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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Direct analysis of cotton swipes for uranium and plutonium isotopic determination by microextraction-ICP-MS

The determination of uranium and plutonium isotopic abundance on environmental samples collected by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors is vital for the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and material under the international nuclear safeguards regime. Current analytical protocols require time-consuming sample preparation steps prior to subsequent measurement by inorganic mass spectrometry (MS). Recent efforts from this laboratory have focused on developing sample preparation methods for faster analysis, potentially allowing higher sample throughput[1]. Alternative methods including microextraction sampling in conjunction with inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) have been recently explored. This methodology, microextraction-ICP-MS, was developed such that uranium and plutonium could be extracted from the swipe surface and directed into the ICP-MS for an in-situ measurement, eliminating the need for swipe ashing and digestion. A commercial off-the-shelf microextraction system was customized with an automated movable XY stage that can be programmed to save sampling locations, allowing for automated rapid sampling of swipe surfaces. Additional efforts have focused on the utilization of collision cell technology to the microextraction ICP-MS method. This would eliminate the need for lengthy column chemistry procedures to purify separated uranium and plutonium fractions before analysis. Here, the extracted U/Pu analyte is measured by reacting the uranium ions with CO2 in the collision cell of an ICP-MS, shifting the uranium to UO+, which will not interfere with the plutonium isotopic determination. The developed method utilizing collision cell – ICP-MS technology has demonstrated the ability to measure plutonium isotope ratios in the presence of high uranium concentration on the transient signal from the microextraction system utilizing certified reference materials from JRC-Geel and the New Brunswick Laboratory Program Office.

Bradley, Veronica↗
DOE OSTI2023

Characterizing Reactor Operations from Realistic Simulated Environmental Samples: Combining High-Performance Computing and Data Analytics

Environmental sampling is a common technique employed by inspectors and facility operators in nuclear safeguards, proliferation detection, and process monitoring contexts. Interpreting measurements performed on samples or collections of samples and ensuring the information extracted is accurate and precise is difficult. To date, these analyses have relied on simulated data to enable systematic studies; however, these models are inherently limited by the fidelity of the models and the implicit spatial averaging of isotopic composition or other signatures of interest. To advance this capability, we have refined the spatial discretization and expanded the range of physics in the simulation codes we use to perform reactor simulations and depletion calculations. This allows us to generate data that are more representative of real environmental samples, especially for the length scale of the isotopic composition and associated variation. Accordingly, these new data allow a more realistic assessment of traditional and new data analytic analysis methods. Here we present motivation for developing reactor simulations using high-performance computing methods and resources, impacts of these new simulations on our assessment of data analysis and interpretation methods, and initial results of developing and systematically testing data analytic methods designed to overcome the challenges expected of real-world samples. We also quantify the performance of these analyses using defensible statistical methods.

Dayman, Ken J.↗
DOE OSTI2023

INTEGRATION OF THE H3D-M400 DETECTOR AND SPOT ROBOT FOR AUTOMATED AREA SURVEY MISSIONS

Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) is charged to identify and develop technologies to detect, disrupt, and investigate smuggling of radiological and nuclear materials •Border protection involves primary inspections using Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM), complimented with secondary and area survey inspections, usually performed manually using portable radiation detectors (PRDs) -RPM rely on fast technologies which provide quick scans of passing cargo/vehicles -Secondary inspections rely on trained, field deployed staff responsible for additional interdiction of screened cargo/vehicle putting them in potentially hazardous environment -Area survey inspections rely on trained, field deployed staff responsible for scanning and identifying presence of radiation while patrolling through a facility or public space •This project explores the use of technology which could reduce risks to field inspectors and add efficiency •The work presented here is a proof of principle of detector-robot integration to perform area survey inspections

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2013

German Support Program for Retrieval and Safe Storage of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Ukraine - 13194

The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany supports the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) in enhancement of nuclear safety and radiation protection and strengthening of the physical protection. One of the main objectives of the agreement concluded by these parties in 2008 was the retrieval and safe interim storage of disused orphan high radioactive sealed sources in Ukraine. At present, the Ukrainian National Registry does not account all high active radiation sources but only for about 70 - 80 %. GRS in charge of BMU to execute the program since 2008 concluded subcontracts with the waste management and interim storage facilities RADON at different regions in Ukraine as well with the waste management and interim storage facility IZOTOP at Kiev. Below selected examples of removal of high active Co-60 and Cs-137 sources from irradiation facilities at research institutes are described. By end of 2012 removal and safe interim storage of 12.000 disused radioactive sealed sources with a total activity of more than 5,7.10{sup 14} Bq was achieved within the frame of this program. The German support program will be continued up to the end of 2013 with the aim to remove and safely store almost all disused radioactive sealed sources in Ukraine. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

