NASA NTRS2018
NASA planning for the human space flight frontier is now coming into alignment with goals promoted by other planetary-capable national space agencies. US policy aims to achieve the “horizon goal” of Humans to Mars through significant learning about systems, operations, and partnerships in the cislunar and lunar-surface environment first. US Space Policy Directive 1 made this shift explicit: “the United States will lead the return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization, followed by human missions to Mars and other destinations”. The stage is now set for sufficient public and private American investment in a wide range of lunar activities. Assumptions about Moon base architectures and operations are likely to drive the invention of requirements that will in turn govern development of systems, commercial-services purchase agreements, and priorities for technology investment. Yet some fundamental architecture-shaping lessons already captured in the literature are not evident drivers, and remain absent from most depictions of lunar base concepts. A prime example is general failure to recognize that most of the time (i.e., before and between intermittent human occupancy), a Moon base must be robotic: most of the activity, most of the time, must be implemented by robot agents rather than astronauts. This paper reviews key findings of a seminal robotic-base design-operations analysis commissioned by NASA in 1989. It culminates by discussing implications of these lessons for today’s Moon Village and SPD-1 paradigms: exploration by multiple actors; public-private partnership development and operations; cislunar infrastructure; production-quantity exploitation of volatile resources near the poles to bootstrap further space activities; autonomy capability that was frontier in 1989 but now routine within terrestrial industry. We need to engineer today’s generation of practical, justifiable, and inspirational Moon base concepts.