Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “FAILURE MODES”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 397 records · Page 22
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power generation/fuel cell powerplant subsystem

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP) hardware. The EPG/FCP hardware is required for performing functions of electrical power generation and product water distribution in the Orbiter. Specifically, the EPG/FCP hardware consists of the following divisions: (1) Power Section Assembly (PSA); (2) Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS); (3) Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS); and (4) Water Removal Subsystem (WRS). The IOA analysis process utilized available EPG/FCP hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Brown, K. L.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the landing/deceleration subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Landing/Deceleration Subsystem hardware. The Landing/Deceleration Subsystem is utilized to allow the Orbiter to perform a safe landing, allowing for landing-gear deploy activities, steering and braking control throughout the landing rollout to wheel-stop, and to allow for ground-handling capability during the ground-processing phase of the flight cycle. Specifically, the Landing/Deceleration hardware consists of the following components: Nose Landing Gear (NLG); Main Landing Gear (MLG); Brake and Antiskid (B and AS) Electrical Power Distribution and Controls (EPD and C); Nose Wheel Steering (NWS); and Hydraulics Actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Due to the lack of redundancy in the Landing/Deceleration Subsystems there is a high number of critical items.

Compton, J. M.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control/electrical power generation subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Electrical Power Generation (EPG) hardware. The EPD and C/EPG hardware is required for performing critical functions of cryogenic reactant storage, electrical power generation and product water distribution in the Orbiter. Specifically, the EPD and C/EPG hardware consists of the following components: Power Section Assembly (PSA); Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS); Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS); Water Removal Subsystem (WRS); and Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System (PRSDS). The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD and C/EPG hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Patton, Jeff A.↗
NASA NTRS2007

A Selection of Composites Simulation Practices at NASA Langley Research Center

One of the major areas of study at NASA Langley Research Center is the development of technologies that support the use of advanced composite materials in aerospace applications. Amongst the supporting technologies are analysis tools used to simulate the behavior of these materials. This presentation will discuss a number of examples of analysis tools and simulation practices conducted at NASA Langley. The presentation will include examples of damage tolerance analyses for both interlaminar and intralaminar failure modes. Tools for modeling interlaminar failure modes include fracture mechanics and cohesive methods, whilst tools for modeling intralaminar failure involve the development of various progressive failure analyses. Other examples of analyses developed at NASA Langley include a thermo-mechanical model of an orthotropic material and the simulation of delamination growth in z-pin reinforced laminates.

Ratcliffe, James G.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Thermoplastic matrix composites - Finite-element analysis of mode I and mode II failure specimens

A finite-element analysis was conducted to evaluate the stress distributions within mode I and mode II failure specimens, assuming both isotropic and orthotropic elastic material properties. The effects of anisotropy on both the magnitude and the location of the highest stress concentration at the vicinity of the crack tip are significant. The results from modeling realistic blunt crack tip geometry and resin-rich zones imply that local variations in the microstructure strongly influence the stress state near the crack tip and therefore the measured fracture properties. In addition, the features of a viscoelastic model for thermoplastic matrices are described. This model will be used in future investigations of matrix-dominated failure phenomena.

Bankert, Ray J.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Coatings for CSP Lifetime

