Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Fire Protection”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 415 records · Page 23

How emissions uncertainty influences the distribution and radiative impacts of smoke from fires in North America

Fires and the aerosols that they emit impact air quality, health, and climate, but the abundance and properties of carbonaceous aerosol (both black carbon and organic carbon) from biomass burning (BB) remain uncertain and poorly constrained. We aim to explore the uncertainties associated with fire emissions and their air quality and radiative impacts from underlying dry matter consumed and emissions factors. To investigate this, we compare model simulations from a global chemical transport model, GEOS-Chem, driven by a variety of fire emission inventories with surface and airborne observations of black carbon (BC) and organic aerosol (OA) concentrations and satellite-derived aerosol optical depth (AOD). We focus on two fire-detection-based and/or burned-area-based (FD-BA) inventories using burned area and active fire counts, respectively, i.e., the Global Fire Emissions Database version 4 (GFED4s) with small fires and the Fire INventory from NCAR version 1.5 (FINN1.5), and two fire radiative power (FRP)-based approaches, i.e., the Quick Fire Emission Dataset version 2.4 (QFED2.4) and the Global Fire Assimilation System version 1.2 (GFAS1.2). We show that, across the inventories, emissions of BB aerosol (BBA) differ by a factor of 4 to 7 over North America and that dry matter differences, not emissions factors, drive this spread. We find that simulations driven by QFED2.4 generally overestimate BC and, to a lesser extent, OA concentrations observations from two fire-influenced aircraft campaigns in North America (ARCTAS and DC3) and from the Interagency Monitoring of Protected Visual Environments (IMPROVE) network, while simulations driven by FINN1.5 substantially underestimate concentrations. The GFED4s and GFAS1.2-driven simulations provide the best agreement with OA and BC mass concentrations at the surface (IMPROVE), BC observed aloft (DC3 and ARCTAS), and AOD observed by MODIS over North America. We also show that a sensitivity simulation including an enhanced source of secondary organic aerosol (SOA) from fires, based on the NOAA Fire Lab 2016 experiments, produces substantial additional OA; however, the spread in the primary emissions estimates implies that this magnitude of SOA can be neither confirmed nor ruled out when comparing the simulations against the observations explored here. Given the substantial uncertainty in fire emissions, as represented by these four emission inventories, we find a sizeable range in 2012 annual BBA PM2.5 population-weighted exposure over Canada and the contiguous US (0.5 to 1.6 µg/cu. m). We also show that the range in the estimated global direct radiative effect of carbonaceous aerosol from fires (−0.11 to −0.048 W/sq. m) is large and comparable to the direct radiative forcing of OA (−0.09 W/sq. m) estimated in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Our analysis suggests that fire emissions uncertainty challenges our ability to accurately characterize the impact of smoke on air quality and climate.

North America↗

Wildland Fire Management Plan for Brookhaven National Laboratory

The DOE policy for managing wildland fires requires that all areas managed by DOE and/or Its various contractors which can sustain fire must have a FMP that details fire management guidelines for operational procedures associated with wildland fire, operational, and prescribed fires. FMPs provide guidance on fire preparedness, fire prevention, wildfire suppression, and the use of controlled ''prescribed'' fires and mechanical means to control the amount of available combustible material. Values reflected in the BNL Wildland FMP include protecting life and public safety; Lab properties, structures and improvements; cultural and historical sites; neighboring private and public properties; and endangered, threatened, and species of concern. Other values supported by the plan include the enhancement of fire-dependent ecosystems at BNL. The plan will be reviewed periodically to ensure fire program advances and will evolve with the missions of DOE and BNL.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Wildland Fire Management Plan for Brookhaven National Laboratory

