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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 379 records · Page 21

Novel concept for detection of a fluid flow fault in a pumped fluid heat rejection system

A pumped fluid heat rejection system (HRS) requires continuous flow of the working fluid to ensure that the components controlled by the HRS stay within their allowable temperature limits. An interruption of flow could result in violations of hardware qualification limits and mission failure. Some of these violations can happen within a few hours. Hence, quick detection of a flow fault to invoke mitigation measures is very critical. In typical pumped fluid HRS, dual or triple pumps are employed to switch the backup units in case the primary unit were to fail. The key metric for the selection of a fault detection system is that it should detect the fault much before the fault’s impact on the thermal health of the HRS controlled components is realized. A trade study was conducted to select such a system for the Europa Clipper Mission to Europa, a moon of Jupiter that is planned for a launch in 2023. Out of the several concepts studied, the most attractive one was a novel and simple concept that uses a low power film heater attached to a section of the HRS tubing. While the fluid flows at its nominal rate, the high thermal coupling of the flowing fluid leads to the tube being close to the fluid’s temperature. However, when the flow stops, the heater warms the small thermal mass of the tubing to a high temperature in a short span of time (~15 minutes). This large temperature rise would then imply that the flow must have stopped. This paper will describe the various concepts considered, the chosen concept, its implementation, and the results of developments tests to validate its performance.

Schmidt, Tyler↗

An Efficient Hardware-Software Approach to Network Fault Tolerance with InfiniBand

In the last decade or so, clusters have observed a tremendous rise in popularity due to excellent price to performance ratio. A variety of Interconnects have been proposed during this period, with InfiniBand leading the way due to its high performance and open standard. Increasing size of the InfiniBand clusters has reduced the mean time between failures of various components of these clusters tremendously. In this paper, we specifically focus on the network component failure and propose a hybrid hardware-software approach to handling network faults. The hybrid approach leverages the user-transparent network fault detection and recovery using Automatic Path Migration (APM), and the software approach is used in the wake of APM failure. Using Global Arrays as the programming model, we implement this approach with Aggregate Remote Memory Copy Interface (ARMCI), the runtime system of Global Arrays. We evaluate our approach using various benchmarks (siosi7, pentane, h2o7 and siosi3) with NWChem, a very popular {\em ab initio} quantum chemistry application. Using the proposed approach, the applications run to completion without restart on emulated network faults and acceptable overhead for benchmarks executing for a longer period of time.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The implementation and use of Ada on distributed systems with high reliability requirements

The use and implementation of Ada in distributed environments in which the hardware components are assumed to be unreliable is investigated. The possibility that a distributed system can be programmed entirely in Ada so that the individual tasks of the system are unconcerned with which processor they are executing on, and that failures can occur in the underlying hardware is considered. The reduced cost of computer hardware and the advantages of distributed processing (for example, increased reliability through redundancy and greater flexibility) indicate that many aerospace computer systems can be distributed. The use of Ada and distributed systems is a good combination for aerospace embedded systems.

Knight, J. C.↗

Turbofan engine demonstration of sensor failure detection

In the paper, the results of a full-scale engine demonstration of a sensor failure detection algorithm are presented. The algorithm detects, isolates, and accommodates sensor failures using analytical redundancy. The experimental hardware, including the F100 engine, is described. Demonstration results were obtained over a large portion of a typical flight envelope for the F100 engine. They include both subsonic and supersonic conditions at both medium and full, nonafter burning, power. Estimated accuracy, minimum detectable levels of sensor failures, and failure accommodation performance for an F100 turbofan engine control system are discussed.

