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NASA NTRS2007

Technology Development for Fire Safety in Exploration Spacecraft and Habitats

Fire during an exploration mission far from Earth is a particularly critical risk for exploration vehicles and habitats. The Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression (FPDS) project is part of the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) and has the goal to enhance crew health and safety on exploration missions by reducing the likelihood of a fire, or, if one does occur, minimizing the risk to the mission, crew, or system. Within the past year, the FPDS project has been formalized within the ETDP structure and has seen significant progress on its tasks in fire prevention, detection, and suppression. As requirements for Constellation vehicles and, specifically, the CEV have developed, the need for the FPDS technologies has become more apparent and we continue to make strides to infuse them into the Constellation architecture. This paper describes the current structure of the project within the ETDP and summarizes the significant programmatic activities. Major technical accomplishments are identified as are activities planned for FY07.

Ruff, Gary A.↗

NASA NTRS2017

A Framework for Reliability and Safety Analysis of Complex Space Missions

Long duration and complex mission scenarios are characteristics of NASA's human exploration of Mars, and will provide unprecedented challenges. Systems reliability and safety will become increasingly demanding and management of uncertainty will be increasingly important. NASA's current pioneering strategy recognizes and relies upon assurance of crew and asset safety. In this regard, flexibility to develop and innovate in the emergence of new design environments and methodologies, encompassing modeling of complex systems, is essential to meet the challenges.

Safety Analysis↗

NASA NTRS1999

Cardiovascular Deconditioning

Spaceflight causes adaptive changes in cardiovascular function that may deleteriously affect crew health and safety. Over the last three decades, symptoms of cardiovascular changes have ranged from postflight orthostatic tachycardia and decreased exercise capacity to serious cardiac rhythm disturbances during extravehicular activities (EVA). The most documented symptom of cardiovascular dysfunction, postflight orthostatic intolerance, has affected a significant percentage of U.S. Space Shuttle astronauts. Problems of cardiovascular dysfunction associated with spaceflight are a concern to NASA. This has been particularly true during Shuttle flights where the primary concern is the crew's physical health, including the pilot's ability to land the Orbiter, and the crew's ability to quickly egress and move to safety should a dangerous condition arise. The study of astronauts during Shuttle activities is inherently more difficult than most human research. Consequently, sample sizes have been small and results have lacked consistency. Before the Extended Duration Orbiter Medical Project (EDOMP), there was a lack of normative data on changes in cardiovascular parameters during and after spaceflight. The EDOMP for the first time allowed studies on a large enough number of subjects to overcome some of these problems. There were three primary goals of the Cardiovascular EDOMP studies. The first was to establish, through descriptive studies, a normative data base of cardiovascular changes attributable to spaceflight. The second goal was to determine mechanisms of cardiovascular changes resulting from spaceflight (particularly orthostatic hypotension and cardiac rhythm disturbances). The third was to evaluate possible countermeasures. The Cardiovascular EDOMP studies involved parallel descriptive, mechanistic, and countermeasure evaluations.

Charles, John B.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Building on the Past - Looking to the Future: A Focus on Expanding Horizons - Part 2

The history of space endeavors stretches far from Robert Goddard s initial flights and will certainly extend far beyond the construction of the International Space Station. As society grows in knowledge of and familiarity with space, the focus of maintaining the safety of the crews and the habitability of the vehicles will be of the utmost importance to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) community. Through the years, Payload Safety has developed not only as a Panel, but also as part of the NASA community, striving to enhance the efficiency and understanding of how business should be conducted as more International Partners become involved. The recent accomplishments of the first docking of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) HII Transfer Vehicle (HTV 1) and completion of the Japanese Experiment Module (JEM) or KIBO and the Russian MRM2 to the International Space Station (ISS) mark significant steps for the future of ISS. 2010 will mark the final flights of the Shuttle and the completion of ISS assembly. Future delivery of humans and hardware will rely on the Russian Progress and Soyuz, the Japanese HII Transfer Vehicle (HTV), the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and US "Commercial Off-The-Shelf" (COTS) and Constellation vehicles. The International Partners (IPs) will have more capability in delivery as well as responsibility for review of hardware they deliver to assure safe operation. This is the second in a series of papers and presentations in what is hoped to be an annual update that illustrates challenges and lessons learned in the areas of communication (how hazard reports can be misunderstood), safety requirements (transitioning from Shuttle-centric to ISS-centric), and processes (review of hardware by RSC-E and Franchised ESA and JAXA PSRP) which have been vital in conducting the business of the Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP). This year will focus on the items annotated above.

