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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2013

Integration of Mirror Design with Suspension System using NASA's New Mirror Modeling Software

Advances in mirror fabrication is making very large space based telescopes possible. In the many applications, only monolithic mirrors meet the performance requirements. The existing and near-term planned heavy launch vehicles place a premium on lowest possible mass. Again, available and planned payload shroud size limits near term designs to 4 meter class mirror. Practical 8 meter and beyond designs could encourage planners to include larger shrouds if it can be proven that such mirrors can be manufactured. These two factors lower mass and larger mirrors, presents the classic optimization problem. There is a practical upper limit to how large a mirror can be supported by a purely kinematic mount system and be launched. This paper shows how the design of the suspension system and mirror blank needs to be designed simultaneously. We will also explore the concepts of auxiliary support systems, which act only during launch and disengage on orbit. We will define required characteristics of these systems and show how they can substantially reduce the mirror mass. The AMTD project is developing and maturing the processes for future replacements for HUBBLE, creating the design tools, validating the methods and techniques necessary to manufacture, test and launch extremely large optical missions. This paper will use the AMTD 4 meter "design point" as an illustration of the typical use of the modeler in generating the multiple models of mirror and suspension systems used during the conceptual design phase of most projects. The influence of Hexapod geometry, mirror depth, cell size and construction techniques (Exelsis Deep Core Low Temperature Fusion (c) versus Corning Frit Bonded (c) versus Schott Pocket Milled Zerodur (c) in this particular study) are being evaluated. Due to space and time consideration we will only be able to present snippets of the study in this paper. The advances in manufacturing techniques for lightweight mirrors, such as EXELSIS deep core low temperature fusion, Corning's continued improvements in the Frit bonding process and the ability to cast large complex designs, combined with water-jet and conventional diamond.

Arnold, William↗
NASA NTRS2013

Integration of Mirror Design with Suspension System Using NASA's New Mirror Modeling Software

Advances in mirror fabrication are making very large space based telescopes possible. In many applications, only monolithic mirrors can meet the performance requirements. The existing and near-term planned heavy launch vehicles place a premium on lowest possible mass, and then available payload shroud sizes limit near term designs to 4 meter class mirrors. Practical 8 meter class and beyond designs could encourage planners to include larger shrouds, if it can be proven that such mirrors can be manufactured. These two factors, lower mass and larger mirrors, present the classic optimization problem. There is a practical upper limit to how large of a mirror can be supported by a purely kinematic mount system handling both operational and launch loads. This paper shows how the suspension system and mirror blank need to be designed simultaneously. We will also explore the concepts of auxiliary support systems which act only during launch and disengage on orbit. We will define required characteristics of these systems and show how they can substantially reduce the mirror mass.

Arnold, William R., Sr.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Integration of Mirror Design with Suspension System using NASA's New Mirror Modeling Software

Advances in mirror fabrication are making very large space based telescopes possible. In many applications, only monolithic mirrors can meet the performance requirements. The existing and near-term planned heavy launch vehicles place a premium on lowest possible mass, and then available payload shroud sizes limit near term designs to 4 meter class mirrors. Practical 8 meter class and beyond designs could encourage planners to include larger shrouds, if it can be proven that such mirrors can be manufactured. These two factors, lower mass and larger mirrors, present the classic optimization problem. There is a practical upper limit to how large of a mirror can be supported by a purely kinematic mount system handling both operational and launch loads. This paper shows how the suspension system and mirror blank need to be designed simultaneously. We will also explore the concepts of auxiliary support systems which act only during launch and disengage on orbit. We will define required characteristics of these systems and show how they can substantially reduce the mirror mass.

Arnold,William R., Sr.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Derivation of Equations of Motion and Model-based Control for 3D Rigid Body Approximation of LUVOIR

The Large UV/Optical/IR Surveyor (LUVOIR) is a conceptual space observatory under development by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center for the Astronomy and Astrophysics Decadal Survey. As with similar space telescopes, e.g., James Webb, this spacecraft will have ultra-stringent pointing stability requirements, i.e., on the order of miliarcseconds. Thus, the design of the LUVOIR attitude control system (ACS) may benefit from a model-based approach. In this document, we present an approximate model of the LUVOIR composed of two 3D rigid bodies connected by a 1-DOF rotary joint. From this model, we derive the nonlinear equations of motion, following the approach of Eric T. Stoneking [1], and linearize them about an arbitrary reference orientation. Using the subsequent state space representation, it is straightforward to compute a set of control gains (e.g., via the ”lqr” or ”place” commands in MATLAB). We conclude this memo with a comparison of our LQR approach with the existing PID slew controller designed by a former NASA intern.

