrease with increasing area, increase with increasing duration, and decrease with increasing return period. This study found significant differences among the available ARF methods. This work also found a strong geographical variability across different US hydrologic regions, suggesting that the ARF are specific to regional climate patterns and geographical characteristics and should not be applied arbitrarily to other locations. The results also reveal the importance of data record length, especially for high return level ARFs. The work reported in NUREG/CR-7271 will assist NRC staff in assessing different classes of ARF methods in conjunction with available rainfall data sets. It will also support the development of guidance for application of point precipitation data in PFHAs. It should be noted that the ARF values presented in this report for any location or region were developed for the purposes of comparing methods and investigating the factors that influence ARFs. They should not be considered official and should not be used in leu of a site-specific analysis.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Saltstone First Quarter Calendar Year 2021 (1QCY21) Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) Results

The aqueous waste from Tank 50 (salt solution) is sampled quarterly for transfers to the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). Salt solution is treated at SPF and disposed of in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Per request of customer, X-TTR-Z00023, Revision 0, two SDF waste form (saltstone) samples were prepared in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) from the Tank 50 Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) sample and Z-Area premix material for the first quarter of calendar year 2021(1QCY21). One sample contained a Full Premix which included 10:45:45 (by weight) of cement, slag and fly ash. The second sample contained 60:40 (by weight) of slag and fly ash only referred to as the “Cement-Free grout sample”. Results from this technical report support Task 2: ‘Grout Leaching Analyses’ of the Task Technical Request (TTR) prepared by Savannah River Remediation (SRR). After at least 28 days cured, a sample of each of the SDF waste forms was collected and shipped to a certified laboratory for analysis using the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP). The 1QCY21 saltstone (Full Premix) and the Cement-Free grout samples met the South Carolina (SC) Code of Regulations for Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (HWMR) 61-79.261.24 and 61-79-268.48 requirements for a non-hazardous waste form with respect to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) metals and Underlying Hazardous Constituents (UHCs), and also met the SPF WAC that was in effect at the time of the tank sampling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Saltstone Third Quarter Calendar Year 2021 (3QCY21) Toxicity Characteristic Leading Procedure (TCLP) Results

The aqueous waste from Tank 50 (salt solution) is sampled quarterly for transfers to the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). Salt solution is treated at SPF and disposed of in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Per request of customer, X-TTR-Z-00023, Revision 0, two SDF waste form (saltstone) samples were prepared in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) from the Tank 50 Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) sample and Z-Area premix material for the third quarter of calendar year 2021(3QCY21). One sample contained a Full Premix which included 10:45:45 (by weight) of cement, slag and fly ash. The second sample contained 60:40 (by weight) of slag and fly ash only referred to as the “Cement-Free grout sample”. Results from this technical report support Task 2: ‘Grout Leaching Analyses’ of the Task Technical Request (TTR) prepared by Savannah River Remediation (SRR). After at least 28 days cured, a sample of each of the SDF waste forms was collected and shipped to a certified laboratory for analysis using the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP). The 3QCY21 saltstone (Full Premix) and the Cement-Free grout samples met the South Carolina (SC) Code of Regulations for Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (HWMR) 61-79.261.24 and 61-79-268.48 requirements for a non-hazardous waste form with respect to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) metals and Underlying Hazardous Constituents (UHCs), and also met the SPF WAC that was in effect at the time of the tank sampling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Permanent Foam Fixatives for Radioactive Contamination Control: Environmental Chamber Testing

The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is tasked with closing cleanup sites throughout the DOE-EM complex. A major component of successfully closing the sites is the deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of radioactively contaminated buildings in nuclear facilities. Deactivation consists of the process of placing a contaminated facility in stable condition in order to minimize any risks that could affect workers, the public, and the environment. Successful deactivation and decommissioning consists of leaving the buildings in an agreed upon end state to provide future protection against hazards. Hazards include radiation but can also include asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls, and other environmental and physical hazards.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

January 2022 Semiannual Saltstone Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) Results

