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DOE OSTI2021

Analysis of Long-Term Quality Control Data for a 137 Cs Dosimetry Calibration Source

Strict quality assurance programs are required for many radiological applications, but these seldom exist for verifying dosimetry calibration sources. After initial characterization of a dosimetry calibration facility, quality control procedures are recommended to ensure the early detection of any changes or malfunctions. These also result in refined knowledge about average dose rate and experimental variations in dose delivery. This paper describes the implementation of a phase I quality control protocol for a 137 Cs dosimetry calibration source and includes an analysis of the resulting data collected over a 24-mo period. During this time, substantial data was collected to establish trial control limits. Air kerma rate measurements were obtained using an ion chamber and were adjusted for decay, corrected for ambient temperature, pressure and humidity, and then analyzed using quality control charts. Three variations of rational subgrouping methods were used in order to find assignable causes of error, and Nelson's Rules were followed to detect any non-random statistical variations. Measurements were subgrouped according to same-day measurements in order to detect positional errors as well as atmospheric correction errors. Additionally, measurements were subgrouped according to analogous experimental setups in order to detect failure in equipment or incorrect settings. Both were analyzed using the X-bar and R chart method. Similarly, individuals and moving ranges charts were used to carefully examine each position in order to observe any situational errors that may occur which include timing, positional, or interference errors. Each method was successful in identifying unique out-of-control data points that occurred during the phase I application of forming control limits. Furthermore, over the 24-mo period, enough data points were deemed in-control to establish reliable trial limits. Future experiments will include the phase II application of gaining more reliable measurements in order to fine-tune the limits, as well as performing a designed experiment, where variables are purposefully changed in order to test the variation of the data.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

NASA NTRS1984

NASA guidelines for assuring the adequacy and appropriateness of security safeguards in sensitive applications

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-71, transmittal Memorandum No. 1, requires that each agency establish a management control process to assure that appropriate administrative, physical and technical safeguards are incorporated into all new computer applications. In addition to security specifications, the management control process should assure that the safeguards are adequate for the application. The security activities that should be integral to the system development process are examined. The software quality assurance process to assure that adequate and appropriate controls are incorporated into sensitive applications is also examined. Security for software packages is also discussed.

Tompkins, F. G.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Requirement Metrics for Risk Identification

The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) is part of the Office of Mission Assurance of the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The SATC's mission is to assist National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) projects to improve the quality of software which they acquire or develop. The SATC's efforts are currently focused on the development and use of metric methodologies and tools that identify and assess risks associated with software performance and scheduled delivery. This starts at the requirements phase, where the SATC, in conjunction with software projects at GSFC and other NASA centers is working to identify tools and metric methodologies to assist project managers in identifying and mitigating risks. This paper discusses requirement metrics currently being used at NASA in a collaborative effort between the SATC and the Quality Assurance Office at GSFC to utilize the information available through the application of requirements management tools.

Hammer, Theodore↗

NASA NTRS1965

Advanced refractory alloy corrosion loop program quarterly progress report no. 1, quarter ending jul. 15, 1965

Material procurement and quality assurance for advanced refractory alloy corrosion loop program

LOOP↗

DOE OSTI2021

Code and Solution Verification Assessment of the CTF Thermal Hydraulic Subchannel Code

CTF is a thermal-hydraulics subchannel code jointly developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory and North Carolina State University. Over the past seven years, the Consortium for Advanced Simulation of Light Water Reactors (CASL) has made a significant investment in developing CTF so it can be used to model light water reactors, including nominal operating conditions, departure from nucleate boiling analysis, and transients ranging from loss of flow to reactivity insertion accidents. In addition to implementing new modeling capabilities and developing the user input and output interface, extensive work has been performed to improve the code’s quality assurance program, resulting in a development process that conforms with NQA-1 requirements. The CASL program follows the Predictive Capability Maturity Model (PCMM) approach for assessing code quality, which emphasizes performing code verification(ensuring the code converges to the correct answer) and solution verification (ensuring the code converges for the intended application). Code and solution verification are used to identify uncertainty errors introduced by numerical approximations in the code and are important for demonstrating that the model is coded without error, which is an important aspect of the Best Estimate plus Uncertainty method. This paper presents a comprehensive overview of the code and solution verification testing that has been performed on CTF. A top-down approach is taken in which the intended CTF applications are presented, followed by the code features required for their modeling. These features are then linked to the applicable code and solution verification tests that demonstrate proper functioning. Past testing efforts are summarized, and new tests are added to help close gaps in the presented test matrix. Rather than performing “one-off” exercises, these tests are added to the automated CTF regression test suite to ensure continual code quality.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Sample Preparation Laboratory (SPL) Best Practices: CGD as the Primary Acceptance Method