Guidry, Richard W.↗

NASA NTRS1966

Bio-Medical Factors and External Hazards in Space Station Design

The design of space-station configurations is influenced by many factors. Probably the most demanding and critical are the biomedical and external hazards requirements imposed to provide the proper environment and supporting facilities for the crew and the adequate protective measures necessary to provide a configuration'in which the crew can live and work efficiently in relative comfort and safety. The major biomedical factors, such as physiology, psychology, nutrition, personal hygiene, waste management, and recreation, all impose their own peculiar requirements. The commonality and integration of these requirements demand the utmost ingenuity and inventiveness be exercised in order to achieve effective configuration compliance. The relationship of biomedical factors for the internal space-station environment will be explored with respect to internal atmospheric constituency, atmospheric pressure levels, oxygen positive pressure, temperature, humidity, CO2 concentration, and atmospheric contamination. The range of these various parameters and the recommended levels for design use will be analyzed. Requirements and criteria for specific problem areas such as zero and artificial gravity and crew private quarters will be reviewed and the impact on the design of representative solutions will be presented. In the areas of external hazards, the impact of factors such as meteoroids, radiation, vacuum, temperature extremes, and cycling on station design will be evaluated. Considerations with respect to operational effectiveness and crew safety will be discussed. The impact of such factors on spacecraft design to achieve acceptable launch and reentry g levels, crew rotation intervals, etc., will be reviewed.

Olling, E. H.↗

NASA NTRS1966

Bio-Medical Factors and External Hazards in Space Station Design

The design of space-station configurations is influenced by many factors, Probably the most demanding and critical are the biomedical and external hazards requirements imposed to provide the proper environment and supporting facilities for the crew and the adequate protective measures necessary to provide a configuration in which the crew can live and work efficiently in relative comfort and safety. The major biomedical factors, such as physiology, psychology, nutrition, personal hygiene, waste management, and recreation, all impose their own peculiar requirements. The commonality and integration of these requirements demand the utmost ingenuity and inventiveness be exercised in order to achieve effective configuration compliance. The relationship of biomedical factors for the internal space-station environment will be explored with respect to internal atmospheric constituency, atmospheric pressure levels, oxygen positive pressure, temperature, humidity, CO2 concentration, and atmospheric contamination. The range of these various parameters and the recommended levels for design use will be analyzed. Requirements and criteria for specific problem areas such as zero and artificial gravity and crew private quarters will be reviewed and the impact on the design of representative solutions will be presented. In the areas of external hazards, the impact of factors such as meteoroids, radiation, vacuum, temperature extremes, and cycling on station design will be evaluated. Considerations with respect to operational effectiveness and crew safety will be discussed. The impact of such factors on spacecraft design to achieve acceptable launch and reentry g levels, crew rotation intervals, etc., will be reviewed. Examples of configurations, subsystems, and internal a arrangement and installations to comply with such biomedical factor requirements will ber presented. The effects of solutions to certain biomedical factors on configuration weight, operational convenience, and program costs will be compared.

