Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Storage Cask”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 397 records · Page 22

A 2-D Test Problem for CFD Modeling Heat Transfer in Spent Fuel Transfer Cask Neutron Shields

In the United States, commercial spent nuclear fuel is typically moved from spent fuel pools to outdoor dry storage pads within a transfer cask system that provides radiation shielding to protect personnel and the surrounding environment. The transfer casks are cylindrical steel enclosures with integral gamma and neutron radiation shields. Since the transfer cask system must be passively cooled, decay heat removal from spent nuclear fuel canister is limited by the rate of heat transfer through the cask components, and natural convection from the transfer cask surface. The primary mode of heat transfer within the transfer cask system is conduction, but some cask designs incorporate a liquid neutron shield tank surrounding the transfer cask structural shell. In these systems, accurate prediction of natural convection within the neutron shield tank is an important part of assessing the overall thermal performance of the transfer cask system. The large-scale geometry of the neutron shield tank, which is typically an annulus approximately 2 meters in diameter but only 5-10 cm in thickness, and the relatively small scale velocities (typically less than 5 cm/s) represent a wide range of spatial and temporal scales that contribute to making this a challenging problem for computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling. Relevant experimental data at these scales are not available in the literature, but some recent modeling studies offer insights into numerical issues and solutions; however, the geometries in these studies, and for the experimental data in the literature at smaller scales, all have large annular gaps that are not prototypic of the transfer cask neutron shield. This paper presents results for a simple 2-D problem that is an effective numerical analog for the neutron shield application. Because it is 2-D, solutions can be obtained relatively quickly allowing a comparison and assessment of sensitivity to model parameter changes. Turbulence models are considered as well as the tradeoff between steady state and transient solutions. Solutions are compared for two commercial CFD codes, FLUENT and STAR-CCM+. The results can be used to provide input to the CFD Best Practices for this application. Following study results for the 2-D test problem, a comparison of simulation results is provided for a high Rayleigh number experiment with large annular gap. Because the geometry of this validation is significantly different from the neutron shield, and due to the critical nature of this application, the argument is made for new experiments at representative scales

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safety aspects of dry spent fuel storage and spent fuel management

As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Safety aspects like safe enclosure of radioactive materials, safe removal of decay heat, nuclear criticality safety and avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure must be achieved throughout the storage period. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more obvious. TUV and BAM, who work as independent experts for the competent authorities, present the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, based on their long experience in these fields. All safety relevant issues like safe enclosure, shielding, removal of the decay heat or behavior of cask and building under accident conditions are checked and validated with state-of-the-art methods and computer codes before the license approval. It is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Status and Path Forward for the Department of Energy Used Fuel Disposition Storage and Transportation Program - 12571

The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE/NE) has sponsored a program since Fiscal Year (FY) 09 to develop the technical basis for extended dry storage of used fuel. This program is also working to develop the transportation technical basis for the transport of used fuel after the extended storage period. As this program has progressed, data gaps associated with dry storage systems (e.g., fuel, cask internals, canister, closure, overpack, and pad) have been identified that need to be addressed to develop the technical bases for extended storage and transportation. There has also been an initiation of experimental testing and analyses based on the identified data gaps. The technical aspects of the NE program are being conducted by a multi-lab team made up of the DOE laboratories. As part of this program, a mission objective is to also collaborate closely with industry and the international sector to ensure that all the technical issues are addressed and those programs outside the DOE program can be leveraged, where possible, to maximize the global effort in storage and transportation research. The DOE/NE program is actively pursuing the development of the technical basis to demonstrate the feasibility of storing UNF for extended periods of time with subsequent transportation of the UNF to its final disposition. This program is fully integrated with industry, the U.S. regulator, and the international community to assure that programmatic goals and objectives are consistent with a broad perspective of technical and regulatory opinion. As the work evolves, assessments will be made to ensure that the work continues to focus on the overall goals and objectives of the program. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