Merrill, Walter C.↗

An innovative design for autonomous backup attitude control of the Gamma Ray Observatory

The Gamma Ray Observatory is a NASA funded three-axis stabilized spacecraft which will carry four scientific instruments to observe gamma ray phenomena. The requirement to protect the scientific mission from system failures led to the attitude control and determination system design described in this paper. The design employs nine control modes with error detection, hardware substitution, and autonomous mode switching. The system architecture evolved to eliminate cross-dependence between the primary on-board computer (OBC) and the backup control processor electronics. Cross strapping of sensors and actuators and separation of the input/output electronics ensure that a reliable set of sensors and actuators will be available for backup mode operation. The OBC software includes failure detection, hardware reconfiguration, and mode switching logic which provide the ability to autonomously transfer, upon anomaly, to a reliable backup mode. Verification of this mode transition design is done in four test programs: at the unit level, by analytical simulation, by a hybrid breadboard electronics-simulation setup, and by a flight hardware-simulation test.

Tai, F.↗

Intelligent Design and Intelligent Failure

Good Evening, my name is Greg Jerman and for nearly a quarter century I have been performing failure analysis on NASA's aerospace hardware. During that time I had the distinct privilege of keeping the Space Shuttle flying for two thirds of its history. I have analyzed a wide variety of failed hardware from simple electrical cables to cryogenic fuel tanks to high temperature turbine blades. During this time I have found that for all the time we spend intelligently designing things, we need to be equally intelligent about understanding why things fail. The NASA Flight Director for Apollo 13, Gene Kranz, is best known for the expression "Failure is not an option." However, NASA history is filled with failures both large and small, so it might be more accurate to say failure is inevitable. It is how we react and learn from our failures that makes the difference.

Jerman, Gregory↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware. The IOA analysis defined the OMS as being comprised of the following subsystems: helium pressurization, propellant storage and distribution, Orbital Maneuvering Engine, and EPD and C. The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of 284 hardware and 667 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 160 hardware and 216 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 101 hardware and 142 EPD and C CIL items.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Enabling Reliable, Fault-Tolerant Autonomous Lunar Habitats with High-Performance Spaceflight Computing

The lunar surface presents unfavorable constraints and harsh living conditions. To address these challenges, autonomous habitats will require complex integrated systems that combine advanced software, high-performance hardware, and cutting-edge sensors to ensure sustainability, safety, and operational efficiency. Consequently, maintaining a sustainable presence on the Moon requires reliable infrastructure and efficient development, precise monitoring, and utilization of resources within a lunar installation. These elements are essential not only to ensure that lunar settlement can be long-term, self-sustaining, and resource-efficient, but also to serve as a foundation for future missions and eventual human habitation on Mars. Humans are not native to the Moon; therefore, our survival and ability to thrive will depend on autonomous systems that can foster safety and resilience through high-availability architectures, graceful degradation, and highly fault-tolerant spaceflight hardware capable of continuing operation during failures. This requires advanced human-rated distributed systems architectures with specialized electronics, scalable capabilities, and an integrated design approach. Unlike current practices focused on short-term missions and regularly maintained components, permanent lunar compute systems must be designed for extended operations beyond mission durations. This paper explores the necessity of transitioning toward fault- tolerant, highly autonomous hardware systems designed for multi-year missions. It also identifies critical subsystems that require high levels of autonomy, supported by radiation-hardened processors and extreme thermal loads, which are essential to mitigate long-term degradation and ensure sustainable lunar habitation. Finally, the paper aligns with NASA’s identified Civil Space Shortfalls, particularly in high-performance onboard computing, advanced data acquisition, extreme-environment avionics, radiation monitoring and countermeasures, and autonomous health management. It proposes NASA’s new High-Performance Spaceflight Computing (HPSC) processor as a turnkey solution, delivering 100 times the performance-per-watt of legacy rad-hard CPUs and enabling onboard AI, edge computing, and fault-tolerant features essential for sustained lunar autonomy and beyond.

