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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 397 records · Page 22
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of Thermolytic Hydrogen Generation Rate Models at High-Temperature/High-Hydroxide Regimes

This report describes the results of testing performed to extend the applicable ranges of temperature and hydroxide concentration for use within the Glycolate and Global Total Organic Carbon (TOC) Hydrogen Generation Rate (HGR) expressions. Seven experimental conditions (six simulants of the 242-25H Evaporator system chosen as a D-optimal set of experiments and a single test conducted at an elevated boiling point of 170 °C) were investigated in the presence of sodium glycolate and Xiameter TM AFE-1010. Glycolate was employed to study the extension of the Glycolate Thermolytic HGR expression while Xiameter TM AFE-1010 was employed to study the extension of the Global TOC Thermolytic HGR expression. The following conclusions were derived from this testing: The Glycolate Thermolytic HGR expression may be confidently used to predict thermolytic HGRs from glycolate at temperatures as high as 170 °C and hydroxide concentrations as high as 23 M.; The hydroxide and temperature-dependence predicted by the Global TOC Thermolytic HGR expression has been confirmed at temperatures as high as 170 °C and hydroxide concentrations as high as 23 M, suggesting that the Global TOC Thermolytic HGR expression may be used at these ranges.; Methane was observed from tests with Xiameter TM AFE-1010 at production rates higher than those observed for hydrogen. These rates were observed at temperatures higher than 100 °C.; Preliminary models suggest that increasing hydroxide/temperature causes an increase in Methane Generation Rate (MGR) from Xiameter TM AFE-1010. The following recommendations are based on this testing: The existing equations for thermolytic HGR from glycolate and non-glycolate organics should be used at Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF) storage and evaporation conditions, including temperatures and hydroxide concentrations exhibited in the 242-25H Evaporator.; Further investigation should be made into the influence of methylsilanes on CSTF flammability. This investigation should include: determination of the types of methylsilanes historically added to the CSTF, determination of methane formation rates from each type of methylsilane, and determination of the extent of degradation of methylsilanes in CSTF waste.; Characterization techniques should be developed by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to assist in the speciation of methylsilane-containing waste in the CSTF.; Additional testing with radioactive waste should be performed to determine the MGRs possible in radioactive waste and better inform model predictions made from testing with simulants.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2023

Determination of the uranium content of storage containers filled with waste from Fukushima using cosmic ray data

This report presents the results of an experimental study of cosmic ray tomography aimed at determining the uranium contents of waste containers filled with waste from Fukushima. Data, taken using the Giant Muon Tracker, were obtained on a set of scenes constructed from blocks of polyethylene, concrete, iron, and lead. The data have been provided to Toshiba and have been used to evaluate the composition of scenes using multivariate linear regression.

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DOE OSTI2026

The Effects of Beta Irradiation on the Performance of ATR Fiber Probes

The use of real-time inline monitoring to track the chemical composition of slurries is recognized as a promising method to reduce the processing time of Hanford tank waste. The conversion of waste into glass suitable for long-term storage requires adherence to waste acceptance criteria and process control limits that respectively ensure safe operation of the vitrification facility and suitable glass quality. Real-time measurements of blended waste materials can ensure that the various criteria are met or can be addressed in a timely manner.

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DOE OSTI2021

Rules of Use Report Engineering evaluations of nuclear material storage containers against the packaging requirements at TA-55

A set of obligations in the yearly storage container surveillance program, ensures that a retrospective approach is applied with loaded containers in inventory to confirm compliance with all “users” to ensure nuclear material storage container requirements are being followed. Validation that packaged containers are properly used, within a specific set of container types prescribed “bounding conditions of use,” is based on meeting requirements as identified in operating procedures associated with TA55-DOP-091, TA-55 Nuclear Material Packaging, and PA-RD-01022, Nuclear Material Packaging Requirements. The surveillance plan obligation requires the application of local area nuclear material accountability software or (LANMAS) to produce queries. The data queries are used to assess attributes of containers in storage these investigations are conducted on a bi-annual basis. This rules of use (ROU) compliance process ensures proper usage of storage containers as containment systems and therefore provides effective worker protection. It is structured as a supporting effort by implementing aspects of PA-AP-01207, Nuclear Material Container Safety Management at TA-55.

