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The use of Gd-153 dual-photon absorptiometry at 43 and 100 keV to measure individual-bone and total-body bone minerals is discussed in a survey of recent studies on humans, phantoms, and monkeys. Precision errors of as low as 1 percent have been achieved in vivo, suggesting the use of sequential measurements in studies of immobilization and space-flight effects.
The goal is to provide a technology base leading to improved safety of the national airspace system through the development and integration of human-centered automation technologies for aircraft crews and air traffic controllers. Information on the problems, specific objectives, human-automation interaction, intelligent error-tolerant systems, and air traffic control/cockpit integration is given in viewgraph form.
TDA documents determine the personnel strengths for each Army installation. They reflect the number of people required to accomplish a certain mission by various characteristics. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) analysts continuously scrutinize these documents to ensure that they comply with provided guidance. Part of this guidance has been used to develop a set of manual rules. Analysts apply these rules to the TDA to eliminate positions, downgrade positions, or reduce position strength. However, this process is very time consuming. ln addition, human involvement introduces inconsistencies and errors that are difficult to detect later. This paper explains how I represented these rules using the 'C' Language Production System (CLIPS) to develop an expert system that is applied consistently and comprehensively for all TRADOC installations. The TDA System Analyzer reduces the review process from about five days to just twenty minutes; giving the user more time to analyze the results and thereby make better decisions. Furthermore, the user is assured that the rules are applied uniformly to every TDA document. This paper also explains the integration of the TDA System Analyzer into TRADOC's On-Line TDA System. Providing the analyst an extra utility module that can be accessed from a familiar environment.
Two dimensional spectral types for each of the stars observed in the global astrometric interferometer for astrophysics (GAIA) mission would provide additional information for the galactic structure and stellar evolution studies, as well as helping in the identification of unusual objects and populations. The classification of the large quantity generated spectra requires that automated techniques are implemented. Approaches for the automatic classification are reviewed, and a metric-distance method is discussed. In tests, the metric-distance method produced spectral types with mean errors comparable to those of human classifiers working at similar resolution. Data and equipment requirements for an automated classification survey, are discussed. A program of auxiliary observations is proposed to yield spectral types and radial velocities for the GAIA-observed stars.
Today's advanced network management systems can automate many aspects of the tactical networking operations within a military domain. However, automation of joint and coalition tactical networking across multiple domains remains challenging. Due to potentially conflicting goals and priorities, human agreement is often required before implementation into the network operations. This is further complicated by incompatible network management systems and security policies, rendering it difficult to implement automatic network management, thus requiring manual human intervention to the communication protocols used at various network routers and endpoints. This process of manual human intervention is tedious, error-prone, and slow. In order to facilitate a better solution, we are pursuing a technology which makes network management automated, reliable, and fast. Automating the negotiation of the common network communication parameters between different parties is the subject of this paper. We present the technology that enables inter-force dynamic communication resource negotiations to enable ad-hoc inter-operation in the field between force domains, without pre-planning. It also will enable a dynamic response to changing conditions within the area of operations. Our solution enables the rapid blending of intra-domain policies so that the forces involved are able to inter-operate effectively without overwhelming each other's networks with in-appropriate or un-warranted traffic. It will evaluate the policy rules and configuration data for each of the domains, then generate a compatible inter-domain policy and configuration that will update the gateway systems between the two domains.
NextGen operations are associated with a variety of changes to the national airspace system (NAS) including changes to the allocation of roles and responsibilities among operators and automation, the use of new technologies and automation, additional information presented on the flight deck, and the entire concept of operations (ConOps). In the transition to NextGen airspace, aviation and air operations designers need to consider the implications of design or system changes on human performance and the potential for error. To ensure continued safety of the NAS, it will be necessary for researchers to evaluate design concepts and potential NextGen scenarios well before implementation. One approach for such evaluations is through human performance modeling. Human performance models (HPMs) provide effective tools for predicting and evaluating operator performance in systems. HPMs offer significant advantages over empirical, human-in-the-loop testing in that (1) they allow detailed analyses of systems that have not yet been built, (2) they offer great flexibility for extensive data collection, (3) they do not require experimental participants, and thus can offer cost and time savings. HPMs differ in their ability to predict performance and safety with NextGen procedures, equipment and ConOps. Models also vary in terms of how they approach human performance (e.g., some focus on cognitive processing, others focus on discrete tasks performed by a human, while others consider perceptual processes), and in terms of their associated validation efforts. The objectives of this research effort were to support the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in identifying HPMs that are appropriate for predicting pilot performance in NextGen operations, to provide guidance on how to evaluate the quality of different models, and to identify gaps in pilot performance modeling research, that could guide future research opportunities. This research effort is intended to help the FAA evaluate pilot modeling efforts and select the appropriate tools for future modeling efforts to predict pilot performance in NextGen operations.
The Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) framework affords software capable of conducting human reliability analysis (HRA) using a dynamic approach built around operating procedures (OPs) from nuclear power plants (NPPs). Previous HUNTER reports document the development of this software tool, the coupling of HUNTER to the simulator code, the collection of operator performance data by using simulators to calibrate HUNTER models, and linking HUNTER to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) software. The present report largely addresses two topics. The first is a new function in HUNTER called the HUNTER Procedure Performance Predictor (P3). HUNTER P3 uses HUNTER’s built in Monte Carlo tools featuring human performance variability to identify potential error traps in procedures. The second topic is time distribution analysis to generate time inputs for dynamic HRA. The current analysis was performed to investigate time distributions for task primitives, which are the minimum task unit of analysis used in dynamic HRA modeling. Using the time distribution data, the elapsed time for human actions in an extended loss of AC power (ELAP) scenario is then investigated. Time data and prediction are essential for modeling procedure performance.
Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. The study of human contributions to safety represents a vast and largely unexplored opportunity to learn. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform system design, safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety producing behaviors in addition to safety reducing behaviors.
As NASA is planning to send humans deeper into space than ever before, adequate crew health and performance will be critical for mission success. Within the NASA Human Research Program (HRP), the Space Human Factors and Habitability (SHFH) team is responsible for characterizing the risks associated with human capabilities and limitations with respect to long-duration spaceflight, and for providing mitigations (e.g., guidelines, technologies, and tools) to promote safe, reliable and productive missions. SHFH research includes three domains: Advanced Environmental Health (AEH), Advanced Food Technology (AFT), and Space Human Factors Engineering (SHFE). The AEH portfolio focuses on understanding the risk of microbial contamination of the spacecraft and on the development of standards for exposure to potential toxins such as chemicals, bacteria, fungus, and lunar/Martian dust. The two risks that the environmental health project focuses on are adverse health effects due to changes in host-microbe interactions, and risks associated with exposure to dust in planetary surface habitats. This portfolio also proposes countermeasures to these risks by making recommendations that relate to requirements for environmental quality, foods, and crew health on spacecraft and space missions. The AFT portfolio focuses on reducing the mass, volume, and waste of the entire integrated food system to be used in exploration missions, and investigating processing methods to extend the shelf life of food items up to five years, while assuring that exploration crews will have nutritious and palatable foods. The portfolio also delivers improvements in both the food itself and the technologies for storing and preparing it. SHFE sponsors research to establish human factors and habitability standards and guidelines in five risk areas, and provides improved design concepts for advanced crew interfaces and habitability systems. These risk areas include: Incompatible vehicle/habitat design, inadequate human-computer interaction, inadequate critical task design, inadequate human-automation/robotic interaction, and performance errors due to training deficiencies. To address the identified research gaps within each risk, SHFH's research plan includes studies in the laboratory, in analogs, and on International Space Station (ISS). In addition to establishing and maintaining the risk-based research portfolio, SHFH is also implementing a qualitative approach to determine how we at NASA evaluate human performance. Via interviews with experts, such as trainers, flight controllers, and flight surgeons, we are collecting the metrics by which they assess human performance, evidence of performance issues, and potential or actual consequences. The Human Performance Data Project will determine what human performance data have been collected in the past at NASA, and what data should be collected in the future in order to complete our knowledgebase and reduce risks related to human factors and habitability.
Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures in aviation. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of aviation safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety-producing behaviors in addition to safety-reducing behaviors. Opportunities and challenges in collecting and analyzing the largely unexploited data on desired, safety-producing operator behaviors are discussed.
Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures in aviation. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of aviation safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety producing behaviors in addition to safety reducing behaviors. The panel will discuss opportunities and challenges in collecting and analyzing the largely unexploited data on desired, safety-producing operator behaviors.
