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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2022

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportunities for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamination, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR community will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Elaine Seasly↗

NASA NTRS2011

Preparing for the High Frontier: The Role and Training of NASA Astronauts in the Post- Space Shuttle Era

In May 2010, the National Research Council (NRC) was asked by NASA to address several questions related to the Astronaut Corps. The NRC s Committee on Human Spaceflight Crew Operations was tasked to answer several questions: 1. How should the role and size of the activities managed by the Johnson Space Center Flight Crew Operations Directorate change after space shuttle retirement and completion of the assembly of the International Space Station (ISS)? 2. What are the requirements for crew-related ground-based facilities after the Space Shuttle program ends? 3. Is the fleet of aircraft used for training the Astronaut Corps a cost-effective means of preparing astronauts to meet the requirements of NASA s human spaceflight program? Are there more cost-effective means of meeting these training requirements? Although the future of NASA s human spaceflight program has garnered considerable discussion in recent years and there is considerable uncertainty about what the program will involve in the coming years, the committee was not tasked to address whether human spaceflight should continue or what form it should take. The committee s task restricted it to studying activities managed by the Flight Crew Operations Directorate or those closely related to its activities, such as crew-related ground-based facilities and the training aircraft.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2022

NASA’s Revised Planetary Protection Policy and Implementation

NASA has updated its planetary protection policy and implementation approach in response to advances in scientific understanding of solar system targets, upcoming mission opportuni-ties for exploration and sample return, and the private sector’s emerging capability to plan missions to Earth’s Moon and Mars. In September 2021, the NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 8715.24, entitled “Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions” was released which repositions planetary protection in existing NASA mission and program management structures, introduces risk-informed decision making, expands on key roles and responsibilities for both programmatic and the Oÿce of Safety and Mission Assurance, updates the categorization process and streamlines the planetary protection documentation approval and schedule. NASA is working on a more detailed technical standard to accompany NPR 8715.24 which will include the detailed technical requirements to address organic contamina-tion, inadvertent impact avoidance, biological control and management, end of mission disposal and restricted Earth-Return sample safety and assurance. This report to the COSPAR com-munity will describe the current NASA planetary protection policy and its alignment with the revised COSPAR planetary protection policy. NASA’s plans for updating the supporting “Handbook for Implementing Planetary Protection Technical Requirements” and future policies for addressing planetary protection of crewed missions will also be presented.

Elaine Seasly↗

NASA NTRS1985

Requirements for Conformal Coating and Staking of Printed Wiring Boards and Electronic Assemblies

In order to maintain the high standards of the NASA conformal coating and staking program, this publication: prescribes NASA's requirements for assuring reliable conformal coating and staking for printed wiring boards and electronic assemblies; describes and incorporates basic considerations necessary to assure reliable conformal coating and staking; establishes the supplier's responsibility to train and certify personnel; provides for supplier documentation of the fabrication and inspection procedures to be used for NASA work, including supplier innovations and changes in technology; and provides visual workmanship standards to aid those responsible for determining quality conformance to the established requirements.

Source record↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗

DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS1992

Hazard detection and avoidance sensor for NASA's planetary landers

An optical terrain analysis based sensor system specifically designed for landing hazard detection as required for NASA's autonomous planetary landers is introduced. This optical hazard detection and avoidance (HDA) sensor utilizes an optoelectronic wedge-and-ting (WRD) filter for Fourier transformed feature extraction and an electronic neural network processor for pattern classification. A fully implemented optical HDA sensor would assure safe landing of the planetary landers. Computer simulation results of a successful feasibility study is reported. Future research for hardware system implementation is also provided.