This Wildland Fire Management Plan (FMP) for Brookhaven National Lab (BNL) updates the 2003 plan incorporating changes necessary to comply with DOE Order 450.1 and DOE P 450.4, Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review; Wildland and Prescribed Fire Management Policy and implementation Procedures Reference Guide. This current plan incorporates changes since the original draft of the FMP that result from new policies on the national level. This update also removes references and dependence on the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and Department of the Interior, fully transitioning Wildland Fire Management responsibilities to BNL. The Department of Energy policy for managing wildland fires requires that all areas, managed by the DOE and/or its various contractors, that can sustain fire must have a FMP that details fire management guidelines for operational procedures associated with wild fire, operational, and prescribed fires. Fire management plans provide guidance on fire preparedness, fire prevention, wildfire suppression, and the use of controlled, 'prescribed' fires and mechanical means to control the amount of available combustible material. Values reflected in the BNL Wildland FMP include protecting life and public safety; Lab properties, structures and improvements; cultural and historical sites; neighboring private and public properties; and endangered, threatened, and species of concern. Other values supported by the plan include the enhancement of fire-dependent ecosystems at BNL. This FMP will be reviewed periodically to ensure the fire program advances and evolves with the missions of the DOE and BNL. This Fire Management Plan is presented in a format that coverers all aspects specified by DOE guidance documents which are based on the national template for fire management plans adopted under the National Fire Plan. The DOE is one of the signatory agencies on the National Fire Plan. This FMP is to be used and implemented for the entire BNL site including the Upton Reserve and has been reviewed by, The Nature Conservancy, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation Forest Rangers, and DOE, as well as appropriate BNL emergency services personnel. The BNL Fire Department is the lead on wildfire suppression. However, the BNL Natural Resource Manager will be assigned to all wildland fires as technical resource advisor.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Modeling Heat Transfer and Pressurization of Polymeric Methylene Diisocyanate (PMDI) Polyurethane Foam in a Sealed Container

Polymer foam encapsulants provide mechanical, electrical, and thermal isolation in engineered systems. It can be advantageous to surround objects of interest, such as electronics, with foams in a hermetically sealed container to protect the electronics from hostile environments, such as a crash that produces a fire. However, in fire environments, gas pressure from thermal decomposition of foams can cause mechanical failure of the sealed system. In this work, a detailed study of thermally decomposing polymeric methylene diisocyanate (PMDI)-polyether-polyol based polyurethane foam in a sealed container is presented. Both experimental and computational work is discussed. Three models of increasing physics fidelity are presented: No Flow, Porous Media, and Porous Media with VLE. Each model us described in detail, compared to experiment, and uncertainty quantification is performed. While the Porous Media with VLE model matches has the best agreement with experiment, it also requires the most computational resources.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Technology for the cities

The activities of an organization for making the technology derived from NASA programs available for use by urban communities are discussed. Examples of technology utilization accomplished by the organization are: (1) self-contained breathing apparatus for firemen, (2) short range communication systems, (3) pavement marking, (4) protective clothing for firemen, (5) underground pipe and conduit locator, and (6) automatic fire hose flow regulator. The manner in which urban problems are identified and the designation of applicable technical developments are described.

Source record↗

Linking repeat lidar with Landsat products for large scale quantification of fire-induced permafrost thaw settlement in interior Alaska

The permafrost–fire–climate system has been a hotspot in research for decades under a warming climate scenario. Surface vegetation plays a dominant role in protecting permafrost from summer warmth, thus, any alteration of vegetation structure, particularly following severe wildfires, can cause dramatic top–down thaw. A challenge in understanding this is to quantify fire-induced thaw settlement at large scales (>1000 km 2 ). In this study, we explored the potential of using Landsat products for a large-scale estimation of fire-induced thaw settlement across a well-studied area representative of ice-rich lowland permafrost in interior Alaska. Six large fires have affected ~1250 km 2 of the area since 2000. We first identified the linkage of fires, burn severity, and land cover response, and then developed an object-based machine learning ensemble approach to estimate fire-induced thaw settlement by relating airborne repeat lidar data to Landsat products. The model delineated thaw settlement patterns across the six fire scars and explained ~65% of the variance in lidar-detected elevation change. Our results indicate a combined application of airborne repeat lidar and Landsat products is a valuable tool for large scale quantification of fire-induced thaw settlement.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Acoustic Emission Analysis of Shuttle Thermal Protection System