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DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of Increased Peak Temperatures for Spent Fuel Cladding Performance during Dry Storage (Rev.1)

NUREG-2214, “Managing Aging Processes in Storage (MAPS) Report,” (2019) documents the technical basis for age-related degradation mechanisms on spent nuclear fuel assemblies during dry storage operations. The technical bases have been reviewed, and hoop cladding stress calculations were conducted using the Fuel Analysis under Steady-state and Transients (FAST) code at elevated normal condition temperatures of 425°C and 450°C, and at an off-normal and accident conditions temperature of 600°C. The NUREG-2214 conclusions are substantiated by the referenced literature. The calculations demonstrate that the aging mechanisms primarily driven by hoop stress such as hydride reorientation, delayed hydride cracking, thermal and athermal (low-temperature) creep, and localized mechanical overload are either not credible or do not compromise the fuel assembly’s performance for increased peak normal condition temperatures of 425°C or 450°C during the up to 60-year dry storage period. Other aging mechanisms considered are also not credible for compromising the fuel assembly’s performance during 60-year dry storage with a peak temperature of 400ºC as specified in ISG – 11 Rev. 3, and the same is indicated for the increased peak normal condition temperatures of 425°C or 450°C.

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DOE OSTI2021

Spent Crystalline Silicotitanate Storage Study—Post AP-105DF Processing

A Tank-Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system is under development by Washington River Protection Solutions to support initial production of immobilized low-activity waste (LAW) by feeding Hanford tank supernate from tank farms to the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) LAW Facility. Tank waste supernate will be filtered to remove suspended solids and then Cs will be removed by processing it through crystalline silicotitanate (CST) ion exchange media manufactured by Honeywell UOP, LLC. The Cs-loaded CST columns will be stored indefinitely, with a goal of eventual CST removal and treatment. Thus, the spent CST needs to be recoverable after undetermined storage time. Previous testing with AP-105 simulant showed that rinsing the CST bed with 3 bed volumes (1.4 apparatus volumes [AVs]) of 0.1 M NaOH resulted in a dried bed that maintained flow characteristics indicative of ease of recovery. This study explored the intermediate conditions (between feed dried in place and the 1.4 AVs of 0.1 M NaOH rinse) to evaluate CST bed properties after: 1) stoppage with feed in place; 2) stoppage after draining feed; 3) stoppage after 0.7 AV of 0.1 M NaOH rinse through column; 4) stoppage after 1.5 AVs of 0.1 M NaOH rinse through column. Post processing, each column was heated at 50 °C for 19 days under pseudo-storage conditions to simulate the expected dried and stored CST bed conditions. Testing was conducted at the small scale (12-mL bed volume); actual, Cs-depleted, AP-105 tank waste was used as the feed. Post-dried CST bed physical properties (angle of repose and penetration depth) were measured to evaluate how CST moved and flowed. All process stop-conditions resulted in a solidified CST bed except for the final condition, 1.5 AVs of 0.1 M NaOH rinse. At this small scale, the three CST beds presented an issue for retrievability after the short storage period (19 days at 50 °C). The latter case confirmed the results from simulant testing. The testing was intended to provide a preliminary assessment of issues that may arise from desiccation of CST during storage with the indicated salt solutions in place. Since these were small-scale tests, the processing system did not scale to full scale conditions exactly; however, the tests did provide insight into the impact on the dried and stored CST bed after stopping processing at an earlier step (upset condition) than normal. These results indicate that if an upset condition occurs at TSCR, a dilute hydroxide rinse should be considered before the CST dries from internal heating.