Radioactive Waste Management in Central Asia - 12034

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the newly independent states in Central Asia (CA) whose regulatory bodies were set up recently are facing problems with the proper management of radioactive waste and so called 'nuclear legacy' inherited from the past activities. During the former Soviet Union (SU) period, various aspects of nuclear energy use took place in CA republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Activities range from peaceful use of energy to nuclear testing for example at the former Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) in Kazakhstan, and uranium mining and milling industries in all four countries. Large amounts of radioactive waste (RW) have been accumulated in Central Asia and are waiting for its safe disposal. In 2008 the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA), with the support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has developed bilateral projects that aim to assist the regulatory bodies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (from 2010) to identify and draft relevant regulatory requirements to ensure the protection of the personnel, population and environment during the planning and execution of remedial actions for past practices and radioactive waste management in the CA countries. The participating regulatory authorities included: Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Agency, Kyrgyzstan State Agency on Environmental Protection and Forestry, Nuclear Safety Agency of Tajikistan, and State Inspectorate on Safety in Industry and Mining of Uzbekistan. The scope of the projects is to ensure that activities related to radioactive waste management in both planned and existing exposure situations in CA will be carried out in accordance with the international guidance and recommendations, taking into account the relevant regulatory practice from other countries in this area. In order to understand the problems in the field of radioactive waste management we have analysed the existing regulations through the so called 'Threat assessment' in each CA country which revealed additional problems in the existing regulatory documents beyond those described at the start of our ongoing bilateral projects in Kazakhstan, Kirgizistan Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Knowledge Management Initiatives Used to Maintain Regulatory Expertise in Transportation and Storage of Radioactive Materials - 12177

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established in 1974 with the mission to license and regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials for commercial, industrial, academic, and medical uses in order to protect public health and safety, and the environment, and promote the common defense and security. Currently, approximately half (∼49%) of the workforce at the NRC has been with the Agency for less than six years. As part of the Agency's mission, the NRC has partial responsibility for the oversight of the transportation and storage of radioactive materials. The NRC has experienced a significant level of expertise leaving the Agency due to staff attrition. Factors that contribute to this attrition include retirement of the experienced nuclear workforce and mobility of staff within or outside the Agency. Several knowledge management (KM) initiatives have been implemented within the Agency, with one of them including the formation of a Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation (SFST) KM team. The team, which was formed in the fall of 2008, facilitates capturing, transferring, and documenting regulatory knowledge for staff to effectively perform their safety oversight of transportation and storage of radioactive materials, regulated under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 71 and Part 72. In terms of KM, the SFST goal is to share critical information among the staff to reduce the impact from staff's mobility and attrition. KM strategies in place to achieve this goal are: (1) development of communities of practice (CoP) (SFST Qualification Journal and the Packaging and Storing Radioactive Material) in the on-line NRC Knowledge Center (NKC); (2) implementation of a SFST seminar program where the seminars are recorded and placed in the Agency's repository, Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS); (3) meeting of technical discipline group programs to share knowledge within specialty areas; (4) development of written guidance to capture 'administrative and technical' knowledge (e.g., office instructions (OIs), generic communications (e.g., bulletins, generic letters, regulatory issue summary), standard review plans (SRPs), interim staff guidance (ISGs)); (5) use of mentoring strategies for experienced staff to train new staff members; (6) use of Microsoft SharePoint portals in capturing, transferring, and documenting knowledge for staff across the Division from Division management and administrative assistants to the project managers, inspectors, and technical reviewers; and (7) development and implementation of a Division KM Plan. A discussion and description of the successes and challenges of implementing these KM strategies at the NRC/SFST will be provided. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Evaluate an impact of incident alpha particle and gamma ray on human blood components: A comparison study