Acoustic emission (AE) signals generated from projectile impacts on reinforced and advanced carbon/carbon (RCC and ACC) panels, fired from a compressed-gas gun, identify the type and severity of damage sustained by the target. This type of testing is vital in providing the required "return to flight" (RTF) data needed to ensure continued and safe operation of NASA's Space Shuttle fleet. The gas gun at Kennedy Space Center is capable of propelling 12-inch by 3-inch cylinders of external tank (ET) foam at exit velocities exceeding 1,000 feet per second. Conventional AE analysis techniques require time domain processing of impulse data, along with amplitude distribution analysis. It is well known that identical source excitations can produce a wide range of AE signals amplitudes. In order to satisfy RTF goals, it is necessary to identify impact energy levels above and below damage thresholds. Spectral analysis techniques involving joint time frequency analysis (JTFA) are used to reinforce time domain AE analysis. JTFA analysis of the AE signals consists of short-time Fourier transforms (STFT) and the Huang-Hilbert transform (HHT). The HHT provides a very good measure of the instantaneous frequency of impulse events dominated by a single component. Identifying failure modes and cracking of fibers from flexural and/or extensional mode acoustic signals will help support in-flight as well as postflight impact analysis.

Lane, John↗

Analysis of Potential Airborne Radionuclide Emissions During and After Fires Through Contaminated Soil Areas on the INL

Analysis of Potential Airborne Radionuclide Emissions During and After Fires Through Contaminated Soil Areas on the INL Wildfires on the INL have heightened concerns that such fires could burn through radiologically contaminated soil areas and could potentially pose a hazard to firefighters and the public. Exposure to windblown contaminated dust from fire-denuded landscapes is another concern. This report re-examines the potential for fire and dust releases from the six previously identified and posted (radiological) soil contamination areas (SCAs), as well as the one Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) site not posted as SCAs that were identified in the original 2001 revision of this report. Releases and their consequences, during and after fires are analyzed in detail for the SCAs and the one CERCLA site near INL facilities.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase I & II

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. However, POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), starting in 2015 SNL conducted a new series of fire tests to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to over-pressurize and release its inner content. Tests conducted during 2015 and 2016, and described herein, were done in two phases. The goal of the first phase was to see if the PC would reach high enough temperatures to decompose typical combustible materials inside the PC. The goal of the second test phase was to determine under what heating loads (i.e., incident heat fluxes) the 7A drum lid pops off from the POC drum. This report will describe the various tests conducted in phase I and II, present preliminary results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase II-A

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. However, POCs are now being used to store combustible Transuranic (TRU) waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), SNL started conducting a new series of fire tests in 2015 to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to overpressurize and release its inner content. In 2016, Phase II tests showed that POCs tested in a pool fire failed within 3 minutes of ignition with the POC lid ejecting. These POC lids were fitted with an all-metal (NUCFIL019DS) filter and revealed that this specific filter did not relieve sufficient pressure to prevent lid ejection. For the test phase discussed in this report, Phase II-A, the POCs are exposed to a 30-minute pool fire, with similar configurations to those tested in Phase II, except that the POC lids are fitted with a hybrid metal-polyethylene (UT9424S) filter instead. This report will: describe the various tests conducted in Phase II-A, present results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs based on the test results.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase II-A

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. However, POCs are now being used to store combustible Transuranic (TRU) waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), SNL started conducting a new series of fire tests in 2015 to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to overpressurize and release its inner content. In 2016, Phase II tests showed that POCs tested in a pool fire failed within 3 minutes of ignition with the POC lid ejecting. These POC lids were fitted with an all-metal (NUCFIL019DS) filter and revealed that this specific filter did not relieve sufficient pressure to prevent lid ejection. For the test phase discussed in this report, Phase II-A, the POCs are exposed to a 30-minute pool fire, with similar configurations to those tested in Phase II, except that the POC lids are fitted with a hybrid metal-polyethylene (UT9424S) filter instead. This report will: describe the various tests conducted in Phase II-A, present results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs based on the test results.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase I II & III.

