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NASA NTRS1994

POINTER: Portable Intelligent Trainer for External Robotics

Intelligent tutoring systems (ITS's) play an increasing role in training and education of people with different levels of skill and knowledge. As compared to conventional computer based training (CBT) an ITS provides more tailored instruction by trying to mimic the teaching behavior of a human instructor as much as possible and is therefore much more flexible. This paper starts with an introduction to ITS's, followed by the description of an ITS for training of an (astronaut) operator in monitoring and controlling robotic arm procedures. The robotic arm will be used for exchange of equipment between a space station and a space plane involving critical and accurate movements of the robotic arm. The ITS for this application, called Pointer, is developed by TNO Physics and Electronics Laboratory and is based upon an existing ITS that includes procedural training. Pointer has been developed on a workstation whereas the target platform was a portable computer. Therefore, a lot of attention had to be paid to scaling effects and keeping up with user friendliness of the much smaller user interface. Although the learning domain was the control of a robotic arm, it is clear that use of intelligent training technologies on a portable computer has many other applications (payload operations, operation control rooms, etc.). Training can occur at any time and place in an attractive and cost effective way.

Kuiper, Hilbert↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Content and Representation of Information Needed to Support Time-Constrained Problem Solving

NASA’s current mission-operations paradigm originated with Project Mercury and endured with minimum evolution through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions. At its foundation is a near-complete real-time dependence on a ground team to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. Utilizing many engineers and operators with broad and deep expertise; large, distributed datasets including extensive telemetry; and expansive analytical and computing power, this ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years. This approach must change to address challenges associated with missions beyond low Earth orbit (BLEO), including infrequent resupply, reduced ability to evacuate, and delayed communications that prohibit real-time operational support. We anticipate that a necessary part of this change will be increased independence for the crew, as roles and responsibilities traditionally performed by ground teams move on board the vehicle. While many risks are associated with Earth-independent operations, one particular concern is ensuring that the crew will have adequate onboard support to perform urgent problem solving when communication with the ground is delayed or intermittent. A key resource that enables the ground team to respond to anomalies quickly and effectively is the extraordinary expertise and experience it possesses. It is comprised of 80+ experts on at any given time, with a combined 600+ years of system-specific experience across 22 unique console disciplines. A small crew will face the unprecedented challenge of independently responding to anomalies that have historically been handled by a team 20 times their size. Another important resource upon which the ground heavily relies to support procedure execution and anomaly response is data. The amount of telemetry data that each flight controller monitors is extensive. In addition, as the ground team works to further assess impacts, trouble shoot, identify workarounds, and oversee procedure execution, it accesses and synthesizes engineering and procedure information, as well as system build, test, and configuration documentation. It is not feasible nor useful to put all these data onboard as crews become more Earth independent. Each member of a small Mars mission small crew will have multiple roles beyond monitoring telemetry and data gathering, and multiple roles within anomaly resolution processes, thereby limiting their capacity for copious amounts of information. Moreover, while access is necessary, it alone is insufficient. Information will need to be compiled, refined, and represented appropriately to support the crew’s reduced attention and expertise. This work seeks to understand the content and representation of information needed to support time-constrained problem solving and decision making by the crew without real-time ground support. To build this understanding, we first surveyed the literature, focusing on how expert problem solvers construct and manipulate their mental models. Next, we interviewed expert problem solvers in spaceflight and analogous domains and surveyed industry solutions for data presentation. Finally, we analyzed current spaceflight operations by investigating flight controller anomaly resolution processes during ISS training simulations and real operational events. These methods led to creating a problem-solving framework that details common themes and features of attending to, assessing, analyzing, and acting on problems in complex, time-constrained domains. Using this framework and the results of our analysis, we identified conceptual data representations needed for crew-led problem-solving. Preliminary onboard user interface concepts to meet identified needs will be presented.

anomaly response↗
NASA NTRS2020

Designing and Training for Appropriate Trust in Increasingly Autonomous Advanced Air Mobility Operations: A Mental Model Approach: Version 1