Sarkis S Mikaelian↗

PEM-INST-001: Instructions for Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuit (PEM) Selection, Screening, and Qualification

Potential users of plastic encapsulated microcircuits (PEMs) need to be reminded that unlike the military system of producing robust high-reliability microcircuits that are designed to perform acceptably in a variety of harsh environments, PEMs are primarily designed for use in benign environments where equipment is easily accessed for repair or replacement. The methods of analysis applied to military products to demonstrate high reliability cannot always be applied to PEMs. This makes it difficult for users to characterize PEMs for two reasons: 1. Due to the major differences in design and construction, the standard test practices used to ensure that military devices are robust and have high reliability often cannot be applied to PEMs that have a smaller operating temperature range and are typically more frail and susceptible to moisture absorption. In contrast, high-reliability military microcircuits usually utilize large, robust, high-temperature packages that are hermetically sealed. 2. Unlike the military high-reliability system, users of PEMs have little visibility into commercial manufacturers proprietary design, materials, die traceability, and production processes and procedures. There is no central authority that monitors PEM commercial product for quality, and there are no controls in place that can be imposed across all commercial manufacturers to provide confidence to high-reliability users that a common acceptable level of quality exists for all PEMs manufacturers. Consequently, there is no guaranteed control over the type of reliability that is built into commercial product, and there is no guarantee that different lots from the same manufacturer are equally acceptable. And regarding application, there is no guarantee that commercial products intended for use in benign environments will provide acceptable performance and reliability in harsh space environments. The qualification and screening processes contained in this document are intended to detect poor-quality lots and screen out early random failures from use in space flight hardware. However, since it cannot be guaranteed that quality was designed and built into PEMs that are appropriate for space applications, users cannot screen in quality that may not exist. It must be understood that due to the variety of materials, processes, and technologies used to design and produce PEMs, this test process may not accelerate and detect all failure mechanisms. While the tests herein will increase user confidence that PEMs with otherwise unknown reliability can be used in space environments, such testing may not guarantee the same level of reliability offered by military microcircuits. PEMs should only be used where due to performance needs there are no alternatives in the military high-reliability market, and projects are willing to accept higher risk.

Teverovsky, Alexander↗

Effect of system workload on operating system reliability - A study on IBM 3081

This paper presents an analysis of operating system failures on an IBM 3081 running VM/SP. Three broad categories of software failures are found: error handling, program control or logic, and hardware related; it is found that more than 25 percent of software failures occur in the hardware/software interface. Measurements show that results on software reliability cannot be considered representative unless the system workload is taken into account. The overall CPU execution rate, although measured to be close to 100 percent most of the time, is not found to correlate strongly with the occurrence of failures. Possible reasons for the observed workload failure dependency, based on detailed investigations of the failure data, are discussed.

Iyer, R. K.↗

Developing Approaches for Certification of Uninspectable Fracture Critical AM Components

Introduction - Human-rated spaceflight hardware is subject to the Fracture Control requirements in NASA-STD5019, which are intended to control the risk of component failure due to undetected cracks or defects. - All hardware in this mission class is classified for Fracture Control – Exempt, Non-fracture Critical, or Fracture Critical - Fracture Critical: A classification that identifies a part where failure due to the presence of a crack is a catastrophic hazard ➔ Pressure vessels, engine components, primary structure, etc. - Axiom 1: Material and manufacturing process produce structures and components with cracks or defects. - Axiom 2: The presence of a crack or defect of sufficient size reduces the strength and life of the structure. - Damage Tolerance: demonstration that a component can survive the service life (with a safety factor) in the presence of an undetected flaw or damage. - Components are manufactured from aerospace quality materials using controlled processes. - Components are inspected for damage (cracks, flaws, defects, etc.). - Components are shown by test or analysis to be tolerant to undetected flaws.

