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For several years we, at JPL, have been working on how to select safety measures for space missions in an optimal way. The main limitation on the measures that can be performed is, of course, cost.
The purpose was to collect and categorize a forecast of civilian space missions and their power requirements, and to assess the suitability of an SP-100 class space reactor power system to those missions. A wide variety of missions were selected for examination. The applicability of an SP-100 type of nuclear power system was assessed for each of the selected missions; a strawman nuclear power system configuration was drawn up for each mission. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) Space nuclear power in the 50 kW sub e plus range can enhance or enable a wide variety of ambitious civil space mission; (2) Safety issues require additional analyses for some applications; (3) Safe space nuclear reactor disposal is an issue for some applications; (4) The current baseline SP-100 conical radiator configuration is not applicable in all cases; (5) Several applications will require shielding greater than that provided by the baseline shadow-shield; and (6) Long duration, continuous operation, high reliability missions may exceed the currently designed SP-100 lifetime capabilities.
Weather conditions at Kennedy Space Center are extremely dynamic, and they greatly affect the safety of the Space Shuttles sitting on the launch pads. For example, on May 13, 1999, the foam on the External Tank (ET) of STS-96 was significantly damaged by hail at the launch pad, requiring rollback to the Vehicle Assembly Building. The loss of ET foam on STS-114 in 2005 intensified interest in monitoring and measuring damage to ET foam, especially from hail. But hail can be difficult to detect and monitor because it is often localized and obscured by heavy rain. Furthermore, the hot Florida climate usually melts the hail even before the rainfall subsides. In response, the hail monitor array (HMA) system, a joint effort of the Applied Physics Laboratory operated by NASA and ASRC Aerospace at KSC, was deployed for operational testing in the fall of 2006. Volunteers from the Community Collaborative Rain, Hail, and Snow (CoCoRaHS) network, in conjunction with Colorado State University, continue to test duplicate hail monitor systems deployed in the high plains of Colorado.
ASA will begin naming "a few hundred" engineers soon who will constitute the Independent. Technical Authority (ITA) recommended by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board to pro- vide an effective check and balance on space programs for safety. Within the next month, the directors of Johnson and Kennedy space centers will name "a couple of dozen at each place" to backstop human spaceflight engineers, according to Theron M. Bradley, Jr., NASA chief engineer. By the time the new fiscal year begins Oct. 1, the ITA should be fully staffed across the agency, with a system of "warrants" delineating who is an expert in what. Overseeing the whole organization
The feasibility of transporting radioactive waste produced in the process of generating electricity in nuclear powerplants into space for ultimate disposal was investigated at the request of the AEC as a NASA in-house effort. The investigation is part of a broad AEC study of methods for long-term storage or disposal of radioactive waste. The results of the study indicate that transporting specific radioactive wastes, particularly the actinides with very long half-lives, into space using the space shuttle/tug as the launch system, appears feasible from the engineering and safety viewpoints. The space transportation costs for ejecting the actinides out of the solar system would represent less than a 5-percent increase in the average consumer's electric bill.
Routine satellite operations for the Earth Science Constellation (ESC) include collision risk assessment between members of the constellation and other orbiting space objects. Each day, close approach predictions are generated by a U.S. Department of Defense Joint Space Operations Center Orbital Safety Analyst using the high accuracy Space Object Catalog maintained by the Air Force's 1" Space Control Squadron. Prediction results and other ancillary data such as state vector information are sent to NASAJGoddard Space Flight Center's (GSFC's) Collision Risk Assessment analysis team for review. Collision analysis is performed and the GSFC team works with the ESC member missions to develop risk reduction strategies as necessary. This paper presents various close approach statistics for the ESC. The ESC missions have been affected by debris from the recent anti-satellite test which destroyed the Chinese Fengyun- 1 C satellite. The paper also presents the percentage of close approach events induced by the Fengyun-1C debris, and presents analysis results which predict the future effects on the ESC caused by this event. Specifically, the Fengyun-1C debris is propagated for twenty years using high-performance computing technology and close approach predictions are generated for the ESC. The percent increase in the total number of conjunction events is considered to be an estimate of the collision risk due to the Fengyun-1C break- UP.
