Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “SAFETY”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 415 records · Page 23
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Semiglobal Safety-Filtered Extremum Seeking With Unknown CBFs

We introduce a safe extremum-seeking (Safe ES) algorithm which achieves the minimization of an unknown objective function while ensuring that an unknown, yet measured, control barrier function (CBF) remains above an arbitrarily small negative value for all time. In other words, “practical safety” is maintained during the entire period of convergence to the constrained extremum. Our design is based on quadratic program (QP) CBF style filters for safety, which is applied in an average and estimated sense. Using nonsmooth analysis tools, we guarantee semiglobal practical asymptotic (SPA) stability of the global constrained optimum, practical convergence to the safe set if starting in a condition violating the CBF, and practical safety for all time—semiglobally—if starting in safe set. The safety result of the paper is analogous with modern notions of SPA stability, guaranteeing that, for any small violation of safety, there exist design coefficients which guarantee that such a small violation is not exceeded. The paper outlines a set of sufficient conditions on the barrier and objective functions, and by way of a Lyapunov argument, we demonstrate that nonconvex constrained optimization problems can be solved. We present these results in the setting of a static map and a dynamical system. A simulation example illustrates the results.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Explorative Visualization for Traffic Safety using Adaptive Study Areas

The pressing need to improve traffic safety has become a societal concern in many cities around the world. Many traffic accidents are not occurring as stand-alone events but as consequences of other road incidents and hazards. To capture the traffic safety indications from a holistic aspect, this paper presents a suite of visualization techniques to explore large traffic safety datasets collected from different sources using adaptive study areas which include the whole region (Hamilton County, Ohio, U.S.) as well as smaller sub-areas. In the present study, these data source include (1) Hamilton County’s 911 emergency response data, which includes traffic incidents as well as other types of incidents throughout the county, and (2) Tennessee crash data, which contains only vehicle crashes with more detail on the circumstances of each crash. We find that both abstract and spatial visualization techniques are used to derive a better understanding of traffic safety patterns for different traffic participants in various urban environments. In addition to the entire region of Hamilton County, safety is examined on the highways, in the downtown area, and in a shopping district east of the city center. It is possible to characterize incidents in the different areas, gain a better understanding of common incident patterns, and identify outliers in the data. Finally, a textured tile calendar is presented to compare spatiotemporal patterns.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

VADER: A Tool for Criticality Safety Validation

The purpose of criticality safety is to prevent any inadvertent criticality from occurring during the handling or storage of fissile material. Calculations are frequently used to demonstrate that a sufficient subcritical margin exists. Validation is a key aspect of the evaluation process, establishing the suitability, accuracy, and associated uncertainty of the computational method and data to be used for the intended application. The validation process is performed by comparing the results of critical experiments with the calculated results from models of the experiments using the computational method to be validated. Laboratory critical experiments are controlled systems that achieve a k eff of approximately 1 in order to investigate the parameters at which such a critical condition is achieved. The validation parameters that are traditionally applied to safety analysis calculations are the bias and the bias uncertainty . The bias is the deviation of the average k eff of the validation suite from unity. The bias uncertainty accounts for the statistical uncertainty in the bias based on the standard deviation, sample size, and distribution of k eff values of the validation suite. The values of bias and bias uncertainty ensure that the systems predicted to be subcritical by the computational method will indeed be subcritical. The bias and bias uncertainty are often combined to determine an upper subcritical limit (USL) or computational margin that can then be applied to safety analysis calculations. Many methods have been developed by different organizations to calculate the bias and bias uncertainty for various types of criticality analyses. Each of these methods typically requires that the validity of various underpinning statistical assumptions be confirmed to demonstrate that the method is appropriate for the analysis of a given validation suite. An example of the validation decision making flow is shown in Fig.1. As shown in Fig. 1, the analyst performing the validation fits a trend line to the data and performs a test to determine if the trend was a statistically better representation of the data than if it were treated as an uncorrelated sample. If the trend line is a better representation of the data, then the analyst uses any one of a number of trending techniques to determine the bias and bias uncertainty. If a trend is not an appropriate representation of the data, then the analyst proceeds to perform a normality assessment for the data. If the normal assumption can be shown to be acceptable, then the analyst calculates the bias and bias uncertainty with the parametric technique. If the assumption of normality cannot be justified, then the nonparametric technique is used. Once the decision flow has been followed and the appropriate technique has been selected, the bias and bias uncertainty is typically combined with an administrative margin to determine a USL below which calculated values of k eff for safety analysis models can be considered subcritical. The calculations used in each decision are often performed with spreadsheets or with small programs available at various sites performing criticality analyses. Expertise in understanding and interpreting the results must be maintained to perform these calculations. This can often be an error-prone process. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is currently developing the Validation and Data Evaluation Resource (VADER) to simplify and automate the criticality safety validation process and to provide a software quality assurance pedigree to the calculational methods used. This paper discusses the use of the Fulcrum user interface with VADER, the anticipated initial capabilities of VADER to perform validation analyses, and the output from the code.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Preliminary Thermal-hydraulics and Selected Safety Analysis for Holos-Quad Reactor Design