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), starting in 2015 SNL conducted a series of fire tests to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to over-pressurize and release its inner content. Tests conducted during 2015 and 2016 were done in three phases. The goal of the first phase was to see if the PC would reach high enough temperatures to decompose typical combustible materials inside the PC. The goal of the second test phase was to determine under what heating loads (i.e., incident heat fluxes) the 7A drum lid pops off from the POC drum. The goal of the third phase was to see if surrogate aerosol gets released from the PC when the drum lid is off. This report will describe the various tests conducted in phase I, II, and III, present preliminary results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase II-B

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire. This test resulted in one of the POCs generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its drum lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials that would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. However, POCs are now being used to store combustible Transuranic (TRU) waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), SNL started conducting a new series of fire tests in 2015 to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that could result in: (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to over-pressurize and release its inner contents. In 2016, Phase II of the tests showed that POCs tested in a pool fire failed within 3 minutes of ignition with the POC lid ejecting. These POC lids were fitted with a NUCFIL-019DS filter and revealed that this specific filter did not relieve sufficient pressure to prevent lid ejection. In the Fall of 2017, Phase II-A was conducted to expose POCs to a 30-minute pool fire with similar configurations to those tested in Phase II, except that the POC lids were fitted with an UltraTech (UT) 9424S filter instead. That specific filter was chosen because of its design to help relieve internal pressure during the fire and thus prevent lid ejection. In Phase II-A, however, setups of two POCs stacked upon one another were never tested, which led to this phase of tests, Phase II-B. This report will describe the various tests conducted in Phase II-B, present results from these tests, and implications for the POCs based on the test results will be discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The 1977 tundra fire at Kokolik River, Alaska

During the summer of 1977, fire totaled 44 sq km of tundra vegetation according to measurements using LANDSAT imagery. Based on the experience gained from analysis of this fire using ground observations, satellite imagery, and topographic maps, it appears that natural drainages form effective fire breaks on the subdued relief of the Arctic coastal plain and northern foothills. It is confirmed that the intensity of the fire is related to vegetation type and to the moisture content of the organic rich soils.

Alaska↗

Fire-Resistant Aircraft Ceilings

Ceiling panel for airplane cabins more fire resistant than conventional panels. New panel incorporates core of polyimide foam as fire shield. Core significantly delays burn-through by flames and offers passengers greater protection.

Trabold, E. A.↗

QM-8 field joint protection system, volume 7

The pre-launch functioning data of the Field Joint Protection System (JPS) used on QM-8 are presented. Also included is the post fire condition of the JPS components following the test firing of the motor. The JPS components are: field joint heaters; field joint sensors; field joint moisture seal; moisture seal kevlar retaining straps; field joint external extruded cork insulation; vent valve; power cables; and igniter heater.

Hale, Elgie↗

Space Operations for a New Era of Exploration Launch Vehicles

NASA's Constellation Program is depending on the Ares Projects to deliver the crew and cargo launch capabilities needed to send human explorers to the Moon and beyond. Ares I and V will provide the core space launch capabilities needed to continue providing crew and cargo access to the International Space Station (ISS), and to build upon the U.S. history of human space exploration. Since 2005, Ares has made substantial progress on designing, developing, and testing the Ares I crew launch vehicle and has continued its in-depth studies of the Ares V cargo launch vehicles. The combined Ares I/Ares V architecture has been designed to reduce the complexity and labor intensity of ground operations for America's next journeys beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO). A deliberate effort is being made to ensure a high level of system operability to significantly increase safety and system availability as well as reduce recurring costs for this new launch vehicle. The Ares Projects goal is to instill operability as part of the vehicles requirements development, design, and operations. This simplicity will come from using simpler, proven engine designs, as in the case of the J-2X upper stage engine and RS-68 engine; improving existing hardware, as in the case of the Shuttle-heritage 5-segment solid rocket motor; and using common propulsion and instrument unit elements between Ares I and Ares V. Furthermore, lessons learned while developing Ares I will be applied directly to Ares V operations. In 2009, the Ares Projects plan to conduct the first flight test of Ares I, designated Ares I-X. Ares I-X preparations have already prompted changes to the vehicle stacking and launch infrastructure at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), including removing Shuttle-specific fixtures from the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) to accommodate Ares I-style stacking operations, new firing room computers and infrastructure in the VAB Launch Control Center, and new lightning protection system towers at Launch Complex 39B to accommodate the greater height of Ares I-X. In addition to lessons learned from the stacking of Ares I-X, the flight test itself promises to yield important data and operations lessons for assembling, launching, and flying Ares I.

Cook, Stephen A.↗