Efficient flight software development from natural language requirements needs an effective way to test designs earlier in the software design cycle. A method to automatically derive logical safety constraints and the design state space from natural language requirements is described. The constraints can then be checked using a logical consistency checker and also be used in a symbolic model checker to verify the early design of the system. This method was used to verify a hybrid control design for the suit ports on NASA Johnson Space Center's Space Exploration Vehicle against safety requirements.
This report presents the derivation of the relationship between the factor of safety, the margin of safety, and a given interaction equation in two- or three-dimensional space. Factors of safety and margins of safety can be calculated from these interaction equations using either the closed-form solutions provided or the numerical methods mentioned in this report. The dual definition of the factor of safety is presented.
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The concept of using the available Soyuz-TM Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) spacecraft for the assurance of the safety of the Space Station Freedom (SSF) crew after the departure of the Space Shuttle from SSF was proposed by the NPO Energia and was accepted by NASA in 1992. The ACRV will provide the crew with the capability to evacuate a seriously injured/ill crewmember from the SSF to a ground-based care facility under medically tolerable conditions and with the capability for a safe evacuation from SSF in the events SSF becomes uninhabitable or the Space Shuttle flights are interrupted for a time that exceeds SSF ability for crew support and/or safe operations. This paper presents the main results of studies on Phase A (including studies on the service life of ACRV; spacecraft design and operations; prelaunch processing; mission support; safety, reliability, maintenance and quality and assurance; landing, and search/rescue operations; interfaces with the SSF and with Space Shuttle; crew accommodation; motion of orbital an service modules; and ACRV injection by the Expendable Launch Vehicles), along with the objectives of further work on the Phase B.
Assuring personnel and equipment are fully protected during the Space Shuttle launch and landing operations has been a primary concern of NASA and its associated contractors since the inception of the program. A key factor in support of this policy has been the area access safety training requirements for badging of employees assigned to work on Space Shuttle Launch and Facilities. This requirement was targeted for possible cost savings and the transition of physical on-site walkdowns to the use of television tapes has realized program cost savings while continuing to fully satisfy the area access safety training requirements.
Throughout 2006, Range Safety was involved in a number of exciting and challenging activities and events, from developing, implementing, and supporting Range Safety policies and procedures-such as the Space Shuttle Launch and Landing Plans, the Range Safety Variance Process, and the Expendable Launch Vehicle Safety Program procedures-to evaluating new technologies. Range Safety training development is almost complete with the last course scheduled to go on line in mid-2007. Range Safety representatives took part in a number of panels and councils, including the newly formed Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel, the Range Commanders Council and its subgroups, the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel, and the unmanned aircraft systems working group. Space based range safety demonstration and certification (formerly STARS) and the autonomous flight safety system were successfully tested. The enhanced flight termination system will be tested in early 2007 and the joint advanced range safety system mission analysis software tool is nearing operational status. New technologies being evaluated included a processor for real-time compensation in long range imaging, automated range surveillance using radio interferometry, and a space based range command and telemetry processor. Next year holds great promise as we continue ensuring safety while pursuing our quest beyond the Moon to Mars.
Presence of defects such as disbonds, delaminations, impact damage, in thermal protection systems can significantly reduce safety of the Space Shuttle and its crew. The physical cause of Space Shuttle Columbia's catastrophic failure was a breach in its thermal protection system, caused by a piece of external tank insulating foam separating from the external tank and striking the leading edge of the left wing of the orbiter. There is an urgent need for a rapid, robust and life-circle oriented nondestructive testing (NDT) technique capable of inspecting the external tank insulating foam as well as the orbiter's protective (acreage) heat tiles and its fuselage prior and subsequent to a launch. Such a comprehensive inspection technique enables NASA to perform life-cycle inspection on critical components of the orbiter and its supporting hardware. Consequently, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center initiated an investigation into several potentially viable NDT techniques for this purpose. Microwave and millimeter wave NDT methods have shown great potential to achieve these goals. These methods have been successfully used to produce images of the interior of various complex, thick and thin external tank insulating foam structures for real focused reflectometer at operating frequency from 50-100 GHz and for synthetic aperture techniques at Ku-band (12-18 GHz) and K-band (18-26 GHz). Preliminary results of inspecting heat tile specimens show that increasing resolution of the measurement system is an important issue. This paper presents recent results of an investigation for the purpose of detecting anomalies such as debonds and corrosion in metal substrate in complex multi-sectioned protective heat tile specimens using a real focused 150 GHz (D-band) reflectometer and wide-band millimeter wave holography at 33-50, GHz (Q-band).
