SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “LAUNCH COMPLEX”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 397 records · Page 22

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS1991

Lunar base siting

As with any planetary body, the lunar surface is quite heterogeneous. There are widely dispersed sites of particular interest for known and potential resource availability, selenology, and lunar observatories. Discriminating characteristics include solar illumination, view of earth, local topography, engineering properties of the regolith and certain geological features, and local mineralogy and petrology. Space vehicle arrival and departure trajectories constitute a minor consideration. Over time, a variety of base sites will be developed serving different purposes. Resource-driven sites may see the fastest growth during the first decades of lunar development, but selection of the most favorable sites is likely to be driven by suitability for a combination of activities. As on earth, later development may be driven by geographical advantages of surface transportation routes. With the availability of near-constant sunlight for power generation, as well as permanently shadowed areas at cryogenic temperatures, polar sites are attractive because they require substantially less earth-launched mass and lower equipment complexity for an initial permanent base. Discovery of accessible volatiles reservoirs, either in the form of polar permafrost or gas reservoirs at other locations, would dramatically increase the attractiveness of any site from a logistical support and selenological point of view. Amid such speculation, no reliable evidence of such volatiles exist. More reliable evidence exists for areas of certain mineral concentrations, such as ilmenite, which could form a feedstock for some proposed resource extraction schemes. While tentative selections of advantageous base sites are made, new data from lunar polar orbiters and the Galileo polar flybys would be very helpful.

Staehle, Robert L.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

How Can We Efficiently Build A Spacecraft That Has Longevity? Experiences From the GSFC Perspective to Inform Lunar Exploration and Science Orbiter’s Architecture

Recent successes in NASA planetary science missions has shown that long-lived missions can yield significant science return. These missions, despite their longevity, were not planned to operate beyond their deign life. For example, the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter has a design life of 2-3 years, and yet we are entering its 14th year on orbit. Spacecraft longevity in practice has been related to: 1) mission class; 2) did we test it long enough and resolve all the anomalies to be beyond the early failure curve; 3) consumables budgets, and 4) how components are de-signed and tested. Mission class has been perceived as one of the primary ways to drive longevity. But higher mission class is a significant cost and mission driver. Parts selection only from the limited military standard parts and extensive parts qualification adds to development time and cost. Largely redundant (often erroneously interpreted as fully redundant) adds to launch mass and increases testing complexity (which may reduce the amount of testing in the nominal con-figuration). Lower Risk Posture (reflected in a higher mission class) drives significant additional processes and quality assurance analyses. Higher mission class also drives significantly greater sparing and life testing costs. This discussion focuses on whether this is indeed the best way to achieve longevity efficiently or whether there are more efficient ways to achieve longevity. Empirical evidence shows that lower mission classes that implement effective risk reduction and selective redundancy generally results in long life at a lower Spacecraft bus cost. By evaluating redundancy careful-ly, spacecraft cost can be lowered which can enable a more capable payload. Risk of the mission is highly dependent on the complexity of the mission and is only loosely dependent on Class of Mission. High complexity missions can have many single point failures and require the development of new technology, while lower class mission can have lower risk by baselining or incorporating: (selective) redundancy, fault-tolerant design, design for minimum risk, ability to reset, and/or design for graceful degradation. The team met with Goddard Space Flight Center Space Systems Mission Operations leaders to discuss which avionics have proven in flight to be the most reliable and which have had lifetime issues. The paper proposes a list of components to focus on for redundancy for a long-lived lunar mission. Reliability numbers are presented for both single string and dual string missions. The history of life-time performance versus planned mission life according to mission class is presented. A mission with well thought out selective redundancy and effective on the ground test program, can be expected to last well beyond its mission lifetime and provided enhanced return for the community. This approach minimizes project expenditures that do not retire significant risk and allows the project to focus risk mitigation efforts on those risks that will have a significant likelihood of threatening mission success. This is aided by keeping the amount of technology maturation and mission complexity low, while focusing effort on ensuring all component stress-ing parameters well within the bounds of their capabilities.