Will Tilson↗

Discovery: Under the Microscope at Kennedy Space Center

The National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) is known for discovery, exploration, and advancement of knowledge. Since the days of Leeuwenhoek, microscopy has been at the forefront of discovery and knowledge. No truer is that statement than today at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), where microscopy plays a major role in contamination identification and is an integral part of failure analysis. Space exploration involves flight hardware undergoing rigorous "visually clean" inspections at every step of processing. The unknown contaminants that are discovered on these inspections can directly impact the mission by decreasing performance of sensors and scientific detectors on spacecraft and satellites, acting as micrometeorites, damaging critical sealing surfaces, and causing hazards to the crew of manned missions. This talk will discuss how microscopy has played a major role in all aspects of space port operations at KSC. Case studies will highlight years of analysis at the Materials Science Division including facility and payload contamination for the Navigation Signal Timing and Ranging Global Positioning Satellites (NA VST AR GPS) missions, quality control monitoring of monomethyl hydrazine fuel procurement for launch vehicle operations, Shuttle Solids Rocket Booster (SRB) foam processing failure analysis, and Space Shuttle Main Engine Cut-off (ECO) flight sensor anomaly analysis. What I hope to share with my fellow microscopists is some of the excitement of microscopy and how its discoveries has led to hardware processing, that has helped enable the successful launch of vehicles and space flight missions here at Kennedy Space Center.

Howard, Philip M.↗

Implementation of an Adaptive Controller System from Concept to Flight Test

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Dryden Flight Research Center (Edwards, California) is conducting ongoing flight research using adaptive controller algorithms. A highly modified McDonnell-Douglas NF-15B airplane called the F-15 Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) is used to test and develop these algorithms. Modifications to this airplane include adding canards and changing the flight control systems to interface a single-string research controller processor for neural network algorithms. Research goals include demonstration of revolutionary control approaches that can efficiently optimize aircraft performance in both normal and failure conditions and advancement of neural-network-based flight control technology for new aerospace system designs. This report presents an overview of the processes utilized to develop adaptive controller algorithms during a flight-test program, including a description of initial adaptive controller concepts and a discussion of modeling formulation and performance testing. Design finalization led to integration with the system interfaces, verification of the software, validation of the hardware to the requirements, design of failure detection, development of safety limiters to minimize the effect of erroneous neural network commands, and creation of flight test control room displays to maximize human situational awareness; these are also discussed.

Larson, Richard R.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware, and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of 208 hardware and 2064 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 141 hardware and 449 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. After comparison and discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, 96 hardware issues, 83 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Implementation of an Adaptive Controller System from Concept to Flight Test

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Dryden Flight Research Center (Edwards, California) is conducting ongoing flight research using adaptive controller algorithms. A highly modified McDonnell-Douglas NF-15B airplane called the F-15 Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) was used for these algorithms. This airplane has been modified by the addition of canards and by changing the flight control systems to interface a single-string research controller processor for neural network algorithms. Research goals included demonstration of revolutionary control approaches that can efficiently optimize aircraft performance for both normal and failure conditions, and to advance neural-network-based flight control technology for new aerospace systems designs. Before the NF-15B IFCS airplane was certified for flight test, however, certain processes needed to be completed. This paper presents an overview of these processes, including a description of the initial adaptive controller concepts followed by a discussion of modeling formulation and performance testing. Upon design finalization, the next steps are: integration with the system interfaces, verification of the software, validation of the hardware to the requirements, design of failure detection, development of safety limiters to minimize the effect of erroneous neural network commands, and creation of flight test control room displays to maximize human situational awareness.

Larson, Richard R.↗

SU-E-T-421: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of Xoft Electronic Brachytherapy for the Treatment of Superficial Skin Cancers

Purpose: To perform a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) of the process for treating superficial skin cancers with the Xoft Axxent electronic brachytherapy (eBx) system, given the recent introduction of expanded quality control (QC) initiatives at our institution. Methods: A process map was developed listing all steps in superficial treatments with Xoft eBx, from the initial patient consult to the completion of the treatment course. The process map guided the FMEA to identify the failure modes for each step in the treatment workflow and assign Risk Priority Numbers (RPN), calculated as the product of the failure mode’s probability of occurrence (O), severity (S) and lack of detectability (D). FMEA was done with and without the inclusion of recent QC initiatives such as increased staffing, physics oversight, standardized source calibration, treatment planning and documentation. The failure modes with the highest RPNs were identified and contrasted before and after introduction of the QC initiatives. Results: Based on the FMEA, the failure modes with the highest RPN were related to source calibration, treatment planning, and patient setup/treatment delivery (Fig. 1). The introduction of additional physics oversight, standardized planning and safety initiatives such as checklists and time-outs reduced the RPNs of these failure modes. High-risk failure modes that could be mitigated with improved hardware and software interlocks were identified. Conclusion: The FMEA analysis identified the steps in the treatment process presenting the highest risk. The introduction of enhanced QC initiatives mitigated the risk of some of these failure modes by decreasing their probability of occurrence and increasing their detectability. This analysis demonstrates the importance of well-designed QC policies, procedures and oversight in a Xoft eBx programme for treatment of superficial skin cancers. Unresolved high risk failure modes highlight the need for non-procedural quality initiatives such as improved planning software and more robust hardware interlock systems.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Assessing the Relative Risk of Aerocapture Using Probabalistic Risk Assessment