Microgreens have been recently identified as a new type of pick and eat salad crop that can be utilized in space crop production systems. The majority of traditionally grown leafy green crops can be grown as microgreens, in addition to crops such as legumes (e.g. pea shoots), sunflower, buckwheat, most herbs, and corn, presenting hundreds of microgreen crop options. With a wide variety of flavors, exceptional nutritional density, short growth cycles (7-14 days), and unmatched volume optimization potential, microgreens present as an interesting option for sustainable production of nutritious and flavorful crops in space. The food safety aspects of microgreens have been investigated by USDA in recent years, however, an assessment for crew consumption purposes has not yet been conducted to capture the variety of microgreen cultivar types grown in spaceflight relevant environmental conditions and hardware that could be a part of the astronaut diet. Seed sanitation methods will be developed for each microgreen cultivar to sanitize the seed coat and ensure viable germination and plant growth. Food safety analysis will be performed on 24 different fast-growing cultivars of microgreens by performing aerobic plate counts (APC), fungal counts, and select pathogen screening of edible plant tissue before and after treatment with ProSan sanitizing produce wash. Additional avenues of investigation into microgreens food safety will be undertaken to understand impacts of plant height at time of harvest (able to be manipulated by light spectrum), seed density at time of planting, and role of blue light in food safety metrics of microgreens (n=6-12 microgreen cultivars tested, depending on variable). These findings will be included in the Space Crop Production Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan. This new work is currently postponed due to Covid-19.
The Johnson Space Center has pursued integrating safety culture and risk management practices and techniques throughout a large organization with an extraordinarily diverse mission. Past mission and institutional failures have been used to inform NASA's safety culture and a implement a uniform risk management environment. Basics from the loss prevention industry have influenced NASA's approach to sustaining its unique, yet aging, infrastructure. Lessons learned at NASA can augment and enhance occupational safety, health and risk management capabilities within hazardous industries. By focusing on risk informed decision-making, building a pervasive safety culture, and accommodating human factors, NASA's safety capabilities have been specifically developed to minimize the risk of loss of life and loss of mission.
This document from the Stennis Space Center Office of Safety and Mission Assurance rates flight preparation elements for Space Shuttle mission STS-114. All elements are rated with the status "Standard Open Work or Completed", and marked in green on the document, which contains a Certificate of Flight Readiness for STS-114.
The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate is responsible for mitigating risk, providing system safety, and lowering risk for space programs from ground to space. The S&MA is divided into 4 divisions: The Space Exploration Division (NC), the International Space Station Division (NE), the Safety & Test Operations Division (NS), and the Quality and Flight Equipment Division (NT). The interns, myself and Arun Aruljothi, will be working with the Risk & Reliability Analysis Branch under the NC Division's. The mission of this division is to identify, characterize, diminish, and communicate risk by implementing an efficient and effective assurance model. The team utilizes Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to ensure decisions concerning risks are informed, vehicles are safe and reliable, and program/project requirements are realistic and realized. This project pertains to the Orion mission, so it is geared toward a long duration Human Space Flight Program(s). For space missions, payload is a critical concept; balancing what hardware can be replaced by components verse by Orbital Replacement Units (ORU) or subassemblies is key. For this effort a database was created that combines mass and reliability data, called Mass and Reliability System or MaRS. The U.S. International Space Station (ISS) components are used as reference parts in the MaRS database. Using ISS components as a platform is beneficial because of the historical context and the environment similarities to a space flight mission. MaRS uses a combination of systems: International Space Station PART for failure data, Vehicle Master Database (VMDB) for ORU & components, Maintenance & Analysis Data Set (MADS) for operation hours and other pertinent data, & Hardware History Retrieval System (HHRS) for unit weights. MaRS is populated using a Visual Basic Application. Once populated, the excel spreadsheet is comprised of information on ISS components including: operation hours, random/nonrandom failures, software/hardware failures, quantity, orbital replaceable units (ORU), date of placement, unit weight, frequency of part, etc. The motivation for creating such a database will be the development of a mass/reliability parametric model to estimate mass required for replacement parts. Once complete, engineers working on future space flight missions will have access a mean time to failures and on parts along with their mass, this will be used to make proper decisions for long duration space flight missions