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DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from the First Year of Property Remediation - 20475

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) is a federal environmental clean-up program. Its mandate is the remediation and local, long-term, safe management of approximately 1.7 million cubic metres of historic low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) in the adjacent communities of Port Hope and Port Granby in Southern Ontario, Canada. The PHAI is being undertaken by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) on behalf of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, a federal Crown corporation. It is currently one of the largest environmental remediation projects in Canada. The safety of workers, the public and the environment while delivering the PHAI compliantly, on time and within budget is CNL's number one priority. The PHAI is being carried out as two projects - the Port Hope Project and the Port Granby Project. The larger of the two PHAI scopes of work - the Port Hope Project - involves the cleanup of approximately 1.2 million cubic metres of historic LLRW from 18 major sites in Port Hope, the construction of an engineered aboveground mound where the waste will be safely contained and the long-term maintenance and monitoring of the facility. Construction of the waste water treatment plant, the first three of four cells in the mound and supporting infrastructure is complete, with construction of the fourth cell in progress. In 2017 with the movement of on-site waste at this facility began and is now complete. Waste excavation and transportation from off-site locations within the community began in 2018; the cleanup of four temporary storage sites is now complete and remediation at several other major sites is underway. The Port Hope Project also includes a survey of the interior and exterior investigation of approximately 4,800 properties, primarily residential, in the urban area of Port Hope for the presence or absence of historic LLRW. The current projection is that approximately 1,250 privately owned residential and commercial properties known as Small-Scale Sites (SSS) will be identified as having waste exceeding the PHAI clean-up criteria. This paper will outline some of the challenges and lessons learned from the first year of SSS remediation including contractual, data and design issues; interaction with and managing expectations of stakeholders; weather, site and structure conditions as well as municipal permitting, resourcing, transportation and remediation verification. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2023

FY23 Status Report: SNF Interim Storage Canister Corrosion and Surface Environment Investigations

Work evaluating spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canister surface environments and canister corrosion progressed significantly in FY23, with the goal of developing a scientific understanding of the processes controlling initiation and growth of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) cracks in stainless steel canisters in relevant storage environments. The results of the work performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) will guide future work and will contribute to the development of better tools for predicting potential canister penetration by SCC.

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DOE OSTI2024

Safety Basis Compliant Flexible Operations [Capstone Project]

Compliant nuclear operations must be weighed against the radiological risk to the worker, public, and the environment. This project set out to look at one facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) and compare the risk with the operational restrictions associated with the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The hope was to identify controls that could be reduced or simplified while maintaining compliance with 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management. This would result in increasing facility operational flexibility and efficiency. Controls were identified to be simplified or eliminated based on risk. This identification was initially envisioned from the perspective of reanalysis of the accident and hazard analysis consequences. Additionally, it was envisioned that fire testing could show that the consequences of a fire are not as dramatic as analyzed. Specific facility controls were identified that cause operational inefficiencies. Based on data collection, two controls were identified for further evaluation. The first control was combustible loading within the waste storage buildings, and the second control is related to the seismic power cutoff switch. In evaluating the combustible loading control, the thought is that the fire suppression system (FSS) provides adequate protection and the combustible loading controls do not need elevation to a TSR control. The FSS, along with the Fire Protection Program, would provide protection to prevent a fire from impacting large amounts of stored waste material. The seismic switch was more of a challenge. When reviewing the facility operation, it was determined that the facility does not operate anywhere near the established material-at-risk (MAR – radioactive material) limits. By adjusting these limits, a reduced consequence could be achieved and hence, a significant risk reduction achieved. A new operating mode would be used to achieve this reduction. A reduced MAR limit was successfully used as a test case for snow removal during this project. This project expands on that trial case as related to combustible loading and the seismic power cutoff switch TSRs. This will increase the efficiency of operations with reduced TSR controls while reducing overall facility risk. This is a win-win situation for Triad National Security, LLC (Triad) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Due to schedule and budgetary constraints, not all envisioned work scope was accomplished. However, it is maintained in this report for future efforts.