To enable effective human-autonomy teaming (HAT) in Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations, the current paper presents a theoretical framework to design and train for appropriate trust in automation. The novel contribution of this work resides in connecting the construct of trust to mental models and showing how this method could be used to enable emerging HAT concepts such as Adaptive Trust Calibration. To contextualize this framework, in section 2 we discuss simplified vehicle operations (SVO) and remote vehicle operations (RVO), which are leading operational concepts within AAM. In section 3 we describe our perspective on automation and increasingly autonomous systems and present a brief discussion on human-automation interaction and human-autonomy teaming. In section 4 we provide a detailed discussion on the construct of trust in automation. In section 5 we present a framework that associates mental models with trust through principles of transparent design. Finally, in section 6 we present three descriptive models for designing and training for appropriate trust in increasingly autonomous systems.

Human-Autonomy Teaming↗
NASA NTRS2010

Applied Meteorology Unit (AMU) Quarterly Report - Fourth Quarter FY-10

Three AMU tasks were completed in this Quarter, each resulting in a forecast tool now being used in operations and a final report documenting how the work was done. AMU personnel completed the following tasks (1) Phase II of the Peak Wind Tool for General Forecasting task by delivering an improved wind forecasting tool to operations and providing training on its use; (2) a graphical user interface (GUI) she updated with new scripts to complete the ADAS Update and Maintainability task, and delivered the scripts to the Spaceflight Meteorology Group on Johnson Space Center, Texas and National Weather Service in Melbourne, Fla.; and (3) the Verify MesoNAM Performance task after we created and delivered a GUI that forecasters will use to determine the performance of the operational MesoNAM weather model forecast.

Bauman, William↗
NASA NTRS1972

Human factors aspects of air traffic control

An overview of human factors problems associated with the operation of present and future air traffic control systems is presented. A description is included of those activities and tasks performed by air traffic controllers at each operational position within the present system. Judgemental data obtained from controllers concerning psychological dimensions related to these tasks and activities are also presented. The analysis includes consideration of psychophysiological dimensions of human performance. The role of the human controller in present air traffic control systems and his predicted role in future systems is described, particularly as that role changes as the result of the system's evolution towards a more automated configuration. Special attention is directed towards problems of staffing, training, and system operation. A series of ten specific research and development projects are recommended and suggested work plans for their implementation are included.

Older, H. J.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Constellations: A New Paradigm for Earth Observations

The last decade has seen a significant increase in the number and the capabilities of remote sensing satellites launched by the international community. A relatively new approach has been the launching of satellites into heterogeneous constellations. Constellations provide the scientists a capability to acquire science data, not only from specific instruments on a single satellite, but also from instruments on other satellites that fly in the same orbit. Initial results from the A-Train (especially following the CALIPSO/CloudSat launch) attest to the tremendous scientific value of constellation flying. This paper provides a history of the constellations (particularly the A-Train) and how the A-Train mission design was driven by science requirements. The A-Train has presented operational challenges which had not previously been encountered. Operations planning had to address not only how the satellites of each constellation operate safely together, but also how the two constellations fly in the same orbits without interfering with each other when commands are uplinked or data are downlinked to their respective ground stations. This paper discusses the benefits of joining an on-orbit constellation. When compared to a single, large satellite, a constellation infrastructure offers more than just the opportunities for coincidental science observations. For example, constellations reduce risks by distributing observing instruments among numerous satellites; in contrast, a failed launch or a system failure in a single satellite would lead to loss of all observations. Constellations allow for more focused, less complex satellites. Constellations distribute the development, testing, and operations costs among various agencies and organizations for example, the Morning and Afternoon Constellations involve several agencies within the U.S. and in other countries. Lastly, this paper addresses the need to plan for the long-term evolution of a constellation. Agencies need to have a replenishment strategy as some satellites age and eventually leave the constellation. This will ensure overlap of observations, thus providing continuous, calibrated science data over a much longer time period. Thoughts on the evolution of the A-Train will also be presented.