The feasibility and performance of tower-technology-based concentrated solar power (CSP) is highly dependent on the efficiency of the energy transformation from sun to heat at the receiver. The higher the solar absorptivity of the receiver coating, the higher the efficiency of the plant as a whole. BrightSource Energy (BSE) has developed a series of High-Performance Coating (HPC) systems in order to achieve high absorptivity over the plant lifetime (25-35 years). This requires stable coatings that are easily applicable on the large receiver surface and will maintain their optical properties under intense solar flux and thousands of heating and cooling cycles in desert conditions. Different coating formulations are required according to the differing plant conditions: receiver materials, operating conditions (temperatures, daily cycles, etc.), and environmental conditions. BSE also developed a coating for the next generation of CSP receivers, such as those being under DOE’s CSP Gen3 program, which will be operated with high temperature heat transfer fluids at temperatures of up to 800°C, which is significantly hotter than the operating temperature of current systems. Once the coating is formulated, the next challenge is evaluating its lifetime properties. BSE has found several independent failure modes that impact HPC absorptivity degradation: • Decrease in HPC optical properties due to oxidation in the receiver tubes surface below the HPC; • HPC film deterioration due to cycling of temperatures and humidity due to daily operation startup and shutdown as well as changing ambient conditions; • Mechanical degradation due to erosion by sand and wind. Existing test methods examine various aspects independently, but do not provide a combined accelerated lifetime result. Creating such a combined test suite, with a way to interpret the results to predict the coating’s projected lifetime, was the ultimate goal of this project. The project was divided into three major workstreams: lab testing (individual failure mode tests and combined failure mode tests); developing a theoretical model for aging; and validation of the test apparatus via on-sun testing in near real-world conditions at CIEMAT-PSA. Developing a test apparatus that accurately controlled the temperature while also introducing the desired solar flux proved more challenging than expected. While in the end we did succeed in creating a test apparatus that can control temperature, solar flux, and humidity, the results did not appear to accelerate the lifetime of the samples as desired. We suspect that to properly accelerate the samples we must also subject the samples to increased amounts of oxygen. Similarly, while we successfully created a combined model that is publicly available, we were unable to validate it sufficiently to feel comfortable recommending it as a general guideline.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the backup flight system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and Potential Critical Items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BFS hardware. The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 21 Potential Critical Items (PCI) being identified. This product was originally compared with the proposed NASA BFS baseline and subsequently compared with the applicable Data Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), and Displays and Controls NASA CIL items. The comparisons determined if there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. The original assessment determined there were numerous failure modes and potential critical items in the IOA analysis that were not contained in the NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA baseline contained three FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe) for CIL items that were not identified in the IOA product.

Prust, E. E.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Development of GENOA Progressive Failure Parallel Processing Software Systems

A capability consisting of software development and experimental techniques has been developed and is described. The capability is integrated into GENOA-PFA to model polymer matrix composite (PMC) structures. The capability considers the physics and mechanics of composite materials and structure by integration of a hierarchical multilevel macro-scale (lamina, laminate, and structure) and micro scale (fiber, matrix, and interface) simulation analyses. The modeling involves (1) ply layering methodology utilizing FEM elements with through-the-thickness representation, (2) simulation of effects of material defects and conditions (e.g., voids, fiber waviness, and residual stress) on global static and cyclic fatigue strengths, (3) including material nonlinearities (by updating properties periodically) and geometrical nonlinearities (by Lagrangian updating), (4) simulating crack initiation. and growth to failure under static, cyclic, creep, and impact loads. (5) progressive fracture analysis to determine durability and damage tolerance. (6) identifying the percent contribution of various possible composite failure modes involved in critical damage events. and (7) determining sensitivities of failure modes to design parameters (e.g., fiber volume fraction, ply thickness, fiber orientation. and adhesive-bond thickness). GENOA-PFA progressive failure analysis is now ready for use to investigate the effects on structural responses to PMC material degradation from damage induced by static, cyclic (fatigue). creep, and impact loading in 2D/3D PMC structures subjected to hygrothermal environments. Its use will significantly facilitate targeting design parameter changes that will be most effective in reducing the probability of a given failure mode occurring.