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRS1987

Launch Processing System operations with a future look to Operations Analyst (OPERA)

The Launch Processing System architecture and the ground support operations required to provide Shuttle System engineers with the capability to safely process and launch an Orbiter are described. The described ground operations are the culmination of eleven years of experience and redesign. Some of the 'lessons learned' are examined, and problem areas which ground support operations have identified over the years as the Shuttle and Launch Processing Systems continue to grow in complexity are discussed. The Operational Analyst for Distributed Systems (OPERA), a proposed set of expert systems for the Launch Processing System Operational assistance, is discussed along with its extensions to prospective future configurations and components for the Launch Processing System.

Heard, Astrid E.↗

NASA NTRS1975

Titan/Centaur T/C-1 post flight evaluation report

The first Titan/Centaur launch vehicle, TC-1, was launched from the Eastern Test Range Complex 41 at 09:48:01.46 hours Eastern Daylight Time on February 11, 1974. The vehicle carried a dynamic mass model of the Viking spacecraft and a SPHINX spacecraft, intended to study high voltage interactions in space. This launch was a Proof Flight of a vehicle con- figuration integrating the Air Force Titan booster and the NASA Centaur upper stage. It also was the first flight of the Centaur Standard Shroud developed for the Titan/Centaur. The countdown for the launch proceeded normally except for an additional 45 minute hold which was required to resolve a question concerning interpretation of booster hydraulic system data. The launch window opened at 09:03:00 hours Eastern Daylight Time. The vehicle was launched o on a flight azimuth of 105°. The Titan boost phase of flight was satisfactory. Solid Motor operation, Stage I and Stage II operation were normal. Venting of the Centaur Standard Shroud during ascent was successful and shroud separation and jettison was accomplished without incident. At the completion of the Titan Stage II burn, the Centaur successfully separated from the Titan. At this time, the Centaur main engines were sequenced through the first planned starting cycle but failed to achieve steady state operation. The vehicle flight control system, not sensing vehicle acceleration, commanded engine shutdown, and recycled, as programmed, through a back-up engine start attempt. The second engine start attempt was also unsuccessful. The flight control system then placed the vehicle in a coast-phase mode and the vehicle continued downrange in free fall. The vehicle was destroyed by Range Safety when the impact point was approximately 2200 nautical miles downrange, 12 minutes, 28.5 seconds after liftoff.

S. V. Szabo, Jr.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Identified Risks of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture in Human Spaceflight

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. One of the identified risks is due to inadequate human systems integration architecture (HSIA) and a driving factor of this risk is that given decreasing real-time ground support for execution of complex operations during future exploration missions, there is a possibility of adverse performance outcomes including that crew are unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety critical procedural errors. The HSRB uses Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) as a communication tool for describing how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes and as the basis for understanding intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes. The HSIA risk DAG will be presented and described. Historically, critical malfunctions requiring Crew/MCC management occurred at a rate of 1.7 times per year for ISS averaged over the lifetime and 3-4 times per year in the burn in phase for the vehicle. These averages do not include EVA data, which greatly increases the incident rate. Prior experience from the Apollo program showed 10/11 crewed missions experienced significant anomalies where crew relied heavily on MCC expertise in real-time. These failure patterns are in line with those observed in other complex engineered systems (e.g., oil rigs, launch systems, commercial aviation, etc.) It is likely that general malfunction and error rates are > 10% for short duration missions (<30 days), based on past and current spaceflight operations data. Likelihood of adverse outcomes has the potential to increase as crew conduct work with new, complex systems and with less ground support. For Low Earth Orbit missions and Lunar missions less than 30 days, assuming minimal comm delays, disruptions and bandwidth limitations, malfunctions and errors can affect mission objectives and crew health but may be mitigated by ground support. For Lunar missions greater than 30 days and any potential Mars mission malfunctions and errors can have Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences due to reduced ground support (communication delays, constraints and blackouts) for more complex operations, as well as reduced resupply and evacuation options.

