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The Aircraft Landing Dynamics Facility (ALDF) is a unique facility with the ability to test aircraft landing gear systems on actual runway surfaces at operational ground speeds and loading conditions. A brief historical overview of the original Landing Loads Track (LLT) is given, followed by a detailed description of the new ALDF systems and operational capabilities.
The motivation, goals, and objectives of the Space Operations Services Grid Project (SOSG) are covered in this viewgraph presentation. The goals and objectives of SOSG include: 1) Developing a grid-enabled prototype providing Space-based ground operations end user services through a collaborative effort between NASA, academia, and industry to assess the technical and cost feasibility of implementation of Grid technologies in the Space Operations arena; 2) Provide to space operations organizations and processes, through a single secure portal(s), access to all the information technology (Grid and Web based) services necessary for program/project development, operations and the ultimate creation of new processes, information and knowledge.
This paper presents a perspective of Automation and Robotics (A&R) research and developments at NASA in terms of its history, its current status, and its future. It covers artificial intelligence, telerobotics and planetary rovers, and it encompasses ground operations, operations in earth orbit, and planetary exploration.
On past and present human space missions, the management of vehicle health and status has primarily been executed from Earth. Missions such as Apollo, Space Shuttle, and ISS have relied on a safety net of ground-based experts with access to real-time telemetry data, broad and deep systems expertise, and powerful analytical and computing capabilities. The ground team monitors and manages the vehicle’s health in real-time and responds quickly to critical situations and malfunctions. Ground operators also provide real-time oversight and verbal guidance to flight crew members, especially during complex procedure execution and high-risk activities like extra-vehicular activities. However, this operational paradigm, in place for 60 years, will not transfer to long duration exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). Lunar and deep-space crewed missions will encounter delayed communications that prohibit real-time operational and medical support. Additionally, there will be infrequent resupply and a diminished capacity to evacuate or rescue crew members. A small crew must operate independently, managing the vehicle’s state, responding to time-critical events, and executing complex procedures, all without the safety net of real-time support.
Results of Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) activities to define and understand alternatives for planetary spacecraft operations with the Space Transportation System (STS) are summarized. The STS presents a set of interfaces, operational alternatives, and constraints in the prelaunch, launch, and near-earth flight phases of a mission. Shuttle-unique features are defined and coupled with JPL's existing program experience to begin development of operationally efficient alternatives, concepts, and methods for STS-launched missions. The time frame considered begins with the arrival of the planetary spacecraft at Kennedy Space Center and includes prelaunch ground operations, Shuttle-powered flight, and near-earth operations, up to acquisition of the spacecraft signal by the Deep Space Network. The areas selected for study within this time frame were generally chosen because they represent the 'driving conditions' on planetary-mission as well as system design and operations.
Integrated vehicle testing will be critical to ensuring proper vehicle integration of the Ares I crew launch vehicle and Ares V cargo launch vehicle. The Ares Projects, based at Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, created the Flight and Integrated Test Office (FITO) as a separate team to ensure that testing is an integral part of the vehicle development process. As its name indicates, FITO is responsible for managing flight testing for the Ares vehicles. FITO personnel are well on the way toward assembling and flying the first flight test vehicle of Ares I, th Ares I-X. This suborbital development flight will evaluate the performance of Ares I from liftoff to first stage separation, testing flight control algorithms, vehicle roll control, separation and recovery systems, and ground operations. Ares I-X is now scheduled to fly in summer 2009. The follow-on flight, Ares I-Y, will test a full five-segment first stage booster and will include cryogenic propellants in the upper stage, an upper stage engine simulator, and an active launch abort system. The following flight, Orion 1, will be the first flight of an active upper stage and upper stage engine, as well as the first uncrewed flight of an Orion spacecraft into orbit. The Ares Projects are using an incremental buildup of flight capabilities prior to the first operational crewed flight of Ares I and the Orion crew exploration vehicle in 2015. In addition to flight testing, the FITO team will be responsible for conducting hardware, software, and ground vibration tests of the integrated launch vehicle. These efforts will include verifying hardware, software, and grou handling interfaces. Through flight and integrated testing, the Ares Projects will identify and mitigate risks early the United States prepares to take its next giant leaps to the Moon and beyond.
