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At least 415 records · Page 23

Operational Aspects of an International Sub-seabed HLW Repository - 18450

The advantages of and the need for an internationally available repository for SNF and other HLW has been recognized since the 1980's. Various proposals have been pursued over the years but none have been able to overcome the hurdle of the Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) syndrome. Sub-seabed disposal has no NIMBY concerns because the disposal facilities are located in sediments below approximately 4000 meters of international waters. This simple approach precisely emplaces HLW canisters using penetrators released from a ship and driven by gravity ∼50 meters into the sub-seabed ooze. The concept was actively studied and demonstrated by 200+ researchers from 10 different countries for over 12 years. Although it was found to be technically feasible and cost effective, social pressures to keep the oceans off-limits to most disposal activities resulted in termination of the coordinated international effort. By 1994 an International Maritime Organization (IMO) treaty, commonly referred to as the 'London Convention/ London Protocol' was in place banning all such activities. However, the list of banned activities has been amended as recently as 2006. The sub-seabed repository effort has been conducted on three fronts. First, previous research was evaluated to confirm the technical feasibility and identify areas requiring additional research or development. Secondly, the probability of successfully amending the London Convention/London Protocol was assessed. Third, an operational and business model was developed to ensure the private enterprise endeavor was worth pursuing from a business standpoint. The latter is the focus of this paper. (author)

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Encapsulation of Defective Fuel Rods for Transport and Dry Storage - 18190

Removing of the whole inventory of fissile and non-fissile material out of the spent fuel pool is performed when the power plant is about to start its last operation phases or may occur during the extended operating life cycle due to plant storage space limitation. Removal of defective spent fuel is then definitely required for emptying the pool and may in addition also be performed in the course of plant operation for reducing pool contamination. Depending on the general used fuel management solution chosen for post-storage pool operations, specific management of a defective fuel assembly (DFA) and/or a defective fuel rod (DFR) should be implemented accordingly to the regulation requirements to be followed. For meeting these DFA and/or DFR management needs, Framatome together with New AREVA offer wide portfolio of solutions with flexibility and adaptability advantages: - from simple to advanced technologies; - for several types of fuel assemblies and/or defective rods; - for suitable and compatible cask designs; - for compatible solution with both used fuel final management strategies (closed and open fuel cycles). For instance, a technology is jointly proposed and developed by New AREVA and Framatome for implementing dry storage of DFR. It consists in: - encapsulating each DFR by loading the fuel rod in a respective capsule, drying the fuel rod using a process which allows to physically verify with high accuracy the dryness inside the DFR, and seal welding the capsule - assembling the capsules in a capsule canister (a skeleton with external dimensions similar to a respective fuel assembly) and - transferring the capsule canister along with intact spent fuel assemblies in an associated dry transport and storage (dual purpose) cask. Such a project is currently being implemented in Belgium. After successfully obtaining the cask transport and storage license extensions for including the encapsulated DFR content, the first encapsulation campaign has been started in 2017. The purpose of the paper is to present the industrial solutions proposed by Framatome and New AREVA together, for management of DFR, notably the one related to dry storage of encapsulated DFR implemented in Belgium and the perspectives opened by this successful project. The paper presents: - the available solutions for management of DFA and/or DFR depending on applicable requirements - the drying method, welding of a capsule and associated cask as the state of art technology for dry storage of DFR and/or DFA; - lessons learned from project management and encapsulation campaign performed in Belgium; - perspectives for management of DFR and/or DFA. (authors)

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Dynamic Impact Analyses and Tests of Concrete Overpacks - 13638