Daniel M Buckland↗

NASA NTRS2014

Space Launch System Ascent Flight Control Design

A robust and flexible autopilot architecture for NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) family of launch vehicles is presented. The SLS configurations represent a potentially significant increase in complexity and performance capability when compared with other manned launch vehicles. It was recognized early in the program that a new, generalized autopilot design should be formulated to fulfill the needs of this new space launch architecture. The present design concept is intended to leverage existing NASA and industry launch vehicle design experience and maintain the extensibility and modularity necessary to accommodate multiple vehicle configurations while relying on proven and flight-tested control design principles for large boost vehicles. The SLS flight control architecture combines a digital three-axis autopilot with traditional bending filters to support robust active or passive stabilization of the vehicle's bending and sloshing dynamics using optimally blended measurements from multiple rate gyros on the vehicle structure. The algorithm also relies on a pseudo-optimal control allocation scheme to maximize the performance capability of multiple vectored engines while accommodating throttling and engine failure contingencies in real time with negligible impact to stability characteristics. The architecture supports active in-flight disturbance compensation through the use of nonlinear observers driven by acceleration measurements. Envelope expansion and robustness enhancement is obtained through the use of a multiplicative forward gain modulation law based upon a simple model reference adaptive control scheme.

Orr, Jeb S.↗

NASA NTRS2003

SLI Complex Curvature Friction Stir Weld Risk Reduction Program

The Space Launch Initiative Program (SLI) in conjunction with the National Center for Advanced Manufacturing (NCAM) will demonstrate the ability to produce large-scale complex curvature hardware using the self-reacting friction stir welding process. This multi-phased risk reduction program includes friction stir welding process development and manufacture of a 22-ft diameter quarter dome using a conventional tooling approach; it culminates in a 27.5-ft diameter quarter dome demonstration performed on a 5-axis Universal Weld System. The design, fabrication, and installation of the Universal Weld System is made possible through a collaboration between the State of Louisiana, NASA, and the University of New Orleans. The Universal Weld System, manufactured by MTS Systems Corporation, will be installed at the Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans, Louisiana, and will be capable of manufacturing domes up to 30 ft in diameter. All welding will be accomplished using the Adaptable Adjustable Pin Tool (AdAPT) weld head and controller manufactured by MTS. Weld parameters will be developed for an aluminum alloy in gauges ranging from 0.320 to 0.400 in. thick. Weld quality will be verified through radiography, mechanical property testing at ambient and LN2 temperatures, and metallurgical analysis. The AdAPT weld head will then be mounted on a 22-ft diameter dome tool, which will be modified to include a welding track and drive system for moving the AdAPT weld head along the weld joint. This tool will then be used to manufacture a 22-ft diameter dome of an aluminum alloy, with 0.320-in. constant thickness joints, consisting of three individual gore panels. Finally, the 27.5-ft diameter quarter dome will be welded on the Universal Weld System. The quarter dome will consist of three individual gore panels with weld lands tapering from 0.320 to 0.360 in. in thickness. With the demonstration of these welds, the ability to manufacture large diameter domes using the friction stir weld process in conjunction with a universal weld system provides a low risk approach to the fabrication of aluminum tanks for future launch vehicle applications.

Hartley, Paula J.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Critical issues in NASA information systems

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has developed a globally-distributed complex of earth resources data bases since LANDSAT 1 was launched in 1972. NASA envisages considerable growth in the number, extent, and complexity of such data bases, due to the improvements expected in its remote sensing data rates, and the increasingly multidisciplinary nature of its scientific investigations. Work already has begun on information systems to support multidisciplinary research activities based on data acquired by the space station complex and other space-based and terrestrial sources. In response to a request from NASA's former Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, the National Research Council convened a committee in June 1985 to identify the critical issues involving information systems support to space science and applications. The committee has suggested that OSSA address four major information systems issues; centralization of management functions, interoperability of user involvement in the planning and implementation of its programs, and technology.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1990

An evolutionary sequence of low frequency radio astronomy missions

Many concepts for space-based low frequency radio astronomy missions are being developed, ranging from simple single-satellite experiments to large arrays on the far side of the moon. Each concept involves a different tradeoff between the range of scientific questions it can answer and the technical complexity of the experiment. Since complexity largely determines the development time, risk, launch vehicle requirements, cost, and probability of approval, it is important to see where the ability to expand the scientific return justifies a major increase in complexity. An evolutionary series of increasingly capable missions, similar to the series of missions for infrared or X-ray astronomy, is advocated. These would range from inexpensive 'piggy-back' experiments on near-future missions to a dedicated low frequency array in earth orbit (or possibly on the lunar nearside) and eventually to an array on the lunar farside.

