Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “secure”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 379 records · Page 21

Security by Design Economics Analysis for Advanced Reactors and Small Modular Reactors Project Interim Report for FY2021

Advanced Reactor and Small Modular Reactor (AR/SMR) designs have the potential to provide clean, reliable baseload energy. Ensuring the capability to deploy these reactors in an economically viable fashion is of interest to industry. A large portion of the expected operating costs of AR/SMRs involves the security of the plant. Security by Design (SeBD) is the practice of including features in the design and construction of the site, with the intent to decrease the operating costs related to security. Quantifying the increase or decrease in the overall lifetime cost to the plant as a result of SeBD is of paramount importance in understanding the disadvantages and benefits of such activities. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) is funding the development of a methodology whereby the capital expenses and operating expenses, as well as the physical security effectiveness, of SeBD can be quantified for AR/SMRs. This report is an interim report on the progress of the work performed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Idaho National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). It is the second annual report on this work.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Security by Design: A Plant Design and Component-Based Approach to Technical Solutions to Insider and Outsider Threat

Security costs for nuclear reactors have been shown to rise over the lifecycle of a nuclear facility as new threats, security weaknesses, and the generic threat profile of the plant location change over time. This paper conducts a review of the technological gaps that currently exist in Security by Design (SeBD) based on the literature available and attempts to close those gaps through proposing technological constructs and processes that can integrate safety and security in the design process of a plant, with a primary focus on SMR technology. Under the new modular and mass manufacturing regime, where plant designs attempt to reduce costs with potential economies of scale and modular construction, the current SeBD definitions focusing on state level regulators are not considered adequate since the licensing stage is often too late in the design process to integrate the true cost savings of SeBD. Thus, this paper attempts to remedy the current logic in order to allow for continuous implementation of security alongside the development of the safety concept for the plant. If adopted within the design process the establishment of this type of technology will allow for a technological ecosystem to evolve that will imbed security concepts into the physical design of the components of the plant.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Nuclear Security Enterprise Study of High-Reliability Systems, Collaboration, and Data

It may seem simple and trivial, but defining the difference between data and information is contested and has implications that may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and controlling them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not inadvertently released to foreign governments, the public, or those without Need-to-Know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the inadvertent conversion to sensitive information. The complexity of this concern is further augmented when institutions are part of tightly coupled networks that informally share data and information. Additionally, those that share data as a function of legislative action—and/or formally integrate data and information system infrastructures—may be a higher security risk. This paper will present a case study that utilizes elements of literature from Knowledge Management and networks to tell a story of an issue in security—specifically, controlling the conversion of data to information.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Finding of No Adverse Effect for the Façade Alteration of Building 23-117, Administration Building, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to update the façade of Building 23-117 in the town of Mercury (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15256), which is on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The purpose of the undertaking is to incorporate Building 23-117 into the new Mercury campus in accordance with the master plan for the modernization of Mercury. The NNSA/NFO will implement this undertaking in accordance with the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA. Building 23-117 was built in 1982 as the architect-engineer Administration Building1 for Holmes & Narver, a government contractor who helped design and engineer the town of Mercury and other areas on the NNSS from its inception until the termination of their contract in 1990. The building continued to be used by subsequent government contractors and is currently still in use by MSTS. The town of Mercury and the immediate surrounding area have been formally determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register, NRHP) as the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230) under Criteria A and C for its importance in supporting nuclear testing and scientific research from 1951 through 1992. Building 23-117 was identified as a contributing element to the MHD in a 2018 architectural survey of the district (Reno et al.) and recorded on a Nevada Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) form (Reno et al. 2017). It is a historic property for the purposes of compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and is subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. The NNSA/NFO requested that Desert Research Institute (DRI), cultural resource subject matter experts, analyze the effects of the proposed project on historic properties in the Area of Potential Effect (APE) and make a recommended finding for the undertaking in accordance with Section 106 of the NHPA and the Mercury PA. The purpose of this letter report is to submit documentation related to the mitigation of the façade alteration of Building 23-117 (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15256) in the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230). This submission is intended to comply with the stipulations in the Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the Mercury PA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Experiences of Member States in Building a Nuclear Security Infrastructure for New Nuclear Power Programmes