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DOE OSTI2023

Overview of System Integration Analysis Activities for Integrated Waste Management

Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated by the current fleet of commercial nuclear reactors is being stored at the reactor sites in spent fuel pools (SFPs) and in dry independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). The US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) is developing an Integrated Waste Management Program (IWMP) comprising a suite of options and supporting analyses to enable future informed choices. The IWMP is organized into the following five major areas: 1) Consent-Based Siting, 2) IWM Facilities and Equipment Concepts and Development, 3) Transportation Capability Analysis and Support, 4) Information Technology Solutions and Support, and 5) System Integration Analysis and Support. This paper discusses the activities ongoing in the IWMP System Integration Analysis and Support area. Two main areas of research in system integration are data and tools development, as well as system analysis assessments. One of the tools being developed in the system integration area is the Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation & Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) tool. It is being developed as a foundational resource for DOE-NE to manage SNF data, along with several compatible analysis tools for time-dependent characterization of SNF and related systems. UNF-ST&DARDS has the unparalleled ability to track SNF through the entire back end of the fuel cycle—from the time the fuel is discharged from a reactor through its disposal in a geological repository. UNF ST&DARDS interfaces with the SCALE code system for nuclear analysis and COBRA-SFS for thermal analysis. Another main tool being developed is the Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM). NGSAM is an agent-based simulation software tool expressly designed to be capable of modeling the waste management system. NGSAM has been developed to enable informed decision-making by providing the capability of analyzing various potential system options for the management of SNF and HLW. Using NGSAM, system architecture analyses are being conducted to support the future deployment of a comprehensive nuclear waste management system that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). System analysis assessments may investigate the implications of various strategies such as different acceptance rates, acceptance queues, facility capacities and options, standardized canisters, and different assumed system operation start dates. Recently, some system analysis effort has begun to look at how the waste management system might operate for advanced reactor fuel cycles.

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DOE OSTI2026

RH-TRU Waste Streams: HFDA Crucibles Create New Complex Waste Stream

This project focuses on the removal of the Hot Fuel Dissolution Apparatus (HFDA) crucibles from the Hot Fuel Examination Facility’s (HFEF) hot cells to create space for upcoming projects. The project team has created a crucible and pyro-salt non-debris waste stream that can be disposed of at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Chemical Compatibility Examinations (CCEs) must be performed on candidate waste by reviewing the types of chemicals used in the experiments, information found in INL Process Knowledge Summary Reports (PKSRs), and Environmental Protection Agency guides on chemical compatibility. The CCEs identify which chemicals can be safely combined to ensure adverse reactions do not occur in the waste packages. The CCEs are then used to update the PKSR, Basis of Knowledge, and Acceptable Knowledge documents and demonstrate compliance with the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria. Once documents are finalized, they are reviewed and approved by the WIPP Central Characterization Project (CCP) to ensure proper waste stream characterization. After the documents are approved, the crucibles can be packaged and shipped to the Idaho Nuclear Technical and Engineering Center for storage awaiting certification. CCP will certify the waste using the approved documents and a series of confirmatory testing before being shipped and disposed in WIPP’s deep geological repository. Currently, the CCE is in progress and the PKSRs are being updated.

Basis of Knowledge↗
DOE OSTI2024

Oxygen Limit for Flammability of a Gas Mixture of Helium – Hydrogen – Oxygen in the U.S. Department of Energy Standard Canister

The radiolytic breakdown of residual free, physisorbed, and chemisorbed waters is anticipated in the sealed dry storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), releasing H 2 gas into the initial cover gas of helium. For aluminum-clad SNF (ASNF) in particular, the expected total hydrogen in the canister is enough to dominate the cover gas mixture if fully released, and based on experimental rates of H 2 generation, H 2 percentages exceeding the lower flammability limit appear likely. However, no evidence of radiolytic generation of O 2 has been observed to date, so the potential for flammability is averted due to the lack O 2 . Lack of oxygen has been credited for avoiding flammability in some existing storage and transportation approaches for SNF and other waste. This report reviews literature on flammability limits with a focus on the limiting oxygen concentration to provide technical underpinnings to refine a flammability criterion for gas mixtures of helium, hydrogen, and oxygen where the oxygen is expected to be the limiting species. While there is general consensus on H 2 flammability limits at standard temperature and pressure, the decay heat and gas generation within ASNF sealed dry storage canisters could push them to elevated temperatures and pressures, so the goal is to identify an oxygen threshold that will bound the behavior over the temperature and pressure range of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard Canister. The information reviewed in this document supports the criterion that the oxygen concentration in a He-H 2 -O 2 mixture should be less than 1.5% to avoid flammability at temperatures and pressures relevant to sealed dry storage of ASNF in the DOE Standard Canister, i.e., up to 343°C (650°F) and 500 psig, respectively. Note that while data covering the full range of temperature at atmospheric pressure and nearly the full range of pressure at room temperature were available, data for the combined effects was available only at moderate temperatures and pressures; the recommended 1.5% O 2 threshold is based on the breadth of available data reported here and apparent trends therein.