Lau, Brian↗

NASA NTRS2015

Update on Risk Reduction Activities for a Liquid Advanced Booster for NASA's Space Launch System

The stated goals of NASA's Research Announcement for the Space Launch System (SLS) Advanced Booster Engineering Demonstration and/or Risk Reduction (ABEDRR) are to reduce risks leading to an affordable Advanced Booster that meets the evolved capabilities of SLS; and enable competition by mitigating targeted Advanced Booster risks to enhance SLS affordability. Dynetics, Inc. and Aerojet Rocketdyne (AR) formed a team to offer a wide-ranging set of risk reduction activities and full-scale, system-level demonstrations that support NASA's ABEDRR goals. For NASA's SLS ABEDRR procurement, Dynetics and AR formed a team to offer a series of full-scale risk mitigation hardware demonstrations for an affordable booster approach that meets the evolved capabilities of the SLS. To establish a basis for the risk reduction activities, the Dynetics Team developed a booster design that takes advantage of the flight-proven Apollo-Saturn F-1. Using NASA's vehicle assumptions for the SLS Block 2, a two-engine, F-1-based booster design delivers 150 mT (331 klbm) payload to LEO, 20 mT (44 klbm) above NASA's requirements. This enables a low-cost, robust approach to structural design. During the ABEDRR effort, the Dynetics Team has modified proven Apollo-Saturn components and subsystems to improve affordability and reliability (e.g., reduce parts counts, touch labor, or use lower cost manufacturing processes and materials). The team has built hardware to validate production costs and completed tests to demonstrate it can meet performance requirements. State-of-the-art manufacturing and processing techniques have been applied to the heritage F-1, resulting in a low recurring cost engine while retaining the benefits of Apollo-era experience. NASA test facilities have been used to perform low-cost risk-reduction engine testing. In early 2014, NASA and the Dynetics Team agreed to move additional large liquid oxygen/kerosene engine work under Dynetics' ABEDRR contract. Also led by AR, the objectives of this work are to demonstrate combustion stability and measure performance of a 500,000 lbf class Oxidizer-Rich Staged Combustion (ORSC) cycle main injector. A trade study was completed to investigate the feasibility, cost effectiveness, and technical maturity of a domestically produced Atlas V engine that could also potentially satisfy NASA SLS payload-to-orbit requirements via an advanced booster application. Engine physical dimensions and performance parameters resulting from this study provide the system level requirements for the ORSC risk reduction test article. The test article is scheduled to complete critical design review this fall and begin testing in 2017. Dynetics has also designed, developed, and built innovative tank and structure assemblies using friction stir welding to leverage recent NASA investments in manufacturing tools, facilities, and processes, significantly reducing development and recurring costs. The full-scale cryotank assembly was used to verify the structural design and prove affordable processes. Dynetics performed hydrostatic and cryothermal proof tests on the assembly to verify the assembly meets performance requirements. This paper will discuss the ABEDRR engine task and structures task achievements to date and the remaining effort through the end of the contract.

Crocker, Andrew M.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Evaluation of Volatile Species in Green Monopropellant Project

NASA is interested in green monopropellants to replace hydrazine in reaction control systems (RCSs). Some current NASA programs require reduced vapor pressure and low toxicity monopropellant (green) and superior performance (specific impulse and density) formulations. Earlier vapor phase studies of a candidate green monopropellant at the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) showed the presence of a volatile species that warranted further investigation. The purpose of this study was to further characterize the volatile species and to evaluate it. The evaluation was with respect to whether the volatile species was an impurity or how it is formed, and to use that information to examine whether its presence as an impurity can be eliminated during formulation. The evaluation also considered whether formation of the volatile impurity could be prevented while not compromising the propellant. To reduce variables associated with evaluation of the propellant formulation as a whole, a precursor to one of the individual components in the propellant formulation was subjected to a NASA Standard 6001B Flammability, Off-gassing, and Compatibility Requirements and Test Procedures "Determination of Off-gassed Products (Test 7)". Testing took place in the NASA WSTF Molecular Desorption and Analysis Laboratory. One gram of the precursor was placed in a flask within a specimen container. After thermal conditioning for 72 +/- 1 h at 50 +/- 3 deg C (122 +/- 5 deg F), the atmosphere inside the specimen container was analyzed for off-gassed compounds by cryotrap gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) and fixed sample loop GC-flame ionization detection (GC-FID). The specimen container used was glass to minimize potential catalytic surfaces. The identification of compounds was difficult due to the complexity of the vapor phase concentrations and overlapping chromatographic peaks and mass spectra. However, eleven compounds were specifically identified and five compounds or classes of compounds were reported as unidentified. Quantitation of most of the compounds, including unidentified compounds, was as methane. Quantitating compounds or classes of compounds that were detected but for which specific calibration is not established as methane is in accordance with the Test 7 standard protocol. The thermal decomposition temperature of the precursor was significantly higher than the test temperature. Based on thermal decomposition temperature and on an examination of the structure and chemistry of the identified volatile species, the presence of the volatile species appears to be chemically reasonable with respect to the propellant formulation and is at this time attributed to impurities. Further examination of the overall propellant formulation process (including the individual components' synthesis processes) and process quality control (including purity of reagents and possible decomposition reactions) is indicated.