An impact of alpha and gamma irradiation on human blood components have been evaluated and compared for healthy blood samples (male and females). Irradiation dose and time of irradiation calibrated and considered as a main comparison factors. Density of blood components measured for each in vitro irradiation before and after irradiation for males and females. Survey radiation dosimeter (Inspector Exp) and nuclear track detectors type CR-39 used to evaluate exposure dose rate and incident density of alpha particles, respectively. Experiment results verified that the irradiation of blood makes ionizing of blood components, either alpha or gamma irradiation dose, and the impacts of ionizing radiation were relativity for WBC, RBC, and PLT. Limited irradiation doses of 1-5 μSv/hr considered as a low radiation dose of alpha and gamma radiation sources ({sup 226}Ra, and {sup 137}Cs). Density of alpha particles accumulated on the blood surface was 34 (alpha particle/cm{sup 2}) for selected dose of incident alpha particle. Optimum value of irradiation dose and time of irradiation were 5 μSv/hr and 4 second for males and females. On the other hands, the values of irradiation dose and time of irradiation were 2.1 μSv/hr and 2 second for males and females for gamma irradiation. Thus, present results demonstrated that densities of RBC and WBC cells are capable of inducing reproduction in vitro for both type of irradiation. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2015

EURATOM safeguards efforts in the development of spent fuel verification methods by non-destructive assay

The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle continues to develop. The European Commission, particularly the Nuclear Safeguards Directorate of the Directorate General for Energy, implements Euratom safeguards and needs to adapt to this situation. The verification methods for spent nuclear fuel, which EURATOM inspectors can use, require continuous improvement. Whereas the Euratom on-site laboratories provide accurate verification results for fuel undergoing reprocessing, the situation is different for spent fuel which is destined for final storage. In particular, new needs arise from the increasing number of cask loadings for interim dry storage and the advanced plans for the construction of encapsulation plants and geological repositories. Various scenarios present verification challenges. In this context, EURATOM Safeguards, often in cooperation with other stakeholders, is committed to further improvement of NDA methods for spent fuel verification. In this effort EURATOM plays various roles, ranging from definition of inspection needs to direct participation in development of measurement systems, including support of research in the framework of international agreements and via the EC Support Program to the IAEA. This paper presents recent progress in selected NDA methods. These methods have been conceived to satisfy different spent fuel verification needs, ranging from attribute testing to pin-level partial defect verification. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

PRD3000: A novel Personnel Radiation Detector with Radiation Exposure Monitoring

PRD3000{sup TM} is a novel Personal Radiation Detector (PRD) with personnel radiation dose exposure monitoring. It is intended for First Responders, Law Enforcement, Customs Inspectors protecting critical infrastructures for detecting unexpected radioactive sources, who also need real time Hp(10) dose equivalent information. Traditional PRD devices use scintillator materials instrumented through either a photomultiplier tube or a photodiode photodetector. While the former is bulky and sensitive to magnetic fields, the latter has to compromise radiation sensitivity and energy threshold given its current noise per unit of photo-detection surface. Recently, solid state photodetectors (SiPM), based on arrays of Geiger operated diodes, have emerged as a scalable digital photodetector for photon counting. Their strong breakdown voltage temperature dependence (on the order of tens of milli-volts per K) has however limited their use for portable instruments where strong temperature gradients can be experienced, and limited power is available to temperature stabilize. The PRD3000 is based on the industry standard DMC3000 active dosimeter that complies with IEC 61526 Ed. 3 and ANSI 42.20 for direct reading personal dose equivalent meters and active personnel radiation monitors. An extension module is based on a CsI(Tl) scintillator readout by a temperature compensated SiPM. Preliminary nuclear tests combined with a measured continuous operation in excess of 240 hours from a single AAA battery cell indicate that the PRD3000 complies with the IEC 62401 Ed.2 and ANSI 42.32 without sacrificing battery life time. We present a summary of the device test results, starting with performance stability over a temperature range of - 20 deg. C to 50 deg. C, false alarm rates and dynamic response time. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2017

CdZnTe Detector Using for Characterization MR Water Cleanup System before Dismantling - 17005