Concrete cask is an option for spent nuclear fuel interim storage which is prevailingly used in US. A concrete cask usually consists of metallic canister which confines the spent nuclear fuel and concrete overpack. When the overpack undergoes a severe missile impact which might be caused by a tornado or an aircraft crash, it should sustain acceptable level of structural integrity so that its radiation shielding capability and the retrievability of canister are maintained. Missile impact against a concrete overpack involves two damage modes, local damage and global damage. Local damage of concrete is usually evaluated by empirical formulas while the global damage is evaluated by finite element analysis. In many cases, those two damage modes are evaluated separately. In this research, a series of numerical simulations are performed using finite element analysis to evaluate the global damage of concrete overpack as well as its local damage under high speed missile impact. We consider two types of concrete overpack, one with steel in-cased concrete without reinforcement and the other with partially-confined reinforced concrete. The numerical simulation results are compared with test results and it is shown that appropriate modeling of material failure is crucial in this analysis and the results are highly dependent on the choice of failure parameters. (authors)

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Integrated Solutions for Interim Used Fuel Management: From Pool Unloading to Safe Delivery to Recycling or Repository Facilities - 17235

Safe management of used nuclear fuel (UNF) is key to the survival of the nuclear industry. That is why it is more important than ever to have a consent-based, practical, credible, and sustainable roadmap for managing the back-end of the nuclear cycle. Worldwide UNF Light Water Reactors (LWR) inventories are currently around 200,000 tons and are estimated to grow to more than 350,000 tons by 2030, and operating nuclear reactors in the U.S. continue to discharge UNF every 18 to 24 months. International experience has demonstrated that the development of a permanent geological repository can be a multi-decade process, especially in the face of public acceptance challenges. Meanwhile, the solution for permanent disposal of UNF in the U.S. is moving at a glacial pace. As a result, industrial stakeholders have been forced to find practical interim UNF storage solutions in order to continue safely operating their reactors. Among those interim solutions are the cask- or canister-based dry storage systems that have dramatically increased in the last 10 years as they provide flexibility for expansion with a low up-front investment. With interim dry storage in place for more than 30 years, our industry is entering a new phase as we are forced to prepare for a few more decades before geological repositories begin operating. Consequently, interim dry storage has to be extended for 80 years or more. Thus, new considerations have to be taken into account to ensure the safety of this stored used fuel: - Interim storage systems are aging; - High burn-up fuel behavior overtime is uncertain; - Used fuel is losing its self-protection; - The number of shutdown sites without a fuel transfer facility, such as a pool, is increasing; - Some owners of Independent Spent Fuel Storage installation (ISFSI) at shutdown sites are not nuclear operators anymore. With increasing uncertainties, AREVA TN -- based on its long expertise with used fuel transportation and interim storage systems -- is adapting its portfolio to develop integrated and flexible solutions that will remove the burden of interim used fuel management from nuclear operators. AREVA TN is developing comprehensive solutions to reduce risks including the continued supply of proven safe high-performance dry storage systems; on-site services to safely transfer used fuel from pool to pad; the optimization of fuel heat load in the storage pool and pad; innovative aging management services including inspection, monitoring and repair; a realistic solution for consolidated interim storage with a priority to remove Used Nuclear Fuel stored in dry storage systems from shutdown sites; world-class transport and logistics services to safely move the used fuel from nuclear reactor sites to consolidated storage and repository or recycling as applicable, and turnkey management of shutdown ISFSIs. Due to the lack of an available path for transporting used fuel away from reactors, nuclear operators are faced with many challenges and growing uncertainties. Our presentation will describe the practical solutions developed and being developed in order to manage used fuel on behalf of nuclear operators and allows them to continue focusing on the important job of producing carbon-free clean energy. (authors)

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SCALE Enhancements for Detailed Cask Dose Rate Analysis - Paper 37

The Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project and the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign, both under the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy, require the ability to predict k{sub eff}, heat generation and temperature distributions, and external dose rates from any combination of commercial spent nuclear fuel assemblies loaded into any type of licensed cask. Work in the Reactor and Nuclear Systems Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory has begun to develop the UNF-ST[and]DARDS system (Used Nuclear Fuel Storage, Transportation and Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System) that uses many of the nuclear analysis codes from the SCALE package, a comprehensive database of used nuclear fuel inventories from utilities, and a library of model template files to produce complete input files for the various types of UNF computational analyses. UNF-ST[and]DARDS uses the template files and input parameters that are applicable to a safety analysis to assemble and execute a complete input file, collect the output files and relevant information for subsequent calculations, and illustrate calculation results as a function of decay time and other relevant analysis parameters. This paper will focus on the shielding aspects and the ability to predict external dose rates from as-loaded casks. Realistic dose rate values based on actual canister fuel contents may be used in developing appropriate plans, procedures, and methods to keep personnel radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable during cask repackaging and transportation operations, as well as in performing total system analyses and transportation risk evaluations. The MAVRIC shielding sequence of the SCALE package was created for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission for analyzing dose rates outside of storage, transfer, or transportation casks loaded with spent nuclear fuel. MAVRIC contains automated variance reduction capabilities based on the CADIS and FW-CADIS methods that are effective for optimizing deep penetration Monte Carlo shielding problems for achieving low relative uncertainties in short computing times. MAVRIC uses the Denovo discrete ordinates code to compute importance maps and biased source terms for the Monaco fixed-source Monte Carlo code, which can use multi-group or continuous-energy cross section data. ORIGEN (Oak Ridge Isotope Generation and Depletion) is the SCALE computer code for calculating time-dependent isotopic concentrations during irradiation and decay for more than 2,200 nuclides that can be produced by nuclear fuel irradiation and activation. A series of SCALE enhancements was implemented to enable automatic decay heat and radiation source term generation and shielding safety analysis of as-loaded casks. The enhancements to SCALE made under this project will be a part of the SCALE 6.2 release expected in fall 2014. (authors)

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Transportation Cask for Bare High Burnup Used Nuclear Fuel - 16362

A conceptual design for a reusable transportation cask (the 6625B-HB) capable of transporting boiling water reactor (BWR) and pressurized water reactor (PWR) used nuclear fuel (UNF) assemblies, including high burnup UNF, was produced for the Department of Energy (DOE) by AREVA. This cask could be configured to ship these assemblies either as bare fuel or fuel loaded into single-assembly damaged fuel cans (DFCs). The 6625B-HB cask has been designed with reasonable assurance it can be certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 10 CFR Part 71 based on AREVA TN's experience with the MP197HB (a transportation cask designed to ship high burnup UNF in a dry storage canister), fabricated within existing facilities, used by most utilities, and transported by rail. The level of detail developed for the 6625B-HB is intended to support analyses and planning activities that DOE is performing in laying the groundwork for an integrated waste management system, which includes preparing for future large-scale transport of UNF to consolidated interim storage or disposal facilities. The details of the conceptual design include cask characteristics (e.g., capacity, dimensions, and masses), characteristics of the UNF that could be shipped in this cask system concept, estimates of costs to fabricate this cask system, an assessment of operational activity durations and associated cumulative doses for loading and unloading this cask system, and identification of potential limitations or anticipated licensing considerations of relevance for this cask system. This design concept for a reusable transportation cask would enhance the high-burnup fuel assembly carrying capacity as compared to other NRC-certified transportation casks and, unlike welded canister systems, could be used for shipment of bare UNF assemblies taken directly from reactor spent fuel pools (SFPs). (authors)

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Laying the groundwork for a large-scale spent nuclear fuel transportation system - 15408