Kelly, Angelita C.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Training Artemis Astronauts to Explore the Moon

To prepare for human exploration of the Moon in the mid-2020s, NASA is developing a program to provide geoscience and planetary science classroom training and geologic eld training to astronauts and other mission personnel. The Artemis geoscience training plan builds on a long legacy: NASA has trained astronauts in geology, planetary science, and geological eld work for more than 50 years. From ~1965-1972, the geology focus for astronauts included orbital Earth observations during the early NASA missions, but the endgame was preparation for the Apollo missions to the Lunar surface [see Phinney (2015), NASA-SP-2015-626; Lofgren et al.(2011);Schmitt, et al. (2011); and El Baz (2011), all from GSA SP483]. From the mid 1970s through2017, the primary purpose for geoscience training was to prepare astronauts to observe theEarth and document a wide variety of Earth processes from orbital platforms (Skylab, SpaceShuttle and International Space Station). Astronaut observations of Earth from the InternationalSpace Station remain an important activity today, but the prospect of exploration of the lunar surface through the Artemis Program lends additional purpose to the geoscience content and eld experiences that we provide the astronauts. We recently completed the geology and eld training with Astronaut Class 22 and are now planning both focused eld exercises and simulations for future Artemis crews, as well as the accompanying classroom lessons on lunar and planetary sciences. The training we offer extends beyond the astronaut office – we partner across operational and engineering organizations at NASA and provide eld work exercises and opportunities to personnel in the Flight Operations Directorate (responsible for the overall training and certification), as well as the exploration Extravehicular Activity Oce (developing spacewalk suits and tools). These partnerships contribute to building a common language and sense of purpose, and also help to ensure that NASA’s geoscience training and science operations are fully integrated with the teams and systems responsible for getting the next generation of astronauts to the surface of the Moon.

Artemis↗
NASA NTRS1987

Orbital transfer vehicle concept definition and system analysis study. Volume 4, Appendix A: Space station accommodations. Revision 1

Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV) processing at the space station is divided into two major categories: OTV processing and assembly operations, and support operations. These categories are further subdivided into major functional areas to allow development of detailed OTV processing procedures and timelines. These procedures and timelines are used to derive the specific space station accommodations necessary to support OTV activities. The overall objective is to limit impact on OTV processing requirements on space station operations, involvement of crew, and associated crew training and skill requirements. The operational concept maximizes use of automated and robotic systems to perform all required OTV servicing and maintenance tasks. Only potentially critical activities would require direct crew involvement or supervision. EVA operations are considered to be strictly contingency back-up to failure of the automated and robotic systems, with the exception of the initial assembly of Space-Based OTV accommodations at the space station, which will require manned involvement.

Randall, Roger M.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Autonomous Mission Operations Roadmap

As light time delays increase, the number of such situations in which crew autonomy is the best way to conduct the mission is expected to increase. However, there are significant open questions regarding which functions to allocate to ground and crew as the time delays increase. In situations where the ideal solution is to allocate responsibility to the crew and the vehicle, a second question arises: should the activity be the responsibility of the crew or an automated vehicle function? More specifically, we must answer the following questions: What aspects of mission operation responsibilities (Plan, Train, Fly) should be allocated to ground based or vehicle based planning, monitoring, and control in the presence of significant light-time delay between the vehicle and the Earth?How should the allocated ground based planning, monitoring, and control be distributed across the flight control team and ground system automation? How should the allocated vehicle based planning, monitoring, and control be distributed between the flight crew and onboard system automation?When during the mission should responsibility shift from flight control team to crew or from crew to vehicle, and what should the process of shifting responsibility be as the mission progresses? NASA is developing a roadmap of capabilities for Autonomous Mission Operations for human spaceflight. This presentation will describe the current state of development of this roadmap, with specific attention to in-space inspection tasks that crews might perform with minimum assistance from the ground.