The Kurchatov Institute's MR research reactor water cleanup system comprises 20 containers with ion-exchange resin. Each container is 25 cm in diameter and 130 cm high. These containers are placed under the floor with 50 cm concrete protection. Access to container is provided via technological hole with protective covers. A CdZnTe detector was chosen for spectrometric investigation due to high exposure dose level from containers. A collimated spectrometric system on the basis of a semiconductor detector CdZnTe (volume of a crystal of 20 mm{sup 3} or 60 mm{sup 3}) and a multichannel analyzer InSpector 2000 was developed. It was determined that 8 of the 20 containers were filled with the ion- exchange resin in aqueous solution. The main dose forming radionuclide was {sup 137}Cs. Specific activity was from 10{sup 7} Bq/kg to 10{sup 9} Bq/kg in different containers. Measurements were carried out in high radiation fields and the background radiation reached the detector even through the lead shield, which created difficulties in the interpretation of collected data. For verification of the results some samples of ion-exchange resin was taken from containers. The concentration of γ-ray radionuclides was estimated by the Canberra Company spectrometric complex that included a semi-conductor detector made of HP Germanium. Obtained data had good correlation with the data of the CdZnTe collimated spectrometer. Our investigation has shown that remote mechanisms must be used to remove the containers with ion-exchange resin. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Implementation of Lessons Learned - 17406

Following a negative occurrence or event, putting corrective actions into place to address an organisation's systemic and administrative weaknesses is paramount to that organisation's future success. At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL, or the Laboratory), recent experiences emphasize this critical point. On February 14, 2014, transuranic (TRU) waste management at DOE facilities changed significantly when a drum of mixed hazardous and TRU (MTRU) waste from LANL breached after its disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Shortly following the LANL-WIPP event, several internal and external investigations and analyses were conducted by LANL, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and others, including the DOE Inspector General and an Office of Environmental Management Accident Investigation Board (AIB), to determine the cause of the LANL drum breach at WIPP. Internal investigations led LANL to self-disclose non-compliancies including treatment without a permit and improper waste characterization to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED), leading to a Settlement Agreement in January 2016. The Settlement Agreement, together with the other investigations, led LANL to identify and implement many corrective actions related to its waste management practices. The Laboratory recognized the need to revisit implementation of some fundamental concepts, and noted the following 'Lessons Learned': - Communicating requirements more clearly, - Using technical expertise more effectively, and - Improving implementation of policies and procedures. This paper presents the actions LANL has taken to prevent recurrence and demonstrate the Laboratory's commitment to compliant waste management requirements. They have focused on promoting a better understanding of the regulatory requirements in order to address the key root causes and the resulting Lessons Learned, as follows: - Ensure that all levels of a Project Team understand the regulatory requirements related to performing the work;- Engage RCRA subject matter experts in planning (for both initial project plans and subsequent modifications to plans); - Validate that Project Teams' plans and procedures will be effective in meeting regulatory requirements; and - Verify implementation. We believe the corrective actions taken since the drum event at WIPP will fundamentally improve our way of doing business throughout the Laboratory. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Use of the underwater collimated spectrometric system for survey of storage ponds of research VVR-2 and or reactors - 15118

Spent nuclear fuel removal activities in the National Research Centre 'Kurchatov Institute' were resumed in 2004. During the last two years, removal was performed of the spent nuclear fuel from the VVR-2 and OR reactor installations, whose storage facilities are located within the Gas Plant complex. The Gas Plant complex is the experimental base of the Institute of Nuclear Reactors, which is part of the 'Kurchatov Institute'. The complex features four storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel, one in a dedicated building for storage of spent nuclear fuel and solid rad-waste and three in the reactor building. They are sub-surface vessels filled with water (the volume of water in each is about 6 m{sup 3}), closed with top shielding slabs. Some spent fuel assemblies and fuel elements stored are resized, deformed, or have defective claddings. In the course of works on removal from ponds of the spent nuclear fuel, its fragments could get to water. The bottoms of ponds storage are covered with a deposit. The bottom of ponds and water are possible to be pollution by fission products. The survey objective was to find uranium-containing materials (elements of irradiated nuclear fuel) at the bottom of the ponds and evaluation of surface activity of fission products. To solve this problem was used the underwater collimated spectrometric system on the basis of a semiconductor detector CdZnTe (volume of a crystal of 20 mm{sup 3}) and a multichannel analyzer InSpector 2000. The detector with the collimator is placed in the waterproof case on which the video camera fastens. The principle of detection of uranium-containing materials is based on the identification of the characteristic peaks in the spectra of uranium radiation measurements in the energy range 95 - 115 keV. The results of the most representative measurements at the bottom of reactor ponds are given. The received results are discussed; comparison of results between in-site pond measurements and gamma spectrometric and radiochemical analysis of the water in the lab is carried out. The received results will be used for scheduling on pond cleaning. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