Abdi, Frank↗
NASA NTRS1991

Comparison of hand laid-up tape and filament wound composite cylinders and panels with and without impact damage

Experimentally determined axial compressive failure loads, strains and failure modes of composite flat panels and cylinders are presented. A comparison of two types of filament wound flat graphite-epoxy panels indicates that the winding pattern can influence structural response. A comparison of hand laid-up tape and filament wound composite cylinders indicates that fabrication method may not significantly influence the failure mode or average failure strain of thick-walled (radius-to-thickness ratio less than 15) graphite-epoxy cylinders. The interaction of manufacturing-induced features (fiber cross-overs) and low-speed impact damage for graphite-epoxy specimens is also presented. Filament would flat panels with many fiber cross-overs exhibited lower failure strains than filament wound panels without fiber cross-overs for all impact speeds examined. Graphite-thermoplastic cylinders exhibited a significantly different failure mode from the graphite-epoxy cylinders.

Jegley, Dawn C.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power generation/power reactant storage and distribution subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (EPG/PRSD) subsystem hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baselines with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison are documented for the Orbiter EPG/PRSD hardware. The comparison produced agreement on all but 27 FMEAs and 9 CIL items. The discrepancy between the number of IOA findings and NASA FMEAs can be partially explained by the different approaches used by IOA and NASA to group failure modes together to form one FMEA. Also, several IOA items represented inner tank components and ground operations failure modes which were not in the NASA baseline.

Ames, B. E.↗
DOE OSTI2021

HEAF Cable Fragility Testing at the Solar Furnace at the NSTTF

In order to establish a zone of influence (ZOI) due to a high energy arcing fault (HEAF) environment, the fragility of the targets must be determined. The high heat flux/short duration exposure of a HEAF is considerably different than that of a traditional hydrocarbon fire, which previous research has addressed. The previous failure metrics (e.g., internal jacket temperature of a cable exposed to a fire) were based on low heat flux/long duration exposures. Because of this, evaluation of different physics and failure modes was considered to evaluate the fragility of cables exposed to a HEAF. Tests on cable targets were performed at high heat flux/short duration exposures to gain insight on the relevant physics and failure modes. These tests yielded data on several relevant failure modes, including electrical failure and sustained ignition. Additionally, the results indicated a relationship between the total energy of exposure and the damage state of the cable target. This data can be used to inform the fragility of the targets.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control/remote manipulator system subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained in the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the results of the independent analysis of the EPD and C/RMS (both port and starboard) hardware. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem hardware provides the electrical power and power control circuitry required to safely deploy, operate, control, and stow or guillotine and jettison two (one port and one starboard) RMSs. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem is subdivided into the four following functional divisions: Remote Manipulator Arm; Manipulator Deploy Control; Manipulator Latch Control; Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison; and Retention Arm Jettison. The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD and C/RMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based on the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Robinson, W. W.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Uncertainty quantification for competing failure mechanisms in unidirectionally reinforced carbon–carbon composites

Microstructure-informed finite element models play a key role in the carbon–carbon composite design process. Variability in manufacturing process parameters and experimental limitations introduce model parameter uncertainty. This study quantifies the effect of model parameter uncertainty on transverse tensile fracture behavior and proposes a methodology to predict the failure mode based on competing microscale damage mechanisms. Finite element simulations incorporate fiber–matrix interface debonding with cohesive zones and matrix damage with a smeared crack band approach in a unidirectional carbon–carbon composite. Results from a variance-based global sensitivity analysis identifies interfacial and matrix damage parameters as the primary source of variability in fracture behavior. Sobol’ indices indicate that matrix and cohesive zone strengths contribute 94% of the variance in the effective ultimate stress. A local analysis elucidates the relationship between these constituent strength parameters and failure mode by estimating the probability of cohesive, matrix, and mixed-mode dominated failure. Based on the results for 4000 simulations, 93% exhibit mixed-mode or interfacial dominated failure, which underscores the crucial role of fiber–matrix interface debonding in the transverse tensile failure of carbon–carbon composites. These uncertainty quantification results facilitate more efficient model calibration and provide a framework for microstructure-informed failure predictions in the face of manufacturing-induced uncertainty.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2017