Integrated vehicle testing will be critical to ensuring proper vehicle integration of the Ares I crew launch vehicle and Ares V cargo launch vehicle. The Ares Projects, based at Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, created the Flight and Integrated Test Office (FITO) as a separate team to ensure that testing is an integral part of the vehicle development process. As its name indicates, FITO is responsible for managing flight testing for the Ares vehicles. FITO personnel are well on the way toward assembling and flying the first flight test vehicle of Ares I, the Ares I-X. This suborbital development flight will evaluate the performance of Ares I from liftoff to first stage separation, testing flight control algorithms, vehicle roll control, separation and recovery systems, and ground operations. Ares I-X is now scheduled to fly in summer 2009. The follow-on flight, Ares I-Y, will test a full five-segment first stage booster and will include cryogenic propellants in the upper stage, an upper stage engine simulator, and an active launch abort system. The following flight, Orion 1, will be the first flight of an active upper stage and upper stage engine, as well as the first uncrewed flight of an Orion spacecraft into orbit. The Ares Projects are using an incremental buildup of flight capabilities prior to the first operational crewed flight of Ares I and the Orion crew exploration vehicle in 2015. In addition to flight testing, the FITO team will be responsible for conducting hardware, software, and ground vibration tests of the integrated launch vehicle. These efforts will include verifying hardware, software, and ground handling interfaces. Through flight and integrated testing, the Ares Projects will identify and mitigate risks early as the United States prepares to take its next giant leaps to the Moon and beyond.
The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles in the national airspace will introduce new vehicle types, technologies, and operational paradigms for which safety must be maintained and hazards mitigated. One approach is to attempt to design for possible hazards and unsafe incidents that can occur at different phases of flight (pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight) and during ground operations. Another is to mitigate safety incidents by implementing changes to policies, procedures, regulations, and design to cover personnel, equipment, and aircraft during operations. These and other techniques, not described herein, are typically conservative or adhoc in that they reduce the likelihood of risk after safety incidents have occurred. In this work, the goal is to develop a more predictive capability to monitor and mitigate risk and hazards to safety “in-time” enough for decisions to be made. In line with NASA’s Aeronautics Mission Directorate Strategic Thrust 5 [1] (In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance), the System-Wide Safety (SWS) project under which this work falls, is developing and demonstrating innovative and safety-oriented solutions that enable modernization and aviation transformation. To that effect, this work will detail data-driven efforts on the SWS project to develop a number of safety-critical services for in-time monitoring and mitigation of hazards to low-altitude flight operations. First, hazards to these operations are identified based on previous work by NASA [2,3] and others in the aerospace industry. These hazards include (i) unsafe proximity to other vehicles, property, and people on the ground, (ii) critical system failures such as communication signal/GPS loss, unexpected propulsion system degradation, engine/power failure, and (iii) operational/environmental issues such as severe weather and gusty winds. For these hazards, safety metrics, which can be quantified and assessed are defined, models to monitor and predict them are developed, and flight test data is generated to develop, validate, and test these models, considering the complex interplay of the different hazards that define them [4-6]. In addition, the uncertainty in the non-deterministic effects that cannot be modeled nor predicted and unknown unknowns that arise after design/testing and during operations must be handled in rigorous manner. As a result, for each of the developed safety metrics, their dependencies on one another are characterized and a framework for handling the uncertainties inherent in the modeling, algorithms, and measurements required for prediction is also developed [7]. To that effect, this presentation will describe the safety metrics and services already developed and underway under the System-Wide Safety project that utilize data-driven techniques for the identification of anomalies, precursors, and trends (APTs) to monitor and mitigate hazards to safety, in-time, for urban flight operations in low-altitude airspace.