The aqueous waste from Tank 50 (salt solution) is sampled semiannually for transfers to the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). Salt solution is treated at SPF and disposed of in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Per request of customer, X-TTR-Z-00025, Revision 0, two SDF waste form (saltstone) samples were prepared in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) from the Tank 50 Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) sample and Z-Area premix material for the January 2022 semiannual Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) samples. One sample contained a Full Premix which included 10:45:45 (by weight) of cement, slag and fly ash. The second sample contained 60:40 (by weight) of slag and fly ash only referred to as the “Cement-Free grout sample.” Results from this technical report support Task 2: ‘Grout Leaching Analyses’ of the Task Technical Request (TTR) prepared by Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC). After at least 28 days cured, a sample of each of the SDF waste forms was collected and shipped to a certified laboratory for analysis using the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP). The January 2022 semiannual saltstone (Full Premix) and the Cement-Free grout samples met the South Carolina (SC) Code of Regulations for Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (HWMR) 61-79.261.24 and 61-79-268.48 requirements for a non-hazardous waste form with respect to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) metals and Underlying Hazardous Constituents (UHCs), and also met the SPF WAC that was in effect at the time of the tank sampling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Integrating the Safety Evaluation for a Molten Salt Reactor Operation and Fuel Cycle Facility Application

Molten salt reactor (MSR) sites may include additional elements of the nuclear fuel cycle beyond those of the existing fleet. In the existing fleet, the individual elements of the fuel cycle typically have been located on different sites and licensed separately. Providing robust separation between hazards remains a useful safety practice for MSRs. Although the different elements of the fuel cycle at a nuclear site that includes MSRs may transfer material between processes more frequently than prior practices, providing adequate separation between distinct facilities avoids the potential for adverse interactions. Additionally, some elements of the MSR fuel cycle, such as fuel salt preparation or waste stabilization, may be more efficient to share among multiple nearby reactors, and nuclear sites that include MSRs may also include other reactor classes. Hence, discrete MSR fuel cycle facilities located at a common site could be physically separated with robust barriers—albeit potentially connected by piping—and licensed individually. This report describes the hazards of individual elements of representative MSR fuel cycle facilities, including their relationship to overall site level hazards. The report maps the regulatory compliance aspects of the individual MSR fuel cycle elements (e.g., fuel salt preparation, reactor, waste stabilization) to existing and developing regulations, as well as describes current and developing site-level regulations from an MSR perspective.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Traditional Forensic Examinations on Bulk Special Nuclear Material

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory at Quantico, Virginia is responsible for the forensic examination of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. Due to these unique hazards and the necessary specialized safety protocols, the FBI has developed a network of Partner Laboratories (PLs) across the United States of America to support conventional forensic examinations of radiological evidence and evidence contaminated with radioactive materials. In support of this, the FBI Laboratory has established the Hazardous Evidence Analysis Team (HEAT), a group of qualified forensic examiners, scientists, technicians, and photographers who can deploy to laboratories outside of the FBI Laboratory at Quantico, VA to perform conventional forensics on evidence containing/contaminated with hazardous materials. One of the FBI’s PLs, the United States Department of Energy’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in Los Alamos, New Mexico, has unique facilities, personnel, and procedures to secure, safely handle, and process significant quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). While LANL’s procedures for working with SNM are well established, working with SNM under evidentiary controls is not. Close cooperation between LANL and FBI HEAT is required due to FBI policies on evidence handling, as well as the challenges associated with the exploitation and preservation of conventional forensics (fingerprints, trace evidence, and photography) on SNM evidence.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Functionalized Mesoporous Carbon Materials for Effective Recovery of Rare Earth Elements from NdFeB Magnet Scrap

The increasing demand and high dependence on international supplies of rare earth elements (REEs) have prompted the US to explore alternative resources and sustainable technologies for domestic REE production. One potential resource is the secondary electronic and industrial wastes at DoD complexes and across the US. These hazardous wastes require high costs for the maintenance and remediation, but their high-REE contents offer unique opportunities for REE recovery. Current hydrometallurgical technologies for REE extraction are energy intensive and costly, with low REE recovery efficiency and the generation of hazardous secondary wastes. Thus, it is crucial to develop high efficiency and environmental-friendly technologies for REE extraction and recovery from the secondary wastes. This project aims to develop novel functionalized mesoporous carbon materials for effective recovery of REEs from NdFeB magnet scrap. The proposed novel functionalized materials will be applied in a solid-liquid separation platform that can effectively extract, recover and separate REEs from NdFeB magnet scrap (the current focus), but also from other secondary electronic/industrial wastes in the future, minimize the generation of secondary hazardous wastes, and offset the management costs for existing waste streams.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

TA-55 building entrusted with more plutonium capability: What does it mean for the mission?