The US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy established the Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project to lay the groundwork for implementing an interim storage facility, including associated transportation activities. Efforts include the development of a system for the large-scale transport of spent nuclear fuel that will be necessary in an integrated waste management system. Progress is being made on long lead time, destination-independent aspects of the transportation infrastructure. The large-scale transportation system for spent nuclear fuel is divided into three elements: institutional, operational, and hardware. The institutional element refers to the various forms of stakeholder interaction that must occur for this type of transportation system to be successful. It includes activities like development of a national transportation plan, work on policy development for Section 180(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and identification of a preliminary suite of national transportation routes that reflect the interests of a broad cross section of stakeholders while meeting regulatory requirements. The operational element refers to the activities that must be undertaken to run a large-scale transportation system. This element is currently focused on development of a new SNF transportation routing analysis tool, study of the infrastructure near SNF storage sites that may be de-inventoried first, and development of tools for modeling transportation activities. The hardware element refers to the casks, railcars, and other items necessary to operate the system. This element currently focuses on development of railcars compliant with Association of American Railroads Standard S-2043, as well as studies related to the use of rail casks and their ancillary equipment. The Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project is making significant progress in all three of these areas along the path forward to a fully operational transportation system. (authors)

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A study of transfer of UNF from non-disposable canisters - 15388

A study was performed by AREVA and URS for the Department of Energy (DOE) [1] to establish optimal methods for the opening of dry storage canisters (DSC) and the subsequent repackaging of used nuclear fuel (UNF) from the DSCs into generic standard transportation, aging, and disposal canisters (STADs) in wet or dry environments at reactor, consolidated storage, or repository sites. Eight dry and wet cutting technologies were evaluated: (1) skiving; (2) milling; (3) arc gouging/plasma torch; (4) cutting wheel; (5) diamond cable cutting; (6) laser cutting; (7) sawing; and (8) electrical discharge machining. The evaluated UNF repackaging technologies options included: (1) wet transfer in a pool; (2) dry transfer in a dry transfer system (DTS); (3) dry transfer in a fixed hot cell (FHC); (4) dry transfer in a mobile hot cell (MHC), and (5) a hybrid approach utilizing wet transfer in a pool and dry transfer in a FHC. A systems engineering evaluation was utilized for ranking the eight viable cutting options and the five different repackaging approaches for each of the sites. The systems engineering evaluation took into account six criteria (i.e., life cycle costs, worker dose, operational efficiency, technical maturity, ease of licensing, and waste generation) and performed a qualitative pairwise ranking of their relative importance to one another. Then quantitative or qualitative factors associated with each criterion (e.g., cost in millions of dollars, relative ease of licensing, etc.) for each option at each location (reactor, consolidated storage facility [CSF], repository) were developed based on historical experience, existing design studies, current 'state-of-the art', and/or engineering judgment. Using this input, the systems engineering evaluation identified dry skiving as the preferred cutting technology, with the wheel cutting technology in either a dry or wet environment identified as a promising technology that, with some RD and D, could mature to a better option (depending also on the disposition of the used DSC). For a reactor and a CSF/repository site, the systems engineering evaluation ranked the repackaging option using the skiving dry cutting technique and wet transfer of UNF in a pool as the highest option. However for a CSF and a repository site, the team recommended the hybrid option using the skiving dry cutting technique and both dry and wet transfer of UNF in a pool and FHC as a potentially better option (providing specific benefits such as higher throughput and more flexibility in operation). (authors)

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Benchmarking Data for the Proposed Signature of Used Fuel Casks

A set of benchmarking measurements to test facets of the proposed extended storage signature was conducted on May 17, 2016. The measurements were designed to test the overall concept of how the proposed signature can be used to identify a used fuel cask based only on the distribution of neutron sources within the cask. To simulate the distribution, 4 Cf-252 sources were chosen and arranged on a 3x3 grid in 3 different patterns and raw neutron totals counts were taken at 6 locations around the grid. This is a very simplified test of the typical geometry studied previously in simulation with simulated used nuclear fuel.

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Draft Geologic Disposal Requirements Basis for STAD Specification

This document provides the basis for requirements in the current version of Performance Specification for Standardized Transportation, Aging, and Disposal Canister Systems, (FCRD-NFST-2014-0000579) that are driven by storage and geologic disposal considerations. Performance requirements for the Standardized Transportation, Aging, and Disposal (STAD) canister are given in Section 3.1 of that report. Here, the requirements are reviewed and the rationale for each provided. Note that, while FCRD-NFST-2014-0000579 provides performance specifications for other components of the STAD storage system (e.g. storage overpack, transfer and transportation casks, and others), these have no impact on the canister performance during disposal, and are not discussed here.