William Bentz↗
NASA NTRS2021

NASA in Silicon Valley

Whether looking back only a few years or more than a century, our world has been changing. Communication networks are more widespread and interconnected than at any other time in human history. Computing power that was only imagined a generation ago is now widely available and can fit in the palm of a hand. The miniaturization of the integrated circuit has brought us close to the limit of what is possible with silicon as we explore new possibilities in the quantum realm. For over 80 years, NASA’s Ames Research Center in California’s Silicon Valley has held a special place amidst such change. With change, there also is continuity. Since 1939, Ames contributions have fundamentally shaped fields of study related to aeronautics and space. The ingenuity and problem-solving capabilities of personnel at Ames have affected all our lives in numerous ways, from everyday air travel to how we envision the possibility of life on other worlds. This publication is a mere hint at the rich history of Ames, told primarily through images that capture some of the recurring threads that have intertwined over that time. A bibliography points the reader to more detailed histories of Ames published over the years. They are excellent resources and, like all historical work, unavoidably incomplete. Our standing invitation in the present is to preserve what we can to help us understand where we are and how we arrived.

History↗
NASA NTRS1990

Advancing automation and robotics technology for the Space Station Freedom and for the US economy

In April 1985, the NASA Advanced Technology Advisory Committee (ATAC) reported to Congress the results of its studies on advanced automation and robotics technology for use on Space Station Freedom. This material was documented in the initial report (NASA Technical Memorandum 87566). The progress made by Levels 1, 2, and 3 of the Office of Space Station in developing and applying advanced automation and robotics technology are described. Emphasis was placed upon the Space Station Freedom Program responses to specific recommendations made in ATAC Progress Report 9, the Flight Telerobotic Servicer, the Advanced Development Program, and the Data Management System. Assessments are presented for these and other areas as they apply to the advancement of automation and robotics technology for the Space Station Freedom.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1993

Surface characterization of LDEF materials

The NASA Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), a passive experimental satellite, was placed into low-Earth orbit by the Shuttle Challenger in Apr. 1984. The LDEF spent an unprecedented 69 months in space. The flight and recovery of the LDEF provided a wealth of information on the longterm space environmental effects of a variety of materials exposed to the low-Earth orbit environment. Surface characterization of LDEF materials included polymers, composites, thermal control paints, and aluminum. X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS), Auger electron spectroscopy (AES), scanning electron microscopy (SEM), and contact angle analysis were used to document changes in both the surface composition and surface chemistry of these materials. Detailed XPS analysis of the polymer systems, such as Kapton, polyimide polysiloxane copolymers, and fluorinated ethylene propylene thermal blankets on the backside of the LDEF revealed significant changes in both the surface composition and surface chemistry as a result of exposure to the low-Earth orbit environment. Polymer systems such as Kapton, polyimide polysiloxane copolymers, and polysulfone showed a common trend of decreasing carbon content and increasing oxygen content with respect to the control sample. Carbon 1s curve fit XPS analysis of the composite samples, in conjunction with SEM photomicrographs, revealed significant ablation of the polymer matrix resin to expose the carbon fibers of the composite during exposure to the space environment. Surface characterization of anodized aluminum tray clamps, which were located at regular intervals over the entire LDEF frame, provided the first results to evaluate the extent of contamination with respect to position on the LDEF. The XPS results clearly showed that the amount and state of both silicon and fluorine contamination were directly dependent upon the position of the tray clamp on the LDEF.

Wightman, J. P.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Flight Test Analysis of the Forces and Moments Imparted on a B737-100 Aircraft During Wake Vortex Encounters

Several of our major airports are operating at or near their capacity limit, increasing congestion and delays for travelers. As a result, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has been working in conjunction with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), airline operators, and the airline industry to increase airport capacity and safety. As more and more airplanes are placed into the terminal area the probability of encountering wake turbulence is increased. The NASA Langley Research Center conducted a series of flight tests from 1995 through 1997 to develop a wake encounter and wake-measurement data set with the accompanying atmospheric state information. The purpose of this research is to use the data from those flights to compute the wake-induced forced and moments exerted on the aircraft The calculated forces and moments will then be compiled into a database that can be used by wake vortex researchers to compare with experimental and computational results.