The first floor of the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building at TA-55, known as RLUOB (roo-lob) or Plutonium Facility-400 (PF-400), will soon become a bustling and dynamic space as employees and programs increase their work scope thanks to the new hazard category 3 designation. On Feb. 7, NNSA gave the final stamp of approval designating RLUOB as a hazard category 3 (HC-3) nuclear facility. RLUOB has been designated as a radiological facility (less than HC-3) since 2013, when the first phase of RLUOB Equipment Installation was completed. HC-3 is a level up in facility hazard category, a major effort to support the national security mission.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

July 2022 Semiannual Saltstone Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) Results

The aqueous waste from Tank 50 (salt solution) is sampled semiannually for transfers to the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). Salt solution is treated at SPF and disposed of in the Salstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Per request of customer, X-TTR-Z-00025, Revision 0, two SDF waste form (salstone) samples were prepared in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) from the Tank 50 Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) sample and Z-Area premix material for the July 2022 Semiannual Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) samples. One sample contained a Full Premix which included 10:45:45 (by weight) of cement, slag and fly ash. The second sample contained 60:40 (by weight) of slag and fly ash only referred to as the "Cement-Free grout sample." Results from this technical report support Task 2: 'Grout Leaching Analyses' of the Task Technical Request (TTR) prepared by Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC). After at least 28 days cured, a sample of each of the SDF waste forms was collected and shipped to a certified laboratory for analysis using Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP). The July 2022 semiannual salstone (Full Premix) and the Cement-Free grout samples met the South Carolina (SC) Code of Regulations for Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (HWMR) 61-79.261.24 and 61-79-268.48 requirements for the non-hazardous waste form with respect to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) metals and Underlying Hazardous Constituents (UHCs), and also met the SPF WAC that was in effect at the time of the tank sampling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technology has significant potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mitigate the impact of climate change, particularly in hard to decarbonize industrial and commercial sectors. CCUS involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from industrial processes or power generation and utilizing it for other purposes, such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR), or storing the captured CO 2 underground. CCUS technology can reduce the environmental impact of continued fossil fuel use while smoothing the transition to a low-carbon economy. CCUS can create new economic opportunities, such as the development of new industries and job creation, and can enhance energy security by diversifying energy sources. For these reasons, enabling CCUS has become a key objective of the Biden-Harris administration’s clean energy policy and has received bipartisan support. Despite its environmental and economic potential, CCUS faces multiple barriers to widespread deployment. One of the main challenges is the high cost and technical difficulty of implementing and operating large-scale CCUS infrastructure. CCUS remains a relatively expensive way to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., compared to solar photovoltaic technology’s displacement of coal generation). Additionally, financial incentives and supportive policies like those enacted to support solar photovoltaic development, especially at the state level, are inconsistent or nonexistent, which can discourage investment in CCUS projects. There are also technical challenges associated with safe and secure underground CO 2 storage and the development of new carbon utilization technologies. Public opposition to various aspects of CCUS technologies, ranging from concerns that CCUS will extend reliance on fossil fuels to CCUS infrastructure being sited in disadvantaged communities, is a growing challenge. This paper focuses on another significant barrier to broad CCUS deployment: the need for considerable expansion of the dedicated land-based CO 2 pipeline network in the United States to meet CCUS goals and the unique regulatory challenges to its development. To reach carbon emissions targets in the United States by 2050, CCUS technology will need to be supported by tens of thousands of miles of CO 2 pipelines. Estimates range from a minimum of roughly 29,000 pipeline miles (according to a 2020 Great Plains Institute study) to 66,000 pipeline miles (as per a 2021 Princeton University–led study). As of October 2022, however, the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) reports fewer than 5,400 miles of U.S. pipelines carrying CO 2 . This deficit—and what it means for the prospect of moving substantially larger quantities of CO 2 from source to use or storage—threatens to stifle the development of CCUS projects and technologies identified as an important tool to meet emissions targets. The current regulatory landscape facing CO 2 pipeline development can best be described as uncertain. At the federal level, the