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Validation study for crediting chlorine in critically analyses for spent nuclear fuel disposition - 14428

Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management practices in the United States rely on dry storage systems that include both canister- and cask-based systems. The United States Department of Energy Used Fuel Disposition Campaign is examining the feasibility of direct disposal of dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs) in a geological repository. One of the major technical challenges for direct disposal is the ability to demonstrate the subcriticality of the DPCs loaded with SNF for the repository performance period (e.g., 10,000 years or more) as the DPCs may undergo degradation over time. Specifically, groundwater ingress into the DPC (i.e., flooding) could allow the system to achieve criticality in scenarios where the neutron absorber plates in the DPC basket have degraded. However, as was shown by Banerjee et al., some aqueous species in the groundwater provide noticeable reactivity reduction for these systems. For certain amounts of particular aqueous species (e.g., chlorine, lithium) in the groundwater, subcriticality can be demonstrated even for DPCs with complete degradation of the neutron absorber plates or a degraded fuel basket configuration. It has been demonstrated that chlorine is the leading impurity, as indicated by significant neutron absorption in the water that is available in reasonable quantities for the deep geological repository media under consideration. This paper presents the results of an investigation of the available integral experiments worldwide that could be used to validate DPC disposal criticality evaluations, including credit for chlorine. Due to the small number of applicable critical configurations, validation through traditional trending analysis was not possible. The bias in the eigenvalue of the application systems due only to the chlorine was calculated using TSURFER analysis and found to be on the order of 100 percent mille (1 pcm = 10-5 k{sub eff}). This study investigated the design of a series of critical configurations with varying amounts of chlorine to address validation gaps. Such integral experiments would support the crediting of the chlorine neutron-absorption properties in groundwater and the demonstration of subcriticality for DPCs in deep geologic repositories with sufficient chlorine availability. (authors)

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Conceptual design of fuel transfer cask for Reactor TRIGA PUSPATI (RTP)

Spent fuel transfer cask is used to transfer a spent fuel from the reactor tank to the spent fuel storage or for spent fuel inspection. Typically, the cask made from steel cylinders that are either welded or bolted closed. The cylinder is enclosed with additional steel, concrete, or other material to provide radiation shielding and containment of the spent fuel. This paper will discuss the Conceptual Design of fuel transfer cask for Reactor TRIGA Puspati (RTP)

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Use of the underwater collimated spectrometric system for survey of storage ponds of research VVR-2 and or reactors - 15118

Spent nuclear fuel removal activities in the National Research Centre 'Kurchatov Institute' were resumed in 2004. During the last two years, removal was performed of the spent nuclear fuel from the VVR-2 and OR reactor installations, whose storage facilities are located within the Gas Plant complex. The Gas Plant complex is the experimental base of the Institute of Nuclear Reactors, which is part of the 'Kurchatov Institute'. The complex features four storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel, one in a dedicated building for storage of spent nuclear fuel and solid rad-waste and three in the reactor building. They are sub-surface vessels filled with water (the volume of water in each is about 6 m{sup 3}), closed with top shielding slabs. Some spent fuel assemblies and fuel elements stored are resized, deformed, or have defective claddings. In the course of works on removal from ponds of the spent nuclear fuel, its fragments could get to water. The bottoms of ponds storage are covered with a deposit. The bottom of ponds and water are possible to be pollution by fission products. The survey objective was to find uranium-containing materials (elements of irradiated nuclear fuel) at the bottom of the ponds and evaluation of surface activity of fission products. To solve this problem was used the underwater collimated spectrometric system on the basis of a semiconductor detector CdZnTe (volume of a crystal of 20 mm{sup 3}) and a multichannel analyzer InSpector 2000. The detector with the collimator is placed in the waterproof case on which the video camera fastens. The principle of detection of uranium-containing materials is based on the identification of the characteristic peaks in the spectra of uranium radiation measurements in the energy range 95 - 115 keV. The results of the most representative measurements at the bottom of reactor ponds are given. The received results are discussed; comparison of results between in-site pond measurements and gamma spectrometric and radiochemical analysis of the water in the lab is carried out. The received results will be used for scheduling on pond cleaning. (authors)