MODELING HEAT TRANSFER IN SPENT FUEL TRANSFER CASK NEUTRON SHIELDS – A CHALLENGING PROBLEM IN NATURAL CONVECTION

In the United States, commercial spent nuclear fuel is typically moved from spent fuel pools to outdoor dry storage pads within a transfer cask system that provides radiation shielding to protect personnel and the surrounding environment. The transfer casks are cylindrical steel enclosures with integral gamma and neutron radiation shields. Since the transfer cask system must be passively cooled, decay heat removal from spent nuclear fuel canister is limited by the rate of heat transfer through the cask components, and natural convection from the transfer cask surface. The primary mode of heat transfer within the transfer cask system is conduction, but some cask designs incorporate a liquid neutron shield tank surrounding the transfer cask structural shell. In these systems, accurate prediction of natural convection within the neutron shield tank is an important part of assessing the overall thermal performance of the transfer cask system. The large-scale geometry of the neutron shield tank, which is typically an annulus approximately 2 meters in diameter but only 10-15 cm in thickness, and the relatively small scale velocities (typically less than 5 cm/s) represent a wide range of spatial and temporal scales that contribute to making this a challenging problem for computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling. Relevant experimental data at these scales are not available in the literature, but some recent modeling studies offer insights into numerical issues and solutions; however, the geometries in these studies, and for the experimental data in the literature at smaller scales, all have large annular gaps that are not prototypic of the transfer cask neutron shield. This paper proposes that there may be reliable CFD approaches to the transfer cask problem, specifically coupled steady-state solvers or unsteady simulations; however, both of these solutions take significant computational effort. Segregated (uncoupled) steady state solvers that were tested did not accurately capture the flow field and heat transfer distribution in this application. Mesh resolution, turbulence modeling, and the tradeoff between steady state and transient solutions are addressed. Because of the critical nature of this application, the need for new experiments at representative scales is clearly demonstrated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Analysis of spent nuclear fuel multipurpose canister dynamics during rail transportation

The primary mode of spent nuclear fuel transportation within the United States will be by railcar. One such system is the Atlas railcar, which is designed to transport 17 different spent nuclear fuel cask systems, including bare fuel systems and canister fuel systems. In the latter configuration, multipurpose canisters containing spent nuclear fuel may be placed within an overpack for storage, or within a cask for transportation. Compared to bare fuel systems, canister fuel systems have additional degrees of freedom for motion during transportation, because clearance between the cask and canister allows for some motion of the canister to occur relative to the cask. This work investigates the effect of canister motion on the shock and vibration imparted to the spent nuclear fuel within. Structural dynamic analyses have been conducted to identify the effects of canister to cask clearance, presence and type of dunnage, and loading direction and frequency. This modeling study calculates anticipated cask motion, canister motion, and spent nuclear fuel structural dynamic response to normal conditions of transportation railcar motion using finite element analysis methods that were developed to model the rail segment of the ENSA/DOE (Equipos Nucleares S.A., U.S. Department of Energy) multimodal transportation test of 2017.

SNF, UNF, LS-DYNA, dynamics, kinematics, shock, vi↗

Applicability of Developed Calculation Models to Predict Long-term Behavior of Metal Seals - Necessary Scope of Tests - 19311

The long-term sealing behavior of metal seals, assembled in the lid system of casks for transportation and storage of radioactive materials, has been investigated. For that purpose, phenomenological models describing the time- and temperature dependent behavior have been introduced by BAM since 2016, e.g. by using the time-temperature superposition principle. Results have shown that these models describe the relaxation behavior adequately and are suitable for extrapolations. In this work, the applicability of these models is checked by analyzing the necessary scope of tests, which must be carried out to get sufficient information about the long-term behavior of metal seals based on short-term tests. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Dose Rate Analysis of As-Loaded Spent Nuclear Fuel Casks - Paper 97

Used Nuclear Fuel Storage, Transportation and Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST[and]DARDS) is a comprehensive data and calculation capability for UNF safety assessments currently being developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory through a collaborative effort of multiple national laboratories and industry participants. The purpose of UNF-ST[and]DARDS is to provide a unified domestic UNF system of data and analysis capabilities in support of U.S. Department of Energy waste management and fuel cycle-related objectives. UNF-ST[and]DARDS is designed to provide safety assessments for UNF storage, transportation, and disposal systems based on actual characteristics of the as-loaded UNF (e.g., fuel assembly burnup, enrichment, decay time, cladding integrity, etc.). The cask-specific safety evaluations allow quantification of realistic safety margins and conditions and provide the technical basis for addressing concerns related to potential fuel failure (e.g., for high-burnup fuel). This paper describes the UNF-ST[and]DARDS methodology for calculating radiation dose rates for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensed casks based on actual UNF canister contents. Realistic dose rate values based on actual canister contents may be used in place of bounding dose rate values to support development of repackaging operations procedures, evaluation of radiation-related transportation risks, and communication with stakeholders. UNF-ST[and]DARDS capabilities have been recently expanded to include automated radiation source term calculations and dose rate analyses of as-loaded transportation casks. This unique capability determines realistic dose rate values based on actual canister UNF contents that may be used in radiation dose assessments to demonstrate safe transportation of commercial UNF. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Alternative Canister Processing Operations at an Interim Storage Facility - 16617