A nuclear power programme has many benefits, but it is a major undertaking that requires careful planning and preparation as well as a substantial investment in time. It also necessitates the establishment of a sustainable national infrastructure with committed and sustained financial and human resources. While nuclear power is not unique in this respect, it is different from other sources of energy because of the risks associated with the use of nuclear material, as well as the need for compliance with international legal instruments, internationally accepted nuclear safety standards, nuclear security guidance, and safeguards requirements. The IAEA’s Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1 (Rev. 1), defines a phased approach that identifies 19 infrastructure issues that should be addressed in each of the three phases of the development of a nuclear infrastructure for a nuclear power programme. The publication Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development IAEA Nuclear Energy Series NG-T-3.2 (Rev. 2) provides a methodology to determine the status of the infrastructure conditions covering all 19 issues identified in the Milestones Approach. A companion IAEA Implementing Guide, Establishing the Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 19, provides guidance on the recommended actions to be taken by a State to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme using the Milestones Approach. This publication is intended to provide guidance based on the experiences and good practices of Member States with embarking nuclear power programmes as well as Member States that are expanding their nuclear power programmes. The guidance is in the form of case studies, which highlight challenges, issues, and solutions identified by Member States as lessons learned for new nuclear power programmes. This TECDOC is designed to present the experiences of Member States to assist other Member States in developing a nuclear security programme. It addresses the key actions necessary to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme consistent with the three phases of the IAEA Milestones Approach. The Member States that provided case studies in this document are at different stages in the development of a nuclear power programme.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Integrating PCTRAN with AI-Driven Host-Intrusion Detection and Secured Container Systems for Advanced Malware Analysis (Summer Internship Report)

This study presents a solution for enhancing the security of the Personal Computer Transient Analyzer (PCTRAN) PC-based Nuclear Power Plant Simulator by integrating the software with an artificial intelligence (AI)-driven host-intrusion detection system (HIDS), in addition to a secured container system, for malware analysis. PCTRAN is a Windows XP-based software package that has the ability to simulate a variety of accident and transient conditions for nuclear power plants (NPPs). It offers a high-resolution replica of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and displays the status of important parameters allowing for operator interaction. By including AI-driven HIDS for the NSSS, the framework can identify security threats in real-time, ensuring the integrity of the nuclear simulation environment. Additionally, the secured container system offers the ability to isolate and analyze malware, preventing potential threats from affecting core systems. The integration process involves extensive testing and validation in order to ensure accuracy, reliability, and compliance with security policies. This framework sets a new precedent for secure simulation and training in NPP operations, and offers insight for future advancements in cybersecurity.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Small Modular Reactor and Microreactor Security-by-Design Lessons Learned: Integrated PPS Designs

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security into the design process can provide robust, cost-effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this report is to capture lessons learned by the Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program that may be beneficial for other advanced and small modular reactor (SMR) vendors to use when developing security systems and postures. This report will capture relevant information that can be used in the security-by-design (SeBD) process for SMR and microreactor vendors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Deep Cyber-Physical Situational Awareness for Energy Systems: A Secure Foundation for Next-Generation Energy Management