Olling, Edward H.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Microbiology and Crew Medical Events on the International Space Station

The closed environment of the International Space Station (ISS) creates an ideal environment for microbial growth. Previous studies have identified the ubiquitous nature of microorganisms throughout the space station environment. To ensure safety of the crew, microbial monitoring of air and surface within ISS began in December 2000 and continues to be monitored on a quarterly basis. Water monitoring began in 2009 when the potable water dispenser was installed on ISS. However, it is unknown if high microbial counts are associated with inflight medical events. The microbial counts are determined for the air, surface, and water samples collected during flight operations and samples are returned to the Microbiology laboratory at the Johnson Space Center for identification. Instances of microbial counts above the established microbial limit requirements were noted and compared inflight medical events (any non-injury event such as illness, rashes, etc.) that were reported during the same calendar-quarter. Data were analyzed using repeated measures logistic regression for the forty-one US astronauts flew on ISS between 2000 and 2012. In that time frame, instances of microbial counts being above established limits were found for 10 times for air samples, 22 times for surface samples and twice for water. Seventy-eight inflight medical events were reported among the astronauts. A three times greater risk of a medical event was found when microbial samples were found to be high (OR = 3.01; p =.007). Engineering controls, crew training, and strict microbial limits have been established to mitigate the crew medical events and environmental risks. Due to the timing issues of sampling and the samples return to earth, identification of particular microorganisms causing a particular inflight medical event is difficult. Further analyses are underway.

Oubre, Cherie↗

NASA NTRS2014

Microbiology and Crew Medical Events on the International Space Station

Oubre, Cherie M.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Orion MPCV Touchdown Detection Threshold Development and Testing

A robust method of detecting Orion Multi ]Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) splashdown is necessary to ensure crew and hardware safety during descent and after touchdown. The proposed method uses a triple redundant system to inhibit Reaction Control System (RCS) thruster firings, detach parachute risers from the vehicle, and transition to the post ]landing segment of the Flight Software (FSW). The vehicle crew is the prime input for touchdown detection, followed by an autonomous FSW algorithm, and finally a strictly time based backup timer. RCS thrusters must be inhibited before submersion in water to protect against possible damage due to firing these jets under water. In addition, neglecting to declare touchdown will not allow the vehicle to transition to post ]landing activities such as activating the Crew Module Up ]righting System (CMUS), resulting in possible loss of communication and difficult recovery. A previous AIAA paper gAssessment of an Automated Touchdown Detection Algorithm for the Orion Crew Module h concluded that a strictly Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) based detection method using an acceleration spike algorithm had the highest safety margins and shortest detection times of other methods considered. That study utilized finite element simulations of vehicle splashdown, generated by LS ]DYNA, which were expanded to a larger set of results using a Kriging surface fit. The study also used the Decelerator Systems Simulation (DSS) to generate flight dynamics during vehicle descent under parachutes. Proto ]type IMU and FSW MATLAB models provided the basis for initial algorithm development and testing. This paper documents an in ]depth trade study, using the same dynamics data and MATLAB simulations as the earlier work, to further develop the acceleration detection method. By studying the combined effects of data rate, filtering on the rotational acceleration correction, data persistence limits and values of acceleration thresholds, an optimal configuration was determined. The lever arm calculation, which removes the centripetal acceleration caused by vehicle rotation, requires that the vehicle angular acceleration be derived from vehicle body rates, necessitating the addition of a 2nd order filter to smooth the data. It was determined that using 200 Hz data directly from the vehicle IMU outperforms the 40 Hz FSW data rate. Data persistence counter values and acceleration thresholds were balanced in order to meet desired safety and performance. The algorithm proved to exhibit ample safety margin against early detection while under parachutes, and adequate performance upon vehicle splashdown. Fall times from algorithm initiation were also studied, and a backup timer length was chosen to provide a large safety margin, yet still trigger detection before CMUS inflation. This timer serves as a backup to the primary acceleration detection method. Additionally, these parameters were tested for safety on actual flight test data, demonstrating expected safety margins.