A recent study performed for the Aerocapture Technology Area in the In-Space Propulsion Technology Projects Office at the Marshall Space Flight Center investigated the relative risk of various capture techniques for Mars missions. Aerocapture has been proposed as a possible capture technique for future Mars missions but has been perceived by many in the community as a higher risk option as compared to aerobraking and propulsive capture. By performing a probabilistic risk assessment on aerocapture, aerobraking and propulsive capture, a comparison was made to uncover the projected relative risks of these three maneuvers. For mission planners, this knowledge will allow them to decide if the mass savings provided by aerocapture warrant any incremental risk exposure. The study focuses on a Mars Sample Return mission currently under investigation at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). In each case (propulsive, aerobraking and aerocapture), the Earth return vehicle is inserted into Martian orbit by one of the three techniques being investigated. A baseline spacecraft was established through initial sizing exercises performed by JPL's Team X. While Team X design results provided the baseline and common thread between the spacecraft, in each case the Team X results were supplemented by historical data as needed. Propulsion, thermal protection, guidance, navigation and control, software, solar arrays, navigation and targeting and atmospheric prediction were investigated. A qualitative assessment of human reliability was also included. Results show that different risk drivers contribute significantly to each capture technique. For aerocapture, the significant drivers include propulsion system failures and atmospheric prediction errors. Software and guidance hardware contribute the most to aerobraking risk. Propulsive capture risk is mainly driven by anomalous solar array degradation and propulsion system failures. While each subsystem contributes differently to the risk of each technique, results show that there exists little relative difference in the reliability of these capture techniques although uncertainty for the aerocapture estimates remains high given the lack of in-space demonstration.

Percy, Thomas K.↗

Balance of Plant Modeling and Real-Time Hardware-in-the-Loop Integration with the Microreactor Automated Control System

The advent of novel microreactor technology has driven a focused effort to explore safety and efficiency improvements that can be achieved through the use of automated system control. Development of control strategies, especially for initial demonstration, requires an adequate surrogate environment to safely research failure modes and control integration with realistic hardware delay. However, efficiency gains from control strategies are improved when the scope of controller action is expanded to include system-level dynamics such as downstream heat extraction and mass flow. For this reason, a balance-of-plant (BOP) model of a representative microreactor system has been developed using the TRANsient Simulation Framework of Reconfigurable Models library in Modelica. This model captures a reactor and primary NaK coolant loop that represent corresponding system components of the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and EvaLuation (MARVEL) design as well as a secondary coolant loop and heat extraction representative of the Microreactor Agile Non-Nuclear Experimental Test Bed (MAGNET). This model configuration allows for hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) integration with microreactor automated control system (MACS) hardware in real time through a Python-based gRPC client. Real-time simulation of model performance with emulated hardware and communication delay suggests that under independent proportional-integral-derivative control of BOP model drum dynamics and downstream heat extraction, stable power load following is achievable. A slight delay in load following, filtering of high-frequency dynamics, and localized temperature fluctation suggest room for improvement through the development of higher-level control strategies. The simulated coupling of the MAGNET facility lays the groundwork for future digital twin analysis with a coupled MACS-MAGNET HIL demonstration.

McConnell, Jono [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000238984741)↗