This document provides the final report for the CYPRES project. The purpose is (1) to highlight and summarize its major accomplishments and (2) to provide guidance on how its outcomes have informed and can inform important additional research and technology transfer. The goal of CYPRES was the research, development, and demonstration of a security-oriented next generation cyber-physical EMS for electric power systems that detects malicious and abnormal events through the fusion of cyber and physical data. To achieve this, the CYPRES project team researched, developed, and built a prototype of the solution, referred to as the CYPRES EMS. The CYPRES EMS is a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that demonstrates the management of the energy system, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. As part of the capabilities of the CYPRES EMS, the team designed and developed a suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control that are inherently cyberaware. At its core, the project aimed to research, develop, and demonstrate a security-oriented next-generation cyber-physical Energy Management System (EMS) capable of detecting malicious and abnormal events through the innovative fusion of cyber and physical data. This approach represents a fundamental shift from traditional EMS, reimagining how critical infrastructure can be protected through unified cyber-aware and physics-aware secure data flow pipelines. The project’s cornerstone deliverable, the CYPRES EMS, serves as a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that revolutionizes the management of energy systems, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. This prototype implements a comprehensive suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control, all designed with inherent cyber awareness. The system’s architecture extends from end-devices in the field through to control center applications, establishing a secure and resilient control framework that addresses the challenges posed by diverse devices of unknown trustworthiness connecting to modern power systems. Through this innovative approach to deep cyber-physical situational awareness, the CYPRES project not only advances the state-of-the-art in energy infrastructure protection but also establishes a new paradigm for how EMS can be designed, deployed, and operated in an increasingly complex threat landscape. The findings and developments from this project provide crucial insights for stakeholders across the energy sector, offering a blueprint for enhancing the reliability and resilience of our nation’s critical energy infrastructure in the face of evolving cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

U.S. Domestic Molten Salt Reactor: Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, economical, and effective physical protection systems (PPS). The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a molten salt reactor (MSR) and show how to effectively design a PPS with a reduced staffing headcount. Specifically, this work focuses on integrating PPS design features into a developed facility layout by making minor modifications to building structures. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D©, PathTrace©, and Blender©, were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic MSR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and responders were added into the model based on defending the hypothetical MSR facility against a hypothetical design basis threat (DBT). Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined, with adversary team sizes ranging from 4–8 to determine security system effectiveness. The results of this work will influence PPS designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic MSRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) complex can impact the design and completion of security-by-design (SeBD) for small modular reactors (SMRs). The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of interinstitutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action— particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of inter-institutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action—particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Assessing the dimensionality of food-security measures

Here, we explore the dimensionality of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s household food security survey module among households with children. Using a novel methodological approach to measuring food security, we find that there is multidimensionality in the module for households with children that is associated with the overall household, adult, and child dimensions of food security. Additional analyses suggest official estimates of food security among households with children are robust to this multidimensionality. However, we also find that accounting for the multidimensionality of food security among these households provides new insights into the correlates of food security at the household, adult, and child levels of measurement.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Guidelines for development of NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) computer security training programs

The report presents guidance for the NASA Computer Security Program Manager and the NASA Center Computer Security Officials as they develop training requirements and implement computer security training programs. NASA audiences are categorized based on the computer security knowledge required to accomplish identified job functions. Training requirements, in terms of training subject areas, are presented for both computer security program management personnel and computer resource providers and users. Sources of computer security training are identified.

Tompkins, F. G.↗

UNIX security in a supercomputing environment

The author critiques some security mechanisms in most versions of the Unix operating system and suggests more effective tools that either have working prototypes or have been implemented, for example in secure Unix systems. Although no computer (not even a secure one) is impenetrable, breaking into systems with these alternate mechanisms will cost more, require more skill, and be more easily detected than penetrations of systems without these mechanisms. The mechanisms described fall into four classes (with considerable overlap). User authentication at the local host affirms the identity of the person using the computer. The principle of least privilege dictates that properly authenticated users should have rights precisely sufficient to perform their tasks, and system administration functions should be compartmentalized; to this end, access control lists or capabilities should either replace or augment the default Unix protection system, and mandatory access controls implementing multilevel security models and integrity mechanisms should be available. Since most users access supercomputing environments using networks, the third class of mechanisms augments authentication (where feasible). As no security is perfect, the fourth class of mechanism logs events that may indicate possible security violations; this will allow the reconstruction of a successful penetration (if discovered), or possibly the detection of an attempted penetration.