A team is defined as: "two or more individuals who interact socially and adaptively, have shared or common goals, and hold meaningful task interdependences; it is hierarchically structured and has a limited life span; in it expertise and roles are distributed; and it is embedded within an organization/environmental context that influences and is influenced by ongoing processes and performance outcomes" (Salas, Stagl, Burke, & Goodwin, 2007, p. 189). From the NASA perspective, a team is commonly understood to be a collection of individuals that is assigned to support and achieve a particular mission. Thus, depending on context, this definition can encompass both the spaceflight crew and the individuals and teams in the larger multi-team system who are assigned to support that crew during a mission. The Team Risk outcomes of interest are predominantly performance related, with a secondary emphasis on long-term health; this is somewhat unique in the NASA HRP in that most Risk areas are medically related and primarily focused on long-term health consequences. In many operational environments (e.g., aviation), performance is assessed as the avoidance of errors. However, the research on performance errors is ambiguous. It implies that actions may be dichotomized into "correct" or "incorrect" responses, where incorrect responses or errors are always undesirable. Researchers have argued that this dichotomy is a harmful oversimplification, and it would be more productive to focus on the variability of human performance and how organizations can manage that variability (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) (Category III1). Two problems occur when focusing on performance errors: 1) the errors are infrequent and, therefore, difficult to observe and record; and 2) the errors do not directly correspond to failure. Research reveals that humans are fairly adept at correcting or compensating for performance errors before such errors result in recognizable or recordable failures. Astronauts are notably adept high performers. Most failures are recorded only when multiple, small errors occur and humans are unable to recognize and correct or compensate for these errors in time to prevent a failure (Dismukes, Berman, Loukopoulos, 2007) (Category III). More commonly, observers record variability in levels of performance. Some teams commit no observable errors but fail to achieve performance objectives or perform only adequately, while other teams commit some errors but perform spectacularly. Successful performance, therefore, cannot be viewed as simply the absence of errors or the avoidance of failure Johnson Space Center (JSC) Joint Leadership Team, 2008). While failure is commonly attributed to making a major error, focusing solely on the elimination of error(s) does not significantly reduce the risk of failure. Failure may also occur when performance is simply insufficient or an effort is incapable of adjusting sufficiently to a contextual change (e.g., changing levels of autonomy).
A large variety of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) designs are currently in production or in development. These aircraft range from small electric quadcopters that are flown close to the ground within visual range of the operator, to larger systems capable of extended flight in airspace shared with conventional aircraft. Before RPA can operate routinely and safely in civilian airspace, we need to understand the unique human factors associated with these aircraft. The task of flying an RPA in civilian airspace involves challenges common to the operation of other highly-automated systems, but also introduces new considerations for pilot perception, decision-making, and action execution. RPA pilots participated in focus groups where they were asked to recall critical incidents that either presented a threat to safety, or highlighted a case where the pilot contributed to system resilience or mission success. Ninety incidents were gathered from focus-groups. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Some of these concerns have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. The presentation will focus on issues that are poorly understood, and have not yet been the subject of extensive human factors study. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.
Activity classification plays a crucial role in various real-life scenarios involving both humans and animals. There is an increasing need for precise activity classification focused on avian-solar interactions, as the usage of solar energy facilities, such as photovoltaic array power stations, has been observed to impact bird species richness, behavior, and activity. However, there has been no work to develop an automated system to monitor and classify these avian-solar interactions. All current methods rely on human observers, which is time and human resources costly and subject to errors related to searcher efficiency. With the recent success of Deep Learning models in activity classification problems, this paper develops a recurrent neural network-based model to automatically classify six avian activities around solar energy facilities. Our proposed model integrates critical feature engineering metadata with video frame data, enabling improved learning and more accurate activity classification. Furthermore, we address the challenge of data imbalance during training and demonstrate the efficacy of our model in detecting and classifying different activities within video tracks. Additionally, we analyze the saliency/backpropagation map of the trained proposed model and validate its decision-making rationale.
Large-scale electrification is vital to addressing the climate crisis, but several scientific and technological challenges remain to fully electrify both the chemical industry and transportation. In both of these areas, new electrochemical materials will be critical, but their development currently relies heavily on human-time-intensive experimental trial and error and computationally expensive first-principles, meso-scale and continuum simulations. To accelerate this process, our team has developed the AutoMat platform. AutoMat can accelerate development of new electrochemical materials along two avenues: first, automated input generation and management of simulations at multiple lengthscales as well as “handoff” of outputs from one lengthscale as inputs to the next; and second, replacement of the most computationally intensive simulation processes with machine-learned surrogate models. The crux of our team’s effort was not “reinventing the wheel” by developing entirely new techniques, but rather building a “superhighway” that allows existing state-of-the-art techniques to run faster and more smoothly than before. AutoMat can utilize tools spanning from first-principles quantum chemistry computations to automated robotic experimentation, and is driven by design space search techniques to reduce the number of iterations through the full simulation loop by rapidly targeting promising regions of design spaces such as single-atom alloy catalysts or blends of liquid electrolytes.
Visual and tactile display for compensatory tracking, noting conditions for minimum error, mean square error, etc
Experimental critique of method of constant stimuli and alternative procedures
A joint JPL-NASA program to develop an automated system to measure the thermoelectric properties of newly developed materials is described. Consideration is given to the difficulties created by signal drift in measurements of Hall voltage and the Large Delta T Seebeck coefficient. The benefits of a computerized system were examined with respect to error reduction and time savings for human operators. It is shown that the time required to measure Hall voltage can be reduced by a factor of 10 when a computer is used to fit a curve to the ratio of the measured signal and its standard deviation. The accuracy of measurements of the Large Delta T Seebeck coefficient and thermal diffusivity was also enhanced by the use of computers.