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Performance of Bolted Closure Joint Elastomers Under Cask Aging Conditions

The bolted closure joint of a bare spent fuel cask is susceptible to age-related degradation and potential loss of confinement function under long-term storage conditions. Elastomeric seals, a component of the joint typically used to facilitate leak testing of the primary seal that includes the metallic seal and bolting, is susceptible to degradation over time by several mechanisms, principally via thermo-oxidation, stress-relaxation, and radiolytic degradation under time and temperature condition. Irradiation and thermal exposure testing and evaluation of an ethylene-propylene diene monomer (EPDM) elastomeric seal material similar to that used in the CASTOR® V/21 cask for a matrix of temperature and radiation exposure conditions relevant to the cask extended storage conditions, and development of semiempirical predictive models for loss of sealing force is in progress. A special insert was developed to allow Compressive Stress Relaxation (CSR) measurements before and after the irradiation and/or thermal exposure without unloading the elastomer. A condition of the loss of sealing force for the onset of leakage was suggested. The experimentation and modeling being performed could enable acquisition of extensive coupled aging data as well as an estimation of the timeframe when loss of sealing function under aging (temperature/radiation) conditions may occur.

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Initial DOE SNF Standardized Canister Storage Configuration Alternatives Study

This study looks at storage configuration alternatives for United States Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Standardized Canisters loaded with DOE-owned SNF. The focus of the study is for the DOE SNF Standardized Canisters that would be packaged in the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) area at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), but its general findings are useful across the DOE Complex. The study considered storage in existing facilities, modified existing facilities, new facilities, and new modular systems. The existing INTEC facilities considered in the study include the CPP-603 Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF), the CPP-749 Underground Fuel Storage Facility (UFSF), the CPP-666 SNF Wet Storage Basin Facility, CPP-1774 Three Mile Island (TMI) Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSF), and the CPP-2707 Cask Pad Facility. The new facilities considered in the study include the Foster Wheeler designed Idaho Spent Fuel (ISF) Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) and some conceptual designs. The new modular systems considered in the study include Holtec International’s HI-STAR/HI-STORM, NAC International’s MAGNASTOR/UMS/MPC and Orano TN’s MATRIX/NUHOMS. Based on considerations of various factors, including but not limited to capacity, impact to facility operations, capital costs, expenditure rate, licensing issues, agreements with the State of Idaho, and road ready conditions, new modular storage systems from commercial vendors may have clear advantages over other storage alternatives. This is further supported by recent experience with West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) storage project for High Level Waste Glass canisters.

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Dose Rate Analysis of the WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility

This report describes a confirmatory calculation for a proposed consolidated interim storage facility (CISF) to support the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s review of the license application submitted by the Interim Storage Partners. The scope of this report is limited to an assessment of the annual dose from direct radiation associated with Phase 1 of the Waste Control Specialists (WCS) CISF and the determination of the minimum controlled area boundary based on the 10 CFR 72.104 limit of 25 mrem annual dose to the whole body. The confirmatory dose rate calculations used the source term and shielding calculation capabilities of the SCALE 6.2.3 computer code system. The calculation method employed in the confirmatory calculations uses a detailed Monte Carlo radiation transport simulation from source to dose rate. This method differs from the two-step method used in the safety analysis report (SAR), which requires determination of the photon and neutron energy and angular distributions on the cask external surface and then the use of this surface source in a new radiation transport calculation to determine dose rate as a function of distance from the storage facility. A simulation was made using the complete site geometry (all casks present) but with only one cask containing source, and a total of 467 independent calculations were performed to obtain the dose rate maps produced by each storage cask. Basic input data and assumptions used in the SAR (e.g., cask design parameters and design basis assembly characteristics) were used in this confirmatory calculation for consistency with the SAR. Local atmospheric conditions for skyshine calculations were simulated using US standard atmosphere data, which describe average air temperature, pressure, and density as a function of altitude. The determined minimum required distances from the WCS Phase 1 CISF to a contour defined by the 25 mrem annual dose limit were approximately 623 m (0.387 miles) in the N-NE direction, 594 m (0.369 miles) in the SSW direction, and 533 m (0.331 miles) in the E-SE direction and the W-NW direction. The annual dose results of the confirmatory calculation are in relatively good agreement with the annual dose values presented in the WCS SAR. The annual dose produced by the Phase 1 CISF at the nearest site boundary, 0.75 miles away from the CISF, was estimated by this study to be approximately 6.02E-02 ± 2.0E-04 mrem, which is significantly smaller than the 25 mrem annual dose limit provided in 10 CFR 72.104. The SAR annual dose rate value for the nearest site boundary was 7.52E-2 mrem, which included 7.73E-03 mrem due to postulated leakage of the FO-, FC-, and FF-canisters. A comparison with the dose rate values reported in the SAR for 16 detector locations, D1 through D16, on the protected area boundary is also included in this report. This comparison shows that the SAR determined higher annual dose values for detectors D1 through D14 by 12% to 45% and lower annual dose values for detectors D15 and D16 by 18% and 8%, respectively, as compared with this ORNL confirmatory calculation. Sensitivity studies have been performed to support a comprehensive review of the application. In these studies, the effects on dose rate of the modeled air volume, density, and humidity were analyzed. The sensitivity calculations showed that the air volume used in the Monte Carlo simulations was adequate and that a larger air volume would not further increase the dose rate due to skyshine contributions. The sensitivity analysis showed that simulation of local atmospheric conditions is important for the accuracy of dose rate estimates at large distances from the facility. Air humidity was demonstrated to have negligible effects on dose rate values for the simulated local atmospheric conditions.

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Systems and Tools to Facilitate Aging Management Inspections of Used Nuclear Fuel Dry Storage Systems - 18382

The Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF) dry storage systems (DSSs) are currently used at almost all the nuclear plants in the USA for the storage of their UNF as the spent fuel pools are running out of capacity to store any additional discharged fuel. Even though these DSSs are supposed to be at the reactor site for a short amount of time, they are expected to be at the reactor sites for an extended duration due to the unavailability of Interim Storage Facilities (ISF) or a permanent disposal sites like Yucca Mountain. Maintaining the integrity of the DSS canisters and storage overpacks so they can safely protect the fuel and maintain the integrity of UNF is of utmost importance during storage at reactor site ISFSI or at the ISF. Comprehensive and robust Aging Management Program (AMP) is an important aspect for DSSs to satisfy these requirements. In order to address this industry need, TN Americas have developed an enhanced NUHOMS{sup R} DSS licensed by NRC under 10 CFR Part 72 regulations and a comprehensive AMP development which includes prevention, inspection, monitoring and mitigation of any corrosion or degradation of DSS components. For DSC and HSM inspection, two remotely operating delivery systems have been developed using non-destructive examination (NDE) methods including robotic crawler and inspection ring system. This paper describes details of these developments and status of their deployment for implementation at various utility ISFSI sites. TN Americas completed the detailed design of the DSC inspection system and conducted functional tests of the inspection system on a DSC mockup and the system is ready for deployment at any NUHOMS{sup R} ISFSI site. TN Americas is committed to offer the most robust and comprehensive AMP systems, tools and services to the industry to assure the safety of the deployed DSS at the utility sites. (authors)

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