This report presents thermal hydraulics and safety analyses of the 10 MWe Holos-Quad micro-reactor design developed by HolosGen LLC. These analyses were executed under steady-state and station black-out (SBO) transient conditions using the System Analysis Module (SAM), with a focus on ensuring peak fuel temperatures do not exceed the safety thresholds of 1,250°C for steady state normal operating conditions and 1,600°C for transient conditions. For steady-state temperature predictions, a coupled 1D fluid-to-3D solid heat conduction methodology was used. The steady-state simulations included a model of the central core region where power peaking occurs to predict the maximum steady-state fuel temperature, and a coarse-mesh full-core model to provide the initial condition for the consequent transient SBO decay heat removal simulation. The maximum fuel temperature predicted from the central core region simulations under the normal operating condition was 1,222°C, which is below the design limit 1,250°C. To simulate a SBO transient, a full core model was necessary because of the non-axial symmetric core design and heat loss from the outer core structures to the environment. To reduce the required computational costs, a novel scaled subassembly approach was used to model the full core domain. With the full core steady-state temperature distribution provided as the initial condition, the passive decay heat removal of the core was simulated with the scaled subassembly full core model under SBO transient conditions. This analysis showed that the peak fuel temperatures of the Holos-Quad core remained below their steady-state values during the transient, therefore much lower than the safety limit 1,600°C. This is mainly due to the large thermal inertia of the graphite matrix, relatively low power density, and the large surface-to-volume-ratio of the core. The preliminary analyses presented in this report confirm the inherent safety of the Holos-Quad micro-reactor thermal-hydraulics design, as the peak fuel temperatures under both normal and off-normal operational conditions remain within design and safety limits.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
NASA NTRS2002

NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE). Volume 1. Interim Report. Navy Submarine Program Safety Assurance

The NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE) was undertaken to identify practices and procedures and to share lessons learned in the Navy's submarine and NASA's human space flight programs. The NNBE focus is on safety and mission assurance policies, processes, accountability, and control measures. This report is an interim summary of activity conducted through October 2002, and it coincides with completion of the first phase of a two-phase fact-finding effort.In August 2002, a team was formed, co-chaired by senior representatives from the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance and the NAVSEA 92Q Submarine Safety and Quality Assurance Division. The team closely examined the two elements of submarine safety (SUBSAFE) certification: (1) new design/construction (initial certification) and (2) maintenance and modernization (sustaining certification), with a focus on: (1) Management and Organization, (2) Safety Requirements (technical and administrative), (3) Implementation Processes, (4) Compliance Verification Processes, and (5) Certification Processes.

SUBSAFE PROGRAM↗
NASA NTRS2001

NASA Safety and Health (Short Form). Final rule

This final rule adopts with changes the interim rule published in the Federal Register on April 5, 2001 (65 FR 18051-18053), which amended the NASA FAR Supplement to implement a Safety and Health (Short Form) clause to address safety and occupational health in all NASA contracts above the micro-purchase threshold where the existing Safety and Health clause did not apply, and amended other safety and health clauses to be consistent with the new NASA Safety and Health (Short Form) clause.