The traditional paradigm applied to the construction of nuclear safety related systems, structures, and components (SSCs), like SPL, involves an owner/licensee hiring an EPC firm with an NQA 1 program to manage the engineering, procurement, and construction of the desired SSC. This traditional approach would have posed significant barriers to the successful completion of the SPL. As a smaller capital project, in the $\$$100–$\$$200 million range, there was concern that employing one of the larger EPC companies would escalate costs and extend the projected schedule beyond what would be feasible for the Department of Energy (DOE). The traditional acceptance method employed for nuclear facilities with credited safety functions requires the use of an EPC firm applying American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NQA 1 nuclear quality assurance (NQA) to accept safety SSCs. In lieu of this approach, INL elected to apply its own NQA 1 program to hire an EPC firm operating a commercial quality program. This method used commercial grade dedication (CGD) as outlined in NQA 1 which had not been applied at this scale. Use of the commercial supply chain was identified as a key factor to the successful completion of SPL. Favorable conditions enabling the use of CGD included: • INL serving as both the designer and the design authority • Design created by an NQA 1 qualified source • A mature CGD program • Availability of a CGD subject matter expert (SME) • A strong construction management program. This white paper elaborates on the methodology employed in the construction of the SPL, the successes achieved, and best practices implemented.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS1999

Employee Assistance Program Issues

Employee Assistance Program (EAP) officers, as well as personnel in other disciplines from eight NASA Centers, attended this breakout session. Ms. Brenda Blair, MA, CEAP, a guest speaker at the conference, also attended as a consultant. Representatives from the NASA Centers introduced themselves and spoke briefly about their programs. In a discussion related to the conference theme on benchmarking, quality control issues within the EAP community and adequate documentation of cases were addressed. Disposition and provision for quality assurance checks for EAP providers in single person offices were also discussed. Ms. Blair presented methods for consulting with other NASA personnel in single person EAP offices as a quality control measure. EAP intervention in critical incidents was discussed. The question of whether EAP assistance is an asset or a potential liability in those situations was addressed. Suggestions were made of topics for future EAP video-teleconference topics. A program on EAP ethics was planned for a September video teleconference. Each person was asked to provide intake forms they use to Mr. Gettleman or Ms. Blair. Ms. Blair said she would review the forms to ensure that adequate notification is provided to the client for confidentiality. She would also review them to ensure they have adequate limits of confidentiality--a topic for future video teleconferencing. Mr. Gettleman described the NASA initiative to reduce stresses in the workplace, and the activities of an ad-hoc EAP group that will make recommendations to NASA senior management. Alternative training methods were discussed for reaching target audiences such as employees at risk, supervisors, and others. Pfc. David A. Pendleton, Victim Assistance Coordinator, U.S. Capitol Police. U.S. House of Representatives made a special presentation. Pfc. Pendleton was on duty during the tragic shooting of two Federal guards at the U.S. Capitol. He related the events immediately after the incident. He described the nature and structure of the EAP's and the separate nature of the House and Senate programs. This episode was a particularly difficult situation as large numbers of tourists were involved. William S. Barry, MD, the new Manager of the NASA Occupational Health Program Office was introduced to those attending the breakout session.