Jones, Dayton L.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Petite Amateur Navy Satellite (PANSAT)

The Naval Postgraduate School's (NPS) Space Systems Academic Group (SSAG) is designing and developing a small communications satellite for launch aboard the shuttle as a complex autonomous payload (CAP). The objectives of PANSAT are three-fold. First, PANSAT will provide an ideal educational tool for the officer students at NPS supporting Space Systems Engineering and Space Systems Operations with hands-on hardware development. Second, the satellite will provide digital store-and-forward communications, or packet radio, for the amateur radio community. The third objective is to provide a low-cost, space-based platform for small experiments. PANSAT will be launched from the shuttle at a nominal altitude of 200 n.m. and an inclination of at least 37 degrees. The satellite weight is 150 lbs. Since there is no attitude control, eight dipole whip antennas will be used to provide isotropic ground coverage for communications. FM digital communications will be used with up-link and down-link on a single frequency in the amateur band of 437.25 MHz. A maximum 50 kHz of bandwidth is envisioned for the satellite. The expected lifetime of the satellite is 1 1/2 to 2 years before atmospheric reentry. The PANSAT design consists of the following: communications subsystem (COMM); computer, or data processor and sequencer (DP&S); power subsystem; structure subsystem; and experiment payload.

Sakoda, D.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Systems Integration Challenges for a National Space Launch System

System Integration was refined through the complexity and early failures experienced in rocket flight. System Integration encompasses many different viewpoints of the system development. System Integration must ensure consistency in development and operations activities. Human Space Flight tends toward large, complex systems. Understanding the system fs operational and use context is the guiding principle for System Integration: (1) Sizeable costs can be driven into systems by not fully understanding context (2). Adhering to the system context throughout the system fs life cycle is essential to maintaining efficient System Integration. System Integration exists within the System Architecture. Beautiful systems are simple in use and operation -- Block upgrades facilitate manageable steps in functionality evolution. Effective System Integration requires a stable system concept. Communication is essential to system simplicity

May, Todd A.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Modeling Powered Aerodynamics for the Orion Launch Abort Vehicle Aerodynamic Database

Modeling the aerodynamics of the Orion Launch Abort Vehicle (LAV) has presented many technical challenges to the developers of the Orion aerodynamic database. During a launch abort event, the aerodynamic environment around the LAV is very complex as multiple solid rocket plumes interact with each other and the vehicle. It is further complicated by vehicle separation events such as between the LAV and the launch vehicle stack or between the launch abort tower and the crew module. The aerodynamic database for the LAV was developed mainly from wind tunnel tests involving powered jet simulations of the rocket exhaust plumes, supported by computational fluid dynamic simulations. However, limitations in both methods have made it difficult to properly capture the aerodynamics of the LAV in experimental and numerical simulations. These limitations have also influenced decisions regarding the modeling and structure of the aerodynamic database for the LAV and led to compromises and creative solutions. Two database modeling approaches are presented in this paper (incremental aerodynamics and total aerodynamics), with examples showing strengths and weaknesses of each approach. In addition, the unique problems presented to the database developers by the large data space required for modeling a launch abort event illustrate the complexities of working with multi-dimensional data.

Chan, David T.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Use of low orbital satellite communications systems for humanitarian programs

Communication and information exchange play a decisive role in progress and social development. However, in many parts of the world the communication infrastructure is inadequate and the capacity for on-line exchange of information may not exist. This is true of underdeveloped countries, remote and relatively inaccessible regions, sites of natural disasters, and of all cases where the resources needed to create complex communication systems are limited. The creation of an inexpensive space communications system to service such areas is therefore a high priority task. In addition to a relatively low-cost space segment, an inexpensive space communications systems requires a large number of ground terminals, which must be relatively inexpensive, energy efficient (using power generated by storage batteries, or solar arrays, etc.), small in size, and must not require highly expert maintenance. The ground terminals must be portable, and readily deployable. Communications satellites in geostationary orbit at altitudes of about 36,000 km are very expensive and require complex and expensive ground stations and launch vehicles. Given current technology, it is categorically impossible to develop inexpensive satellite systems with portable ground terminals using such satellites. To solve the problem of developing an inexpensive satellite communications system that can operate with relatively small ground stations, including portable terminals, we propose to use a system with satellites in low Earth orbit, at an altitude of 900-1500 km. Because low orbital satellites are much closer to the Earth than geostationary ones and require vastly less energy expenditure by the satellite and ground terminals for transmission of messages, a system using them is relatively inexpensive. Such a system could use portable ground terminals no more complex than ordinary mobile police radios.