Greene, Benjamin↗

NASA NTRS1996

Analysis of microgravity space experiments Space Shuttle programmatic safety requirements

This report documents the results of an analysis of microgravity space experiments space shuttle programmatic safety requirements and recommends the creation of a Safety Compliance Data Package (SCDP) Template for both flight and ground processes. These templates detail the programmatic requirements necessary to produce a complete SCDP. The templates were developed from various NASA centers' requirement documents, previously written guidelines on safety data packages, and from personal experiences. The templates are included in the back as part of this report.

Terlep, Judith A.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Johnson Space Center Health and Medical Technical Authority

1.HMTA responsibilities: a) Assure program/project compliance with Agency health and medical requirements at identified key decision points. b) Certify that programs/projects comply with Agency health and medical requirements prior to spaceflight missions. c) Assure technical excellence. 2. Designation of applicable NASA Centers for HMTA implementation and Chief Medical Officer (CMO) appointment. 3. Center CMO responsible for HMTA implementation for programs and projects at the center. JSC HMTA captured in "JSC HMTA Implementation Plan". 4. Establishes specifics of dissenting opinion process consistent with NASA procedural requirements.

Fogarty, Jennifer A.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Evalution of a DE-Identification Process for Ocular Imaging

Medical privacy of NASA astronauts requires an organized and comprehensive approach when data are being made available outside NASA systems. A combination of factors, including the uniquely small patient population, the extensive medical testing done on these individuals, and the relative cultural popularity of the astronauts puts them at a far greater risk to potential exposure of personal information than the general public. Therefore, care must be taken to ensure that the astronauts' identities are concealed. Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) medical data is a recent source of interest to researchers concerned with the development of Visual Impairment due to Intracranial Pressure (VIIP) in the astronaut population. Each vision MRI scan of an astronaut includes 176 separate sagittal images that are saved as an "image series" for clinical use. In addition to the medical information these image sets provide, they also inherently contain a substantial amount of non-medical personally identifiable information (PII) such as-name, date of birth, and date of exam. We have shown that an image set of this type can be rendered, using free software, to give an accurate representation of the patient's face. This currently restricts NASA from dispensing MRI data to researchers in a deidentified format. Automated software programs, such as the Brain Extraction Tool, are available to researchers who wish to de-identify MRI sagittal brain images by "erasing" identifying characteristics such as the nose and jaw on the image sets. However, this software is not useful to NASA for vision research because it removes the portion of the images around the eye orbits, which is the main area of interest to researchers studying the VIIP syndrome. The Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health program has resolved this issue by developing a protocol to de-identify MRI sagittal brain images using Showcase Premier, a DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) software package. The software allows manual editing of one image from a patient's image set to be automatically applied to the entire image series. This new approach would allow a new level of access to untapped medical imaging data relating to VIIP that can be utilized by researchers while protecting the privacy of the astronauts. In the next step toward finalizing this technique, NASA clinical radiology consultants will test the images to verify removal of all metadata and PII.

LaPelusa, Michael B.↗

NASA NTRS1984

Large aircraft handling qualities

The short period frequency requirements of MIL-F-8785C are applicable to the very large transport aircraft simulated. The large aircraft simulated meet the requirements of NASA CR-159236 for effective time delay and pitch transient peak ratio. However, the requirements of this reference for the effective rise time parameter are believed to be too convservative for very large transport aircraft. Data obtained to date as well as other data indicate that MIL-SPEC requirements for the parameter t(phi=30 degrees) are too conservative for very large transport aircraft. The results of the present study indicate that t(phi=30 degrees) of less than 6 sec should result in ""acceptable'' roll response characteristics, and t(phi=30 degrees) of less than 4.0 sec should result in ""satisfactory'' roll response.

