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At least 379 records · Page 21

Objective analysis of toolmarks in forensics

Since the 1993 court case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. the subjective nature of toolmark comparison has been questioned by attorneys and law enforcement agencies alike. This has led to an increased drive to establish objective comparison techniques with known error rates, much like those that DNA analysis is able to provide. This push has created research in which the 3-D surface profile of two different marks are characterized and the marks’ cross-sections are run through a comparative statistical algorithm to acquire a value that is intended to indicate the likelihood of a match between the marks. The aforementioned algorithm has been developed and extensively tested through comparison of evenly striated marks made by screwdrivers. However, this algorithm has yet to be applied to quasi-striated marks such as those made by the shear edge of slip-joint pliers. The results of this algorithm’s application to the surface of copper wire will be presented. Objective mark comparison also extends to comparison of toolmarks made by firearms. In an effort to create objective comparisons, microstamping of firing pins and breech faces has been introduced. This process involves placing unique alphanumeric identifiers surrounded by a radial code on the surface of firing pins, which transfer to the cartridge’s primer upon firing. Three different guns equipped with microstamped firing pins were used to fire 3000 cartridges. These cartridges are evaluated based on the clarity of their alphanumeric transfers and the clarity of the radial code surrounding the alphanumerics.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Joint IAEA/NNSA International Workshop Nuclear Forensics Methodologies for Practitioners 2013 Scenario Based Exercise – Version 4.0 Instructor’s Manual

[Participants will serve as border guards for Reimerland. They will be given brief instruction on the operation of hand-held RadioIsotope DetectorS (RIDS) and be provided an intelligence briefing that tells them to be on the lookout for suspicious activity at their post. Their instruction will include directing suspicious vehicles to a location for secondary screening. If, after secondary screening, suspicions of a criminal act involving nuclear and or radioactive materials remain, participants have been instructed to request assistance from the NLEA, who will then setup and manage a radiological crime scene. Participants will watch a demonstration of two vehicles containing radioactive materials driving through and setting off a portal monitor. The first vehicle, a semi-tractor trailer, sets off only a gamma alarm. After the driver provides a shipping manifest of fertilizer, participants, posing as border guards, are expected to waive this vehicle through inspection. The second vehicle, an SUV, set off both gamma and 2 neutron alarms. The alarming of the neutron monitor should prompt participants to set up a secondary inspection of the vehicle immediately. The driver of the vehicle indicates he is in legal possession of an industrial instrument containing an old 133Ba source that has decayed to a level no longer requiring official paperwork according to the IAEA and internationally accepted transportation regulations. Authorities have verified that the industrial source does fit the description of one that is sold commercially. However, upon setting up a secondary screening, participants will use hand-held detectors to locate several other radioactive sources emanating from a black duffle bag in the rear of the vehicle (Figure 1). Hand held detectors detect the presence of 133Ba, and Pu. Upon questioning, the driver only commits to having the 133Ba industrial source and cannot account for the detection of neutrons within his vehicle. Since neutron alarms also sounded, participants should indicate that a neutron alarm would be inconsistent with a 133Ba source alone and should therefore conclude further investigation is warranted. This will prompt participants to call in a response team from the NLEA to set up a radiological crime scene around the vehicle in question. The response team is able to shoot a 3-D X-ray radiograph of the duffle bag without moving it to ensure it is rendered safe and moveable without disturbing the contents in the field (Figure 2). At this point, the duffle bag is entered into inventory as evidence and a chain of custody form is initiated. Swipes are taken from the outer bag to confirm there is no dispersible contamination. The bag and its contents are considered valuable for the investigation by the lead investigator. He determines the duffle bag is safe to transport to RRL for evidence inventory and analysis. The duffle bag and its contents are packaged and sent off to the RRL.]

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Optical Spectroscopy Capabilities:Application to Nuclear Forensics, Nuclear Detection, Nuclear Safeguards, Oil Industry, Material Identification and Analysis, and Sustainable Agricultural Nutrient Analysis

We have been very successful in measuring and analyzing actinides and actinide containing material for concentration ranges as low as 100 ppm to metal alloys. Several publications and LA-UR spectral line assignment references have been generated from this effort and listed below (1-6).

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

New Routes for the Production of Fission Products and Their Separation from the Source Material for the Development of Realistic Nuclear Forensic Debris

In order to fully characterize the NIF neutron spectrum, SAND-II-SNL software was requested/received from the Radiation Safety Information Computational Center. The software is designed to determine the neutron energy spectrum through analysis of experimental activation data. However, given that the source code was developed in Sparcstation 10, it is not compatible with current version of FORTRAN. Accounts have been established through the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s High Performance Computing in order to access different compiles for FORTRAN (e.g. pgf77, pgf90). Additionally, several of the subroutines included in the SAND-II-SNL package have required debugging efforts to allow for proper compiling of the code.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Nuclear Forensics and Radiochemistry: Chemistry

The chemical behavior of radioactive elements can differ from conventional wisdom because the number of atoms can be unusually small. Kinetic effects and unusual oxidation states are phenomena that make radiochemistry different from conventional analytic chemistry. The procedures developed at Los Alamos are designed to minimize these effects and provide reproducible results over a wide range of sample types. The analysis of nuclear debris has the additional complication of chemical fractionation and the incorporation of environmental contaminants. These are dealt with through the use of three component isotope ratios and the use of appropriate end members.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Nuclear Forensics and Radiochemistry: Reaction Networks

In the intense neutron flux of a nuclear explosion the production of isotopes may occur through successive neutron induced reactions. The pathway to these isotopes illustrates both the complexity of the problem and the need for high quality nuclear data. The growth and decay of radioactive isotopes can follow a similarly complex network. The Bateman equation will be described and modified to apply to the transmutation of isotopes in a high flux reactor. A alternative model of growth and decay, the GD code, that can be applied to fission products will also be described.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Separations for Radiochronometry and Forensics: Chemistry - Nuclear and Radiochemistry [Slides]

The term “separation” means multiple things when applied to radiochronometry efforts in C-NR: 1) How efficiently and rapidly can we separate trace-level nuclides used for age dating from bulk matrices? 2) Do we have pure (separated) well-calibrated single isotope tracers needed for high-precision trace level quantification of nuclides? 3) How much knowledge do we have about how nuclides used for radiochronometry are separated during uranium and plutonium production?

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