Bishop, Matt↗

Secure voice for mobile satellite applications

The initial system studies are described which were performed at JPL on secure voice for mobile satellite applications. Some options are examined for adapting existing Secure Telephone Unit III (STU-III) secure telephone equipment for use over a digital mobile satellite link, as well as for the evolution of a dedicated secure voice mobile earth terminal (MET). The work has included some lab and field testing of prototype equipment. The work is part of an ongoing study at JPL for the National Communications System (NCS) on the use of mobile satellites for emergency communications. The purpose of the overall task is to identify and enable the technologies which will allow the NCS to use mobile satellite services for its National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) communications needs. Various other government agencies will also contribute to a mobile satellite user base, and for some of these, secure communications will be an essential feature.

Vaisnys, Arvydas↗

Secure, Mobile, Wireless Network Technology Designed, Developed, and Demonstrated

The inability to seamlessly disseminate data securely over a high-integrity, wireless broadband network has been identified as a primary technical barrier to providing an order-of-magnitude increase in aviation capacity and safety. Secure, autonomous communications to and from aircraft will enable advanced, automated, data-intensive air traffic management concepts, increase National Air Space (NAS) capacity, and potentially reduce the overall cost of air travel operations. For the first time ever, secure, mobile, network technology was designed, developed, and demonstrated with state-ofthe- art protocols and applications by a diverse, cooperative Government-industry team led by the NASA Glenn Research Center. This revolutionary technology solution will make fundamentally new airplane system capabilities possible by enabling secure, seamless network connections from platforms in motion (e.g., cars, ships, aircraft, and satellites) to existing terrestrial systems without the need for manual reconfiguration. Called Mobile Router, the new technology autonomously connects and configures networks as they traverse from one operating theater to another. The Mobile Router demonstration aboard the Neah Bay, a U.S. Coast Guard vessel stationed in Cleveland, Ohio, accomplished secure, seamless interoperability of mobile network systems across multiple domains without manual system reconfiguration. The Neah Bay was chosen because of its low cost and communications mission similarity to low-Earth-orbiting satellite platforms. This technology was successfully advanced from technology readiness level (TRL) 2 (concept and/or application formation) to TRL 6 (system model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment). The secure, seamless interoperability offered by the Mobile Router and encryption device will enable several new, vehicle-specific and systemwide technologies to perform such things as remote, autonomous aircraft performance monitoring and early detection and mitigation of potential equipment malfunctions. As an additional benefit, team advancements were incorporated into open standards, ensuring technology transfer. Low-cost, commercial products incorporating the new technology are already available. Furthermore, these products are fully interoperable with legacy network technology equipment currently being used throughout the world.

Ivancic, William D.↗

Security Risks: Management and Mitigation in the Software Life Cycle

A formal approach to managing and mitigating security risks in the software life cycle is requisite to developing software that has a higher degree of assurance that it is free of security defects which pose risk to the computing environment and the organization. Due to its criticality, security should be integrated as a formal approach in the software life cycle. Both a software security checklist and assessment tools should be incorporated into this life cycle process and integrated with a security risk assessment and mitigation tool. The current research at JPL addresses these areas through the development of a Sotfware Security Assessment Instrument (SSAI) and integrating it with a Defect Detection and Prevention (DDP) risk management tool.

securiy↗

Network Security via Biometric Recognition of Patterns of Gene Expression

Molecular biology provides the ability to implement forms of information and network security completely outside the bounds of legacy security protocols and algorithms. This paper addresses an approach which instantiates the power of gene expression for security. Molecular biology provides a rich source of gene expression and regulation mechanisms, which can be adopted to use in the information and electronic communication domains. Conventional security protocols are becoming increasingly vulnerable due to more intensive, highly capable attacks on the underlying mathematics of cryptography. Security protocols are being undermined by social engineering and substandard implementations by IT (Information Technology) organizations. Molecular biology can provide countermeasures to these weak points with the current security approaches. Future advances in instruments for analyzing assays will also enable this protocol to advance from one of cryptographic algorithms to an integrated system of cryptographic algorithms and real-time assays of gene expression products.

cybersecurity↗