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is laying the groundwork for implementing interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in response to recommendations by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future in their report to the Secretary of Energy published January 2012. These efforts include planning for a Pilot Interim Storage Facility (ISF) and a Larger ISF. In March 2014, the DOE employed the CB and I team to evaluate design alternatives for cask handling operations and storing SNF at an ISF. The report, 'Generic Design Alternatives for Dry Storage of Used Nuclear Fuel', (Alternatives Report) evaluates different aspects of an ISF, including a study on alternative approaches for processing SNF canisters such as different cask handling methods and configurations which might be used to transfer canisters from shipping casks into storage locations at an ISF. The purpose of this paper is to report on the development of alternative cask handling operations that have been evaluated for the receipt and storage of the SNF at an initial Pilot ISF and a Larger ISF. This design study is relevant for host communities considering near-term development of a Pilot ISF. DOE-sponsored system analyses indicate that a processing rate of up to 3,000 MTU/yr (approximately 230 to 300 canisters) would be needed for a single Larger ISF (less if more than one ISF were developed) to remove SNF from commercial nuclear plants in a reasonable amount of time. The study evaluated different canister processing operation methodologies in order to reduce the complexity, cost, and personnel exposure associated with processing operations at an ISF. The conclusions from this design study could help to inform the selection of future canister processing operations for an ISF. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

STP-ECRTS - THERMAL AND GAS ANALYSES FOR SLUDGE TRANSPORT AND STORAGE CONTAINER (STSC) STORAGE AT T PLANT

The Sludge Treatment Project (STP) is responsible for the disposition of sludge contained in the six engineered containers and Settler tank within the 105-K West (KW) Basin. The STP is retrieving and transferring sludge from the Settler tank into engineered container SCS-CON-230. Then, the STP will retrieve and transfer sludge from the six engineered containers in the KW Basin directly into a Sludge Transport and Storage Containers (STSC) contained in a Sludge Transport System (STS) cask. The STSC/STS cask will be transported to T Plant for interim storage of the STSC. The STS cask will be loaded with an empty STSC and returned to the KW Basin for loading of additional sludge for transportation and interim storage at T Plant. CH2MHILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) contracted with Fauske & Associates, LLC (FAI) to perform thermal and gas generation analyses for interim storage of STP sludge in the Sludge Transport and Storage Container (STSCs) at T Plant. The sludge types considered are settler sludge and sludge originating from the floor of the KW Basin and stored in containers 210 and 220, which are bounding compositions. The conditions specified by CHPRC for analysis are provided in Section 5. The FAI report (FAI/10-83, Thermal and Gas Analyses for a Sludge Transport and Storage Container (STSC) at T Plant) (refer to Attachment 1) documents the analyses. The process considered was passive, interim storage of sludge in various cells at T Plant. The FATE{trademark} code is used for the calculation. The results are shown in terms of the peak sludge temperature and hydrogen concentrations in the STSC and the T Plant cell. In particular, the concerns addressed were the thermal stability of the sludge and the potential for flammable gas mixtures. This work was performed with preliminary design information and a preliminary software configuration.

08 HYDROGEN↗

EPRI/DOE High Burnup Fuel Sister Pin Test Plan Simplification and Visualization

The EPRI/DOE High Burnup Confirmatory Data Project (herein called the "Demo") is a multi-year, multi-entity confirmation demonstration test with the purpose of providing quantitative and qualitative data to show how high-burnup fuel ages in dry storage over a ten-year period. The Demo involves obtaining 32 assemblies of high-burnup PWR fuel of four common cladding alloys from the North Anna Nuclear Power Plant, drying them according to standard plant procedures, and then storing them in an NRC-licensed TN-3 2B cask on the North Anna dry storage pad for ten years. After the ten-year storage time, the cask will be opened and the rods will be examined for signs of aging. Twenty-five rods from assemblies of similar claddings, in-reactor placement, and burnup histories (herein called "sister rods") have been shipped from the North Anna Nuclear Power Plant and are currently being nondestructively tested at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. After the non-destructive testing has been completed for each of the twenty-five rods, destructive analysis will be performed at ORNL, PNNL, and ANL to obtain mechanical data. Opinions gathered from the expert interviews, ORNL and PNNL Sister Rod Test Plans, and numerous meetings has resulted in the Simplified Test Plan described in this document. Some of the opinions and discussions leading to the simplified test plan are included here. Detailed descriptions and background are in the ORNL and PNNL plans in the appendices . After the testing described in this simplified test plan h as been completed , the community will review all the collected data and determine if additional testing is needed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Final Report: Characterization of Canister Mockup Weld Residual Stresses

Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of interim storage containers has been indicated as a high priority data gap by the Department of Energy (DOE) (Hanson et al., 2012), the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI, 2011), the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB, 2010a), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, 2012a, 2012b). Uncertainties exist in terms of the environmental conditions that prevail on the surface of the storage containers, the stress state within the container walls associated both with weldments as well as within the base metal itself, and the electrochemical properties of the storage containers themselves. The goal of the work described in this document is to determine the stress states that exists at various locations within a typical storage canister by evaluating the properties of a full-diameter cylindrical mockup of an interim storage canister. This mockup has been produced using the same manufacturing procedures as the majority of the fielded spent nuclear fuel interim storage canisters. This document describes the design and procurement of the mockup and the characterization of the stress state associated with various portions of the container. It also describes the cutting of the mockup into sections for further analyses, and a discussion of the potential impact of the results from the stress characterization effort.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Addressing fission product validation in MCNP burnup credit criticality calculations - 14508

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation issued Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 8, Revision 3 in September 2012. This ISG provides guidance for NRC staff members' review of burnup credit (BUC) analyses supporting transport and dry storage of pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in casks. The ISG includes guidance for addressing validation of criticality (k{sub eff}) calculations crediting the presence of a limited set of fission products and minor actinides (FP and MAs). Based on previous work documented in NRC Regulatory Guide (NUREG) Contractor Report (CR)-7109, the ISG recommends that NRC staff members accept the use of either 1.5 or 3% of the FP and MA worth - in addition to bias and bias uncertainty resulting from validation of k{sub eff} calculations for the major actinides in SNF - to conservatively account for the bias and bias uncertainty associated with the specified unvalidated FP and MAs. The ISG recommends (1) use of 1.5% of the FP and MA worth if a modern version of SCALE and its nuclear data are used and (2) 3% of the FP and MA worth for well qualified, industry standard code systems other than SCALE with the Evaluated Nuclear Data Files, Part B (ENDF/B),-V, ENDF/B-VI, or ENDF/B-VII cross sections libraries. The work presented in this paper provides a basis for extending the use of the 1.5% of the FP and MA worth bias to BUC criticality calculations performed using the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code. The extended use of the 1.5% FP and MA worth bias is shown to be acceptable by comparison of FP and MA worths calculated using SCALE and MCNP with ENDF/B-V, -VI, and -VII-based nuclear data. The comparison supports use of the 1.5% FP and MA worth bias when the MCNP code is used for criticality calculations, provided that the cask design is similar to the hypothetical generic BUC-32 cask model and that the credited FP and MA worth is no more than 0.1 Δk{sub eff} (ISG-8, Rev. 3, Recommendation 4). (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Applications of neutron-absorbing structural amorphous metal (SAM) coatings for criticality safety controls of used fuel storage, transportation, and disposal - 14534

Used nuclear fuel contains fissionable materials ({sup 235}U, {sup 239}Pu, {sup 241}Pu, etc.). To prevent nuclear criticality in used fuel storage, transportation, and disposal, neutron-absorbing materials (or neutron poisons, such as borated stainless steel, Boral{sup TM}, Metamic{sup TM}, Ni-Gd, etc.) would have to be applied. Corrosion-resistant, iron-based structural-amorphous metals (SAMs) have been tested to determine their relative corrosion resistance. Many of these materials can be applied as coatings with advanced High Velocity Oxy-Fuel (HVOF) thermal-spray technology. SAM2X5, SAM1651, and other SAMs are amorphous-metal composite alloys that have been identified as having outstanding corrosion resistance. Because of its high boron content, SAM2X5 can be applied as the neutron-absorbing coatings to the metallic support structure for criticality-safety controls of used fuel in racks in wet storage pool and baskets inside the storage containers, the transportation cask, and eventually the disposal containers in repository disposal. Research and experiment conducted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory indicated that the high boron-containing SAM2X5 coating could be an effective criticality control material for used fuel management. The neutron irradiation experiments and the neutron transmission measurements conducted at McClellan Nuclear Radiation Center indicated that extensive fast neutron irradiation did not change the structure of the amorphous SAM2X5 melt-spun ribbons, and SAM2X5 exhibited effective neutron absorbing capability, similar to Boral{sup TM} and Metamic{sup TM}. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