Chapter 3: Photovoltaic Module Stability and Reliability

Profits realized from investment in photovoltaic will benefit from decades of reliable operation. Service life prediction through accelerated tests is only possible if indoor tests duplicate power loss and failure modes observed in fielded systems. Therefore, detailing and quantifying power loss and failure modes is imperative. In the first section, we examine recent trends in degradation rates, the gradual power loss observed for different technologies, climates and other significant factors. In the second section, we provide a summary of the most commonly observed failure modes in fielded systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2012

Development of the IPRO-zone for fire PSA and its applications

A PSA analyst has been manually determining fire-induced component failure modes and modeling them into the PSA logics. These can be difficult and time-consuming tasks as they need much information and many events are to be modeled. KAERI has been developing the IPRO-ZONE (interface program for constructing zone effect table) to facilitate fire PSA works for identifying and modeling fire-induced component failure modes, and to construct a one top fire event PSA model. With the output of the IPRO-ZONE, the AIMS-PSA, and internal event one top PSA model, one top fire events PSA model is automatically constructed. The outputs of the IPRO-ZONE include information on fire zones/fire scenarios, fire propagation areas, equipment failure modes affected by a fire, internal PSA basic events corresponding to fire-induced equipment failure modes, and fire events to be modeled. This paper introduces the IPRO-ZONE, and its application results to fire PSA of Ulchin Unit 3 and SMART(System-integrated Modular Advanced Reactor). (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): FMEA/CIL assessment

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. The IOA analysis featured a top-down approach to determine hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process compared the independently derived failure modes and criticality assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation. When possible, assessment issues were discussed and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues were elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager, Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously unknown stuck autopilot push-button criticality 1/1 failure mode. The worst case effect could cause loss of crew/vehicle when the microwave landing system is not active. It is concluded that NASA and Prime Contractor Post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed by IOA is believed to be technically accurate and complete. All CIL issues were resolved. No FMEA issues remain that have safety implications. Consideration should be given, however, to upgrading NSTS 22206 with definitive ground rules which more clearly spell out the limits of redundancy.

Hinsdale, L. W.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Numerical and experimental evaluation of mechanical performance of the multifunctional energy storage composites

This work presents numerical simulation methods to model the mechanical behavior of the multifunctional energy storage composites (MESCs), which consist of a stack of multiple thin battery layers reinforced with through-the-hole polymer rivets and embedded inside carbon fiber composite laminates. MESC has been demonstrated through earlier experiments on its exceptional behavior as a structural element as well as a battery. However, the inherent complex infrastructure of the MESC design has created significant challenges in simulation and modeling. A novel homogenization technique was adopted to characterize the multi-layer properties of battery material using physics-based constitutive equations combined with nonlinear deformation theories to handle the interface between the battery layers. Second, mechanical damage and failure modes among battery materials, polymer reinforcements, and carbon fiber-polymer interfaces were characterized through appropriate models and experiments. The model of MESCs has been implemented in a commercial finite element code in ABAQUS. A comparison of structural response and failure modes from numerical simulations and experimental tests are presented. The results of the study showed that the predictions of elastic and damage responses of MESCs at various loading conditions agreed well with the experimental data. © 2021

Materials Science↗
NASA NTRS1984

Status of Understanding for Bearing Materials

The structural materials and potential failure modes for high technology aircraft gas turbine bearings are reviewed. Among the failure modes discussed for iron-base through-hardened bearing materials are fatigue, surface distress, and corrosion. It is shown that the sub-surface initiated rolling-contact fatigue failure mode is reasonably well understood and in most cases can be controlled by proper material selection and design. Current bearing materials provide long life and high reliability in existing applications. A new generation of materials are being developed which will provide improved fracture toughness, better corrosion resistance, and a further extension of bearing fatigue life. Bearing problems due to surface distress, caused by a variety of surface and near surface anomalies, are less well understood. This area will require the implementation of an interdisciplinary effort to improve the level of understanding of metallic surface-lubricant reactions and interactions.

E N Bamberger↗