Roberts, Christopher L.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Survivability of Microbes in Mars Wind Blown Dust Environment

Although the probability of Earth microbes growing (dividing) in the Martian environment is extremely low, the probability of their survival on the Martian surface is unknown. During the course of landed missions to Mars terrestrial microbes may reach the surface of Mars via inadequately sterilized spacecraft landers, rovers, or through accidental impact of orbiters. This investigation studied the potential for Earth microbes to survive in the windblown dust on the surface of Mars. The rationale for the study comes from the fact that Mars regularly has huge dust storms that engulf the planet, shading the surface from solar UV radiation. These storms serve as a mechanism for global transfer of dust particles. If live organisms were to be transported to the surface of Mars they could be picked up with the dust during a dust storm and transported across the planet. Washed, dried spores of Bacillus subtilis strain HA 101 were aseptically mixed with sterile sieved (size range of 1-5microns) Mars soil standard (obtained from NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas, USA), or Fe-montmorillonite such that the number of microbes equals 5 x 10(exp 6)/g dry wt soil. The microbe soil mixture was placed in a spherical 8 L Mars simulation chamber equipped with a variable speed rotor, gas ports and an Oriel deuterium UV lamp emitting light of wave lengths 180-400 nm. The chamber was sealed, flushed with a simulated Martian atmosphere (96.9% CO2, 3% O2, 0.1% H2O), and the pressure brought to 10 torr. The lamp and rotor were switched on to begin the experiment. Periodically samples were collected from the chamber, and the numbers of microbial survivors g soil was determined using plate counts and the most probable number method (MPN). The data indicate that Bacillus subtilis spores dispersed with Mars analog soil in a Mars atmosphere (wind blown dust) survive exposure to 5.13 KJ m-2 UV radiation, suggesting that Mars wind blown dust has potential to the protect microbes from solar UV radiation.

Mancinelli, Rocco L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

An Up-Close Look at Ares I-X

On October 28, 2009, one day later than the originally planned launch date, the Ares I-X suborbital test flight roared into the Florida sky. Flying its preplanned parabolic arc over the Atlantic, the development test vehicle for the Ares I crew launch vehicle performed as advertised, executing a perfect liftoff, 90-degree roll maneuver, ascent, and separation before its upper and lower stages descended into the ocean 150 miles downrange. This test flight, while carrying no astronauts, marked a major milestone for NASA, which had not flown a test launch of a human-rated rocket since the first flight of the Space Shuttle in 1981. During the flight, over 700 sensors collected over 900 measurements, which NASA will apply to validating the engineering models they used to design the vehicle in the first place. That data, telemetered to the ground and stored in a flight recorder onboard, was the primary "payload" of the mission.

Leahy, Bart↗
NASA NTRS2024

Quantifying Risk to Improve Medical System Design for Long Duration Artemis Missions: A Demonstration of NASA's IMPACT Tradespace Analysis Tool

BACKGROUND NASA’s human exploration spaceflight missions to the Moon and Mars present unprecedented challenges for in-mission medical care. A greater distance from Earth will mean increased mission durations, communication delays, limited to no resupply opportunities, and constraints on the evacuation of ill or injured crew. Mass, volume, and power will be limited while higher demands will be placed on the crews to manage medical events. NASA’s Moon to Mars exploration strategy outlines increasingly complex Artemis missions both in terms of duration and operations. In these more challenging deep space missions, it is important to quantitatively estimate the human system risk attributable to medical conditions and use these estimates to advance medical system design. METHODS IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and tradespace analysis tool developed by NASA to advance exploration mission medical system design. IMPACT v1.0 includes a novel evidence library baselined to exploration environments; an expanded list of 119 medical conditions; a large increase in the number of medical resources and the flexibility of their use; and the ability for rapid and iterative analysis. Medical system risk estimates include loss of crew life, consideration of the need for return to definitive care (medical evacuation), and an estimate of crew time affected due to medical conditions. A notional long duration lunar orbit and lunar surface design reference mission (DRM) was chosen with a 4-astronaut crew to mimic a foundational exploration Artemis mission. The DRM profile includes outbound transit on Orion, Gateway space station rendezvous in lunar orbit, 6 months on the Lunar surface with extravehicular activity (EVA), return rendezvous with Gateway, and transit back to Earth. RESULTS/DISCUSSION: Overall, IMPACT successfully quantified medical risk and derived an optimal medical system to support crew on a long duration lunar mission. In this DRM, the calculated loss of crew life from a medical event was 0.008 events per mission, risk of potential need for evacuation was 0.30 events per mission, and cumulative crew time affected by medical conditions was 103 days. The medical conditions that most contributed to medical risk were decompression sickness, trauma, and respiratory failure. The conditions that had the largest effects on crew performance included musculoskeletal injuries and lunar dust exposure. The IMPACT-generated medical system included resources that target the most common and highest risk conditions and performed as expected. This demonstrates the value of the IMPACT tool in medical system design for human exploration spaceflight missions.