Daum, Jared↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Content and Representation of Information Needed to Support Time-Constrained Problem Solving

NASA’s current mission-operations paradigm originated with Project Mercury and endured with minimum evolution through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions. At its foundation is a near-complete real-time dependence on a ground team to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. Utilizing many engineers and operators with broad and deep expertise; large, distributed datasets including extensive telemetry; and expansive analytical and computing power, this ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years. This approach must change to address challenges associated with missions beyond low Earth orbit (BLEO), including infrequent resupply, reduced ability to evacuate, and delayed communications that prohibit real-time operational support. We anticipate that a necessary part of this change will be increased independence for the crew, as roles and responsibilities traditionally performed by ground teams move on board the vehicle. While many risks are associated with Earth-independent operations, one particular concern is ensuring that the crew will have adequate onboard support to perform urgent problem solving when communication with the ground is delayed or intermittent. A key resource that enables the ground team to respond to anomalies quickly and effectively is the extraordinary expertise and experience it possesses. It is comprised of 80+ experts on at any given time, with a combined 600+ years of system-specific experience across 22 unique console disciplines. A small crew will face the unprecedented challenge of independently responding to anomalies that have historically been handled by a team 20 times their size. Another important resource upon which the ground heavily relies to support procedure execution and anomaly response is data. The amount of telemetry data that each flight controller monitors is extensive. In addition, as the ground team works to further assess impacts, trouble shoot, identify workarounds, and oversee procedure execution, it accesses and synthesizes engineering and procedure information, as well as system build, test, and configuration documentation. It is not feasible nor useful to put all these data onboard as crews become more Earth independent. Each member of a small Mars mission small crew will have multiple roles beyond monitoring telemetry and data gathering, and multiple roles within anomaly resolution processes, thereby limiting their capacity for copious amounts of information. Moreover, while access is necessary, it alone is insufficient. Information will need to be compiled, refined, and represented appropriately to support the crew’s reduced attention and expertise. This work seeks to understand the content and representation of information needed to support time-constrained problem solving and decision making by the crew without real-time ground support. To build this understanding, we first surveyed the literature, focusing on how expert problem solvers construct and manipulate their mental models. Next, we interviewed expert problem solvers in spaceflight and analogous domains and surveyed industry solutions for data presentation. Finally, we analyzed current spaceflight operations by investigating flight controller anomaly resolution processes during ISS training simulations and real operational events. These methods led to creating a problem-solving framework that details common themes and features of attending to, assessing, analyzing, and acting on problems in complex, time-constrained domains. Using this framework and the results of our analysis, we identified conceptual data representations needed for crew-led problem-solving. Preliminary onboard user interface concepts to meet identified needs will be presented.

anomaly response↗

NASA NTRS1975

Clinical aspects of crew health

While the primary goal of the Apollo Program was to land men on the moon and return them safely to Earth, there were other very important medical objectives. The earlier Mercury and Gemini programs bad raised some concerns about the health and safety of future crews. For example, the high metabolic energy expenditure of extravehicular activity during the Gemini missions was unexpected. Before Apollo astronauts could safely explore the lunar surface, reliable predictors of energy cost and real-time monitoring techniques had to be developed. Physiological changes were noted in individual crewmen, some more consistently than others. The most important of these changes was in cardiopulmonary status demonstrated by decreased exercise capacity, loss of red blood cell mass, and cardiovascular deconditioning demonstrated by a decrease in the effectiveness of antigravity cardiovascular responses during postflight stress testing.

W. Royce Hawkins↗

NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗

NASA NTRS2019

ISEP: A Joint SRAG/CCMC Collaboration to Improve Mitigation of Space Weather Effects on Crew Health in the Exo-LEO Era