Contract Services↗
NASA NTRS2016

Ensuring Payload Safety in Missions with Special Partnerships

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) payload space flight missions involve cooperative work between NASA and partners including spacecraft (or payload) contractors, universities, nonprofit research centers, Agency payload organization, Range Safety organization, Agency launch service organizations, and launch vehicle contractors. The role of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate is typically fairly straightforward, but when a mission's partnerships become more complex, to realize cost and science benefits (e.g., multi-agency payload(s) or cooperative international missions), the task of ensuring payload safety becomes much more challenging. This paper discusses lessons learned from NASA safety professionals working multiple-agency missions and offers suggestions to help fellow safety professionals working multiple-agency missions.

Agency launch service organizations↗
NASA NTRS2018

Effects of Aircraft Health on Airspace Safety

This manuscript investigates the effects of aircraft health on the surrounding airspace, and proposes a methodology to understand how different aircraft-level faults (system faults, communication faults, etc.) can adversely affect the safety of the airspace, and qualitatively assess the impact of such faults on airspace safety metrics (such as congestion, controller/pilot workload, etc.). The topic of systems health management deals with continuously monitoring the performance of an engineering system, identifying and detecting the presence of faults, predicting the growth/progression of faults, computing the remaining useful life, and aiding online decision-making for the robust, continued operation of such engineering systems. The topic of real-time airspace modeling and safety analysis deals with defining and computing safety metrics for airspace operations in order to support risk-informed decision-making activities for various airspace entities including pilots, air traffic controllers, airlines, etc. This report presents recent research efforts that focus on combining multiple aspects of the aforementioned topics, and investigates the impact of aircraft-level faults on the airspace safety

Aircraft Health↗
NASA NTRS2018

Survey of Methods to Predict Controller Workload for Real-Time Monitoring of Airspace Safety

The Real Time Safety Monitoring (RTSM) approach allows for assessment and prediction of the safety margin in the National Airspace System (NAS) to help preempt incidents and accidents, rather than having to reactively mitigate them. In RTSM, the NAS is modeled using state variables, and safety metrics are defined in terms of these state variables. The safety metrics have been classified as weather-related, airspace-related, and human-related. Many of the formulated human-related safety metrics need an estimate of the controller workload for their computation. However, this computation is not trivial. Hence, in this report, we perform a literature survey to identify the different factors that enable the computation of controller workload and categorize these factors. Next, we describe studies undertaken to determine a minimal set of factors that pro- vide a correct assessment of controller workload. Lastly, we survey approaches for evaluating how well the selected factors correlate with the controllers' subjective assessment of their workload. Based on this survey, we present factors beneficial to computing and predicting controller workload in real time, and discuss the status of data sources necessary for these computations.

National Airspace System↗
NASA NTRS2018

Risk Tolerance and Safety Culture: Minimizing the Risk of Catastrophe by Bringing the Lessons of Space Home

The Johnson Space Center has pursued integrating safety culture and risk management practices and techniques throughout a large organization with an extraordinarily diverse mission. Past mission and institutional failures have been used to inform NASA's safety culture and a implement a uniform risk management environment. Basics from the loss prevention industry have influenced NASA's approach to sustaining its unique, yet aging, infrastructure. Lessons learned at NASA can augment and enhance occupational safety, health and risk management capabilities within hazardous industries. By focusing on risk informed decision-making, building a pervasive safety culture, and accommodating human factors, NASA's safety capabilities have been specifically developed to minimize the risk of loss of life and loss of mission.