Arian Anderson↗
NASA NTRS2011

Estimating the Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission for Crew Spacecraft

Once the US Space Shuttle retires in 2011, the Russian Soyuz Launcher and Soyuz Spacecraft will comprise the only means for crew transportation to and from the International Space Station (ISS). The U.S. Government and NASA have contracted for crew transportation services to the ISS with Russia. The resulting implications for the US space program including issues such as astronaut safety must be carefully considered. Are the astronauts and cosmonauts safer on the Soyuz than the Space Shuttle system? Is the Soyuz launch system more robust than the Space Shuttle? The Soyuz launcher has been in operation for over 40 years. There have been only two loss of life incidents and two loss of mission incidents. Given that the most recent incident took place in 1983, how do we determine current reliability of the system? Do failures of unmanned Soyuz rockets impact the reliability of the currently operational man-rated launcher? Does the Soyuz exhibit characteristics that demonstrate reliability growth and how would that be reflected in future estimates of success? NASA s next manned rocket and spacecraft development project will have to meet the Agency Threshold requirements set forth by NASA. The reliability targets are currently several times higher than the Shuttle and possibly even the Soyuz. Can these targets be compared to the reliability of the Soyuz to determine whether they are realistic and achievable? To help answer these questions this paper will explore how to estimate the reliability of the Soyuz Launcher/Spacecraft system, compare it to the Space Shuttle, and its potential impacts for the future of manned spaceflight. Specifically it will look at estimating the Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission (LOM) probability using historical data, reliability growth, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment techniques used to generate these numbers.

Lutomski, Michael G.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Micro-Pressure Sensors for Future Mars Missions

The joint research interchange effort was directed at the following principal areas: u further development of NASA-Ames' Mars Micro-meteorology mission concept as a viable NASA space mission especially with regard to the science and instrument specifications u interaction with the flight team from NASA's New Millennium 'Deep-Space 2' (DS-2) mission with regard to selection and design of micro-pressure sensors for Mars u further development of micro-pressure sensors suitable for Mars The research work undertaken in the course of the Joint Research Interchange should be placed in the context of an ongoing planetary exploration objective to characterize the climate system on Mars. In particular, a network of small probes globally-distributed on the surface of the planet has often been cited as the only way to address this particular science goal. A team from NASA Ames has proposed such a mission called the Micrometeorology mission, or 'Micro-met' for short. Surface pressure data are all that are required, in principle, to calculate the Martian atmospheric circulation, provided that simultaneous orbital measurements of the atmosphere are also obtained. Consequently, in the proposed Micro-met mission a large number of landers would measure barometric pressure at various locations around Mars, each equipped with a micro-pressure sensor. Much of the time on the JRI was therefore spent working with the engineers and scientists concerned with Micro-met to develop this particular mission concept into a more realistic proposition.

Catling, David C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Intentional Collaboration & Innovation Spaces at NASA

Collaboration and Innovation (C&I) are extremely popular terms in corporate jargon, and institutions with reputations for creativity often have clever and fun spaces set aside for hatching ideas and developing products or services. In and of themselves, a room full of "collaboration furniture" and electronics can't make C&I happen, any more than oil makes a gas or diesel engine run. As with the engine, though, quality lubrication is a huge factor in the smooth operation, power, and longevity of C&I activity. This paper describes spaces deliberately set up at numerous NASA field centers to support collaborative and creative thinking and processes. (Sometimes support is not so much a matter of doing things to spark discussion as it is removing constraints imposed by traditional settings and making information sharing as easy as possible.) Some spaces are rooms or suites dedicated to C&I, with significant electronic support and/or intentional lack thereof (to emphasize the human element). Others are small, comfortable "roosting places" that invite conversations of opportunity. Descriptions include the sponsoring organization, underlying goals and philosophies, lessons learned, and opportunities to excel. There is discussion about how such areas might interconnect within centers, across NASA, and with external entities using current technology and what tools and approaches may be in our future.

Scott, David W.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRS1986

New shape in the sky

The 'dual keel' design currently under consideration for NASA's Space Station program is of rectangular configuration to yield greater space along the truss structure for the attachment of payloads, by comparison with a previously considered single-keel truss design. The placing of the pressurized modules much nearer the center of gravity of this station configuration allows accelerations that are closer to 1 micro-g than the earlier alternative. The U.S. Servicing Facility and Telerobotic System, and the Canadian Mobile Servicing Center, will be incorporated in order to meet a large variety of Space Station servicing requirements.

Aaron, J. W.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Use of the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) for placement and retrieval of spacecraft and platforms

This paper describes the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) and its intended role as a key element of NASA's space infrastructure. Status, plans, and operational modes are summarized. Typical mission scenarios supporting the servicing of spacecraft and platforms from both the Shuttle and the Space Station are described. Particular emphasis is placed on the orbital mechanics associated with the placement and retrieval of spacecraft and platforms. For example, the optimum placement of a Space Station co-orbiting spacecraft in order to maximize the time interval during which it can be retrieved by a Space Station based OMV is shown as a function of the ballistic coefficient of the spacecraft.

Snoddy, William C.↗