Multiprobe missions are an important part of NASA's future: Cluster, Magnetospheric Multi Scale, Global Electrodynamics and Magnetospheric Constellation are representatives from the Sun-Earth Connections Theme. To make such missions robust, reliable, and affordable, ideally the many spacecraft of a constellation must be at least as easy to operate as one spacecraft is today. To support this need for scalability, science instrumentation must become increasingly easy to operate, even as this same instrumentation becomes more capable and advanced. Communication and control resources will be at a premium for future instruments. Many missions will be out of contact with ground operators for extended periods either to reduce operations cost or because of orbits that limit communication to weekly perigee transits. Autonomous capability is necessary if such missions are to effectively achieve their operational objectives. An autonomous system is one that acts given its situation in a mission appropriate manner without external direction to achieve mission goals. To achieve this capability autonomy must be built into the system through judicious design or through a built-in intelligence that recognizes system state and manages system response. To recognize desired or undesired system states, the system must have an implicit or explicit understanding of its expected states given its history and self observations. The systems we are concerned with, science instruments, can have stringent requirements for system state knowledge in addition to requirements driven by health and safety concerns. Without accurate knowledge of the system state, the usefulness of the science instrument may be severely limited. At the same time, health and safety concerns often lead to overly conservative instrument operations further reducing the effectiveness of the instrument. These requirements, coupled with overall mission requirements including lack of communication opportunities and tolerance of environmental hazards, frame the problem of constructing autonomous science instruments. we are developing a model of the Low Energy Neutral Atom instrument (LENA) that is currently flying on board the Imager for Magnetosphere-to-Aurora Global Exploration (IMAGE) spacecraft. LENA is a particle detector that uses high voltage electrostatic optics and time-of-flight mass spectrometry to image neutral atom emissions from the denser regions of the Earth's magnetosphere. As with most spacecraft borne science instruments, phenomena in addition to neutral atoms are detected by LENA. Solar radiation and energetic particles from Earth's radiation belts are of particular concern because they may help generate currents that may compromise LENA's long term performance. An explicit model of the instrument response has been constructed and is currently in use on board IMAGE to dynamically adapt LENA to the presence or absence of energetic background radiations. The components of LENA are common in space science instrumentation, and lessons learned by modelling this system may be applied to other instruments. This work demonstrates that a model-based approach can be used to enhance science instrument effectiveness. Our future work involves the extension of these methods to cover more aspects of LENA operation and the generalization to other space science instrumentation.
Aviation safety is challenged by the practical necessity of compromising inherent factors of design, environment, and operation. If accidents are to be avoided these factors must be controlled to a degree not often required by other transport modes. The operational problems which challenge safety seem to occur most often in the interfaces within and between the design, the environment, and operations where mismatches occur due to ignorance or lack of sufficient understanding of these interactions. Under this report the following topics are summarized: (1) The nature of operating problems, (2) NASA aviation safety research, (3) clear air turbulence characterization and prediction, (4) CAT detection, (5) Measurement of Atmospheric Turbulence (MAT) Program, (6) Lightning, (7) Thunderstorm gust fronts, (8) Aircraft ground operating problems, (9) Aircraft fire technology, (10) Crashworthiness research, (11) Aircraft wake vortex hazard research, and (12) Aviation safety reporting system.
The objective of this project was to operate ground based Fabry-Perot Interferometers at several points under the auroral zone to analyze and quantify the vertical wind in the thermosphere. These measurements were made in conjunction with TIMED, especially GUVI data, to relate the observed wind to the resulting mixing and compositional changes in the thermosphere. The ground based wind measurements were obtained from a scanning Doppler imager (SDI) in Poker Flat, and a vertically aligned Fabry Perot Imager (FPI) in Inuvik. A third FPI at Eagle, Alaska, was operated for a brief overlapping period as well. The SDI at Poker Flat had been in operation for several years, and was continued to run with little support from this grant. The much more expensive operation, maintenance, and data acquisition of the remote Inuvik FPI was made possible with funds from this project. During the 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 seasons, we operated the Inuvik FPI from September to April during hours of darkness. Two trips to service the instrument were required per year, and a local caretaker was funded to help keep the instrument going during the winter seasons. The data were transfered via modem and phone line to Poker Flat and were then analyzed to obtain wind and temperature at the altitude of the auroral green line OI(557.7 nm). The final data product was archived and transferred to the GEDDS system at Poker Flat were it is available on the web: http://gedds.pfrr.alaska.edu/. The data set is also available from the CEDAR data base: http://cedarweb.hao.ucar.edu/.