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DOE OSTI2020

Review of Mercury in the SRS Tank Waste Storage and Treatment Processes for Applicability to Hanford Waste Processing

The Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford produced large quantities of plutonium and other radioisotopes. The separations processes recovered plutonium and produced large quantities of High- Level Waste (HLW) that accumulated at each site in large, underground storage tanks. SRS has been retrieving the stored HLW, pretreating the waste for immobilization, and immobilizing the waste in glass or grout waste forms since the mid-1990s. Treatment of the waste at Hanford is expected to start in the early 2020s. Mercury is present in both the SRS and Hanford tank waste. SRS has recently completed an evaluation of mercury speciation throughout the tank waste treatment and immobilization flowsheet. This study was reviewed to determine what information from the study can be applied to the Hanford tank waste treatment program.

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DOE OSTI2023

Considerations for Managing DOE Standard Canisters within an Over-canister as Part of an Integrated Waste Management System

To better enable informed decision making regarding the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management Program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring the research into a comprehensive integrated waste management system (IWMS) that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). An important aspect of the IWMS is DOE-managed SNF. DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated, transported, received, stored, and reprocessed SNF at DOE facilities nationwide, and DOE is responsible for managing the SNF currently in its possession. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types that employ various cladding materials, fuel materials, and enrichments. To enable interim, road-ready dry storage (RRDS) of the wide variety of SNF types found in the DOE inventory, a standardized canister system (i.e., the DOE Standard Canister) was proposed. This robust, welded canister system is designed to confine radionuclides, prevent criticality by precluding content moderation, and satisfy other requirements as part of a larger storage, transportation, and disposal system. While SNF has yet to be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister, DOE Standard Canister designs were included in past storage facility and disposal facility design licensing endeavors. In a renewed effort to evaluate packaging SNF at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in a RRDS configuration, researchers are planning the RRDS Packaging Demonstration. This demonstration is supplemented by analytical structural, criticality, and material compatibility evaluations that support management of SNF in DOE Standard Canisters, taking advantage of past analysis work to the extent possible. One of the largest differences between the current Packaging Demonstration and past analytical evaluations is the inclusion of an over-canister containing multiple DOE Standard Canisters. For the Packaging Demonstration, DOE Standard Canisters loaded with SNF are planned to be placed in a larger diameter over-canister. The sealed over-canister could then be placed in a storage overpack for onsite storage, or in a transportation overpack for shipment to an offsite storage location or disposal site once one becomes available. This paper examines the relevant considerations and provides a preliminary evaluation of integrating the over-canister configuration into the storage, transportation, and disposal processes of the overall waste management system. For storage and transportation, the over-canister can be considered analogous to a multi-purpose canister (MPC) for commercial SNF. For disposal, the DOE Standard Canisters could be removed from the over-canister and placed in a co-disposal waste package with canisters containing vitrified HLW similar to configurations examined previously, or the sealed over-canisters might be capable of direct disposal in a waste package.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Shaker Table Test Plan