Gettleman, Alan G.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Distribution and Validation of CERES Irradiance Global Data Products Via Web Based Tools

The CERES SYN1deg product provides climate quality 3-hourly globally gridded and temporally complete maps of top of atmosphere, in atmosphere, and surface fluxes. This product requires efficient release to the public and validation to maintain quality assurance. The CERES team developed web-tools for the distribution of both the global gridded products and grid boxes that contain long term validation sites that maintain high quality flux observations at the Earth's surface. These are found at: http://ceres.larc.nasa.gov/order_data.php. In this poster we explore the various tools available to users to sub-set, download, and validate using surface observations the SYN1Deg and Surface-EBAF products. We also analyze differences found in long-term records from well-maintained land surface sites such as the ARM central facility and high quality buoy radiometers, which due to their isolated nature cannot be maintained in a similar manner to their land based counterparts.

Rutan, David↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗

DOE OSTI2024

Review of In Situ Sensing for Directed Energy Deposition for Industrial Part Quality Assessment

As the use additive manufacturing (AM) processes continues to grow in critical industries, improved quality assurance methods are becoming increasingly sought after for qualification and certification of AM components. Traditional nondestructive evaluation of printed components is often unable to supply the required confidence in print quality to justify qualification and certification, but the layer-by-layer nature of AM provides unprecedented opportunities for in situ quality inspection. This document summarizes recent developments in process monitoring research specifically related to Directed Energy Deposition (DED). Particular attention is given to three aspects of the highlighted manuscripts: (1) the type of sensors used, (2) features extracted from each sensor modality, and (3) analysis of extracted features for AM quality assessment. Based on the review of the state-of-the-art, several observations have been made. First, none of the reviewed works have applied their trained models to real part geometries, with many of the works relying on single track experiments, thin-walled structures, and cubes. Similarly, there have not been any works demonstrating model generalizability, i.e., a model trained on data from one build allows for fruitful analysis of data from another build. Many works used machine learning techniques to distinguish different process regimes (i.e., normal, keyholing, lack-of-fusion), but very few papers have investigated stochastic variation in an already “optimized” process. Sensor fusion approaches are also limited in the DED sensing literature, but the few works that have employed such techniques have demonstrated the benefits. Finally, registration of in situ data to the build coordinate system is of paramount importance to producing industrially relevant in situ monitoring systems. Data registration allows direct correlations between process anomalies detected in the process monitoring data to localized departures in part quality, but such techniques are generally lacking in the current literature.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

NASA NTRS1983

Implementation of R & QA practices in Research and Development programs

DOE has established a number of broad programs aimed at reducing fuel consumption. Several programs address the R&D of ground transportation propulsion alternatives to the conventional spark-ignition engine. NASA Lewis is responsible for managing the effort between the Government and industry teams involving American and foreign companies. Thus, existing NASA SR&QA procedure were modified/adapted to these R&D programs and implemented to assure that the test hardware design intent was met, the hardware was not hazardous to personnel, it would demonstrate reliable operation, and it would help establish the future R&D quality assurance and maintainability requirements. This successful low-cost approach might be applicable to other similar projects.

Bankaitis, H.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Work Done For the Safety and Assurance Directorate

The Safety and Assurance Directorate (SAAD) has a vision. The vision is to be an essential part of NASA Glenn's journey to excellence. SAAD is in charge of leading safety, security, and quality and is important to our customers. When it comes to programmatic and technical decision making and implementation, SAAD provides clear safety, reliability, maintainable, quality assurance and security. I worked on a couple different things during my internship with Sandra Hardy. I did a lot of logistics for meeting and trips. I helped run the budget for the SAAD directorate. I also worked with Rich Miller for one week and we took water samples and ran tests. We also calibrated the different equipment. There is a lot more to meetings than people see. I did one for a retirement party. I had to get work orders and set up the facilities where the event is going to take place. I also set up a trip to Plum Brook Station. I had to order vans and talk with the people up there to see when a good time was. I also had to make invitations and coordinate everything. I also help Sandy run the numbers in the budget. We use excel to do this, which makes it a lot easier. things. He is in the environmental safety office. I learned how to collaborate the equipment using alpha and beta sources. I went out with him and we took water samples and tested them for conductivity and chlorine. I have learned a lot in the short time I've been here. It has been a great experience and I have has the pleasure of meeting and working with great people.