CASTOR V casks: quiver for damaged fuel rods

After the accident at Fukushima in 2011, 8 nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Germany were shut down immediately and parliament decided a phase-out of nuclear energy by 2022. As prerequisite for a quick dismantling of the shut-down NPPs, all fuel has to be removed from the spent fuel pools as soon as possible. For over 20 years, spent fuel assemblies from German NPPs have already been stored in CASTOR dual purpose casks by GNS. Already more than 1200 CASTOR casks are stored in dry interim storage facilities worldwide, and there is an additional demand for several hundred more casks for the remaining spent fuel assemblies in Germany until the final phase-out. Furthermore the phase-out decision has triggered the demand for a complementary solution for the damaged fuel rods that have been collected separately in the pools for disposal after the NPP shut-down. In 2011, GNS started to develop a disposal concept for these damaged fuel rods. For that purpose, GNS designed 2 quivers for damaged fuel rods to fit into square tubes of the basket of the CASTOR V/19 (PWR) and the CASTOR V/52 (BWR) respectively. The customisable internal baskets of the quivers facilitate the disposal of a large variety of nuclear inventory. Furthermore, the quiver features a robust design and a welded closure system. This design has been affirmed by a series of tests and qualification processes, supervised by the German authorities. This first of its kind solution ensures the dry interim storage of damaged fuel rods. The package design approval for the quiver for CASTOR V/19 is expected for 2016. This presentation will focus on the design of the Quivers in combination with the CASTOR V casks and describe the challenges during the licensing procedures. We will show the components of the Quiver and explain their mechanical characteristics during accident conditions of transport as well as the drying and welding process necessary to enable the long term storage of the Quivers. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Preliminary Results of Ancillary Safety Analyses Supporting TREAT LEU Conversion Activities

The Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT), located at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), is a test facility designed to evaluate the performance of reactor fuels and materials under transient accident conditions. The facility, an air-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor designed to utilize fuel containing high-enriched uranium (HEU), has been in non-operational standby status since 1994. Currently, in support of the missions of the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M3) Reactor Conversion Program, a new core design is being developed for TREAT that will utilize low-enriched uranium (LEU). The primary objective of this conversion effort is to design an LEU core that is capable of meeting the performance characteristics of the existing HEU core. Minimal, if any, changes are anticipated for the supporting systems (e.g. reactor trip system, filtration/cooling system, etc.); therefore, the LEU core must also be able to function with the existing supporting systems, and must also satisfy acceptable safety limits. In support of the LEU conversion effort, a range of ancillary safety analyses are required to evaluate the LEU core operation relative to that of the existing facility. These analyses cover neutronics, shielding, and thermal hydraulic topics that have been identified as having the potential to have reduced safety margins due to conversion to LEU fuel, or are required to support the required safety analyses documentation. The majority of these ancillary tasks have been identified in [1] and [2]. The purpose of this report is to document the ancillary safety analyses that have been performed at Argonne National Laboratory during the early stages of the LEU design effort, and to describe ongoing and anticipated analyses. For all analyses presented in this report, methodologies are utilized that are consistent with, or improved from, those used in analyses for the HEU Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [3]. Depending on the availability of historical data derived from HEU TREAT operation, results calculated for the LEU core are compared to measurements obtained from HEU TREAT operation. While all analyses in this report are largely considered complete and have been reviewed for technical content, it is important to note that all topics will be revisited once the LEU design approaches its final stages of maturity. For most safety significant issues, it is expected that the analyses presented here will be bounding, but additional calculations will be performed as necessary to support safety analyses and safety documentation. It should also be noted that these analyses were completed as the LEU design evolved, and therefore utilized different LEU reference designs. Preliminary shielding, neutronic, and thermal hydraulic analyses have been completed and have generally demonstrated that the various LEU core designs will satisfy existing safety limits and standards also satisfied by the existing HEU core. These analyses include the assessment of the dose rate in the hodoscope room, near a loaded fuel transfer cask, above the fuel storage area, and near the HEPA filters. The potential change in the concentration of tramp uranium and change in neutron flux reaching instrumentation has also been assessed. Safety-significant thermal hydraulic items addressed in this report include thermally-induced mechanical distortion of the grid plate, and heating in the radial reflector.