Mission Operations↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons for Future In-Space Telerobotic Servicing from Robotic Refueling Mission

The Robotic Refueling Mission (RRM) was a multi-phased technology development effort by the National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) and the Canadian Space Agency (CSA). The program leveraged the existing robotic systems and expertise of the International Space Station (ISS) program and the tool design and satellite servicing expertise of NASA’s Exploration & In-space Services (NExIS) Projects Division at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) to evaluate new hardware and techniques for on-orbit telerobotic servicing. Between 2011 and 2021, two external ISS payloads housed over a dozen robotic tools and adapters designed to service a variety of existing and novel satellite interfaces. Robot operators at NASA’s Johnson Space Center (JSC) and CSA used the Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM) to retrieve and operate these tools for tasks such as cutting wires or multi-layer insulation blanketing, removing valve caps, mating electrical connectors, transferring fluids, and performing visual inspections inside a vehicle. Each phase of RRM involved years of preparation. Tool and interface designs were prototyped and evaluated using both NASA and Canadian ground robotic systems. Procedures were developed by GSFC engineers and vetted in partnership with JSC and CSA robot operators. GSFC engineers were trained to provide real-time support during on-orbit operations. These preparatory efforts and the successful on-orbit evaluations yielded an array of lessons for future in-space telerobotic missions. Designing robotic tools for the space environment requires special consideration of materials, indicators, and differences between ground and flight use cases and environments. When there is a limited window for on-orbit operations, devoting time and high-fidelity hardware to ground testing can be critical. Needs during potential troubleshooting are more essential to camera view quality, frame rate, and position requirements more than nominal operations. Detailed hardware manuals, nominal and contingency procedures, along with clearly defined operations team roles and protocols are vital for efficiency. RRM also demonstrated how the ISS can be utilized to increase the technology readiness levels required for future missions and led to additional technology partnerships between NExIS and the ISS program. The lessons from RRM are currently being applied to designs, operations concepts, and ground test methodology for missions such as On-orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing1(OSAM-1)and Mars Sample Return.

Zakiya Tomlinson↗
NASA NTRS2006

Imagine Moving Off the Planet

Moving off the planet will be a defining moment of this century as landing on the Moon was in the last. For that to happen for humans to go where humans cannot go-- simulation is the sole solution. NASA supports simulation for life-cycle activities: design, analysis, test, checkout, operations, review and training. We contemplate time spans of a century and more, teams dispersed to different planets and the need for systems that endure or adapt as missions, teams and technology change. Without imagination such goals are impossible. But with imagination we can go outside our present perception of reality to think about and take action on what has been, is and, especially, what might be. Consciously maturing an imagined, possibly workable, idea through framing it to optimization to design, and building the product provides us with a new approach to innovation and simulation fidelity. We address options, analyze, test and make improvements in how we think and work. Each step includes increasingly exact information about costs, schedule, who will be needed, where, when and how. NASA i integrating such thinking into its Exploration Product Realization Hierarchy for simulation and analysis, test and verification, and stimulus response goals. Technically NASA follows a timeline of studies, analysis, definition, design, development and operations with concurrent documentation. We have matched this Product Realization Hierarchy with a continuum from image to realization that incorporates commitment, current and needed research and communication to ensure superior and creative problem solving as well as advances in simulation. One result is a new approach to collaborative systems. Another is a distributed observer network prototyped using game engine technology bringing advanced 3-D simulation of a simulation to the desktop enabling people to develop shared consensus of its meaning. Much of the value of simulation comes from developing in people their ability to make good decisions and reflexes supporting impressive achievement. Synthesizing imagination systematically into our work - and thus our success - is a challenge. NASA engineers have inventive minds, and the task is determining how best to enable them to devise the simulation and other innovations that will make a story so clear and so intellectually sound that people can carry out the mission for 50-100 years. This demands skills and knowledge traditionally under-respected and under-represented in technology organizations. But we are beginning to see that the process encourages efficiency and enables us to attain more effective results. We have to elicit imaginative, intelligent and effective ways to make better use than ever of the minds we have and will have available. We have to accept the challenge to accomplish tasks among dispersed interdisciplinary teams who must overcome changing priorities and technology, time and distance in order to maximize interactivity and innovation as never before. Attention to the process of innovation is a practical means to increase the efficiency of our intelligence. We have an obligation to reexamine and improve the process by which we approach and exercise innovation as we accept the charge to move off the planet.