Struhar, Paul T., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2018

NC Space Grant Report

During the summer of 2018 I supported the Safety & Mission Assurance Directorate (SMA) and Operations Support Division (QA-20) at Stennis Space Center. The mission of the SMA team is to prove safety, risk, reliability, independent assessments, configuration management and quality assurance guidance, and services for all NASA Stennis Space Center (SSC) programs, facilities, and supporting infrastructure. The office actively participates and contributes to the Agency-level Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) effort. Over the course of the Summer I participated in three projects. Two of them were focused around Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and the third focused on relief valves for their E-1 engine test stand.

Torres, David↗

NASA NTRS2000

National Transonic Facility Characterization Status

This paper describes the current status of the characterization of the National Transonic Facility. The background and strategy for the tunnel characterization, as well as the current status of the four main areas of the characterization (tunnel calibration, flow quality characterization, data quality assurance, and support of the implementation of wall interference corrections) are presented. The target accuracy requirements for tunnel characterization measurements are given, followed by a comparison of the measured tunnel flow quality to these requirements based on current available information. The paper concludes with a summary of which requirements are being met, what areas need improvement, and what additional information is required in follow-on characterization studies.

Bobbitt, C., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - The Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRS1992

Defining the performance gap: Conducting a self-assessment

This paper presents two different approaches to performing self-assessments of continuous improvement activities. Case Study 1 describes the activities performed by JSC to assess the implementation of continuous improvement efforts at the NASA Center. The JSC approach included surveys administered to randomly selected NASA personnel and personal interviews with NASA and contractor management personnel. Case Study 2 describes the continuous improvement survey performed by the JSC Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) organization. This survey consisted of a short questionnaire (50 questions) administered to all NASA and contractor SR&QA personnel. The questionnaire is based on the eight categories of the President's Award for Quality and Productivity Improvement. It is designed to objectively determine placement on the TQ benchmark and identify a roadmap for improvement.

Braymer, Susan A.↗

DOE OSTI2020

Real-Time Acoustic Analysis of Batteries

The project explored development and commercialization of an acoustical approach to battery diagnostics. The technology has significant potential impacts for battery manufacturing and quality assurance, battery management during operation, and could be an enabler for the second-life battery market. Research was focused on inspecting and analyzing the physical condition of batteries using ultrasound. This consisted of designing and building hardware for gathering high-quality acoustic data, as well as using battery charge-discharge cyclers and temperature chambers to operate and age the batteries. Over the course of the 2-year program, we were able to build our first prototypes that are robust enough to be used by industry partners to evaluate our technology. Using the same prototypes, we also showed preliminary evidence that our acoustic inspection method may have distinct advantages over standard electrical methods in terms of detecting differences in the physical quality of battery cells. The project also expanded the participant’s core capabilities beyond time-of-flight acoustic measurements.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

NASA NTRS2013

Validation and Uncertainty Estimates for MODIS Collection 6 "Deep Blue" Aerosol Data

The "Deep Blue" aerosol optical depth (AOD) retrieval algorithm was introduced in Collection 5 of the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) product suite, and complemented the existing "Dark Target" land and ocean algorithms by retrieving AOD over bright arid land surfaces, such as deserts. The forthcoming Collection 6 of MODIS products will include a "second generation" Deep Blue algorithm, expanding coverage to all cloud-free and snow-free land surfaces. The Deep Blue dataset will also provide an estimate of the absolute uncertainty on AOD at 550 nm for each retrieval. This study describes the validation of Deep Blue Collection 6 AOD at 550 nm (Tau(sub M)) from MODIS Aqua against Aerosol Robotic Network (AERONET) data from 60 sites to quantify these uncertainties. The highest quality (denoted quality assurance flag value 3) data are shown to have an absolute uncertainty of approximately (0.086+0.56Tau(sub M))/AMF, where AMF is the geometric air mass factor. For a typical AMF of 2.8, this is approximately 0.03+0.20Tau(sub M), comparable in quality to other satellite AOD datasets. Regional variability of retrieval performance and comparisons against Collection 5 results are also discussed.

MODIS collection 6↗