Any system with a human component is inherently risky. Studies in human factors and psychology have repeatedly shown that human operators will inevitably make errors, regardless of how well they are trained. Onboard the International Space Station (ISS) where crew time is arguably the most valuable resource, errors by the crew or ground operators can be costly to critical science objectives. Operations experts at the ISS Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC), located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, have learned that from payload concept development through execution, there are countless opportunities to introduce errors that can potentially result in costly losses of crew time and science. To effectively address this challenge, we must approach the design, testing, and operation processes with two specific goals in mind. First, a systematic approach to error and human centered design methodology should be implemented to minimize opportunities for user error. Second, we must assume that human errors will be made and enable rapid identification and recoverability when they occur. While a systematic approach and human centered development process can go a long way toward eliminating error, the complete exclusion of operator error is not a reasonable expectation. The ISS environment in particular poses challenging conditions, especially for flight controllers and astronauts. Operating a scientific laboratory 250 miles above the Earth is a complicated and dangerous task with high stakes and a steep learning curve. While human error is a reality that may never be fully eliminated, smart implementation of carefully chosen tools and techniques can go a long way toward minimizing risk and increasing the efficiency of NASA's space science operations.
Pairwise Trajectory Management (PTM) is an Interval Management (IM) concept that utilizes airborne and ground-based capabilities to enable the implementation of airborne pairwise spacing capabilities in oceanic regions. The goal of PTM is to use airborne surveillance and tools to manage an "at or greater than" inter-aircraft spacing. Due to the precision of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) information and the use of airborne spacing guidance, the PTM minimum spacing distance will be less than distances a controller can support with current automation systems that support oceanic operations. Ground tools assist the controller in evaluating the traffic picture and determining appropriate PTM clearances to be issued. Avionics systems provide guidance information that allows the flight crew to conform to the PTM clearance issued by the controller. The combination of a reduced minimum distance and airborne spacing management will increase the capacity and efficiency of aircraft operations at a given altitude or volume of airspace. This paper provides an overview of the proposed application, description of a few key scenarios, high level discussion of expected air and ground equipment and procedure changes, overview of a potential flight crew human-machine interface that would support PTM operations and some initial PTM benefits results.
The engineering analysis subsystem environment (EASE) is being developed to enable fewer controllers to monitor and control power and other spacecraft engineering subsystems. The EASE prototype has been developed to support simultaneous real-time monitoring of several spacecraft engineering subsystems. It is being designed to assist with offline analysis of telemetry data to determine trends, and to help formulate uplink commands to the spacecraft. An early version of the EASE prototype has been installed in the JPL Space Flight Operations Facility for online testing. The EASE prototype is installed in the Galileo Mission Support Area. The underlying concept, development, and testing of the EASE prototype and how it will aid in the ground operations of spacecraft power subsystems are discussed.
NASA is pursuing the technology and advanced development of a non-toxic (NT) orbital maneuvering system (OMS) and reaction control system (RCS) for shuttle upgrades, RLV, and reusable first stages. The primary objectives of the shuttle upgrades program are improved safety, improved reliability, reduced operations time and cost, improved performance or capabilities, and commonality with future space exploration needs. Non-Toxic OMS/RCS offers advantages in each of these categories. A non-toxic OMS/RCS eliminates the ground hazards and the flight safety hazards of the toxic and corrosive propellants. The cost savings for ground operations are over $24M per year for 7 flights, and the savings increase with increasing flight rate up to $44M per year. The OMS/RCS serial processing time is reduced from 65 days to 13 days. The payload capability can be increased up to 5100 Ibms. The non-toxic OMS/RCS also provides improved space station reboost capability up to 20 nautical miles over the current toxic system of 14 nautical miles. A NT OMS/RCS represents a clear advancement in the SOA over MMH/NTO. Liquid oxygen and ethanol are clean burning, high-density propellants that provide a high degree of commonality with other spacecraft subsystems including life support, power, and thermal control, and with future human exploration and development of space missions. The simple and reliable pressure-fed design uses sub-cooled liquid oxygen at 250 to 350 psia, which allows a propellant to remain cryogenic for longer periods of time. The key technologies are thermal insulation and conditioning techniques are used to maintain the sub-cooling. Phase I successfully defined the system architecture, designed an integrated OMS/RCS propellant tank, analyzed the feed system, built and tested the 870 lbf RCS thrusters, and tested the 6000 lbf OMS engine. Phase 11 is currently being planned for the development and test of full-scale prototype of the system in 1999 and 2000
In June 2018, NASA’s Mars Exploration Rover Opportunity became engulfed in the most intense global dust storm observed in its 14-year mission and in Mars’ recorded history. Sapped of life-giving solar energy, Opportunity fell silent to ground operators on June 11, in what would be its final call home. Over the course of the next eight months, the MER team employed numerous recovery efforts and radiated over one thousand commands to wake the silent rover. Although unsuccessful, MER’s dust-storm recovery team changed the paradigm of dust-storm operations from Opportunity’s survival of a previous global dust storm in 2007. In this paper, the authors offer a glimpse into MER’s recovery efforts and lessons learned from Opportunity dust-storm operations for future solar-powered Mars surface missions. In the first section, the authors discuss the indicators of the approaching dust storm and the actions the team employed to reduce Opportunity’s power consumption and preserve available battery charge prior to loss of contact. The second section discusses the team’s recovery efforts until Opportunity’s declared End-of-Mission, the steps the team took to re-establish contact with Opportunity, the assumptions made during each step of the recovery process, and the commanding actions employed. Finally, the authors discuss the operational impacts of global dust storms on the safe and successful operation of solar-powered spacecraft on the Martian surface, and offer design recommendations for future solar-powered missions from the lessons learned during Opportunity’s 14-year mission and experience through two global dust storms.