Brunett, A. J.↗

Remote Monitoring Systems/Remote Data Transmission for International Nuclear Safeguards.

The use of remotely transmitted data from a nuclear facility under international nuclear safeguards to an inspectorate headquarters has been rapidly growing since inception as its value in reducing inspection effort and cost is demonstrated. There are opportunities for further growth moving forward including (1) the number of spent fuel casks in dry interim storage are increasing, leading to strain on inspection resources and potentially increased radiation exposure to inspectors, (2) the frequency of encapsulating spent nuclear fuel for final disposal in geological repositories occurs at a rate that may lead to the need for on-site inspectors unless systems can be developed to remotely transmit data, and (3) new facility types such as small modular reactors may rely heavily on remotely transmitted data due in part to remote locations of operation and mobility. Challenges need to be addressed too and include (1) hesitancy to implement remote data transmission by states, (2) data collection, transmission, security, and analysis, and (3) reliable power and communications. This report examines the evolution, equipment deployed, status, and opportunities/challenges of remote data transmission moving forward.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of the French Haut Taux de Combustion (HTC) Critical Experiment Data

In the 1980s, a series of critical experiments referred to as the Haut Taux de Combustion (HTC) experiments was conducted by the Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN) at the experimental criticality facility in Valduc, France. The plutonium-to- uranium ratio and the isotopic compositions of both the uranium and plutonium used in the simulated fuel rods were designed to be similar to what would be found in a typical pressurized-water reactor fuel assembly that initially had an enrichment of 4.5 wt% {sup 235}U and was burned to 37,500 MWd/MTU. The fuel material also includes {sup 241}Am, which is present due to the decay of {sup 241}Pu. The HTC experiments include configurations designed to simulate fuel handling activities, pool storage, and transport in casks constructed of thick lead or steel. Rights of use for the HTC experiment data were purchased under an agreement that limits release of the information. Consequently, a detailed and complete description of the experiments is not presented in this report. This report discusses evaluation of the four HTC data reports, modeling of the experiments, sensitivity and uncertainty analysis, and upper subcritical limit (USL) calculation. The report also presents some conclusions and recommendations concerning use of the HTC experiment data for burnup credit applications. The similarity of the HTC experiments with PWR spent nuclear fuel has been quantified using sensitivity/uncertainty analysis, confirming that the HTC experiments are significantly more applicable to the validation of burnup credit calculations than other available mixed-oxide (MOX) experiments. The HTC experiments were designed and executed with a high level of rigor, resulting in experimental uncertainties that are lower than many of the earlier MOX experiments. The HTC data reports, together with information provided in this report, provide sufficient data to allow for either detailed or simplified computational models to be developed. The HTC experiments substantially strengthen the technical basis for validation by adding to the previously small number of applicable experiments against which to compare burnup credit applications. Existing MOX experiments found to be applicable are also identified in this report.

Mueller, Don↗

Bias Estimates Used in Lieu of Validation of Fission Products and Minor Actinides in MCNP K eff Calculations for PWR Burnup Credit Casks

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation recently issued Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 8, Revision 3. This ISG provides guidance for burnup credit (BUC) analyses supporting transport and storage of PWR pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel in casks. Revision 3 includes guidance for addressing validation of criticality (k eff ) calculations crediting the presence of a limited set of fission products and minor actinides (FP&MA). Based on previous work documented in NUREG/CR-7109, recommendation 4 of ISG-8, Rev. 3, includes a recommendation to use 1.5 or 3% of the FP&MA worth to conservatively cover the bias due to the specified FP&MAs. This bias is supplementary to the bias and bias uncertainty resulting from validation of k eff calculations for the major actinides in SNF and does not address extension to actinides and fission products beyond those identified herein. The work described in this report involves comparison of FP&MA worths calculated using SCALE and MCNP with ENDF/B-V, -VI, and -VII based nuclear data and supports use of the 1.5% FP&MA worth bias when either SCALE or MCNP codes are used for criticality calculations, provided the other conditions of the recommendation 4 are met. The method used in this report may also be applied to demonstrate the applicability of the 1.5% FP&MA worth bias to other codes using ENDF/B V, VI or VII based nuclear data. The method involves use of the applicant s computational method to generate FP&MA worths for a reference SNF cask model using specified spent fuel compositions. The applicant s FP&MA worths are then compared to reference values provided in this report. The applicants FP&MA worths should not exceed the reference results by more than 1.5% of the reference FP&MA worths.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