Mishap↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Informing New Concepts for UAS and Autonomous System Safety Management using Disaster Management and First Responder Scenarios

As emerging flight operations become more prevalent and increasingly automated and distributed, the capabilities for managing safety of vehicles and operations will also need to evolve. To address this challenge, the National Academies has envisioned an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) capability for a wide range of aviation operations including current commercial operations as well as new entrants envisioned with advanced air mobility (AAM). The suite of IASMS services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) would be implemented in a federated approach and would address trends as well as individual operations. Through predictive modeling and data analysis, IASMS is envisioned to identify arising risks so that they can be mitigated, in-time, before a safety incident occurs. IASMS and its requisite set of SFCs must leverage a wide range of information to perform. To better understand these new needs, FSF worked with the aviation and humanitarian communities to develop and validate scenarios that include traditional aviation operations and UAS operations intermingled as they are deployed for disaster management and first responder (DMFR) situations. The three scenarios developed include: • Post Natural disaster response, such as a hurricane, involving multiple parties utilizing traditional aviation and UAS to support rescue operations, surveil damage, and locate survivors needing assistance. • Wildfire fighting in remote locations with traditional aircraft for transport and fire-retardant delivery combined with UAS for surveillance of fire locations as well as to track individual firefighter locations. • Medical Operations and AAM in Urban Environments including passenger-carrying helicopters and AAM vehicles, medical missions (such as transport of radio-pharmaceuticals), and other UAS delivery operations (such as the delivery of defibrillators). Each scenario was developed and validated by representatives with expertise in humanitarian operations, urban and rural emergency response, air traffic management, UAS operations, and traditional flight operations. The scenario definitions address roles and responsibilities of individual actors, the appropriate utilization of UAS, and the actions taken by those actors to appropriately manage risks associated with the mission and environment. The risks to aviation traffic and to people on the ground explored included potential risks arising from incompatibilities in calculating reference altitudes (eg, differing uses of AGL, MSL, barometric, or GPS-derived values), loss of command and control (C2) communications, rapid changes in weather and winds, and physical interference. For each risk, IASMS SFCs were postulated in the context of monitoring services, risk assessment capabilities, and identifying appropriate mitigation strategies. The identified SFC capabilities were envisioned from known services postulated for IASMS and for UTM. For these unique environments, IASMS SFCs are needed to address conditions such as hazardous payloads, micro-climates and urban canyons, and the need to keep uninvolved air traffic out of the area where DMFR operations are being conducted. The second phase of analysis focused on inferring the specific information needs and the SFCs for IASMS, utilizing a structure of 16 information classes to organize requirements. For each of the risks identified in the workshops, it was postulated what data sources would be necessary to monitor critical aspects of the risk (eg, surrounding air traffic, ground population, terrain, etc). to be directly measured as well as data that would be derived, which implies additional SFCs for different actors to understand what information would likely be exchanged between parties. For an IASMS to be effective, additional research is needed to develop the advanced algorithms that can address the increasingly autonomous and complex operations in differing environments and to develop means of identifying unknown risks. Looking at these scenarios highlighted a number of research issues. These include the ability to quickly "cordon off" airspace thru temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) or other means, developing clear definitions to enable automation-based algorithms for prioritizing operations, defining airspace density metrics, standardization of altitude reporting, and establishing a basis for safety data metrics definition and collection. This paper seeks to outline the development of an IASMS in the context of the DMFR scenarios and resulting demonstrations. Utilizing this contextual approach, NASA will generate recommendations for an assured safety framework for AAM operations that enables AAM operations to safely access the NAS.

In Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRS2021

Reliability and Safety Assessment of Urban Air Mobility Concept Vehicles

The following work was commissioned by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to guide industry and future regulation related to urban air mobility (UAM). Prior studies compared the relative safety of NASA concept vehicles, Figure ES1, designed for UAM and provided recommendations for industry research, aircraft architectural improvements, and regulatory updates. After the prior study completed, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) released regulatory guidance in the form of a special condition (SC), SC-VTOL-01, for multirotors with distributed propulsion and flight controls (DPFC). The objective of the current work was to develop DPFC architectures that will comply with SC-VTOL-01. Vehicle designs, DPFC architectures, and stability & control (S&C) models were developed to find limitations and trends to guide industry. To guide this task, NASA developed quad, hex, and an octorotor to better define vehicle attributes and trade space. Aircraft for study included electric, hybrid-electric, and turboshaft powerplants and collective and RPM control schemes. Assessments are in terms of the safety level achieved, and/or aircraft component/features needed to meet SC-VTOL-01. The most challenging criteria being the catastrophic failure rate, ≤10-9 catastrophic failures per flight hour, and that no single failures may result in a catastrophic event. A disciplined process was followed, similar to that in Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761. A preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA) leveraged prior work as a basis of creating failure rate budgets for system design teams. System designs were updated and iterated upon, working with reliability and safety subject matter experts to develop SC-VTOL-01 compliant designs. Design changes were reflected in updated PSSAs for initial verification of compliance. The DPFC architecture was broken into four system design teams, the (1) flight control system (FCS), (2) drive and power system, (3) thermal management system (TMS), and (4) electrical power and distribution system. The FCS including elements necessary to control the aircraft, drive and power including elements necessary to generate and transmit shaft power, the TMS including elements necessary to maintain temperature limits in all operating environments, and electrical pow-er and distribution including equipment necessary to store and transmit electrical energy. Results found that all aircraft evaluated may have paths to comply with SC-VTOL-01, Figure ES2. However, S&C models showed large power transients that must be addressed and PSSA results show that future work is needed in single load path structures, high voltage power storage and distribution, and in motor/rotor overspeed protection.

Boeing↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Safety-Driven Approach to Exploring and Comparing Air Traffic Management Concepts for Enabling Urban Air Mobility

There is broad recognition that the high tempo and density of Urban Air Mobility (UAM) operations will require identifying new Air Traffic Management (ATM) concepts to safely integrate UAM air traffic into the airspace alongside existing air traffic. However, the simulation models used to compare ATM concepts today are difficult to apply during the early stages of concept development and do not offer enough support in identifying potential new concepts. In addition, they have limited ability to evaluate ATM concepts in terms of safety, security, and other key emergent properties. Instead of using simulation to evaluate ATM concepts, this paper demonstrates how a safety-driven systems engineering approach based on Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) can be used to design properties such as safety into an ATM system from the earliest stages of development. Using a hazard analysis technique called Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), system requirements and the desired ATM behavior are derived. As an example, two possible ATM concepts to implement that behavior are compared to identify their safety-related benefits and tradeoffs. This new approach enables (1) systematic exploration of alternative ATM concepts and (2) identification of the safety-related tradeoffs between concepts as early as possible in the development process.

system safety↗
NASA NTRS2024

In-Time Safety Management for Part 139 Airports

Today’s airports are complex multi-faceted ecosystems. Currently, of the 517 certificated airports, 270 are required to use safety management systems (SMSs) to identify and mitigate known hazards and emergent risks and to voluntarily share safety data with commercial operators and tenants. Airports manage a wide variety of hazards. These traffic hubs have direct responsibilities, such as removing foreign object debris from runways and taxiways and configuring runways to help prevent against incursions and tail strikes during takeoff. To ensure safety in the future NAS, the National Academies recommended an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). An IASMS will employ services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) to identify and mitigate hazards that are proactively and predictively managed based on data analytics of detected anomalies, precursors, and trends. SFCs would scale with airport complexity and environmental conditions using increasingly automated systems to respond proactively to hazards and, by using integrated data sources and predictive safety analytical methods, discover new, never before seen risks.

IASMS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Developing a New Criticality Safety Hands-On Training Utilizing ZPPR Plates

Nuclear criticality safety is an extremely important part of the work at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). As part of the work LANL performs to continue to keep criticality safety a top priority, LANL has developed and regularly teaches nuclear criticality safety training classes for both the United States Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program as well as internal trainings for LANL employees. A portion of the training classes is comprised of hands-on demonstrations, where students get the opportunity to handle special nuclear material at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). One hands-on demonstration uses the “Class foils,” thin HEU foils which are stacked with lucite moderator plates. A hand-stack is performed until the multiplication reaches the “three-quarters rule,” where the demonstration is continued remotely on a vertical lift assembly up until the system is critical. This hands-on demonstration eventually achieves a critical configuration and follows the ANS-1 guidelines on an approach to critical. Another hands-on demonstration involves handling clad plutonium and neptunium spheres, and follows procedures using criticality safety evaluations to ensure that the hands-on demonstrations remain subcritical.This hands-on demonstration also involves the use of polyethylene shells around the plutonium sphere to demonstrate how additional reflector increases the criticality of a system. This paper is focused on developing a new hands-on demonstration using Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) plates. This new hands-on demonstration will follow the ANS-8 standards as it is not desired to achieve criticality with the ZPPR plates during the hands-on demonstration. A hands-on demonstration using multiple plutonium parts will likely be more applicable to personnel who handle plutonium on a daily basis, such as LANL glovebox operators.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Integrating Commercial Ready Autonomous Robotic Platforms to Enhance Worker Safety and Efficiency - 20053