Vlasov, Vladimir N.↗

NASA NTRS1994

WIND Mated to Delta

This NASA Kennedy Space Center video release presents footage of the mating of NASA's WIND payload to the Delta launch vehicle at Cape Canaveral Air Station's complex 17B. The video includes shots of the workcrews as well as wide angle views of the spacecraft in its launching position. WIND was launched on November 1, 1994 and is the first of two NASA spacecraft in the Global Geospace Science initiative and part of the International Solar Terrestrial Physics (ISTP) Project.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1974

Skylab checkout and launch operations at KSC

Checkout and launch operations for the four Skylab flights, plus checkout for a fifth vehicle on rescue status during the last mission, were complex and demanding. Preparations began well before the launch of the last Apollo moon mission in December 1972, and had to be performed without interference with the ongoing program. Three major new flight modules were used in Skylab, each of which imposed specific requirements on Kennedy Space Center. A major facilities modification program resulted in the ability to launch the three Saturn IB Skylab vehicles from Saturn V facilities. This provided large cost savings, but imposed the usual problems caused by first-time use of a new system.

Moser, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Pad Safety Personnel Launch Support For STS-200

The launch of a space shuttle is a complex and lengthy procedure. There are many places and components to look at and prepare. The components are the orbiter, solid rocket boosters, external tank, and ground equipment. Some of the places are the launch pad, fuel locations, and surrounding structures. Preparations for a launch include equipment checks, system checks, sniff checks for hazardous commodities, and countless walkdowns. Throughout these preparations, pad safety personnel must always be on call. This requires three shifts of multiple people to be ready when needed. Also, the pad safety personnel must be available for the non-launch tasks that are always present for both launch pads

Guarino, Jennifer↗

NASA NTRS2004

The Mars Exploration Rover Project

The twin rovers of the Mars Exploration Rover Project successfully landed on the surface of Mars in January 2004, and initiated a highly successful science and exploration campaign. This marked the culmination of an unprecedented four-year effort to design, build, launch, and operate two of the most complex planetary spacecraft ever built. The project was started in the aftermath of the 1999 Mars mission failures, and was commissioned to take advantage of the highly advantageous 2003 opportunity. The development schedule from project start to launch was only 35 months, so schedule management was the most significant challenge facing the project. This problem was compounded when early assumptions about the extent of design heritage from Mars Pathfinder proved to be flawed. The project derived a number of useful lessons learned in solving these challenges that can be applied to future missions.

Mars↗

NASA NTRS2016

NASA's Space Launch System: An Evolving Capability for Exploration

A foundational capability for international human deep-space exploration, NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) vehicle represents a new spaceflight infrastructure asset, creating opportunities for mission profiles and space systems that cannot currently be executed. While the primary purpose of SLS, which is making rapid progress towards initial launch readiness in two years, will be to support NASA's Journey to Mars, discussions are already well underway regarding other potential utilization of the vehicle's unique capabilities. In its initial Block 1 configuration, capable of launching 70 metric tons (t) to low Earth orbit (LEO), SLS will propel the Orion crew vehicle to cislunar space, while also delivering small CubeSat-class spacecraft to deep-space destinations. With the addition of a more powerful upper stage, the Block 1B configuration of SLS will be able to deliver 105 t to LEO and enable more ambitious human missions into the proving ground of space. This configuration offers opportunities for launching co-manifested payloads with the Orion crew vehicle, and a class of secondary payloads, larger than today's CubeSats. Further upgrades to the vehicle, including advanced boosters, will evolve its performance to 130 t in its Block 2 configuration. Both Block 1B and Block 2 also offer the capability to carry 8.4- or 10-m payload fairings, larger than any contemporary launch vehicle. With unmatched mass-lift capability, payload volume, and C3, SLS not only enables spacecraft or mission designs currently impossible with contemporary EELVs, it also offers enhancing benefits, such as reduced risk, operational costs and/or complexity, shorter transit time to destination or launching large systems either monolithically or in fewer components. This paper will discuss both the performance and capabilities of Space Launch System as it evolves, and the current state of SLS utilization planning.

Creech, Stephen D.↗