Grantham, W. D.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Battery Review Board

The topics covered are presented in viewgraph form: NASA Battery Review Board Charter; membership, board chronology; background; statement of problem; summary of problems with 50 AH standard Ni-Cd; activities for near term programs utilizing conventional Ni-Cd; present projects scheduled to use NASA standard Ni-Cd; other near-term NASA programs requiring secondary batteries; recommended direction for future programs; future cell/battery procurement strategy; and the NASA Battery Program.

Vaughn, Chester↗

NASA NTRS2003

A Gold Medal Finish

During the summer of 1999, Darryl Mitchell of Goddard Space Flight Center's Technology Commercialization Office (TCO) met with the U.S. Olympic Committee at the official training facility in Colorado Springs, Colorado, to offer assistance in transferring NASA technologies applicable to Olympic sports. Following the meeting with the Olympic committee, Mitchell was approached by U.S. Speedskating Long Track Program Director Finn Halvorsen, who eagerly voiced his interest in working with NASA to identify a means of improving performance for his team. According to Halvorsen, 'If (NASA) can put a man on the moon, surely they can help our skaters.' Mitchell and Halvorsen went to work uncovering NASA technologies that could boost the U.S. team's skating capabilities. Mitchell received a crash course in speedskating, and as a result, generated a lengthy list of promising NASA developments that could benefit the sport. From this list, he and his Goddard TCO partner, Joe Famiglietti, deliberated over whether a NASA mirror-polishing technique could possibly be adapted to the athletes speedskates. The polishing technique, developed by Jim Lyons, a 16-year optical engineering veteran of Goddard, was derived from the same principles used to create the optics for NASA's science observatories, such as the Hubble Space Telescope (highly polished optics are required by NASA to obtain sharp, clear images in space).

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NASA NTRS2008

A Review of NASA's Radiation-Hardened Electronics for Space Environments Project

NASA's Radiation Hardened Electronics for Space Exploration (RHESE) project develops the advanced technologies required to produce radiation hardened electronics, processors, and devices in support of the requirements of NASA's Constellation program. Over the past year, multiple advancements have been made within each of the RHESE technology development tasks that will facilitate the success of the Constellation program elements. This paper provides a brief review of these advancements, discusses their application to Constellation projects, and addresses the plans for the coming year.

Keys, Andrew S.↗

NASA NTRS2019

ESD Control in the NASA STD-8739.6

This presentation covers the history of NASA using the industry ESD standard ANSI/ESD S20.20, the rationale for adding ESD control requirments to NASA STD-8739.6, and what many of those changes will look like.

NASA STD-8739.6↗

NASA NTRS2010

Ares I-X Range Safety Simulation Verification and Analysis IV and V

NASA s ARES I-X vehicle launched on a suborbital test flight from the Eastern Range in Florida on October 28, 2009. NASA generated a Range Safety (RS) flight data package to meet the RS trajectory data requirements defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710. Some products included in the flight data package were a nominal ascent trajectory, ascent flight envelope trajectories, and malfunction turn trajectories. These data are used by the Air Force s 45th Space Wing (45SW) to ensure Eastern Range public safety and to make flight termination decisions on launch day. Due to the criticality of the RS data in regards to public safety and mission success, an independent validation and verification (IV&V) effort was undertaken to accompany the data generation analyses to ensure utmost data quality and correct adherence to requirements. Multiple NASA centers and contractor organizations were assigned specific products to IV&V. The data generation and IV&V work was coordinated through the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel s Trajectory Working Group, which included members from the prime and IV&V organizations as well as the 45SW. As a result of the IV&V efforts, the RS product package was delivered with confidence that two independent organizations using separate simulation software generated data to meet the range requirements and yielded similar results. This document captures ARES I-X RS product IV&V analysis, including the methodology used to verify inputs, simulation, and output data for an RS product. Additionally a discussion of lessons learned is presented to capture advantages and disadvantages to the IV&V processes used.

Tarpley, Ashley↗