On the influence of the power plant operational history on the inventory and the uncertainties of radionuclides relevant for the final disposal of PWR spent fuel - 15149

A mandatory requisite for official granting safe final disposal approval of SNF is the comprehensive specification and declaration of the nuclear inventory in SNF by the NPP-operators. The whole radiochemical characterization of each spent fuel assembly hides many difficulties such as very high radiation burden, destruction method, the inhomogeneous burn-up of fuel assembly, very high cost. Thus, non-destructive characterization is usually applied on industrial scale. In this case only several nuclides can be measured, and the rest is calculated using simulations and typical irradiation history. Like any other German rad-waste acceptance requirements all these declarations will have to be checked and verified by an independent inspector. In this verification process not only values of radionuclide (RN) activities are important, but also their uncertainties. The simple simulation using burn-up calculations based on typical and generic reactor operational parameters do not answer the question about possible uncertainties observed in real reactor operations. At the same time, the details of irradiation history are often unknown, which complicates the assessment of declared RN inventories. Therefore, the development of dedicated generic proof tools, which can be applied to different types of waste, often of unknown origin and history is worth a serious consideration. Here, we have compiled a set of burn-up calculations considering the operational history of 339 published or anonymized real PWR fuel assemblies. This gives us the possibility to calculate the realistic variation or spectrum of RN inventories. These histories were used as a basis for 'SRP analysis', to provide information about the range of the values of the associated secondary reactor parameters (SRP's), i.e. initial enrichment (IE), specific power (SP), irradiation time (IT), downtime (DT), boric acid concentration (BA), moderator and fuel density (MD and FD) and temperatures (MT and MT) used as input parameters for the simulation models. Then, burn-up calculation codes provide the anticipated results for the entire nuclear inventory such as characteristic activity values and the corresponding minimum and maximum limits as a function of the fuel burn-up. These results are being validated with the experimental data from various publications and the online database - SFCOMPO and subsequently transferred and summarized into our own database. Ultimately, this database will provide the basis of proof tools for the operator independent verification of the declared nuclear inventories for the quality and safety assessment of a radioactive waste compound and bounding values for certain RN as a function of burn-up. The RN inventory can hence be verified without taking credit of the whole of the operational history of the SNF. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

The German product quality control of the compacted metallic nuclear waste - 15311

The treatment and safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel is a key challenge of nuclear energy utilization and has to be accomplished regardless the future nuclear of electricity production or phase-out policies. Until June 2005 approx. 6662 tons of spent fuel from German nuclear power plants was sent to the La Hague (France) and Sellafield (UK) plants for reprocessing. An equivalent amount of nuclear waste compounds has contractually to be returned to Germany, which is currently in progress. The returnable waste streams comprise mainly highly-active vitrified waste containing a major part of fission products and actinides, and intermediate-active super-compacted metallic waste containing reprocessed fuel element's structural materials and some technological waste from the reprocessing process itself. Shearing and dissolution of spent fuel leaves scraps of fuel metal cladding, the end-pieces and spacers which are contaminated, activated and irradiating from their life in a reactor core. In fact, this metallic intermediate level radioactive waste makes up a bit more than half of the total volume of the reprocessed waste. At La Hague the metallic waste is super-compacted. Several, typically eight, compacted discs are stacked in a stainless steel container, named CSD-C as for 'Colis Standard de Dechets Compactes'. 4104 containers of such CSD-Cs in 152 transport/storages casks have to be returned to Germany. Each one of them has to be checked and quality certified for its conformity with German national product specifications and acceptance criteria by independent national product quality control inspectors (PKS). The residue package documentation has to be complete and the characterization methods have to be comprehensive. Due to the heterogeneity of metallic waste the characterization and control of its properties is very complex. The nuclear characterization is performed by means of non-destructive measurements, where only a few key nuclides are measured directly. In fact, the proper calculation of the whole nuclear inventory relies on numerous supplementary simulations. The measurement and calculation methodology is scrutinized by PKS in detail and key points are benchmarked with our own simulations for the sake of an independent nuclear inventory declaration check. With respect to the vast amount of documentation and parameters, which have to be checked and verified, PKS had to optimize their checking procedures. For this purpose dedicated proof tools have been developed that shall be applied for selected indicative cross-checks of the relevant parameters. This contribution is dedicated to the procedure of quality control by PKS and examples of actually performed computational verifications of declared nuclear inventory. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Knowledge Management in Nuclear Liabilities Regulation in the UK - 18155