The Space Radiation Analysis Group (SRAG) at Johnson Space Center (JSC) is tasked with monitoring changes to space weather and mitigating any resultant impacts to crew health and safety. As human spaceflight goals extend from Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) missions like the International Space Station (ISS) to the moon, Mars and beyond, SRAG will need to update their current approach for crew monitoring of and protection from radiation exposure due to energetic Solar Particle Events (ESPEs). Challenges faced in planning exo-LEO missions include the lack of protection from the Earth’s geomagnetic field employed by the ISS in addition to limited communication capability between the crew and the ground. In the event of an ESPE, the current ISS trajectory ensures that the vehicle is only traveling through fields of higher radiation exposure for a brief period of time; the Earth’s geomagnetic field prevents the penetration of the high-energy particles of concern throughout the majority of the orbit. Exo-LEO missions, on the other hand, require that the vehicle travel through free space, exposing vehicle and crew to the full impact of the ESPE. NASA has combined multiple approaches to resolve this radiation exposure issue. New vehicles are designed to take advantage of advances in particle transport modeling capabilities and shielding technology, allowing redistribution of mass throughout the vehicle to areas of thinner shielding when the energetic particle flux has increased to levels of concern. Although vehicle shielding is an important aspect of radiation exposure protection, there is a continued requirement to monitor and predict the space weather environment. To this end, SRAG maintains a console position in Mission Control with 24/7 mission support capability. In the event of increased solar activity, SRAG collaborates with the Flight Control Team (FCT) to determine if crew action (i.e., shelter) is required. During any increase in solar activity, the FCT needs three pieces of information to effectively decide the crew response in light of other required mission tasks: if an event (ESPE) will occur, how ‘intense’ an observed event will be, and how long will an observed event will last. An ideal alert system limits false alarms, therefore causing the crew to take action unnecessarily, without ignoring events that pose a hazard to the crew. SRAG’s current operational concept for ISS missions focuses on short-term forecasts, best described as ‘now-casting’. Console operators are in daily communication with the Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) for situational awareness purposes. When conditions exist that may lead to increased solar activity, operators receive notifications from SWPC. In the case of a well-connected ESPE, the console operator may only have on the order of minutes to several hours to notify the FCT of the event and provide a recommendation for crew action. As NASA shifts to exo-LEO missions, the increased time in free space as well as the reduced ability to communicate with the crew will force a transition in crew protection strategy that emphasizes improvments to both the accuracy and the lead time in forecasting capabilities.

Barzilla, Janet E.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Tailoring of NASA-STD-3001 to Lunar Gateway Program Requirements

The Gateway Program must meet NASA's Agency-level human rating requirements, which are intended to accommodate human capabilities and limitations while protecting the safety of the crew, and providing to the maximum extent practical, the capability to safely recover the crew from hazardous situations. Human systems integration represents a key human rating component of Moon to Mars systems to support the execution of Artemis missions, including compliance with mandatory standards for Health and Medical, Safety and Mission Assurance, and Engineering. The human system requirements, together with the human systems integration plan, medical operations requirements, and Gateway sub-system specifications, represent the flow-down of NASA Health and Medical Standards (NASA-STD-3001, Volumes 1 and 2) into the Gateway system. This paper discusses how these documents and other human systems integration activities provide full consideration of human capabilities and limitations as part of the total system design trade space, serving as an example on how the human must be effectively integrated as part of the system in order to achieve mission success. At a bigger scale, the paper con-tributes to the application of systems engineering standards to cutting-edge space exploration initiatives and to the dialogue on how systems engineering can continue to evolve to meet the needs of such ambitious projects.

Systems engineering↗

NASA NTRS2016

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Numerical Investigation of Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow within Electrochemical Hydrogen Peroxide Generation Unit