Currently, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is stored in onsite independent spent fuel storage facilities (ISFSIs), which is a dry storage facility, at 55 nuclear power plant sites. The majority of SNF in dry storage is in welded metal canisters (2,917 canisters at the end of 2019). The canisters are loaded for storage in storage overpacks (vertical casks or horizontal storage modules) and placed on outdoor concrete pads. Because the SNF will be stored at ISFSIs for an extended period of time, there is growing concern with regards to the behavior of the SNF within these dry storage systems during earthquakes. To address these concerns, the SFWST program is considering conducting an earthquake shaker table test. The goal of this test is to determine the strains and accelerations on fuel assembly hardware and cladding during earthquakes of different magnitudes to better quantify the potential damage an earthquake could inflict on spent nuclear fuel rods. The seismic integrity of the storage system has been addressed in the past by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and is not the focus of this potential test. Instead the DOE would benefit from knowing the condition of the fuel cladding from storage, transportation, to disposal so that it can ascertain repository performance for the fuel and packaging in its final state. A seismic event is part of the possible loading events that the fuel could experience in its lifetime. This report proposes several earthquake shaker table tests with different degrees of complexity. Alternative 1 was defined in the FY20 work scope. Alternatives 2 and 3 were recently developed to take advantage of the NUHOMS 32PTH dry storage canister that may be available in FY21 for this test at a minimum cost to the project. The selection of the alternative(s) will depend on the available budget and the SFWST program priorities for the near future.

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DOE OSTI2026

Supplement Analysis for the Proposed Shipment of High Burnup Research Cask to Idaho National Laboratory for Research and Development Purposes

DOE needs to continue with the HBUSFDP and transfer the HBURC to a facility capable of examination and testing of HBU SNF. These types of facilities do not exist at NAPS but are available at DOE national laboratories. The removal and eventual opening of the TN-32B research cask will provide DOE with the opportunity to gather data that will support continued safe storage of SNF at existing nuclear power plants, or a future federal consolidated storage facility. This effort will also help build public trust and confidence by demonstrating DOE’s ability to safely and securely transport commercial SNF using the certified Atlas rail consist.

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DOE OSTI2020

Remote Handled Hot Cell Facility and Other Research Transuranic Waste (Debris)

This acceptable knowledge (AK) Summary Report has been prepared for the Central Characterization Program (CCP) for remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste generated and managed by Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The waste described in this report was predominately generated in the SNL/NM Hot Cell Facility (HCF) during the removal and packaging of experimental material and decontamination operations in Building 6580 at Technical Area (TA)-V. The waste stream also includes a very small amount of waste (estimated at less than 1 gram of fuel similar to that used for research at the HCF) originating from classified research at TA-I. In addition, the waste also includes secondary waste termed by SNL/NM as process generated waste (PGW), created during repackaging operations for this waste at the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF). The waste has been stored at the Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR) Dense Pack Storage Facility within TA-V or the Manzano Bunkers located at Manzano Base within Kirtland Air Force Base. All of the waste is being repackaged at the AHCF. This report was prepared in accordance with CCP-TP-005, CCP Acceptable Knowledge Documentation (Reference 1), to implement the AK requirements of DOE/WIPP-02-3214, Remote-Handled TRU Waste Characterization Program Implementation Plan (WCPIP) (Reference 2); Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, Waste Analysis Plan (WIPP-WAP) (Reference 3); and DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP-WAC) (Reference 4).

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DOE OSTI2020

Savannah River Site Composite Analysis (FY2019 Annual Review)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a Department of Energy (DOE) site encompassing approximately 310 square miles in South Carolina. It is bounded on the southwest by the Savannah River (SR) and is situated approximately 12 miles south of Aiken, South Carolina, and 15 miles southeast of Augusta, Georgia. Construction of and subsequent operations at the SRS began in 1951 under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission. The primary mission of the SRS was to produce tritium and plutonium for the national nuclear weapons complex. Between 1953 and 1955, SRS brought five reactors and various support facilities into operation in support of its primary mission. Support facilities included two chemical separations plants, a heavy water extraction plant, a nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility, a tritium extraction facility and waste management facilities. With the declining need for a large nuclear weapons stockpile since the end of the Cold War, many SRS facilities no longer produce or process nuclear materials. All reactors were shut down by 1993. However, the SRS Tritium Extraction Facility continues to supply DOE with tritium. Additionally, operations at the K-Area Complex currently provide interim safe storage for much of DOE’s excess plutonium (Pu) and high enriched uranium, in a building which formerly housed K Reactor. As the SRS mission has changed, many surplus facilities are being dispositioned safely and economically. SRS has completed extensive decommissioning activities in D-Area, M-Area, P-Area, R-Area, and T-Area, with groundwater (GW) remediation ongoing. High-level waste tanks continue to be emptied and closed.

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