Within the UK's nuclear safety regulator (Office for Nuclear Regulation; ONR) nuclear liabilities regulation addresses the safe management of radioactive waste, decommissioning and land quality through a facility's lifetime. Higher activity radioactive waste (HAW) could be stored on site for up to 150 years prior to disposal, Magnox decommissioning sites are planned to be in Care and Maintenance for up to 70 years and Sellafield decommissioning is not planned to be complete until after 2100. The long timescales over which decommissioning occurs and radioactive waste is managed is a challenge to maintaining a suitable level of knowledge to effectively and efficiently regulate nuclear liabilities activities. There is a danger that implicit knowledge accumulated over decades could be lost as people retire. Effective knowledge capture and transfer are key elements in maintaining a workforce with the capacity and capability to deliver high levels of nuclear safety, given the demographics of the UK nuclear industry. Maintenance of recorded information over long timescales with changing technologies is necessary to allow safe storage and disposal of waste and intelligent response to incidents. As the safety regulator, ONR's ability to influence improvement in nuclear safety relies on our inspectors having access to high quality knowledge. The ONR Strategy 2016-2020 [1,2] commits to continue to recruit, retain and develop staff so that we have a core workforce with the capacity and capability to deliver high quality, enabling nuclear regulation. Over the next 30 years, the UK plans to develop a geological disposal facility and UK EDF power stations will transition into decommissioning. The ONR Knowledge Management Strategy sets out the activities planned to maintain specialist knowledge to support staff development and build organisational resilience. Guidance on waste management is given in 'The management of higher activity radioactive waste on nuclear licensed sites' (referred to as the Joint Guidance [3]) published by ONR and the UK environmental regulators. It includes our expectations for managing information and records relating to radioactive waste, and introduces the concept of Radioactive Waste Management Cases (RWMCs). Our expectation is that knowledge and records must both be managed and transferred in such a way that future licensees are properly equipped to ensure that waste continues to be managed in a manner that prevents or minimises hazards to human health and the environment. RWMCs are an effective vehicle for demonstrating how the key elements of long-term safety and environmental performance will be delivered over the life cycle of the waste. They give a history of how the waste has been managed, capturing information and change over time. This paper will look at the challenges to managing knowledge in the UK nuclear industry, focusing on the safe management of radioactive waste, decommissioning and land quality. It will look at the problems faced by both licensees and ONR, drawing out common challenges. The paper will outline the approach taken within ONR to capture and communicate waste management and decommissioning knowledge and experience. Finally, it will look at how ONR regulates and influences how knowledge and records are dealt with in the industry to ensure safe nuclear liabilities management in the long term. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2016

The Safe Guards Analysis Toolbox for Non-Proliferation Modeling

As nuclear technology becomes more widely available outside of nuclear weapon armed nations, the importance of preventing the illicit development of nuclear weapons has increased dramatically. A system of nuclear safeguards prevents proliferation; stopping the diversion of nuclear material from civilian facilities for the construction of nuclear weapons. These safeguards function through a combination of accountancy measurements that confirm the locations and amounts of nuclear material, and physical security at every nuclear facility. Safeguards Analysis (SGA) is a computational tool-kit developed using the MATLAB Simulink software suite that simulates a system of nuclear safeguards. The code allows users to examine current safeguards systems for weaknesses and to pinpoint the best locations for improvement. Developed as a modular framework, SGA does not directly model material flows, and relies on an outside code for this information. Instead, it represents a series of safeguards measurements that represent the values inspectors would see. Furthermore, SGA is designed to be modular in design, allowing the user to construct as complex or simple a model as needed: simulating an entire fuel-cycle comprising multiple facilities to a single measurement. SGA's use of outside codes for its material flow information makes it applicable to any model available to the user, as opposed to previous work that applied only to a single scenario. This paper discusses the initial development of SGA and the testing of these modules. The tests described in this paper demonstrate that the different pieces of SGA currently work as intended. Future work on the toolbox will develop and test SGA against a more realistic and complicated scenario using the various tools available in SGA. SGA currently has the pieces to perform analysis on safeguards systems, but needs to be tested on large, multi-MBA, systems to ensure the code is capable of handling such large models, to see the effect large models have on calculation speed, and if further work is needed to improve code efficiency. (authors)