Long-term manned space missions require the onboard production of disinfectants essential for maintaining crew health and supporting life systems. Currently, disinfection aboard the International Space Station (ISS) relies on disposable wetted wipes, which are regularly resupplied from Earth. This approach imposes a significant burden on resupply logistics, storage, and waste management. To address these challenges and support future missions, efforts are underway to develop an in-situ solution that electrochemically generates hydrogen peroxide disinfectant using onboard resources. In collaboration with NASA, Faraday Technology, Inc. has advanced this concept through a series of Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) projects, resulting in the development of a Peroxide Generation Unit (PGU). The PGU can produce up to 3 wt.% hydrogen peroxide on-demand at a rate of 1 liter per day, providing a sustainable alternative to Earth-dependent supplies. The resulting aqueous hydrogen peroxide (H₂O₂) is an effective disinfectant, safe for crew use, compatible with spacecraft systems, and free from volatiles, off-gassing, or residues. This innovation offers a reliable, efficient solution for onboard disinfection, reducing dependence on Earth-based resupply while ensuring the health and safety of space crews. Generating hydrogen peroxide at the required rate needs high voltages and currents, exceeding 20V and 2A respectively, which leads to significant heat generation from Joule heating. This temperature rise poses a risk to sensitive system components, especially critical and expensive membranes that can degrade under thermal stress. To mitigate this risk, the thermal, fluid, and electrical flows within the system are modeled computationally using the commercial software COMSOL. The numerical simulations are validated against experimental data from both sub-scale and alpha-scale systems. Once verified, the model is employed to identify thermal hotspots, investigate their underlying causes, and explore solutions to prevent them.

Life Support Systems (LSS)↗

NASA NTRS2016

Capturing Safety Requirements to Enable Effective Task Allocation Between Humans and Automaton in Increasingly Autonomous Systems

There is a current drive towards enabling the deployment of increasingly autonomous systems in the National Airspace System (NAS). However, shifting the traditional roles and responsibilities between humans and automation for safety critical tasks must be managed carefully, otherwise the current emergent safety properties of the NAS may be disrupted. In this paper, a verification activity to assess the emergent safety properties of a clearly defined, safety critical, operational scenario that possesses tasks that can be fluidly allocated between human and automated agents is conducted. Task allocation role sets were proposed for a human-automation team performing a contingency maneuver in a reduced crew context. A safety critical contingency procedure (engine out on takeoff) was modeled in the Soar cognitive architecture, then translated into the Hybrid Input Output formalism. Verification activities were then performed to determine whether or not the safety properties held over the increasingly autonomous system. The verification activities lead to the development of several key insights regarding the implicit assumptions on agent capability. It subsequently illustrated the usefulness of task annotations associated with specialized requirements (e.g., communication, timing etc.), and demonstrated the feasibility of this approach.

Neogi, Natasha A.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploring Sustained Food Production in the Veggie Vegetable Production System

Since 2014, the Veggie vegetable production system on the International Space Station has intermittently supplied astronaut crews with fresh produce. To assess the potential for continuous crop production in Veggie and develop a baseline for future space crop production systems, a 120-day study was conducted to determine methodology for inputs, optimal yield, food safety standards, and crew involvement. ‘Amara’ mustard and ‘Red Russian’ kale were grown as initial crops, followed by ‘Extra Dwarf’ pakchoi and shungiku as final crops. Previous grow-outs in Veggie have included harvests at 28-35 days after initiation. In this study, a 56-day grow-out with multiple harvests from the same plants was compared to the conventional, single harvest Veggie schedule. Unlike previous Veggie studies which grew all plants simultaneously, this test staggered initiation and harvest, aiming for consistent and increased production. Plant pillows were initiated in pairs weekly and positioned to reduce shading. Completed pillows were immediately replaced with fresh ones. The multi-harvest scheme used fewer pillows, totaling 46% less pillow mass than the single harvest method. Yield varied by crop and harvest scheme, when compared as fresh edible biomass production across 56-day time increments. ‘Red Russian’ kale yielded similarly across harvest schemes. In the multiple-harvest schedule, ‘Amara’ mustard and shungiku yielded 23% to 25% higher, respectively, while ‘Extra Dwarf’ pakchoi had 43% lower yield. Microbial analysis of the plants indicated no culturable human pathogens. Microbial load of a given plant appeared to depend more on system age than plant age; across harvest methods, aerobic plate counts from final crops were higher than those of initial crops. This project also considered the complexity of crew involvement in a continuous production scenario. New crew procedures that periodically remove plant material from the Veggie root mat would be needed under continuous production to prevent potential pathogens and unpleasant odors. This study supports future space crop production scenarios and was funded by NASA’s Human Research Program.

Jess M Bunchek↗