Pairwise Trajectory Management (PTM) is an Interval Management (IM) concept that utilizes airborne and ground-based capabilities to enable the implementation of airborne pairwise spacing capabilities in oceanic regions. The goal of PTM is to use airborne surveillance and tools to manage an "at or greater than" inter-aircraft spacing. Due to the accuracy of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) information and the use of airborne spacing guidance, the minimum PTM spacing distance will be less than distances a controller can support with current automation systems that support oceanic operations. Ground tools assist the controller in evaluating the traffic picture and determining appropriate PTM clearances to be issued. Avionics systems provide guidance information that allows the flight crew to conform to the PTM clearance issued by the controller. The combination of a reduced minimum distance and airborne spacing management will increase the capacity and efficiency of aircraft operations at a given altitude or volume of airspace. This document provides an overview of the proposed application, a description of several key scenarios, a high level discussion of expected air and ground equipment and procedure changes, a description of a NASA human-machine interface (HMI) prototype for the flight crew that would support PTM operations, and initial benefits analysis results. Additionally, included as appendices, are the following documents: the PTM Operational Services and Environment Definition (OSED) document and a companion "Future Considerations for the Pairwise Trajectory Management (PTM) Concept: Potential Future Updates for the PTM OSED" paper, a detailed description of the PTM algorithm and PTM Limit Mach rules, initial PTM safety requirements and safety assessment documents, a detailed description of the design, development, and initial evaluations of the proposed flight crew HMI, an overview of the methodology and results of PTM pilot training requirements focus group and human-in-the-loop testing activities, and the PTM Pilot Guide.
Enabling safe, routine, and high-density flight operations of small UAS at low-altitude over heavily populated urban centers presents a difficult challenge for emerging UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system concepts. Urban operations by definition involve flight over people, property, and infrastructure. Low-altitude urban environments - such as urban canyons – are one of the most difficult areas for UTM to consider. Mission concepts require routine operations in a cluttered radio-frequency (RF) environment with degraded or denied Global Positioning System (GPS) reception. Flights with any appreciable distance will be beyond visual and communications line-of-sight from ground operators. Timely detection and response to emergencies and onboard failures, which is critical for safe aircraft operation, will be difficult. This work seeks to establish a feasible reference autonomy architecture for autonomous vehicles in an urban UTM system, then verifying and validating this architecture within a complete UTM concept point-design and systems analysis study. In this paper, we present the results from the NASA SAFE50 conceptual design and systems study that investigates the trade-space of urban UTM operations. This advanced conceptual design study develops a feasible, verified, validated point-design solution. The SAFE50 point-design concept places emphasis on advanced, highly-autonomous, and highly-capable vehicles that favors intelligent onboard autonomy over direct human control with today's technologies and operating in today's urban environments. This paper focuses on an general overview of the design study, highlighting decisions made in the architectural solution. This paper will presents a summary of the study, architectures, and requirements. We present an overview of the architecture designs as derived from the top-level UTM system. The point-design has been implemented in both simulation and through flight testing of hardware design prototypes. The results from simulation and flight testing as part of the verification and validation process of the reference design study.