U.S. DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) oversees safety regulation of pipelines transporting hazardous materials, including CO 2 upon commencement of operation. However, PHMSA’s definition of CO 2 as “a fluid consisting of more than 90 percent CO 2 molecules compressed to a supercritical state” has not been updated since its 1991 addition to the Federal Register. Because CO 2 can be transported in a gaseous, liquid, or supercritical state (indeed, the physical state of CO 2 can fluctuate within a single pipeline due to environmental changes), doubts persist about the extent of PHMSA’s purview—and raise questions about what, if anything, states should do to address this apparent gap. PHMSA has begun a major revision of its existing rules, but the agency does not expect a first draft before 2024. Economic oversight of CO 2 pipelines is even less clear. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Surface Transportation Board (STB)—which regulate the rates of interstate oil/natural gas and non-energy pipelines, respectively—have both declined jurisdiction over interstate CO 2 pipelines. This presumably leaves economic regulation to state and/or local governments, but few if any states have the laws or resources in place to oversee just and reasonable rates. Further, the interstate nature of CO 2 pipeline development creates questions around how different states should align their rate-making decisions. Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation Currently, regulatory responsibilities regarding CO 2 pipeline siting and permitting fall to state and local governments. The variety of laws and regulations across the country, however, creates a maze of requirements for pipeline developers to navigate. To secure necessary permits, most states require pipeline companies to be “common carriers” that provide transport service to the public at uniform rates. However, the specific definition of that term varies. Some states require clear evidence that a pipeline services the public, while others automatically deem any pipeline company transporting energy products or hazardous materials to be a “common carrier”—with little consideration for accessibility to third parties. Other states have eschewed common-carrier terminology entirely, placing private and publicly accessible pipelines on equal footing. Much like the variation in common-carrier requirements, laws governing eminent domain authority to secure rights-of-way (ROW) to commence construction on a planned pipeline route differ by state. Several states have no laws or rules governing CO 2 pipelines. In addition to creating questions about whether long-standing rules for other pipelines (e.g., natural gas or petroleum products) apply to CO 2 , this policy vacuum leaves local governments as the sole authority over sections of pipe within their boundaries. With dozens of counties along a given route, the probability of inconsistent regulation of the same pipeline is significant. Even in states with CO 2 pipeline laws in place, local regulatory attempts to address rising concerns over pipeline routing and safety have triggered lawsuits by pipeline companies seeking to delimit areas of federal, state, and local government responsibility. Meanwhile, legislators across the country have introduced bills to restrict the application of eminent domain to CO 2 pipeline projects, which could threaten a key means of securing ROW that companies cannot secure through negotiation with landowners. Taken separately, any of these regulatory issues—the narrow federal definition of CO 2 , FERC’s and STB’s decisions that CO 2 pipelines are not within their jurisdiction, and the considerable variation in state and local governments’ laws regulating CO 2 pipeline technologies—are extremely difficult to resolve. Adding the required scale of CO 2 pipeline expansion and the currently identified narrow window of time in which to reach climate target goals, the task becomes even more difficult—and raises a host of urgent questions for regulators. How should CO 2 be defined in federal regulations to ensure consistent safety standards across the country? What is the potential impact radius of a CO 2 pipeline rupture, and how should that inform local emergency response? In the absence of centralized federal oversight, what should state legislatures do to increase alignment for interstate CO 2 pipeline projects? This paper intends to serve as a primer for regulators and stakeholders who seek to better understand the regulatory challenges and opportunities facing this critical infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Resilience Development for Electric Energy Delivery Sytems (ResDEEDS): A Tool for Power System Resilience Planning (Rev. 1)

The INL Resilience Framework is built to be customized to a particular system’s characteristics, resilience goals, and hazards that it is likely to face. The challenge with a framework that is built to be customized is that it requires more effort from the user to understand the framework and apply it correctly to a particular system. The goal of the web application described here is to automate the framework application as much as possible. Inputs from users are standardized into a common format, but the modeling platform used is a modular framework built to adapt to any system. Baseline effects from common hazards are programmed with stochastic variables to allow for quick exploration of hazard impacts, but can be customized down to component-level impact if a user desires a high level of detail and specificity.

17 WIND ENERGY↗