Elfrey, Priscilla R.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Chemical Hygiene Program

The Chemical Management Team is responsible for ensuring compliance with the OSHA Laboratory Standard. The program at Lewis Research Center (LeRC) evolved over many years to include training, developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) for each laboratory process, coordinating with other safety and health organizations and teams at the Center, and issuing an SOP binder. The Chemical Hygiene Policy was first established for the Center. The Chemical Hygiene Plan was established and reviewed by technical, laboratory and management for viability and applicability to the Center. A risk assessment was conducted for each laboratory. The laboratories were prioritized by order of risk, higher risk taking priority. A Chemical Management Team staff member interviewed the lead researcher for each laboratory process to gather the information needed to develop the SOP for the process. A binder containing the Chemical Hygiene Plan, the SOP, a map of the laboratory identifying the personal protective equipment and best egress, and glove guides, as well as other guides for safety and health. Each laboratory process has been captured in the form of an SOP. The chemicals used in the procedure have been identified and the information is used to reduce the number of chemicals in the lab. The Chemical Hygiene Plan binder is used as a training tool for new employees. LeRC is in compliance with the OSHA Standard. The program was designed to comply with the OSHA standard. In the process, we have been able to assess the usage of chemicals in the laboratories, as well as reduce or relocate the chemicals being stored in the laboratory. Our researchers are trained on the hazards of the materials they work with and have a better understanding of the hazards of the process and what is needed to prevent any incident. From the SOP process, we have been able to reduce our chemical inventory, determine and implement better hygiene procedures and equipment in the laboratories, and provide specific training to our employees. As a result of this program, we are adding labeling to the laboratories for emergency responders and initiating a certified chemical user program.

Mayor, Antoinette C.↗
NASA NTRS2025

Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) Remote Teleoperation Studies Under Four Lunar Communication Latencies