This paper will explore the challenges and triumphs of implementing advanced robotic systems and the supporting technology for the waste management industry. Deployment-ready solutions for autonomous robotic platforms are new to the radioactive waste management industry and have been slow to implement across the complex. Specifically, it will explore Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's implementation of ground-based autonomous robotic platforms to enhance workforce safety and efficiency. The first objective of the project is to demonstrate safe operation of autonomous instrumented robots, followed by a scaling up of capabilities for the platform to meet any additional requests of internal stakeholders. Autonomous robotics platforms offer a fantastic range of capabilities that will aid in decreasing long-term liability of radioactive waste management industry by enhancing clean-up efforts and worker safety. Over the past five years, deployment-ready solutions for autonomous robotic platforms have come a long way. Autonomous robotic platforms are increasingly available to purchase from many vendors, often for prices under $100,000. Additionally, the vendors who produce these products are efficient in accommodating customized solutions to unique challenges, such as those often found in the radioactive waste management industry. However, the newness of this technology to the radioactive waste management industry and has resulted in a slow implementation across the complex. This paper will explore the challenges and triumphs of implementing advanced robotic systems and supporting technology for the waste management industry. Specifically, it will explore Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's implementation of ground based autonomous robotic platforms to enhance workforce safety and efficiency. While the company has utilized robots in many parts of the tank farms mission, this was first attempted in the deployment of an autonomous platform that required no operator with only minor maintenance and created challenges not yet encountered. These challenges included stakeholder buy-in, operational safety, procurement uncertainties, adaption of 'off the shelf products, overcoming the 'Fukushima complexity' perception, security concerns, and the initial criteria down select. Hanford Tank Operations Contractor's management identified the need for a workforce protecting low cost robotics solution in the fall of 2017. The project scope generated was part of the response to the Tank Vapor Assessment Team recommendation to enhance the safety of the workforce by utilizing new technology. Since the projects inception, it has been incorporated into the Tank Stewardship Plan. This project was unique to Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, as the company does not frequently incorporate advanced technology for field deployment quickly. The project was also progressive to the Hanford Tank Operations Contractor as it functions as a partnership project with a local university. The first objective of the project is to demonstrate safe operations of autonomous instrumented robotics, monitoring and collecting data, and the wireless transmission of data to a central computing system. Following the completion of this first objective, the project will scale up capabilities of the platform to meet the requests of additional internal stakeholders throughout the tank farms - including completion of specific in-field tasks. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Overview of International Activities in Hydrogen System Safety in IEA Hydrogen TCP Task 43

Safety and reliability have long been recognized as key issues for the development, commercialization, and implementation of new technologies and infrastructure, and hydrogen systems are no exception to this rule. Reliability engineering, quantitative risk assessment (QRA), and knowledge exchange each play a key role in proactive addressing safety - before problems happen - and help us learn from problems if they happen. Many international research activities are focusing on both reliability and risk assessment for hydrogen systems. However, the element of knowledge exchange is sometimes less visible. To support international collaboration and knowledge exchange, the International Energy Agency (IEA) convened a new Technology Collaboration Program, "Task 43: Safety and Regulatory Aspects of Emerging Large Scale Hydrogen Energy Applications" started in June 2022. Within Task 43, Subtask E focuses on Hydrogen Systems Safety. This paper discusses the structure of the Hydrogen Systems Safety subtask and the aligned activities and introduces opportunities for future work.

HYDROGEN↗