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Safeguards Lessons Learned from the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant - 19502

Once operational, the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) will have an operating throughput of 800 MT of uranium in irradiated LWR fuel per year. In order to establish effective and efficient safeguards at RRP, the safeguards discussion with the IAEA was initiated in 1988. However, at that time there were no available models or guidelines that could be used as a reference and multiple difficulties were recognized for the implementation of safeguards into a large scale reprocessing plant. Therefore, from 1988 to 1992, a multinational forum, referred to as LASCAR (Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards) [1], provided the recommendations on how an effective safeguards approach could be implemented into a large scale reprocessing plant while efficiently using existing resources. During the course of safeguards discussions between the IAEA, the State, and JNFL, the use of operator's equipment and measurement systems (by signal splitting with authentication) for inspections was studied. JNFL also examined incorporating inspection requirements into the process design: to reduce the costs associated with system installation and future system maintenance and to ensure effective, efficient, and credible safeguards implementation into the RRP (this approach has essentially become the 'Safeguards by Design (SBD)' process). From these studies and JNFL's experience of implementing safeguards into a new plant [2], JNFL established and applied signal splitting from operator's equipment as a means for providing inspectors required safeguards information. In addition, the LASCAR findings were utilized to establish the safeguards implemented into the RRP. Safeguards implementation into RRP commenced March 31, 2006. On June 4, 2008, the IAEA approved the 'integrated safeguards approach' for RRP. This paper provides a high level overview of the major safeguards implemented at RRP and the lessons learned from this implementation that can be applied to existing or future similar facilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Fortifying Environmental Compliance Strategies at Hanford - 19541

At the Hanford Site, located near Richland, Washington, the Department of Energy is cleaning up legacy radioactive and mixed-waste generated from the Manhattan Project in the 1940's. A major component of cleaning up the waste is maintaining compliance with federal and state environmental regulations. Environmental compliance is also determined through permits, agreements, and consent orders issued by regulating agencies such as the Washington State Department of Health: Office of Radiation Protection, Washington State Department of Ecology Nuclear Waste Program, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Maintaining compliance at Hanford reduces environmental impacts and addresses violations, or non-compliances. The following strategies improve compliance and support the avoidance of enforcement actions. At Hanford, regulatory agency environmental enforcement actions, and their corrective actions, are tracked to completion using databases maintained by inspection subject matter experts. The databases are used to provide the Department of Energy and contractor management with up-to-date status of regulatory agency activity and the required corrective actions. Trending enforcement actions helps target compliance vulnerabilities. Findings and corrective actions that are entered into the databases are then trended by date, location, responsible contractor, agency, and type of compliance issue. The ability to review previous non-compliances in certain locations of the Site, or by general alleged violation, provides the project's environmental contacts with information on what types of issues to look for on pre-inspection walk downs. Finding non-compliances during pre-inspection walk downs allows the contractor to correct the issue and avoid potential fines from regulating agencies. The walk downs are conducted by environmental specialists and project personnel looking for issues that may be viewed as a compliance problem. Using agency checklists and previous inspection correspondence can help to provide valuable information during pre-inspection activities. Training regulatory agency inspectors on Site security requirements, cultural and ecological standards, and inspection protocols allows for increased efficiency and reduces potential miscommunication between regulatory agencies and the regulated contractors. The training also allows the contractors to give the regulating agencies the up-to-date policies and procedures that will be addressed during the inspection. Hanford has pre-identified inspection coordinators within each contractor to assist in coordinating with Department of Energy personnel, projects, and management prior to the inspections. These inspection coordinators notify affected management, accommodate and escort the regulators to locations they ask to inspect, set up requested interviews, and gather requested information that will need to be cleared for public release. These practices make for positive experiences and interactions with the regulating agency personnel and help reduce and eliminate environmental non-compliances, findings, violations, and fines. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