Remotely operating a lunar rover from Earth while subject to an Earth-Moon time delay of multiple seconds could result in a dangerous state where the roving vehicle is either damaged or lost, thereby potentially compromising an entire mission or series of missions. Providing the right capabilities to the remote operator to manage inherent communication latencies will be important for remote driving to be successful. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducted two studies to investigate the average speed and number of kilometers per day that an operator on Earth could teleoperate a notional Artemis unpressurized rover with minimal remote operator capabilities under 0- and 4-second communication delays (April 2023 study) and 6- and 8-second delays (August 2023 study). A primary goal of these studies was to understand if an Artemis Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) could cover 6 kilometers (km) in 24 hours when operated remotely. During the April 2023 evaluation, eight test operators used an in-house simulation of the lunar surface South Pole to teleoperate a NASA government reference LTV. Each operator received approximately 30 minutes of remote driving familiarization/training prior to their test run. Operators viewed the surrounding terrain via a single, rover mast-mounted, high-resolution camera with pan/tilt/zoom capabilities; continuous communication was provided throughout all testing. In the August 2023 evaluation, remote operators received approximately 3 hours of familiarization training in each latency, and the simulation environment provided remote operators with an operator-selected rate limiter to enable finer sensitivity in the hand controller and a predictive circle function to better assist operators with predicting the path the vehicle could take. All test operators were able to successfully navigate and drive through six different types of terrain and five planned traverse scenarios using natural lighting under all communication delays. Results for average speeds for each communication delay, computed by averaging the data from all test conditions for that latency and all operators, are shown in the table below. The average speed data was then used to derive the total time needed to cover 6 km, 8 km, and 20 km. Remote operators drove slower and used the brake more frequently when subject to a communication latency as opposed to no communication latency. Subjective workload assessments revealed that while operating in a latency the overall workload significantly increased when compared to a 0-s delay with mental demand, frustration, and performance being the primary contributing factors. Driving strategies in the 0-s delay did not vary significantly among subjects; however, in the 4-s delay condition, three different driving strategies were identified. In the 6-s and 8-s latency conditions the operator’s use of the cruise control to maintain speed was more apparent. Additionally, over the course of the August study, the operator took advantage of the predictive circle indicator on the navigation display and over 95% of the operator’s navigation used the mast camera 180-degree panning function for ground truthing in terms of boulders and craters. Operators started to define more specific parameters in driving strategies for general operations. This consisted of setting the vehicle into a low-speed cruise mode of approximately 1–1.5 kph and noticing driving performance of the vehicle seemed to be much harder at slower speeds 0.4–0.8 kph; however, the vehicle was more responsive at speeds of 2.9–3.6 kph. Regardless of communication delay, operators used both the horizontal translation rails and the vehicle fenders as guides to predict a path for the vehicle through heavily concentrated terrain features. Test operators acknowledged that the teleoperations training for this study was substantially less than what an actual LTV remote operator will ultimately receive. They estimated a minimum of 20 to 100 hours spread across multiple days and weeks (e.g., strategies included immersion training over a 3-day period, to a short 8-week starter program) would be needed to get an operator ~ 60% proficient (i.e., able to complete a subset of remote driving tasks), to a yearlong program for full proficiency in remote driving tasks under all terrain types and natural lighting conditions. Remotely operating a vehicle on another planetary body while subject to communication latency is a complex task. Speed, distance covered, time spent driving, time spent navigating, brake usage and rock contacts are all affected by operator workload, driving strategies, workstation ergonomics and training. These studies provided a “firstlook” answer to a potential system requirement (namely if a remote operator could cover a given distance in a given amount of time); however, considerable general knowledge was gained to begin to understand what it will take to make a successful lunar rover teleoperator.

LTV↗
NASA NTRS2024

Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) Remote Teleoperation Studies Under Four Lunar Communication Latencies

Remotely operating a lunar rover from Earth while subject to an Earth-Moon time delay of multiple seconds could result in a dangerous state where the roving vehicle is either damaged or lost, thereby potentially compromising an entire mission or series of missions. Providing the right capabilities to the remote operator to manage inherent communication latencies will be important for remote driving to be successful. NASA conducted two studies to investigate the average speed and number of kilometers per day that an operator on Earth could teleoperate a notional Artemis unpressurized rover with minimal remote operator capabilities under 0- and 4-second communication delays (April 2023 study) and 6- and 8-second delays (August 2023 study). A primary goal of these studies was to understand if an Artemis Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) could cover 6 kilometers (km) in 24 hours when operated remotely. During the April 2023 evaluation, eight test operators used an in-house simulation of the lunar surface South Pole to teleoperate a NASA government reference LTV. Each operator received approximately 30 minutes of remote driving familiarization/training prior to their test run. Operators viewed the surrounding terrain via a single, rover mast-mounted, high-resolution camera with pan/tilt/zoom capabilities; continuous communication was provided throughout all testing. In the August 2023 evaluation, remote operators received approximately 3 hours of familiarization training in each latency, and the simulation environment provided remote operators with an operator-selected rate limiter to enable finer sensitivity in the hand controller and a predictive circle function to better assist operators with predicting the path the vehicle could take. All test operators were able to successfully navigate and drive through six different types of terrain and five planned traverse scenarios using natural lighting under all communication delays. Results for average speeds for each communication delay, computed by averaging the data from all test conditions for that latency and all operators, are shown in the table below. The average speed data was then used to derive the total time needed to cover 6 km, 8 km, and 20 km (distances relevant to LTV-SYS071 and -029 requirements). Remote operators drove slower and used the brake more frequently when subject to a communication latency as opposed to no communication latency. Subjective workload assessments revealed that while operating in a latency the overall workload significantly increased when compared to a 0-s delay with mental demand, frustration, and performance being the primary contributing factors. Driving strategies in the 0-s delay did not vary significantly among subjects; however, in the 4-s delay condition, three different driving strategies were identified. In the 6-s and 8-s latency conditions the operator’s use of the cruise control to maintain speed was more apparent. Additionally, over the course of the August study, the operator took advantage of the predictive circle indicator on the navigation display and over 95% of the operator’s navigation used the mast camera 180-degree panning function for ground truthing in terms of boulders and craters. Operators started to define more specific parameters in driving strategies for general operations. This consisted of setting the vehicle into a low-speed cruise mode of approximately 11.5 kph and noticing driving performance of the vehicle seemed to be much harder at slower speeds 0.4–0.8 kph; however, the vehicle was more responsive at speeds of 2.9–3.6 kph. Regardless of communication delay, operators used both the horizontal translation rails and the vehicle fenders as guides to predict a path for the vehicle through heavily concentrated terrain features. Test operators acknowledged that the teleoperations training for this study was substantially less than what an actual LTV remote operator will ultimately receive. They estimated a minimum of 20 to 100 hours spread across multiple days and weeks (e.g., strategies included immersion training over a 3-day period, to a short 8-week starter program) would be needed to get an operator ~ 60% proficient (i.e., able to complete a subset of remote driving tasks), to a yearlong program for full proficiency in remote driving tasks under all terrain types and natural lighting conditions. Remotely operating a vehicle on another planetary body while subject to communication latency is a complex task. Speed, distance covered, time spent driving, time spent navigating, brake usage and rock contacts are all affected by operator workload, driving strategies, workstation ergonomics and training. These studies provided a “first-look” answer to a potential system requirement (namely if a remote operator could cover a given distance in a given amount of time); however, considerable general knowledge was gained to begin to understand what it will take to make a successful lunar rover teleoperator.

LTV↗
NASA NTRS1970

Hyperbola-generator for location of aperiodic events

Plotting device, when used in conjunction with three or more detectors and local receiver and recorder, can quickly pinpoint location of any aperiodic event. Operation requires minimal training and is readily adapted to the field. Mechanical error in device prototype is less than or equal to 3 percent.

Paucker, H. R.↗
NASA NTRS1971

What Made Apollo A Success?

Spacecraft development, mission design planning, flight crew operations, and flight operations are considered. Spacecraft design principles and test activities are described. Determination of the best series of flights leading to a lunar landing at the earliest possible time, flight planning, techniques for establishing flight procedures and carrying out flight operations, and crew training and simulation activities are discussed.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1972

Tracking and data system support for the Mariner Mars 1971 mission. Volume 2: First trajectory correction maneuver through orbit insertion

The Deep Space Tracking and Data System activities in support of the Mariner Mars 1971 project from the first trajectory correction maneuver on 4 June 1971 through cruise and orbit insertion on 14 November 1971 are presented. Changes and updates to the TDS requirements and to the plan and configuration plus detailed information on the TDS flight support performance evaluation and the preorbital testing and training are included. With the loss of Mariner 8 at launch, a few changes to the Mariner Mars 1971 requirements, plan, and configuration were necessitated. Mariner 9 is now assuming the former mission plan of Mariner 8, including the TV mapping cycles and a 12-hr orbital period. A second trajectory correction maneuver was not required because of the accuracy of the first maneuver. All testing and training for orbital operations were completed satisfactorily and on schedule. The orbit insertion was accomplished with excellent results.

Textor, G. P.↗
NASA NTRS1973

Skylab and the Sun

Articles pertaining to the solar studies and the Skylab program are presented, with emphasis on the usefulness of the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) program. A description of Skylab objectives and key mission events is included along with articles about the sun. Skylab solar studies which are reported include these topics: ATM solar observatory, scientific instruments, crew operations and crew training, and the joint observing program. The Skylab associated solar programs are also reported.

Source record↗